

Zoran Janjetović

EMPERORS' CHILDREN, KINGS' STEPCHILDREN  
National Minorities in Yugoslavia 1918-1941

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INSTITUTE FOR RECENT HISTORY OF SERBIA

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in Yugoslavia 1918–1941**



**Belgrade  
2023**



**Regnum unius linguae uniusque moris imbecille et fragile est.**

*St. Stefan, King of Hungary (974–1038)*



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## Preface to this Edition

The book before the reader is the English translation of my Ph.D. that was originally published in 2005. Since then many people's first idea when they met me was "Oh, the author of *The Emperors' Children!*" This testifies that the book gained certain popularity in historians' circles, which spurred me to finally publish this translation that was made soon after the original came out. It was meant to be published by the University of Mary in North Dakota thanks to the goodness of one of its regents, Mr. John Michels Ph.D. (who had also been instrumental in publishing the second edition of my first book) but his unfortunate death prevented this project from being completed. Thus, the translation he had edited, languished in my computer for more than fifteen years. However, the relative popularity of the book and the fact that no similar synthesis appeared in any language in the meantime, encouraged me to think about finally publishing the translation. The manager of my Institute, Mile Bjelajac Ph.D. warmly supported the idea and offered to take care of the financial part of the project, for which I am deeply indebted to him. I am also much obliged to editor-in-chief Bojan Simić Ph.D. for quickly resolving technical and formal issues, and to Nebojša Stambolija Ph.D. for shaping up the text that was scrambled by use of different computers and programs.

Thus, with some delay the book comes before the English-reading public. I am aware that the bibliography that can be found on its pages is relatively and sometimes absolutely old, but I feel that it is still useful. To be sure, a number of valuable books and even larger number of useful articles on the topics this book deals with have appeared in the meantime. They have enlarged the pool of knowledge about various aspects of existence of some or all national minorities in the inter-war Yugoslavia, but I feel that the bird's eye view I have taken when writing this monograph, retained its value as a general survey of the situation of national minorities in that period. On the other hand including the latest works in the footnotes would sometimes require re-writing parts of the main text. This in turn would increase the volume of necessary work beyond the time limits set by my other professional obligations. For that reason, I will confine myself to mentioning several authors who in the meantime have published valuable monographs dealing with one or more national minorities in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia: Edvin Pezo (on emigration of the Muslim population to Turkey), Carl Bethke (on identity-building of German and Hungarian minorities), Bernd Robionek (on German cooperatives), Enes Omerović (who covered most of my blank spots concerning minorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina), Carolne Metzger (on inclusion of the Volksdeutsche youth into the Nazi nationalist project), Vladan Jovanović (who published the second part of his Braudelesque account on southern parts of Yugoslavia), Božica Slavković Mirić (who shed new light on Kosovo between 1925 and 1941 following in Jovanović's footsteps), Mihael Antolović (who elucidated various aspects of the history of the Vojvodina Swabians), Dmitar Tasić (who dealt with security issues in Kosovo, Macedonia and on the Yugoslav-Albanian border), Oliver Jens Schmitt (who supplied general but not superficial overviews of Albanian and Kosovo history), Nathalie Clayer (whose works mark a sea change in research of Albanian nationalism), Vlatka

Dugački (who dealt with Czech and Slovak minority press), Dietmar Müller (who pinpointed the nexus between state-sponsored ethno-politics and citizenship as well as between nationalist goals of the government and landownership) and others. With some of them I had cooperated already when doing my Ph.D. and I am glad that they continued their studies in the same field.

Finally, at the end of this preface I would like to thank once again the late John Michels for supporting me and for editing the final version of the translation of this book. I dedicate this edition to his memory.

Belgrade, August 2023

Zoran Janjetović

## Acknowledgements

Although a book is usually signed by one or just a few people, an endeavor of a number of individuals and institutions actually stands behind it. If a topic is a broad one, such as that of the present volume, the number of persons and institutions an author has to rely on, must also be large. Therefore, I would like to thank to everybody who made this book possible, at the same time begging an excuse for not being able to mention by name all those who had helped me. In the first place, I owe a debt of gratitude to my Professors Milan Ristović Ph.D. and Andrej Mitrović Ph.D. who not only kept an eye on my handling of this topic, but also decisively contributed to the beginnings of my scholarly career. Similar debt of gratitude I owe to the managers (the former and the present one) of the Institute for Recent History of Serbia, Žarko Jovanović Ph.D. and Momčilo Mitrović Ph.D. who always showed understanding for my work and my absence which the research required. Their management was harmoniously supplemented by the workers of the general section of the Institute, who did a million of small things of which people usually never think, but without which the work wouldn't be possible.

Furthermore, I'm grateful to certain institutions and to some individuals in them in particular. The place of honor among them is taken by the Archives of Yugoslavia where I felt at home for over two years. Among the very forthcoming employees of the Archives, I received particular help from the best librarian in the world Suzana Srndović, Gojko Malović MA and Smilja Grujičić. I'm also grateful to the personnel of the Archives of the Institute for Military History, with the sole exception of Vlada, who continues to make lives of researchers miserable. I also enjoyed great forthcoming of the employees of the University Library in Belgrade, Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin and especially of the Historical Archives in Pančevo who really receive researches as dear guests.

Apart from these institutions I'm very thankful to the Institute for European History in Mainz, its employees and its manager Prof. Heinz Duchhardt Ph.D. for a six-months grant which enabled me to fill considerable holes in my bibliography. The same goes for the Institute for the History and Geography of the Danube Swabians in Tübingen, where, apart from a rich library, I enjoyed vast knowledge and friendship of its employees Josef Wolf MA and Mathias Beer Ph.D.

Due to harsh working conditions in a country of impoverished libraries and expensive inter-library loans, a very special role in providing literature was played by many colleagues and friends from Serbia and abroad: Vladimir Geiger Ph.D, Nikica Barić Ph.D, Edvin Pezo MA, Carl Bethke Ph.D. Aleksandra Janeska, Ing. Branko Križanić, Michael Portmann Ph.D., Gerhard Seewann Ph.D, Professor Ljubodrag Dimić Ph.D, Đorđe Borozan Ph.D. and many others who supplied me not only with literature, but with useful information and good advices. Furthermore, I would like to mention Vesna Đikanović, Aleksandar Miletić, Vladimir Cvetković MA, Bojan Simić MA and Vladan Jovanović Ph.D. to whom I'm indebted for a number of useful comments. I thank them here again: they are the best proof that one's fortune is measured by the number of his friends.

I would like to thank my dear friend and colleague Saša Ilić for his help in the design of the cover, my mother for making linguistic improvements of the original text, my father for his improvements of the English translation and Miss Nada Rvović for irreplaceable technical support.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife Slađana for great patience and excellent pancakes, my son Filip for being a splendid baby and my daughter Andrea for having stopped being one. Finally, I would like to thank my mother-in-law Slobodanka and my father-in-law Petar without whose logistic support my work wouldn't have been possible in the first place. It is to them that I dedicate this book.

Belgrade, July 2005

Zoran Janjetović

## Foreword

This book deals with the history of the national minority populations in Yugoslavia during the time interval between the First World War, when Yugoslavia was formed from portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and extending to the Second World War. During this inter-war period the minorities experienced significant changes in their circumstances as their relations and favors within the more paternalistic Austro-Hungarian Empire and Ottoman Empire was replaced by different ones within the Yugoslav structure.

National minorities, as defined in this work, were indeed a numerical minority within the Yugoslav society. In some regions, however, they were actually the majority population, and often their overall influence – economic but also social in the local community – was very important, and in some cases even decisive. Furthermore, they sometimes vitally influenced the stability of the state – of some of its parts, and sometimes even the whole of the body politic. Therefore it was more than justified to choose national minorities as a topic for a Ph.D. thesis, out of which this book evolved.

The goal of the author when working on this topic was to show the importance of national minorities for the inter-war Yugoslavia, their attitude toward the state, and vice versa, their role in the bilateral relations of Yugoslavia with its neighbors and theirs with it, as well as to depict the situation of national minorities in various spheres of life: culture, politics, economy, church etc. The final result of our work is the endeavor to depict synthetically the position of national minorities in a comparative perspective, i.e., to compare the situation of certain minorities among themselves, then in various parts of the country, and finally, to compare the position of national minorities in Yugoslavia with that of their Yugoslav opposite numbers in the neighboring countries (which for greater part had been mother countries of the minorities living in Yugoslavia). The novelty of our approach lies in this combination of synthetic and comparative perspectives: authors who have dealt with the topic thus far, concerned themselves either with just one minority in one or several parts of the country (which was more often the case), or like Arpad Lebl (much more seldom), with all minorities, but confining their work only to certain aspects of minority existence – in most cases to the legal status, political representation and education. Our wish was to overcome the one-sidedness and incompleteness of these approaches and to paint the picture of the situation of the national minorities within the first Yugoslav state, trying to take a general view of all minorities, in the whole state territory and in various spheres of life – in a broader historical, geographical and social context.

Clearly, such a broad aim posed a number of problems. They were of subjective and objective nature. As subjective, the problems connected with human limitations of any researcher could be adduced. Among them, the most important was the inability to read the literature and archival sources in all minority languages. The author capable of doing this, would have to be able to read in all minority languages and in several larger ones, which means in some dozen languages, some of which are quite exotic in European relations. We tried to overcome the insufficient

knowledge of minority languages by the knowledge of several world languages and by reading the comparatively rich pertinent literature in the languages of the Yugoslav peoples. Thus, by reading the works from the minorities' mother countries in world languages and works of other foreign authors, we managed, to a large degree, to overcome the language barrier.

Among the objective problems, we should first name the dispersion of the relevant archival sources and literature. For financial, political and of course, linguistic reasons, the archives of the neighboring countries remained inaccessible to us. Serbian libraries, even before Milošević's regime, did not abound in rather specialist literature necessary for our work, and during the 1990s, and unfortunately still nowadays, inter-library loans were and are a luxury a researcher can afford only in special cases. Happily, several stays abroad and friends in Serbia and in several important research centers outside of the country, helped to a large extent to fill in the holes in our bibliography. Archival research in the former Yugoslav republics and abroad could not have been fully substituted in this way, which certainly influenced the quality of this work. The redeeming fact is that the central archives of the former state located in Belgrade contain a lot of material from the ex-Yugoslav territories. Furthermore, in some places (Slovenia above all) a large literature on minority questions was written, which could, to a degree, offset the lack of archival sources. Finally, one should not forget that the greater part of the minority population in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia had lived in the present-day territory of the Republic of Serbia (including Kosovo). However, financial reasons prevented us from using all the relevant archives in Serbia to the full. Hopefully future researchers in smaller upcountry centers will be able to delve deeper and broader and possibly correct the results of this author, giving them also some local flavor – as, indeed, some are already doing, both in Serbia and abroad.

In our research we utilized the documents of the Archives of Yugoslavia and the Military Archives in Belgrade, the archives of the Vojvodina in Novi Sad, and to a lesser degree the Historical Archives in Pančevo. Among foreign archives, we were able to conduct research in (only partly preserved) archives of the German Foreign Ministry (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes) and the small archives of the Institut für donauschwäbische Geschichte und Landeskunde in Tübingen, Germany. The main trait of all these archives is that their contents are incomplete. The Archives of the Vojvodina contain the best preserved sets of acts, but for objective reasons we were able to use them only partly. Certain documents put at my disposal thanks to the kindness of my colleagues from Croatia and Slovenia also deserve mentioning. Part of the missing links were found in the contemporary press – which, to be sure, due to its huge quantity could not have been leafed through completely. Furthermore, irreplaceable published source are the minutes of the Yugoslav Parliament, whereas the British diplomatic documents published by Živko Avramovski proved to be by far less yielding – and often factually flawed at that.

As to the relevant literature, it is not only scattered, but at the same time very copious – if one wanted to put the inter-ethnic relations in a broader historical and geographical framework of Southeastern Europe. However, when the period with that we are dealing is concerned, the literature, both Yugoslav and foreign, is much less abundant. The differences in quantity and quality are also huge. They are the result of great disparity in the size of certain minorities, and are partly due to different political and other interest in them in Yugoslavia and in their mother

countries. Part of this literature, contemporary and modern alike, is more or less propagandistic in nature, although this literature, too, has importance for the research into how certain states depicted the position of their respective minorities, and how these minorities themselves used to describe their own situation. The same goes for part of foreign authors, who in writing about certain national minorities, uncritically took over data from national propaganda of some states. It should be said that propaganda and national bias are also characteristics of great part of the Yugoslav literature on national minorities, both before and after the Second World War. Furthermore, considerable part of the Yugoslav works on the subject from the socialist period is, as a rule, burdened with ideological baggage which not only makes its reading more difficult, but sometimes distorts and blurs some of the crucial points. In other words, when dealing with such a topic, the researcher must try to separate the truth from propaganda and myth, and, at the same time, to try to find solid facts to be fitted into a broader historical and social context, in order to understand their real meaning and importance.

It would be impossible to discuss here the merits and flaws of all the works used for writing this book. Roughly, one can divide foreign works in those with scholarly aspirations which qualify for that title, and in those written rather in the spirit of polemics and/or propaganda - although sometimes in the guise of scholarship. As for the works published in the former Yugoslav territory (before and after the break-up of Yugoslavia), they can best be divided according to the time they were written, to works from the inter-war, post-war and post-Yugoslav period. Those of the first group have almost always a nationalist or even jingoist taint, dovetailing thus nicely with their counterparts from minorities' mother countries: the works from the socialist period, although they contain a number of solid historical facts, because of their ideological slant, usually tend to see the position of national minorities exclusively as bad, due to their concentration on only some aspects of the minority existence. In some of them (above all in the works about Ethnic-Germans, and partly about Ethnic-Albanians from the 1980s) a streak of national intolerance is perceptible. On the whole, however, the Yugoslav literature of this period has proved as very useful and indeed in many cases as indispensable. This goes above all for seminal studies of Sandor Mesaros on the Hungarians, Gligor Popi on the Romanians in the Banat, Dušan Biber about the influence of National-Socialism on Yugoslav Germans, numerous works of Nikola L. Gaćeša on agrarian problems and colonization, as well as for a number of well researched works on other topics which, among other things, touch upon the position of national minorities. The literature that came into being after the collapse of communism in the mother countries was partly marked by revival of nationalism, whereas in ex-Yugoslav lands (together with more or less nationalistically tinged ones), works which critically and objectively depict the position of national minorities in the inter-war Yugoslavia, and minorities' relations with the Yugoslav peoples before the foundation of the common South Slav state started to appear. Among these, special mention deserve the works of Bogumil Hrabak on the Muslim party, the Cemiyet, of Gordana Krivokapić-Jović on the Serbian People's Radical Party and an excellent work by Branko Bešlin on the Volksdeutsche press. Among foreign works, the book by Enikő Sajti about the Hungarian minority stands out. Although as a whole it cannot be compared to the works of Mesaros, it sheds an interesting light from Budapest perspective.

Can research like ours be of some practical use? In the opinion of this author, it can. We hope we managed to give an outline of the position of national minorities in the inter-war Yugoslavia that can be useful to the scientific community when doing further research in this field - either in a more general way, or in many of the sub-topics this large subject embraces. From the viewpoint of broader social relevance, and especially from the point of practical minority policy, we believe the lesson (that admittedly is not new) can be drawn, that inequality bears political instability and conflicts. This, however, does not mean that equality automatically bears loyalty on the part of national minorities. Whether a national minority will be loyal to the country in which it lives or not, depends on many factors – most of which have been dealt with in this book too. But policy and society which disregard lessons of history are doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past. Only policy, and society in general that are able to learn from examples of the past, can hope to have a future that will be better than the past.



# Chapter One

## Settlement of Non-South Slavic Peoples in the Territory of Yugoslavia

Because of their geographic position, the South Slavic lands have always been subject to constant migrations. At the end of the migration of peoples Slavic tribes settled down in the territory that would eventually form the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, dispersing, exterminating and assimilating the local population they had found. By the end of the Middle Ages after a long process of assimilation, the South Slavic peoples became majority population in the future Yugoslav territory,<sup>1</sup> except in the Batschka and the Banat, but with an addition of some areas (Istria, parts of Macedonia, Carinthia and Styria) which in 1918 remained outside the borders of the newly founded state, having only partly lost their Slavic majority.

Among the peoples who became national minorities in the new state, two pretend to greater antiquity and the right of first-comers compared with the Slavic population of South Eastern Europe: the Albanians and Romanians. Because of their larger number in the future Yugoslav territory and their greater relevance in the history of that state, we shall first turn to the process of settlement of Albanians. From the point of view of historiography, the problem of the Albanian settlement in the Yugoslav territory lies in the fact that at the moment of the foundation of the state, Albanians inhabited predominantly the territory which the politically leading people in the State, the Serbs, considered their "Holy Land". We are talking about Kosovo, which the Serbs, for historical, but not completely justified reasons, regarded as their "cradle".<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, Albanian extremists also tend to depict Kosovo as the "cradle" of the Albanians that had been gradually infiltrated by the Serbs during the Ottoman rule.<sup>3</sup> Albanian authors usually believe the Albanians are the autochthonous population of the Balkans, adducing in the scholarship widely spread but not completely proven theory of Illyrian ancestry of the Albanians.<sup>4</sup> This opinion is shared by many foreign scholars too.<sup>5</sup> Some

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1 This process of assimilation was best researched in the case of Latin populations of coastal towns and their mountainous hinterland. (Cf. Constantin Jireček, *Die Romanen in den Städten Dalmatiens während des Mittelalters*, Denkschriften der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Classe, Bd. 48, Wien 1902.) Attilio Tamaro dealt with the same topic with strong pro-Italian slant. (Cf. Attilio Tamaro, *Italiani e slavi nell'Adriatico*, Roma 1915.)

2 Cf. Alex N. Dragnich, Slavko Todorovich, *The Saga of Kosovo*. Focus on Serbian-Albanian Relations, Boulder 1984, p. 6.

3 Cf. Hamit Kokalari, *Kosovo*. Berceau du peuple albanais et foyer de sa renaissance nationale, Tirana 1943, pp. 38, 84.

4 Anton Logoreci, *The Albanians*. Europe's Forgotten Survivors, London 1977, p. 16; Stavro Skendi (ed.), *Albania*, New York 1958 (2nd ed.), p. 1; Stefanaq Pollo, Arben Puto (eds.), *Histoire de l'Albanie des origines à nos jours*, Roanne 1974, pp. 31-40.

5 Milan Šufflay, *Povijest sjevernih Arbanasa* (sociološka študija), Arhiv za arbansku starinu, jezik i etnologiju, knj. II, 1924, pp. 193ff; Jireček, p. 22; idem, *Albanija u*

Albanian authors are convinced this theory is true, although they admit there are no conclusive proofs for it,<sup>6</sup> or they accept it with a grain of salt.<sup>7</sup> Part of Albanian scholars strives to prove that not only are the Albanians autochthonous and descendants of the Illyrians, but that they originated from the Illyrians in exactly the same territory where Albanian is spoken today,<sup>8</sup> or that this territory had even shrunk over the centuries.<sup>9</sup> Some conclude from this that not only have the Albanians been living in Kosovo and Western Macedonia<sup>10</sup> from the very beginning, but that they had also always been the majority population there.<sup>11</sup> However, massive reference to archeological finds, similarities in jewelry, clothing and building of houses,<sup>12</sup> cannot hide the fact that next to nothing is known about the Illyrian language from which Albanian scientists claim the present-day Albanian evolved.<sup>13</sup> It would be even more difficult to explain why, from the vast territory they had allegedly inhabited, the Albanians survived only in the comparatively small present-day one.<sup>14</sup>

Naturally, Serbian and other scholars marked these shortcomings and criticized them,<sup>15</sup> whereas some foreign scholars are also not firmly convinced of

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prošlosti, I, Srpski književni glasnik, 9, 1914, p. 684; Noel Malcolm, Kosovo. A Short History, London 1998, p. 37.

- 6 Thus for example Zef Mirdita, Iliri i etnogeneza Albanaca, in: Iz istorije Albanaca. Zbornik predavanja. Priručnik za nastavnike, Beograd 1969, p. 7; idem, Neki aspekti pitanja o ilirskoj osnovi albanskog etnosa, in: Simpozijum Predslovenski etnički elementi na Balkanu u etnogenezi južnih Slovena, Sarajevo 1969, p. 157; Skënder Anamali, Des Illyriens aux Albanais, Studia albanica, 2, 1972.
- 7 Ramadan Marmullaku, Albania and the Albanians, London [1975], p. 5.
- 8 Ekrem Çabej, Le probleme du territoire de la formation de la langue albanais, Studia albanica, 2, 1972, pp. 125-151; Idriz Ajeti, Pour servir a l'histoire des ancien raports linguistiques albano-slaves, Studia albanica, 2, 1972, p. 276; Hivzi Islami, Demografska stvarnost Kosova, in: Škreljzen Malići, Dušan Janjić (eds.), Sukobi ili dijalog. Srpsko-albanski odnosi i integracija Balkana. Zbornik radova, Subotica 1994, p. 38.
- 9 Thus for instance Mirdita (Neki aspekti, p. 164; Iliri i etnogeneza, p. 26.) Similarly Anamali, p. 165.
- 10 Pollo and Puto claim the Slavs appeared in Kosovo and Western Macedonia only in 9th century. (Historie d'Albanie, p. 38.)
- 11 Islami, p. 38; Selmi Pulaha, Aspects de demographie historique des contrees albanaises pendant les XVe-XVIIe siecles, Studia albanica, 2, Tirana 1984.
- 12 Skënder Anamali, Muzafer Korkuti, Les Illyriens et la genese de des Albanais a la lumiere des recherches archeologiques albanaises, in: Les Illyriens et la genese des Albanais. Travaux de la session du 3-4 mars 1969, Tirana 1971, p. 34.
- 13 Cf. Ekrem Çabej, L'illyrien et l'albanais. Question du principe, in: Les Illyriens, p. 41; Pollo, Puto, p. 37.
- 14 Mehmed Vokshi claims the Albanians are descendants of Illyrians and Thracians who used to inhabit the whole Balkan Peninsula, but he fails to explain how come that from these two large peoples only the numerically weak Albanians survived. (Albania di tutti gli albanesi, Roma 1931, p. 2.)
- 15 Milutin Garašanin waters down the continuity Albanian thesis, claiming the Illyrians, together with the Dardanians and Thracians were elements out of which the new people - the Albanians - was formed. (Illyrians and Albanians, in: Kosovo – Part and Present, Belgrade s.a., pp. 35-38; Nastanak i poreklo Ilira, in: Milutin Garašanin (ed.), Iliri i Albanci, Beograd 1988, p. 76; Idem, Zaključna razmatranja, in: Ibid., pp. 362, 366.) Cf. Also: Slobodan Jovanović, Jugosloveni i Albanci, Ideje, 5-6, 1987, p. 181. Jovan Cvijić considered the Albanians partly romanized Illyrians mixed with South

the Illyrian ancestry of the Albanians.<sup>16</sup> However, when speaking about Albanian settlement in the territories which would subsequently become part of Yugoslavia, of much greater importance is the opinion of several prominent foreign scholars concerning the place where the Albanian people came to being. The famous Balkanologist Gustav Weigand deemed the Albanians were formed between the cities of Niš, Sofia and Skopje, between 600 and 900 A.D.<sup>17</sup> The well known historian of South-Eastern Europe, Georg Stadtmüller thought the Albanians had been formed in Northern Albania.<sup>18</sup> Gottfried Schramm claims the Albanians were formed in the vicinity of the present-day Macedonian-Bulgarian border, from the tribe of the Bessi, and that they moved to Albania only in the mid-9<sup>th</sup> century A.D.<sup>19</sup> As for Serbian scholars and publicists, they were more interested in the origin and place where the Albanians came into being<sup>20</sup> in the context of the question: who came to Kosovo first – the Serbs or the Albanians?

As opposed to their Albanian counterparts, almost all Serbian historians, ethnologists and demographers believe the Serbs are the older population in Kosovo than the Albanians. According to them, up to the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, the whole population of Kosovo, or at least the vast majority, had been of Serbian nationality. According to them, after the defeat of the Habsburg armies in 1689 the Great Migration of the Serbs started, opening thus the gap for the Albanian settlement. These, favored by the Ottoman authorities who preferred them to the Christian *raya*, started descending Albanian mountains and with misdeeds, pillage, arson and murder, started gradually to oust the Serbian population. The Second Migration of the Serbs headed by Patriarch Arsenije IV Šakabenta in 1737 numerically weakened the Serbian population further still. Ousting and expelling the Serbs, the Albanians managed to infiltrate also the neighboring parts, and by mid-19<sup>th</sup> century they penetrated as far as Vranje, Leskovac,

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Slavs, assigning their cradle to the South of the Prokletije range. (Jovan Cvijić, *Balkansko poluostrvo i južnoslovenske zemlje. Osnovi antropogeografije*, Beograd s.a., p. 197.) It is interesting to note that almost all Serbian history schoolbooks speak of the Albanians as descendant of the Illyrians - to be sure, without pinpointing the place of their ethnogenesis. (Cf. Zoran Janjetović, *From Foe to Friend and Back: Albanians in Serbian History Textbooks 1918-2000*, *Balkanologie*, VI, 1-2, 2002, p. 246.)

16 Jens Reuter, *Die Albaner in Jugoslawien*, München 1982, p. 11.

17 Gustav Weigand, *Ethnographie von Makedonien. Geschichtlich-nationaler, sprachlich-statistischer Teil*, Leipzig 1924, pp. 11-12.

18 Georg Stadtmüller, *Geschichte Südosteuropas*, München 1976 (2nd. ed.), p. 203.

19 Gottfried Schramm, *Anfänge des albanischen Christentums. Die frühe Bekehrung der Bessen und ihre lange Folgen*, Freiburg i.Br. 1994, pp. 9-47, 121-156.

20 Spiridon Gopčević, who was always prone to bring his opinion into line with the wishes of his current employers, claimed in 1914 the Southern Albanians, the Toske, were the real Albanians, autochthonous and descendants of the Illyrians, as opposed to the Northern ones, the Gege, who were, according to him, Albanized Serbs. (*Das Fürstentum Albanien, seine Vergangenheit, ethnographische Verhältnisse, politische Lage und Aussichten für die Zukunft*, Berlin 1914, pp. 2-3.) Much more serious is the semi-official *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije I*, which pinpoints the „cradle“ of the Albanians in Dardania, from where they spread, together with the Slavs, westward over time. (*Istorija naroda Jugoslavije (henceforth: INJ)*, I, (od početka do XVI veka) Beograd 1953, p. 93.)

Kuršumlja, Prokuplje, almost reaching Niš.<sup>21</sup> Part of the remaining Serbian population converted to Islam under their pressure, and became gradually Albanized – at first in costume, and later on, in the language and feelings.<sup>22</sup> These converts were called, not without derision, “Arnautashi.”<sup>23</sup>

Having spread over Kosovo, Metohija and part of Serbia proper, the Albanians started penetrating the Preševo watershed of the Morava and the Vardar, advancing towards the Pčinja. They also spread from Tetovo and Gostivar towards the Vardar.

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- 21 Cf. Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, Beograd 1989, pp. 133-193; Dušan T. Bataković, Kosovo. La spirale de la haine. Les faits. Les acteurs. L'histoire, Lausanne 1993, pp. 23-24; Đoko Slijepčević, Srpsko-arbanaški odnosi kroz vekove s posebnim osvrtom na novije vreme, Himelstir 1982 (2nd ed.), pp. 99-126; Rista T. Nikolić, Širenje Arnauta u srpske zemlje, Beograd 1938; Atanasije Urošević, Ethnic Processes in Kosovo During the Turkish Rule, in: Kosovo, Past and Present, pp. 41-47; Dimitrije Bogdanović, Knjiga o Kosovu, Beograd 1985, pp. 85-125; Aleksa Jovanović (ed.), Spomenica dvadesetpetogodišnjice oslobođenja Južne Srbije 1912-1937, Skoplje 1937, pp. 410-411; Mita Kostić, Prilozi istoriji srpsko-arbanskog ustanka 1689-1690, Arhiv za arbansku starinu, jezik i etnologiju, II, 1924, p.16. This version is basically accepted also by the leading Serbian social-democrat at the turn of the 20th century, Dimitrije Tucović, who saw no historical precedent in the way the Albanian expansion was achieved. (Srbija i Albanija. Jedan prilog kritici zavojevačke politike srpske buržoazije, in: Dimitrije Tucović, Sabrana dela, 8, Beograd 1980, p. 22.)
- 22 The question of Islamization and then also of Albanization of the Slavic population is one of the crucial ones in the Serbian-Albanian and Macedonian-Albanian relations. According to Serbian authors, conversion to Islam and then the gradual Albanization were quite a massive phenomenon which greatly weakened the Serbs and strengthened the Albanians – in Kosovo and other regions where the Albanians settled down. The real extent of Islamization and Albanization, however, remained in the realm of guess, partly due to the lack of reliable historical sources and partly due to obvious propagandistic slant of some of the authors who had been writing about it. (Jovan N. Tomić, O arnautima u Staroj Srbiji i Sandžaku, Beograd 1995 (3rd ed.), pp. 12-56; Bogdanović, pp. 91-98; Nikolić, pp. 5, 13-18; Urošević, pp. 45-47; Mirko Barjaktarević, Međuetnički odnosi Srba i Arbanasa, in: Etnički odnosi Srba sa drugim narodima i etničkim zajednicama, Beograd 1998, pp. 49-60; Slijepčević, pp. 110-112; Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 173, 185; Bataković, p. 24; Idem, The Kosovo Chronicles, Belgrade 1992, pp. 51-52; K. Gestrin [Niko Županić], Altserbien und die albanesische Frage, Wien, Leipzig 1912, pp. 25, 29; Gopčević pushed the Albanization theory ad absurdum, claiming all Northern Albanians were of Serbian origin. (Ibid., pp. 1-10.) According to him, Skenderbeg turned against the Sultan because he had realized he was a Serb! (Ibid., p. 10.) Jovan Cvijić thought the majority of Kosovo Albanians were of Serbian descent. (Jovan Cvijić, Balkanski rat i Srbija, Beograd 1912, pp. 16-17.) Similar claim is propounded in the book Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, where it is said on p. 351 that 80% of Kosovo Albanians are of Serbian origin. Puffing-up the number of Albanized Serbs before 1912 was aimed at justifying the right of Serbia to Kosovo (and Western Macedonia!) by adducing a kind of inverted ethnic right and historical continuity, whereas after the incorporation of these parts into the Serbian state it served the purpose of justifying Serbian possession of these territories and the policy towards the Albanians. (Cf. Marco Dogo, Kosovo. Albanesi e Serbi: le radici del conflitto, Lungro di Cosenza 1992, pp. 25, 27-28; Jovanović (ed.), pp. 408, 411-412, and especially 413 and 418.)
- 23 Islamization and gradual Albanization occurred along the rivers Crni Drim and Radika, and further northward up to Prizren as early as 16th century. In that way the Slavic population tried to save itself from attacks of Muslim Albanians who had been pillaging them. (INJ, II, (od početka XVI do kraja XVIII veka), Beograd 1960, p. 52.)

Their spreading was by no means fast, but very gradual, which was only fragmentarily recorded in the sloppy and inaccurate Ottoman censuses.<sup>24</sup> This incompleteness of the Ottoman statistics and lack of historical records enabled Albanian historians to dispute this picture painted by their Serbian colleagues.

Thus some of them deny that the Great migration of 1689/90 ever happened,<sup>25</sup> claiming the Albanians had already been the majority population before that.<sup>26</sup> Serbian authors on the other hand believe flight and expulsion of the Albanian population from those parts Serbia liberated in 1878, as well as the simultaneous flight and expulsion of the Serbs from Kosovo have aggravated further or even conclusively the ethnic make-up of that province at the expense of the Serbs, since part of the Albanians who had been expelled or who have fled liberated parts of Serbia, settled there.<sup>27</sup> The Serbian exodus did not end after the wars of 1876-1878, but continued under Albanian pressure until the Balkan Wars, which coupled with the Albanian influx, birth-rate and Albanization, was changing the ethnic make-up at the expense of the Serbs.<sup>28</sup>

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24 Cf. Vladimir Stojančević, *Etničke, konfesionalne i demografske prilike u Metohiji 1830-ih godina. O stanovništvu u Prizrenskom vilajetu pred srpsko-turske ratove 1876-1878*, in: Idem, *Srbi i Arbanasi 1804-1912*, Novi Sad 1994.

25 Skënder Rizaj, *Sur le pretendu grande exode serbe de Kosove avec a sa tete le patriarche Arsenija (sic!) Čarnojević (1690)*, *Studia albanica*, 1, 1984.

26 Ibid, p. 96; Pulaha, p. 74, claims the Albanians were the majority in Metohija already in 15th century; Petrit Imami, *Srbi i Albanci kroz vekove*, Beograd 2000 (2nd ed.), p. 59, claims according to Ottoman defters (census books) the Albanians had majority in Kosovo already in 17th century. It is interesting to note that various Albanian authors adduce different points when the Albanians acquired majority.

27 Bogdanović, pp. 136-141; Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 213-219; Slijepčević, pp. 152-155; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 112. Whereas the older literature mentions the number of 30.000 of resettled Albanians and other Muslimes, the latest research indicate the actual number was considerably larger: some 71.000 people, with at least 49.000 Albanians among them. (Cf. Miloš Jagodić, *The Emigration of Muslims from the new Serbian Regions 1877/1878*, *Balkanologie*, II, 2, 1998, pp. 109, 114.) That author thinks exactly at that time, due to the "forcible exchange of populations" (Dimitrije Bogdanović) the Albanians became the majority in Kosovo. (Ibid, 120.) Aleksandar Popović tried to depict the Albanian exodus of 1877/78 only as a flight, which does not correspond to the facts. (Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam balkanique. Les musulmans de sud-est européen dans la période post-ottomane*, Wiesbaden 1986, p. 304.) For an Albanian version of the expulsion of the Albanian population from Serbia see: Emin Pllana, *Les Raisons et le maniere de l'exode des refugies albanais du territoire du sanjak de Nish a Kosove (1877-1878)*, *Studia albanica*, 1, 1985. That author claims more than 30.000 Albanians were expelled or fled (pp. 186-187), that not many of them settled down in Kosovo, and that only a small number of Serbs left it. (pp. 193-195.) Together with the Albanians, a lot of refugees from Bosnia, Herzegovina and the Sandžak also settled down in Kosovo. According to some authors they numbered 150.000, and the majority of them was eventually Albanized. (Cf. Safet Bandžović, *Iseljenici iz Sandžaka u Tursku*, *Novopazarski zbornik*, 20, 1996, p. 140.)

28 Slijepčević, pp. 223-233; Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 231-238, 243-276; Bogdanović, pp. 148-157; Bogumil Hrabak, *The Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija from the League of Prizren to 1918*, in: *Kosovo. Past and Present*, p. 57; *Prepiska o arbanskim nasiljima u Staroj Srbiji 1890-1889*, Beograd 1889; Branko Peruničić, *Pisma srpskih konzula iz Prištine 1890-1900*, Beograd 1985, *passim*.

Some of the Albanian scholars accept basically this view of the Albanian settlement in Kosovo and Western Macedonia, albeit in a somewhat toned-down version, according to which the Albanians simply filled the demographic void that the Serbs who had fled or had been expelled, left behind.<sup>29</sup> However, that their settlement was far from peaceful is testified by many foreign writers who witnessed its last phase before the foundation of Yugoslavia.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, the vast majority of place-names are Slavic and not Albanian. Memories of the then still not nationally conscious Albanians recorded by Johan Georg von Hahn, in mid 19<sup>th</sup> century, of their old homeland in Albania and the tribes of which they were descendants, also testify to their comparatively recent arrival.<sup>31</sup> These and other testimonies, even if one discards Serbian ones as biased, show that the Serbs, although not the original inhabitants, have been living in Kosovo much longer than the Albanians. And yet, the Ottoman census of 1900, found that 64% (819,756) of the population there had been of Muslim faith.<sup>32</sup> Although not all of these Muslims were Albanians, the census results strongly resemble those at which the Yugoslav authorities arrived some twenty years later. In other words, by gradual infiltration, violence and Albanization, the Albanians managed over two hundred years to oust the once majority Serbian population from Kosovo and Metohija.<sup>33</sup>

Similar to the Albanian settlement in Kosovo, was the way they settled down in Western and North-Western Macedonia. The methods of ousting the Slav population were more or less the same, but the process took place somewhat later than in Kosovo. Although the Albanian settlement began at the time of the collapse of the uprising of Karpoš (1689) in North-Western Macedonia,<sup>34</sup> its major part took place in the

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- 29 Skendi, p. 6; *Historia e popullit shqiptar* also talks about the descent of the Albanians from Northern and Central Albania, from Malesia, from Šara, from around Đakovica, Peć, Debar, Gostivar, Tetovo etc. into the plains of Kosovo, Tetovo, Gostivar, Metohija and Kičevo, as well as around Niš, Novi Pazar, Veles and Prilep. (Quated in: Hasan Kaleši, *O seobama Srba sa Kosova krajem XVII i početkom XVIII veka, etničkim promenama i nekim drugim pitanjima iz istorije Kosova*, Obeležja, VI, 4, 1976, p. 201; Rexhep Krasniqi, *Der Berliner Kongress und Nordostalbanien* (Ph.D. manuscript), Wien 1934, p. 6; Sander Bushati, *Die Entstehung des Fürstentums Albanien (vom Berliner Kongress 1878 bis 1914)* (Ph.D. manuscript), Wien 1940, p. 14.) The version of "Albanian return to Kosovo" after 1690 also exists. (Cf. Edith Durham, *Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle*, London 1920, p. 17; Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo*, London 1998, p. 3.)
- 30 Cf. for instance: Henry Baerlein, *A Difficult Frontier (Yugoslavia and Albania)*, London 1922, p. 17; H.N. Brailsford, *Macedonia. Its Races and Their Future*, London [London 1906?], pp. 273-274, 280; Gustav Weigand, *Die Aromunen. Ethnographisch-philologisch-historische Untersuchungen über das Volk der sogenannten Makedo-Romanen oder Zinzaren*, I, Leipzig 1895 pp. 43-45; Victor Berard, *La Macédoine*, Paris 1900 (2nd. ed.), pp. 98, 113-114, 117, 119, 121, 133, 139-140; Eduard Driault, *La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'à nos jours*, Paris 1898, p. 279.
- 31 Johan Georg von Hahn, *Reise von Belgrad nach Salonik*, Wien 1868 (2nd. ed.), p. 70.
- 32 Peter Bartl, *Die albanische Muslime zur Zeit der National-Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (1878-1912)*, Wiesbaden 1968, pp. 52-53.
- 33 Basically that is also the conclusion of the rather pro-Albanian than pro-Serbian best-seller author Noel Malcolm. (Cf. Malcolm, pp. 114, 172.)
- 34 Александар Стојановски (ed.), *Историја на македонскиот народ*, III. Македонија под турска власт (од XIV до крајот на XVIII век), Скопје 1998, p. 142; *A History of the Macedonian People*, Skopje 1979, p. 98.

last decades of the 18th and first decades of the 19th centuries, helping thus to keep the memories of it among the immigrant Albanian population alive longer. For that reason, this migration can be better reconstructed than the one in Kosovo, although the written sources for it are also rather scanty.<sup>35</sup>

According to Jovan Trifunoski, in Macedonia, as well as in Kosovo, there were no Albanians until the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>36</sup> From then on, their slow descent begins – at first into planes and valleys. Unlike in Kosovo where the massive influx began in 1740s, the main immigration wave reached Macedonia between 1780 and 1840. According to Trifunoski, some 30% of the Albanians came in late 18<sup>th</sup> century and around 10% between 1840 and 1912, whereas the largest immigration took place between 1801 and 1840, when some 50% of the Albanian population came.<sup>37</sup> The same author infers from the way they settled down, that it was deliberately planned<sup>38</sup> Turkish policy, but proffers no solid proofs for this claim. Generally speaking, the settlement methods were the same as in Kosovo - marauding raids would “soften” or partly disperse the local inhabitants, and only then would the (sometimes peaceful) colonization begin. The Albanians settled in that way would then start bringing in their relatives from the old homeland, ousting the Slav population further still.<sup>39</sup>

Just like in Kosovo, conversion to Islam of the local population played an important role in the Albanian expansion, since it often (albeit not always) led to gradual Albanization.<sup>40</sup> However, one should keep in mind that some Albanians came to Kosovo as Roman-Catholics to be converted to Islam there, as well as that part of them, especially in towns, assimilated with the more “gentlemanly” Turks.<sup>41</sup> In Western Macedonia cases of Muslim Albanians (and Turks) assimilating into Slavic Muslims (the Torbeši) also occurred.<sup>42</sup>

Taking advantage of the Ottoman authorities' connivance between the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and 1912, the Albanians managed to oust considerable part of the Slavic population from Kosovo and Metohija, as well as from Western and North-western Macedonia, spreading their ethnic territory from Debar and Struga in the West, to Kumanovo, Skopje, Veles, Prilep and Bitola (Bitolj) in the East. Their North-Eastern ethnic wedge towards Niš, Leskovac and Vranje was cut off after the Serbian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 with which we shall deal in one of the next chapters.

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35 Jovan Trifunoski, *Albansko stanovništvo u SR Makedoniji. Antropogeografsko i etnografsko istraživanje*, Beograd 1988, p. 8.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 19-26.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 30.

39 *Ibid.*; Idem, *Zapadna Makedonija i neki karakteristični etnički problemi*, *Balkanica*, VIII, 1970; Idem, *O plemenskim odlikama Arbanasa (Šiptara) u severozapadnoj Makedoniji*, *Radovi [Naučnog društva BiH]*, knj. XXVI, Odeljenje istorijsko-filoloških nauka, knj. 9, 1965; Idem, *Albansko stanovništvo*, pp. 53-69; Jovan Hadži-Vasiljević, *Skoplje i njegova okolina. Istorijska, etnografska i kulturno politička izlaganja*, Beograd 1930, pp. 239-245; Stojanovski (ed.), pp. 235-236; Нијаз Лиманоски, *Исламизација и етничките промени во Македонија*, Скопје 1993, pp. 102, 119, 193-207.

40 Jovan Haži-Vasiljević, *Muslimani naše krvi u Južnoj Srbiji*, *Bratstvo*, XIX, 1925, pp. 30-31, 35-37, 41; Trifunoski, *Zapadna Makedonija*, p. 650; Idem, *Albansko stanovništvo*, pp. 116-120; Limanoski, *passim*.

41 Trifunoski, *Albansko stanovništvo*, pp. 114-115; Hadži-Vasiljević, *Muslimani*, pp. 29, 41, 47; A. Jovanović (ed.), p. 388; Nikolić, pp. 25-26.

42 Trifunoski, *Zapadna Makedonija*, p. 652; Idem, *Albansko stanovništvo*, p. 120.

It is questionable if this colonization had been planned by the Ottoman authorities. The fact is they tolerated it, and often encouraged it, but it seems, in the case of the Albanians, they had no deliberate colonization policy, comparable to that of the Habsburgs in the Northern part of what was to become Yugoslavia (which has also been subject to changes of foreign and domestic policy). It is more likely that the majority of Albanian immigrants came on their own accord. Since in Albanian hills (as indeed in many others!) pillaging was one of the most important branches of the economy, and often the sole way to survive,<sup>43</sup> migrating to fertile plains was certainly an enticing way of raising one's living standard. Escape from blood feuds, family ties, invitations by agas and beys, benevolence of the Ottoman authorities or service with them and other factors were also encouraging Albanian immigration which the subjected Slavic peasants were unable to stop.<sup>44</sup>

The only Southern Slavs who managed to have relations with the Albanians that would not be based primarily on conflicts, were the Montenegrins.<sup>45</sup> Similar landscape conditioned similar living and working conditions, and this in turn, intermingling, assimilation, taking on of customs, language and tribal affiliation.<sup>46</sup> This led to many legends about common ancestry of certain now single-national, or still multinational Montenegrin and Albanian tribes.<sup>47</sup> Since both peoples had lived in tribal organization from the time immemorial, blending and mixing with each other, assimilating in the process diverse Vlach tribes, it would be difficult to draw clear cut temporal and geographical lines of the Albanian settlement in the territories that would later fall to Montenegro.<sup>48</sup> It may be that this lack of more solid hints, as well as the comparatively

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43 A. Jovanović (ed.), p. 692; Tucović, p. 30.

44 Trifunski, Albansko stanovništvo, pp. 33-34; Gligor Todorovski, Migracioni pokreti u Makedoniji od Berlinskog kongresa 1870 (sic!) do početka Prvog balkanskog rata, Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis (henceforth: JIČ), 3-4, 1970, p. 123. With a true Marxist narrow-mindedness Tucović has seen the reason for Albanian migrations in the Turkish feudal system (which did not exist in the Albanian hills from where the immigrants were coming!). (Tucović, p. 23.)

45 Barjaktarević, p. 53.

46 Istorija Crne Gore (henceforth: ICG), II. Od kraja XII do kraja XV vijeka, Titograd 1970, p. 138.

47 INJ, II, p. 349; INJ, II, p. 153; Vasa Čubrilo, Postanak plemena Kuća, in: Idem, Odabrani istorijski radovi, Beograd 1983; Šufflay, pp. 227-228; Vickers, p. 8; Noel Malcolm, The Kelmendi. Notes on the Early History of a Catholic Albanian Clan, Südost-Forschungen, 59/60, 2001; Barjaktarević, pp. 53-57; Cvijić, Balkansko poluostrvo, pp. 172-173; Jireček, Albanija, p. 688. It is highly probable that this intermixing enabled Gopčević, drawing on some foreign authors, to put forward the theory that all Northern Albanians were of Serbian origin. (Gopčević, pp. 1-10.) On the Albanian side, there is the claim of Ekrem Vlora the Albanians and Montenegrins were so similar to each other "in spirit, bearing and way of life", because allegedly one half of the Montenegrins were of Albanian descent. (Ekrem Bey Vlora, Lebenserinnerungen, I, (1885-1912), München 1968, p. 223.) Additional confusion is created by the fact the scholars are not sure as to the ethnic background of certain tribes. Thus, for instance, Jireček claims the Šekularci had originally been an Albanian tribe (Albanija, p. 41), whereas others claim they had been Serbs. Tribal "kinship" by no means presupposed that "related" tribes had always been on friendly terms. (Cf. Risto J. Dragičević, Malisorske bune 1910. i 1911. godine, Zapis, Glasnik Cetinskog istorijskog društva, XIII, knj. XXIV, 1940, p. 144.)

48 ICG, II, pp. 350-367; INJ, II, p. 745.



small area and insignificance of the territory in question were the reasons why the quantity of literature about the settlement of the Albanians in them cannot be compared to the one about the settlement in Kosovo and Western Macedonia. It was only with the creation and expansion of the Montenegrin state, and national consciousness among both peoples in the 19<sup>th</sup> century that mutual relations became clearer, but also more contentious – depicted in an increased number of historiographical works. It is important to mention that the Albanians were inhabiting the area around the present-day Montenegrin capital Podgorica, Plav, Gusinje, parts of the Sandžak as well as parts of the Adriatic coast which today belong to Montenegro. Before the foundation of Yugoslavia some of these areas had already changed their ethnic make-up.

Another people living in the Yugoslav territory in 1918 and pretending to antiquity and the rights of the first-comers, are the Romanians of the Banat.<sup>49</sup> Historiographical debate about their ancestry and place of formation is not unlike the one about the origins and cradle of the Albanians, with which it is sometimes connected. The big difference is that it is not the Serbs, but the Hungarians who are the main opponents. To put it in a nutshell: the discussion revolves around the question where the Romanians came into being – North of the Danube through Romanization of the Dacians, as claimed by Romanian and some foreign scholars,<sup>50</sup> or to the South of it, through

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49 It is proven beyond the shadow of doubt that the Romanians of North-Eastern Serbia were much later immigrants. (Cf. Introduction.)

50 Romanian argumentation with a list of older literature see in: G[eorge] Bratianu, *An Enigma and a Miracle of History: the Romanian People*, Bucharest 1996 (French original from 1937!); Kurt W. Treptow (ed.), *A History of Romania*, Iași 1995, pp. 44-48; N[icolae] Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains et de la Romanité Orientale*. 1, *Les Ancêtres avant les Romains*, Bucarest 1937, pp. 14-16; Idem, *Istorija Rumuna i njihove civilizacije*, Beograd s.a., pp. 46-47; Günter Reichenkron, *Die Entstehung des Rumänentums nach der neuesten Forschungen*, Südost-Forschungen, XXII, 1963, pp. 74-76. These authors deem the Romanians were formed both North and South of the Danube, but that in the North they had assimilated the Slavic newcomers, whereas in the South they had been to large extent assimilated by the Slavs. This theory has the advantage of legitimizing Romanian possession of the territory to the North of the Danube according to historical rights, laying claims to Aromuns as part of the Romanian nation at the same time. General works on Romanian history which follow the official line of state patriotism and affix the cradle of the Romanians to the present-day Romanian territory North of the Danube, are: Mircea Musat, Ion Ardelean, *From Ancient Dacia to Modern Romania*, Bucharest 1985, pp. 11-33; Andrei Oțetea (ed.), *Storia del popolo romeno*, Roma 1981 (3rd ed.), pp. 1-2; Miron Constantinescu, Constantin Daicoviciu, Stefan Pascu et al., *Histoire de la Roumanie des origines à nos jours*, s.l. 1970, pp. 30, 89; Dinu C. Giurescu, *Illustrated History of the Romanian People*, Bucharest 1981, p. 76; Dimitriu Protase, *La population daco-romaine en Transylvanie et dans le Banat, Dacoromania*, 3, 1975-1976. The last mentioned author unintentionally admits archeology has yet to proffer proofs of Daco-Romanian continuity. (p. 56.) If political need be, the cradle could be ascribed not only to Romania, but more precisely to Transylvania: Cf. Constantin Daicoviciu, Miron Constantinescu (eds.), *Brève histoire de la Transylvanie*, Bucharest 1965, p. 12. Among foreign scholars supporting the theory that the Romanians were formed to the North of the Danube, the most prominent are: R.W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Romanians. From the Roman Times to the completion of Unity*, London 1963, pp. 14-15; Keith Hitchins, *The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania 1780-1849*, Cambridge, Mass. 1969, p. 74. Grgur Jakšić also recognizes the Romanians as descendants of

Romanization of the Thracians and others, and immigrating into their present-day territory only from 14<sup>th</sup> century onward, as claimed by Hungarian, Serbian and partly other scholars?<sup>51</sup> The discussion has been running in circles for almost two hundred years,<sup>52</sup> with more or less the same arguments.<sup>53</sup> The Romanian historiography, predominantly nationalist and romantic, serves the cause of defense of the national territory, underpinning ethnic right with the historical one.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, Hungarian scholars endeavor to strengthen the weakened ethnic right by historical arguments. Serbian scholars stepped into the fray only occasionally, like their Romanian and Hungarian opposite numbers, – usually in order to defend the “national cause”, i.e., Serbian claims to (Western) Banat.<sup>55</sup>

the Dacians, but claims that in the Banat they had been autochthonous only in its Eastern, hilly part. (Gregoire Yakchitch, *Le Banat*, Paris 1915, p. 4.)

- 51 For Hungarian thesis see: Paul Hunfalvy, *Ethnographie von Ungarn*, Budapest 1877, pp. 334-350; Ludwig von Thallóczy, *Die Theorie der walachischen oder rumänischen Frage*, in: Idem (ed.), *Illyrisch-albanische Forschungen*, I, München, Leipzig 1916, p. 39; Ladislaus Galdi, Ladislaus Makkai (eds.), *Geschichte der Rumänen*, Budapest 1942, pp. 5-45; Bela Köpeczi (ed.), *Kurze Geschichte Siebenbürgens*, Budapest 1990, pp. 57-113, 181-185. Apart from Hungarian scholars, the theory of Romanian immigration from the Balkans is supported by some foreign scholars, also not always without political strings attached. (Cf. Robert Roesler, *Romänische Studien. Untersuchungen zur älteren Geschichte Romäniens*, Leipzig 1871, (especially p. 99); Johann Heinrich Schwicker, *Geschichte des Temeser Banats*, Pest 1872, pp. 437-438; Jireček, *Die Romanen*, p. 20; Stadtmüller, pp. 95, 209-210; Gotfried Schramm, *Die Katastrophe des 6. bis 8. Jahrhunderts und die Entstehung des rumänischen Volkes*, *Südosteuropa Jahrbuch*, 17, 1987, p. 93. A survey of other most important works contesting autochthonousness of the Romanians North of the Danube see in: Daicoviciu, Constantinescu (eds.), pp. 58-59; Musat, Ardeleanu, pp. 64-66.) It is interesting to note that the immigration theory also had some supporters among Romanian “bourgeois” historians. (Cf. Daicoviciu, Constantinescu (eds.), p. 59.)
- 52 Dietmar Müller, *Die Siebenbürgische Frage: Neue Fragestellungen – alte Antworten*, *Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde*, XXIV, 1, 2001; Josef Wolf, *Entwicklung der ethnischen Struktur des Banats 1890-1992*, Wien 2004, pp. 11-14.
- 53 A summary of the arguments see in: Georges Castellan, *A History of the Romanians*, New York 1989, pp. 18-22.
- 54 Catharine Durandin, *Histoire des Roumains*, s.l. 1996, pp. 33-35.
- 55 The most prominent was Jovan Radonjić who championed the thesis of Serbian priority, that is, Romanian immigration into the Banat. (Cf. Iov[an] Radonitch, *Le droit historique des Roumains et des Serbes sur le Banat*, *Revue des Études historiques*, Octobre-Décembre 1916, pp. 7, 10; Idem, *The Banat and the Serbian-Romanian Frontier Problem*, Paris 1918, p. 8; Idem, *Histoire des Serbes en Hongrie*, Paris, Barcelone, Dublin 1919, p. 6; T.P. Vukanović, *Les Vlaques, habitants autochtones des pays balkaniques*, *L’Ethnographie*, 56, Paris 1962, p. 15.) Borislav Jankulov, mainly under the influence of Hungarian and German authors, also believed the original homeland of the Romanians had been in the Balkans. (Pregled kolonizacije Vojvodine u XVIII i XIX veku, Novi Sad 1961, p. 50.) Mita Klicin concurs with the Hungarian opinion that the Romanians first appeared in the Banat in the 13th and 14th centuries. (Mita Klicin, *Kratka istorija srpskog Elzasa od VI-XX veka*, Beograd s.a., p. 9.) A brochure for the Paris Peace Conference claims only the Serbs had been autochthonous in the Banat, whereas Hungarians, Romanians and Germans were later colonists. (Delimitation entre les Serbes et les Roumains dans le Banat, s.l. s.a., p. 3. Cf. also: Andrej Mitrović, *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom i Rumunijom 1919-1920*. Prilog proučavanju Jugoslavije na konferenciji

It is worth noting that in all general surveys of Romanian history the Banat plays less than a modest role. It is a real peripheral national area, although some historians strive to locate the first recorded Romanian states there.<sup>56</sup> The first explorer of the Banat after the Ottoman rule, Francesco Grisellini, upgraded the importance of the Romanians, perceiving them, somewhat romantically, as the direct descendants of the Roman colonists.<sup>57</sup> He considered them, together with the Serbs, Gypsies, Bulgarians, Hungarians and Greeks from Macedonia (probably Aromunes – Z.J.) and Ionian islands for indigenous population – as opposed to colonists of various nationalities who had settled down in the Banat in the decades that preceded his research expedition.<sup>58</sup>

Even though we are still in the dark as to the ethnicity of the oldest inhabitants of the Banat, for the 15<sup>th</sup> century we can say with a considerable degree of certainty that in the Western Banat (which is our major interest) Romanians were few.<sup>59</sup>

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mira u Parizu, Novi Sad 1975, p. 67; Bogdan Krizman, Bogumil Hrabak (eds.), *Zapisnici sa sednica delegacije Kraljevine SHS na mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919-1920*, Beograd 1960, p. 60.) Ljubivoje Cerović says nothing about the original homeland of the Romanians, but with the aid of place names, claims the Serbs were the oldest population in Western Banat. (Srbi u Rumuniji od najranijeg Srednjeg veka do današnjeg vremena, Beograd 1997, p. 24.) There is an interesting anonimus memo about Serbian rights to the Banat, probably from October 1916 (entitled "only for us"), which states the original inhabitants of the Banat had been the Dacians who were Romanized during the times of emperor Trajan (sic!) and who emigrated to the Carpathians in the course of the Migration of Peoples. According to this memo, the Romanians started immigrating into the province only after the Peace of Passarowitz in 1718. (AJ, F. 336, f. 5.) Another anonymous memo (probably) from 1919, summarizes Radonjić's thesis about the Serbian primacy. (AJ, F. 336, f. 4.) At the time the map of Europe was being redrawn anew in early 1940s, Dobrivoj Nikolić wrote: "The Banat has always been a Serbian province which continuously resisted onslaughts by various people of different nationality and different religion at its fertile soil and its peaceful people, sometimes with greater, sometimes with smaller success, but it never lost its Serbian and Orthodox characteristics [...] The Serbs are the only autochthonous people in the Banat. In the history of the Banat, as well as in other parts of the former Vojvodina, on several occasions they had been the sole inhabitants and the only bearers of spiritual and material culture..." (Srbi u Banatu u prošlosti i sadašnjosti, Novi Sad 1941, p. 1.) On the other hand, Dušan Popović paints a much more realistic picture, pointing out that in the 14th century, there was almost no mention of the Serbs in the Banat. (Naseljavanje Vojvodine, Glasnik Istorijskog društva u Novom Sadu, sv. 35, knj. 1, Novi Sad 1939, p. 29.)

56 Cf. Oțetea (ed.), p. 140 – with the aid of Anonymous Scribe of Bela IV and his work *Gesta Hungarorum* and archeological finds.

57 Franz Grisellini, *Versuch einer politischen und natürlichen Geschichte des Temeswarer Banats in Briefen an Standespersonen und Gelehrte*, Wien 1780, p. III.

58 Ibid.

59 According to Jankulov, the first mention of the Romanians in the Banat dates from 1373. (Jankulov, p. 52.) Radivoj Simonović claims the same. (Etnografski pregled Vojvodine, Novi Sad [1924], p. 22.) Galdi and Makkai aduce 1335. (p. 52.) Schwicker states that whole counties of Timis and Krasso were inhabited by Romanians. (Schwicker, p. 440.) There is a mention of the Romanian presence around Vršac in the 14th and 15th centuries. (Irina Papuga, *Nesrpski narodi u Vojvodini na početku XX veka*, in: *Zbornik radova sa svečanog skupa posvećenog 75. godišnjici prisajedinjenja Vojvodine Srbiji*, Novi Sad 1993, p. 46; D. Nikolić claims there were no Romanians in the Banat in the 17th century (p. 18), only to speak about the common struggle of the Serbs and Romanians against the Turks

It was only since the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century that the Romanians started descending to the Banat plains: this tendency was strengthened only in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, after the liberation from the Ottomans<sup>60</sup> – although the Habsburg authorities frowned at it.<sup>61</sup> Luckily for historians, despite the administration that Joseph II compared to the Ottoman one,<sup>62</sup> settlement in the Northern parts of Yugoslavia is much better documented – even when it was partly spontaneous, as was the case with the Romanians. Furthermore, among the Banat Romanians memories have been preserved of how their ancestors had come to their present-day homeland.<sup>63</sup>

The first planned colonization of the Romanians was carried out in mid-18<sup>th</sup> century when the setting up of the Military Border began. At that time, the Romanians were settled in the Southern and Central part of the Yugoslav Banat.<sup>64</sup> During the colonization of the Germans around the river Moriš (Maros), the Romanians were settled around the river Begej (Bega), where they founded a number of villages. In the Southern Banat military authorities colonized the Romanians (sometimes together with Serbs or Germans, and sometimes alone) in the course of the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> and in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>65</sup> It took time before the Habsburg

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in 1658 on the next page! He also says the Romanians have inhabited only the Eastern Banat in the 16th century (p. 151). The same author claims the Romanians started immigrating after 1718 (p. 141), only to affirm afterwards: "Romanians are the older population of the Banat, especially in its eastern part" (p. 143.) This only goes to show how confused and contradictory nationalist historiography can be when it strives to prove tenets formulated in advance instead of seeking the truth.

- 60 Cf. Dušan Popović, *Srbi u Banatu do kraja XVIII veka. Istorija naselja i stanovništva*, Beograd 1955, p. 16. According to the ethnic make-up, in mid-18th century, the Banat could be divided in easternmost – predominantly inhabited by the Romanians, westernmost – predominantly inhabited by the Serbs, and the central zone between these two more or less ethnically pure extreme parts. (Cf. Dušan Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini, 2. Od Karlovačkog mira 1699. do Temišvarskog sabora 1790*, Novi Sad [1990] (2nd. ed.), p. 37.) Nikola Gavrilović claims the Romanians were the majority in the Banat already in 1719. (*Jurisdikcija Karlovačke mitropolije nad pravoslavnim Rumunima u Banatu, Krišani i Erdelju*, in: *Idem, Srbi i Rumuni. Srpsko-rumunske veze kroz vekove*, Beograd 1998, p.27.) The latter statement does not exclude the first one, especially if one considers the whole of the Banat.
- 61 Cvijić, *Balkansko poluostrvo*, p. 544; Jankulov, pp. 52-53; Simović, pp. 22-23; Mirjana Maluckova, *Narodna nošnja Rumuna u jugoslovenskom Banatu*, Novi Sad 1973, p. 13; Gligor Popi, *Rumuni u jugoslovenskom Banatu između dva rata (1918-1941)*, Novi Sad 1976, p. 4.
- 62 Antal Hegediš, *Josif II o svom putovanju u Banat 1768, Istraživanja*, 11, 1980, p. 230. (If such was the Habsburg administration, one can easily imagine what the local government in the Ottoman Empire was, and why the sources for many important phenomena and processes that went on there are lacking, or are extremely imprecise or contradictory.)
- 63 Maluckova, p. 13.
- 64 Wolf, p. 36. They were colonized in the Central Banat so as to prevent them from making an alliance with the Turks, as they had done in the war 1737-1739. (Aron Petrike, *Istorija veza rumunskog naroda sa narodima Jugoslavije*, in: *Istorija veza mađarskog, slovačkog i rumunskog naroda sa narodima Jugoslavije. Priručnik za nastavnike*, Novi Sad 1969, p. 167; Cf. Also Schwicker, p. 442.)
- 65 Popi, p. 5; Jankulov, p. 56; Petrike, p. 168; Branislav Bukurov, *Stanovništvo i naselja Potamišja*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za prirodne nauke*, 34, 1968, p. 28; Miloš Ratković, *Dolovo*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za prirodne nauke*, 57, 1979, pp. 233-234; Maluckova

authorities started accepting Romanians who were perceived as lazy, unreliable and addicted to plunder and liquor.<sup>66</sup> Partly because of this bad image<sup>67</sup> and partly because these bad characteristics were, to a degree, related to facts, and especially because they reduced their economic usefulness for the Viennese authorities, they, just like the Serbs, were subject to resettlement in order to make room for economically more useful Germans.<sup>68</sup>

Depending on where they came from, the Romanians in the Yugoslav Banat are distinguished as Banatians, Transylvanians and Oltenians.<sup>69</sup> Because they have been living together, except for differences in speech and costume, this division neither played a role in their history nor in their relations with other peoples. We shall shortly see that other peoples who came to settle down in the Vojvodina were also not identical in their geographic origin or religious affiliation.

The thing Albanians and Romanians have in common is that they descended from autochthonous populations of South-Eastern Europe. Their ancestry is questionable on certain points, although not nearly so as the question of their original homelands. In their maximalist demands, their intellectuals often tried to prove primacy and continuity of the settlement of their respective peoples in the parts of Yugoslav territory. Proofs for that are, however, slight. It should be pointed out that Albanian scholars and publicists were much more pertinacious in their endeavors. The reason lies in the fact that a much higher number of Albanians live in Kosovo and Western Macedonia compared to the number of Romanians in the Yugoslav part of the Banat. Furthermore, areas of former Yugoslavia inhabited by Albanians played incomparably more important role in the Albanian history than the role that the geographically, but also historically, rather peripheral Banat (and especially its Western part) played in the Romanian one. Besides, traditionally friendly relations between Yugoslavia and Romania between the World Wars and, most of the time, later on, have left more or less the matter of the Romanians of West Banat to the extremist press and jingoist associations which left almost no trace in publications with scholarly pretensions. As for the Romanians in the Yugoslav Banat, being numerically weak and for the greatest part peasants, unlike the newly-educated Albanian intellectuals after the Second

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(pp. 17-23) published a list of villages from which it can be seen that the Romanians had settled down in them mostly during 1740s and 1760s.

66 Hegediš, p. 210; Grisellini, pp. 151-155, 167-171, 213-242; Schwicker, pp. 307-313, 336-343; Mirko Mitrović, *Naseljavanje i kolonizacija Vojvodine 1690-1945*, *Godišnjak Društva istoričara SAP Vojvodine*, 1981, p. 202.

67 Romanians in Hungary retained this bad image also in the 19th century, with pretty much the same vices, which seem to suggest that such perception of them contained a grain of truth. (Cf. Mariann Nagy, *Nineteenth Century Hungarian Authors on Hungary's Ethnic Minorities*, in: Laszló Kontler (ed.), *Pride and Prejudice. National Stereotypes in 19th and 20th Century Europe East to West*, Budapest 1995, pp. 40-41.)

68 Nikola Petrović, *O nekim otvorenim i spornim pitanjima kolonizacije srednjeg Podunavlja u XVIII veku*, *JiČ*, 1-2, 1976, 32; Simović, p. 24; Vasilije Kolaković, *Naselje Ovča*, *Godišnjak grada Beograda*, VII, 1960, p. 116; Lazar Čelap, *Kolonizacija Nemaca u današnjoj Vojvodini 1790-1792*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 32-33, 1962, p. 115. Such transfers of Romanians and Serbs were undertaken only as an ultimate measure. (Wolf, pp. 41, 45-46.)

69 Maluckova, pp. 14-15; Idem, *Etnički odnosi Srba i Rumuna u Banatu*, in: *Etnički odnosi Srba sa drugim narodima*, p. 146.

World War, they had no opportunity to delve into high-brow questions of ethnogenesis, continuity or primacy.

The ethnic enclave of the Kočevje-Germans (Gottscheer) certainly cannot aspire to autochthony in their homeland, but it was, by all means, the oldest non-Yugoslav ethnic community in the Yugoslav territory which survived until the foundation of the common South-Slav state and of which it was at least approximately known when it came into being. It would not be incorrect to say that writing of the Slovenian and German historiography about Kočevje, together with their writing about the Slovene minority of Carinthia, is the most blatant example of a continued national struggle of these two peoples through scholarship and publicistics. The reasons are to be found in the bitterness with which intellectuals on both sides waged that struggle since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, as well as in the fact that Kočevje had been an ethnic island deep within the Slovenian national territory. The latter fact determined to a large degree the attitude of both parties concerning the importance of that enclave, which was to a large extent reflected in writings about it.

In geographical terms Kočevje comprises the territory of 800 km<sup>2</sup>, to the North-West of Novo Mesto, between the rivers Krka in the North and the Kupa in the South, and from the vineyards of Bela Krajina in the East to the highland of Central Carniola behind the Loški potok and Prezid in the West.<sup>70</sup> This area, which used to have somewhat broader confines, was settled with German peasants<sup>71</sup> by the counts of Ortenburg in the 14<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>72</sup> Both German and Slovenian authors agree on this. However, as far as the time of settlement is concerned, opinions differ, along the national lines.<sup>73</sup> Thus, the Slovenian authors claim main colonization took place between 1349 and 1363,<sup>74</sup> whereas the German ones strive to prove that as early as 1330s the number of Germans there had been considerable, since the information is preserved that in 1339 they asked to have a priest.<sup>75</sup> It is less contentious that the colonists came

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70 Kočevsko. Izgubljena kulturna dediščina kočevskih Nemcev/Gottschee. Das verlorene Kulturerbe der Gottscheer Deutschen, Ljubljana 1993, p. 14.

71 Hugo Grothe, *Deutsche Sprachinsel Gottschee in Slowenien*. Ein Beitrag zur Deutsch-tumskunde des europäischen Südostens, Münster in Westfalen 1931, p. 18; Herbert Otterstädt, *Gottschee. Verlorene Heimat deutscher Waldbauer*, Freilassing [1962], pp. 6-8; Idem, *Gottschee. Eine deutsche Volksinsel im Südosten*, Graz 1941, p. 9; Ivan Simonič, *Zgodovina kočevskega ozemlja*, in: *Kočevski zbornik. Razprave o Kočevski in njenih ljudeh*, Ljubljana 1939, pp. 51-58; *Jubiläums-Festbuch der Gottscheer-600-Jahresfeier*. Aus Anlaß des 600-jährigen Bestandes des Gottscheer Landes, [Kočevje 1930], pp. 39-42; *500 let mesta Kočevja*, [Kočevje 1971], pp. 8-10; Karl Schemitsch, *Das war Gottschee*, Landskron, Kitchener [1977], p. 18.

72 The probably most famous researcher of Kočevje, Hugo Grothe, deemed Kočevje had been settled through a long process of colonization between mid-13th and mid-15th century. (Grothe, p. 29.)

73 Grothe gives a survey of various phantastic theories according to which the Gottscheers were descendants of remnants of the Suevians, Goths, Kimbri, Vandals or other ancient Germanic tribes. (Grothe, pp. 31-36.) With part of German authors such theories could have been the product of scholarly curiosity, but also a means of proving German priority.

74 Kočevsko, p. 18. Simonič claims the colonization started around 1330 and that its main part was executed between 1350 and 1363. (Simonič, pp. 51-52.)

75 *Jubiläums-Festbuch*, p. 39; Schemitsch, p. 16; Otterstädt, *Gottschee. Eine deutsche Volksinsel*, p. 9. In this particular case, even in the context of nationality struggle, it is not clear why the difference of a few decades should be so important.

from Carinthia and Tyrol, and later on also from Thuringia, although the Slovenian authors do not miss the opportunity to point out that the Slovenes from Carinthia were also among the settlers.<sup>76</sup>

Opinions diverge most on the question whether Kočevje was inhabited at the time of the German colonization. The answer to this question logically calls for an answer to the following pertinent question: was it an ethnic island, as claimed by the German authors, or was it an ethnically mixed region, as insisted by the Slovenian authors?<sup>77</sup> The German authors claim Kočevje had been uninhabited when the Germans came.<sup>78</sup> On the other hand, their Slovenian counterparts claim it had been inhabited by Slovenes, albeit sparsely.<sup>79</sup> It is interesting to note how both parties try to document their respective theses adducing place-names, proving that they are predominantly Slovene or German. From those data, they deduce who had founded the given village. Another method for proving primacy used by some Slovenian authors, is using of folk costumes – which are, according to them, completely Slovene. According to them, this proves that the Slovenes had been the autochthonous population there and have been assimilated by the Germans, who in turn, took over Slovene costumes and folklore.<sup>80</sup> In order to underpin their claims to the German character of Kočevje, the German authors claim the Germans had been living around that area almost a hundred years before the colonization.<sup>81</sup>

Regardless of the degree of its “ethnic purity” and the exact date when the colonization began, the fact remains, it managed to endure as predominantly German ethnic island in the Slovenian sea, managing to Germanize a large number of Slovenes who came to settle there over the centuries. In that respect this last fruit of the German agrarian colonization<sup>82</sup> in the Slovenian lands resembled predominantly German towns in Slovenian territory, which preserved their German character until 1918. When the agrarian colonization from the outside ended around 1400, the internal colonization of German peasants ensued during the next couple of centuries. But much earlier the influx of German burghers into towns in Slovenian lands began.

Most of the towns in Slovenia were founded by Germans, that is, by German feudal lords who had controlled the whole Slovenian ethnic territory.<sup>83</sup> To their

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76 500 let, p. 9.

77 Among other things, the ethnically mixed make-up of Kočevje was being proven by minute analysis of the number of Germans from ethnically pure and mixed marriages; the latter were, to be sure, excluded from the German national minority. (Tone Zorn, *Narodnostni podatki kočevskega območja po podatkih narodnega katastra iz leta 1936*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XXVI, 3-4, 1972; Dušan Biber, *Kočevski Nemci med obema vojnama*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XVII, 1963, p. 26.)

78 Otterstädt, Gottschee. *Verlorene Heimat*, pp. 6-7; Idem, Gottschee. *Eine deutsche Volksinsel*, p. 10; Schemitsch, p. 15.

79 Simonič, pp. 45-46; Jože Rus, *Jedro kočevskega vprašanja*. *Zgodovina, sedajnost in bodočnost kočevskega gospodarstva in njegovih prirodnih in socialnih podlag*, in: *Kočevski zbornik*, pp. 131-133; S. Šantel, *O izvoru kočevske narodne noše*, in: *Kočevski zbornik*, p. 347; 500 let, p. 8; Kočevsko, p. 18.

80 Šantel, o.c.; Rus, p. 134; Ivan Koštial, *O Kočevcih in kočevščini*, in: *Kočevski zbornik*, p. 324.

81 Otterstädt, Gottschee. *Verlorene Heimat*, 6; *Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtums* (henceforth: HWBGAD) III, Breslau 1938, p. 60.

82 500 let, p. 11; Kočevsko, p. 18; Simonič, p. 61.

83 So for example, in Carniola twelve of the most important towns (including Ljubljana (Laibach) and Kranj (Krainburg)) were founded by German nobility from 12th century

lands they were bringing peasants – Germans and Slovenes, but also burghers – chiefly Germans. Whereas the German agrarian population dispersed among the majority Slovenes<sup>84</sup> was gradually assimilated by the latter by the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century, the German town-dwellers survived until the foundation of Yugoslavia, and even later. This particularly held true for Lower Styrian towns of Celje (Cilli), Ptuj (Petau) and especially Maribor (Marburg) (that was closest to compact German ethnic territory), but partly also for Ljubljana and some smaller towns deep within the Slovene ethnic territory.<sup>85</sup> Slovenian scholars and national champions have always been deeply frustrated by the German character of Slovenian towns<sup>86</sup> which these preserved well into 19<sup>th</sup> century, and partly into 20<sup>th</sup> too. For that reason they strove to underplay the German features of Slovenian towns – in their own time, as well as in the more distant past. Slavization of the towns which came about only in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, was predated to Middle Ages or early Modern Age.<sup>87</sup>

Thanks to the archival documents one can observe the continuous influx of the German population into Slovenian towns until 20<sup>th</sup> century, but also the process of Germanization of the Slovene inhabitants of these towns.<sup>88</sup> This process was above all connected to upward social mobility and the influence of the environment. Political

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onward. (HWBGAD, III, Breslau 1938, p. 322.) The towns of Maribor (Marburg) and Ptuj (Petau) were also founded by the Germans. (Doris Kraft, *Das untersteierische Drauland. Deutsches Grenzland zwischen Unterdrauburg und Marburg*, München 1935, p. 127.)

- 84 INJ, I, pp. 753-756; HWBGAD, III, pp. 317-320; Kraft, p. 128. About mutual assimilation processes and gradual shrinking of the Slovene ethnic territory from 10<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> centuries, see: Milko Kos, *Kolonizacija i germanizacija slovenske zemlje*, *Historijski zbornik*, IV, 1-4, 1951. About the settlement and asimilation of German peasantry in Carniola see: Balduin Saria, *Die mittelalterliche deutsche Besiedlung in Krain*, in: *Gedenkschrift für Harold Steinacker (1875-1965)*, München 1966, pp. 85-94.

- 85 Saria, p. 102.

- 86 This however was not particular to Slovenian lands – most of the towns in the Habsburg Monarchy had German character until the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century, thanks to German and Germanized population, as well as to the Jews of German language and culture. (A.J.P. Taylor, *Habzburška monarhija 1809-1918*, Zagreb 1990, pp. 32-33.) Ferdo Šišić wrote: "As late as the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century some towns in Croatia, such as Zagreb, Varaždin or Osijek, were so infested with Germanness, that a foreigner couldn't tell if he was in a Slavic country or not." (*Biskup Štrosmajer i jugoslavenska misao*, I, Beograd 1922, p. 25.)

- 87 Thus Janko Orožen tries hard to prove the bearers of German names in the mediaeval Celje had actually not been Germans but Slovenes. (*Zgodovina Celja in okolice*, I, Celje 1971, p. 269.) Although names are by no means certain proof of nationality of their bearers, the fact remains that Slovene names appear in the lists of the town officials only since the second half of 18<sup>th</sup> century. (*Ibid.*, pp. 349-350.) Fran Kovačič proceeds in the same way. (*Slovenska Štajerska in Prekmurje. Zgodovinski opis*, Ljubljana 1926, p. 220.) The official "Istorija naroda Jugoslavije" claims the Slovenes were the majority of the town populations. (pp. 758, 772.)

- 88 In Maribor there was a Windische Gasse in 1317, which testifies to the presence of Slovenian inhabitants in the town. (Jože Mlinarič, *Maribor do začetka 17. stoletja*, *Kronika*, XXXI, 2-3, 1983, p. 131.) Ptuj, being smaller and with much weaker Slovene imigration, preserved longer and easier its German character. (Bogo Grafenauer, *Ptuj v Srednjem veku*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XXIV, 3-4, 1970. Cf. also: Janez Cvritn, *Trdnjavski trikotnik. Politična orijentacija Nemcev na spodnjem Štajerskem (1861-1914.)*, Maribor 1997, pp. 10-11.)



and ideological affinity was a major factor in Germanization of Slovenian newcomers in 19<sup>th</sup> century. The liberal bourgeoisie, German and Germanized, sailed under the German banner, and the same was true of Social-Democracy. Conservatism remained as the trade mark of the Slovenian national movement which lacked a stronger bourgeoisie and which was therefore led predominantly by Catholic clergy. This won many a liberal Slovene over to the German national camp, which deliberately boasted of its liberalism.<sup>89</sup>

How important these factors have been was proven by the last Austrian census which recorded, apart from the language of communication, the place of origin. Based on these data, Slovenian scholars strove to prove that the majority of Germans in Slovenian towns had actually been "nemčuri" or »nemškiutari", i.e., Slovenes who, for various reasons, declared themselves Germans.<sup>90</sup> This opting for German nationality was often one-sidedly construed as a consequence of economic and other pressure, or as caused by the school.<sup>91</sup> Others, however, correctly marked the importance of upward social mobility for linguistic and national assimilation.<sup>92</sup> For Slovenian national awakeners, the "nemčuri" were a red rag, just like the "arnautaši" for their Serbian opposite numbers. As shall be shown later in this work, Slovenian origin of part of the Germans in Slovenia or apostasy on part of the Slovenes, served as one of the excuses for intolerant Slovenian national policy towards the German minority during the inter-war period.

Together with assimilation of the immigrant Slovenes, the German population of bigger towns was renewed by continuous influx of bureaucrats, military officers, businessmen and workers. During the era of nationalism in 19<sup>th</sup> century, the immigration was strongest in Maribor for two reasons. On the one hand, the town was closest to the compact German ethnic area: on the other, unlike other predominantly German towns, it was a big industrial center, attracting a large German, but also Slovenian labor force.<sup>93</sup> Skilled workers were German or Germanized, whereas Slovenian newcomers were unskilled, and for greater part, without a national consciousness. Together with economic dependence, Slovenian workers were influenced by daily use of

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89 Bruno Hartman, *Kulturni tokovi v Mariboru in njegovem zaledju med vojnama*, Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje, LIV, 1-2, 1983, p. 234; Cvirn, pp. 56, 75, 105, 125.

90 Vlado Valenčič, *Etnična struktura ljubljanskega prebivalstva po ljudskem štetju 1880*, Zgodovinski časopis, XXVIII, 3-4, 1974, pp. 295-299. Valenčič concluded that one third of the population which has declared itself German, originated from non-German regions. (p. 300.) Anton Melik came to similar conclusions analyzing the data of the 1900 census. He deduced that in Maribor, Celje and Ptuj, which were the towns with German majority and highest percentage of German population in Slovenian lands, 71%, 63,12%, and 69,63% of the population originated from predominantly Slovene areas. (Nemci u Sloveniji. Prilikom opštih izbora u Mariboru, Celju i Ptuj, Letopis Matice srpske, knj. 303, sv. 1, 1925, p. 68.) One should however bear in mind that these estimates concerned all the inhabitants of these towns, where not all citizens declared German nationality. In Maribor the ratio of Germans and Slovenes was 27.994 : 22.653; in Ptuj 3.672 : 608; in Celje 6.919 : 4.625. (Ibid.) Matijaž Klemenčič came to the same results. (Germanizacijski procesi na Štajerskem od srede 19. stoletja do prve svetovne vojne, Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje, L, 1-2, 1972, p. 368.)

91 Kovačič, p. 337.

92 Melik, p. 67; Orožen, II, p. 43.

93 Milko Kos rightly noticed the importance of large industrial centres for Germanization. (Kos, p. 18.)

the German language, as well as the German-tinged Social Democracy whose influence contributed to blunting the national consciousness of Slovenian workers and a gradual Germanization.<sup>94</sup>

On the German side, such tendencies were deliberately encouraged. They wanted to completely Germanize Maribor, but also to narrow the Slovenian ethnic gap which separated it from the compact German-speaking territory.<sup>95</sup> Not only “a bridge to Maribor” was wanted, but also further towards the Adriatic Sea. Such plans were popularized especially by a German nationalist organization called the “Südmark”, founded in Graz in 1889 in order to protect the endangered German diaspora in the South, as well as in order to preserve German hegemony in predominantly German or mixed areas of Austria.<sup>96</sup> This association, which was by no means unique, wanted to build its “bridge towards the Adriatic” by colonizing Germans from Germany. In order to do that it undertook concrete steps to raise money, buy farms and bring in the colonists between Šent Ilj and Maribor.<sup>97</sup> The results of this colonization 1906-1914 were rather modest,<sup>98</sup> and in the last resort, served more to awaken Slovenian fears, than to realize the plans of German nationalists.

Since Slovenian lands were part of the Habsburg Empire for centuries, and stood under domination of nobility and officialdom, and later on also of bourgeoisie of German descent or at least of German language, the influx of Germans into the Slovenian territory was steady, although not overly strong. In the territories which remained outside Yugoslavia in 1918, with the aid of schools, economic, social, cultural, political and other factors, in the course of the second half of 19th century it pushed to the South the Northern Slovenian ethnic border in Carinthia which had been constant ever since 15th century.<sup>99</sup> Immigration in the Slovenian ethnic territory, coupled with the above-mentioned factors, helped preserve predominantly German character of at least some towns – especially in Lower Styria. The Germans received further reinforcements through quiet assimilation of Slovenes – above all in towns and especially among the upper strata. However, it would be wrong to ascribe the immigration of the German population throughout the centuries and even in 19th century, to some deliberate attempt at Germanization. Indeed, the greater part of German and other migrations was the consequence of economic, political, military and other needs of the powers-that-be, as

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94 Emin Kržičnik, *Gospodarski razvoj Maribora. Gradivo k zgodovini industrijalizacije mesta Maribora*, Maribor 1956, p. 22; Tone Petek, *Kratek etnološki oris železničarske kolonije Studenci v Mariboru*, *Kronika*, XXXI, 2-3, 1983, pp. 197-200.

95 Klemenčič, p. 364.

96 Eduard G. Staudinger, *Die Südmark. Aspekte der Programmatik und Struktur eines deutschen Schutzvereins in der Steiermark bis 1914*, in: Helmut Rumppler, Arnold Suppan (eds.), *Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Slowenien 1848-1941*, Wien, München 1988; Günter Schödl, *Varianten deutscher Nationalpolitik vor 1918. Zur politische Organisationen und Programmbildung deutscher Minderheiten in Ost- und Südosteuropa*, *Südostdeutsches Archiv*, XXII-XXIII, 1979/80. Special importance of Maribor for the Südmark can be discerned from the fact that its second largest library (out of 162) was in that town. (Bruno Hartman, “Südmarkini” knjižnici v Mariboru, *Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje*, LIV, 1-2, 1983, p. 150.)

97 Staudinger, pp. 137-138, 145-147.

98 During this period 435 colonists were settled down. (Ibid., p. 146.)

99 Kos, p. 17.

well as of the needs of the migrating people themselves. Since the Germans had been the leading cultural, economic and political factor in the old Austria, their migrations often left a much deeper impact than migrations of other peoples. In the predominantly Slovenian territory, German peasant colonists completely assimilated with the Slovenes until the end of 19th century, whereas large portion of the Germans in the towns, who immigrated only recently, emigrated or were sent packing by the new authorities after the foundation of Yugoslavia - as we shall see in one of the following chapters.

The Turks are chronologically the next group of non-Yugoslav population which moved in to the territory of Yugoslavia. They were first mentioned in 9th century. These were so called Vardar-Turks, as well as the Turks around Ohrid. Being Christians, they gradually merged with the local Slavic population.<sup>100</sup> As for the Turkish population that lived in the Yugoslav territory at the time the state was founded, due to lack of sources, little is known about its immigration.<sup>101</sup> Therefore the literature about them - and above all about the time of their settlement - is contradictory. Especially contentious is the colonization of the so-called Juruks, a nomadic, cattle-breeding tribe from Asia Minor. "The History of the Macedonian People" puts their arrival at the end of 14<sup>th</sup> or beginning of 15<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>102</sup> "The History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia, II" at the end of 14<sup>th</sup> century,<sup>103</sup> whereas the well-known Macedonian geographer Jovan Trifunovski claims they came only in 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>104</sup> It is possible that this difference in dating was caused by the existence of several waves of colonization, but this supposition is yet to be checked. In any case, they had been colonized because of their intractability in their Asiatic homeland, which could be of service to the Ottoman authorities in the newly conquered European regions. Although their transfer had not always been voluntary, the Ottoman government colonized them along the strategic routes: above all around the Vardar and the main roads (Drama-Ser-Petrič-Strumica-Štip-Skopje), but also around Kičevo, Prilep, Bitola, Dojran, Valandovo, Vinica, Kočani, Sv. Nikola (in Ovče Polje) and Kumanovo, as well as in the enclaves around Kavadar, Veles and Gostivar.<sup>105</sup> According to Trifunovski, the Juruks were settled in the Macedonian villages which had become vacant long before.<sup>106</sup> That author deems that another Turkish group, the Konjari (allegedly named after the town of Konya in Asia Minor) came only later. They were settled around Prilep, Kumanovo, Skopje etc.<sup>107</sup>

Probably less contentious is the immigration of the urban Turks who started coming ever since the beginning of the Ottoman domination as officials, soldiers, merchants, artisans, servants etc. In that way Skopje, Ćustendil, Štip, Bitola (Bitolj,

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100 Hadži-Vasiljević, Muslimani, pp. 21, 90.

101 Stojanovski (ed.), p. 81; Jovan Trifunovski, O Turcima u SR Makedoniji, Geografski preglad, X, 1966, p. 141.

102 Stojanovski (ed.), p. 83. Limanoski basically agrees with this view. (Limanoski, pp. 177-178.)

103 INJ, II. P. 49.

104 Jovan Trifunovski, Tursko stanovništvo u SR Makedoniji, Novopazarski zbornik, 10, 1986, p. 132; Idem, Albansko stanovništvo, p. 30.

105 Stojanovski (ed.), pp. 85-88; Trifunovski, Tursko stanovništvo, p. 133; Idem, Maloazijsko stanovništvo u Valandovsko-đevdelijskoj koltlini, Novopazarski zbornik, 15, 1991, p. 80; A. Jovanović (ed.), p. 389.

106 Trifunovski, Maloazijsko stanovništvo, p. 81.

107 Trifunovski, O Turcima, p. 141.

formerly Monastir) got their predominantly Turkish populations during 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>108</sup>

The last wave of Turkish colonization took place in 1878. The Ottoman Empire lost large territories then, and a considerable number of Muslims, many ethnic-Turks among them, left their homes in Bulgaria, Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina seeking refuge partly in Macedonia too. These refugees settled down in Macedonian towns, but they also founded some new Turkish villages. They increased the number of Turks in Skopje and Kumanovo and their vicinity, but also around Štip, Bitola, Kočani, Kavadar etc. Among these "muhachirs" there were also some families of Albanian, Cherkes and other ethnic background.<sup>109</sup>

When one deals with the Turks in Macedonia, together with the urban population, the Juruks and Konjari, one should also mention the so-called Čitaks. To all appearances, they are muslim Slavs turned Turks. They speak a turkish dialect garnished with many Slavic words, but they consider themselves full-fledged Turks.<sup>110</sup> Although their relations with the Juruks were not friendly, mixing occurred – which probably explains their ethnogenesis.

Just like in the case of other ethnic groups, the number of Turks increased through assimilation of people from other nationalities. This held true particularly for Albanian, Slav and other Muslims in towns of Kosovo and Macedonia.<sup>111</sup> Therefore, according to its make-up and origins, the Turkish population of Yugoslavia was as heterogeneous as that of other non-Yugoslav (and indeed Yugoslav) populations. Unlike some other minority communities, by 1918, the Turks have already been numerically considerably weakened by the emigration during the First Balkan War. By the time of the foundation of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes considerable part of their 250 villages<sup>112</sup> were partly or completely empty.

The colonization that was not only better recorded, but that can practically be reconstructed from year to year, with all the institutions and more or less known personages who took part in its preparation and execution, is the Habsburg colonization of (Southern) Hungary. It was one of the great settlement schemes in the Europe of 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> century. This, however, does not imply it has been completely consistent. In principle, the goals were clear enough: a vast and potentially economically profitable area had to be populated. As to how to achieve that, the opinions differed. Various interests were involved: those of the Court, the Court Chamber, the Army, the Roman-Catholic Church, private landowners, big stock merchants, manufacturers, some high state officials, the local population, and finally, those of the colonists themselves. Various parties involved in the planning and executing of the colonization had their own partial goals, often in collision with one another. Because of all this, the colonization was, despite its clear main goal, full of contradictions, halts and

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108 Limanoski, p. 178; Stojanovski (ed.), pp. 300-301.

109 Trifunski, O Turcima, p. 141.

110 Limanoski, p. 184; Галаба Паликрушева, Етнографске особености на македонските Јуруци, in: Етногенеза на Јуруците и нивното населување на Балканот, Скопје 1986, pp. 71-73; A. Jovanović (ed.), pp. 491-493.

111 Trifunski, Zapadna Makedonija, p. 652; Jovan Hadži Vasiljević, Muslimani, p. 41; Limanoski, p. 226.

112 Trifunski, Tursko stanovništvo, p. 133; Jovan Hadži-Vasiljević, Grad Bitolj (from: "Kroz Staru Srbiju i Makedoniju") Beograd 1911, p. 35.

setbacks.<sup>113</sup> In the first part of this chapter, we have dealt with the settlement of the Romanians – which was, just like the settlement of the Serbs, a mix of spontaneity and planned population policy of the Viennese authorities – and below we shall deal with the colonization of Germans, Magyars, Slovaks, Ruthenians and other less numerous populations, who through 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries had settled in what later became known under the name of the Vojvodina. One should however, bear in mind, that at that time no one saw that region as something apart: the colonization in Southern Hungary took place in the same way as in other parts of the country. Only the situation of the Military Border and the Banat, which was gained only in 1718 by the peace treaty of Passarowitz (Požarevac) and joined to the rest of Hungary in 1779, was somewhat particular. Its characteristics were prevention of Hungarian colonization, and greater presence of Serbs and Romanians, as well as the larger direct control of the Viennese court. Still, the colonization of all Hungarian territories should be seen as a whole, regardless of local differences and breaks over time. Finally, the colonization of Southern Hungary (and neighboring Eastern Syrmium) should be regarded as part of a longer colonization process which spilled over into Western Syrmium and Slavonia in the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century. Together with supplementary colonization organized by the Hungarian government in the last third of 19<sup>th</sup> century, this settlement would give the Vojvodina and Slavonia the make-up that would last until the Second World War.

After the successful Great Viennese War (1683-1699) the Habsburg Court was enriched by spacious new territories: central Hungary, Slavonia, part of Syrmium, the Bačka, Baranya,<sup>114</sup> part of the Banat, Partium and Transylvania. To these territories the rest of Syrmium, a greater part of the Banat and Northern Serbia were added in 1718. Parts of historical Hungary recovered, thanks to successful wars, were in no envious condition. What the Ottoman authorities did not neglect was to a great extent destroyed in war or in Rakoczy's uprising, of 1703-1711.<sup>115</sup> The Muslim population

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113 Cf. Wolf, p. 40. For the still best survey of different aspects of the colonization of Hungary see: Konrad Schünemann, *Österreichs Bevölkerungspolitik unter Maria Theresia*, I, Berlin [1935]. Unfortunately, the second volume of this master-piece never came out.

114 The whole of Baranya comprises a much larger territory than was allotted to Yugoslavia after the First World War.

115 The thesis of more or less devastated South Hungary see in: Schünemann, pp. 66. 73; Anton Tafferner, *Quellenbuch zur donauschwäbische Geschichte*, Stuttgart 1977, p. XXXII; Čelap, p. 115; Zrenjanin, Zrenjanin 1966, p. 35; D. Popović, *Srbi*, II, pp. 26-27, 40; Imre Wellmann, *Die erste Epoche der Neubesiedlung Ungarns nach der Türkenzeit (1711-1761)*, *Acta Historica*, XXVI, 1980, p. 241; Šandor Mesaroš, *Položaj Mađara u Vojvodini 1918-1929*, Novi Sad 1981, p. 7; Erik Roth, *Die planmäßig angelegte Siedlung im Deutsch-Banater Militärbezirk 1765-1821*, München 1988, pp. 26, 51; Ladislaus Michael Weifert, *Beiträge zur Mercyschen Besiedlung des Banats*, in: *Gedenkschrift für Harold Steinacker (1875-1965)*, München 1966, p. 133; M. Mitrović, p. 197; Slavko Gavrilović, *Rusini u Bačkoj i Sremu od sredine XVIII do sredine XIX veka*, *Godišnjak Društva istoričara Vojvodine*, Novi Sad 1977, p. 153; basically also Gačeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 8. There are however, authors who do not share this, in the relevant literature predominant, opinion: Cf. Felix Lackner, *Rumänische und deutsche Siedlungsbewegungen im Banat, ihre Beziehungen und gegenseitige Bedingtheit*, *Südostdeutsches Archiv*, XVII-XVIII, 1974/1975, p. 75; Gerhard Seewann, *Serbische Süd-Nord-Migrationen in Südosteuropa als Voraussetzung für die deutsche Ansiedlung im 18. Jahrhundert*, in: *A Kárpát-Medence vonzásában Pécs* 2001, p. 441.) Quoting some eyewitnesses, Nikola Petrović even claims the Banat had been a

withdrew, and the Christian one was few and far between, half-nomadic, cattle-breeding, and “schismatic” at that. The newly acquired territories were to be capacitated to be of economic and military use to the new powers, but the population at their disposal did not measure up – neither in quality nor in quantity.<sup>116</sup> Because of such a state of affairs, a Commission was set up in Vienna already during the war in 1688, which, under the influence of cameralists, drew a colonization plan for the new territories. The Commission proposed settlement of the Germans “so that the Kingdom, or at least its large parts, be gradually Germanized and Hungarian blood prone to unrest and revolt be tempered with German and thus led into assiduous fidelity and love for its natural (sic!) hereditary king.” Hungarian nobility, headed by the palatine, protested vehemently against such “attack on the Hungarian nation”. What hurt them more than the national sting was the limitation of corvee, or compulsory labor to just three days, greater judicial and ownership rights of the serfs, but most of all, the infamous proposal that the land of the nobility too should be subject to taxation. The Hungarian Diet also issued a sharp protest in 1689, so the whole scheme was eventually dropped.<sup>117</sup>

The real colonization began only under Charles VI, and was continued with increased intensity under his heirs Maria Theresa (1740-1780), Joseph II (1780-1790), Leopold II (1790-1792). The later colonization in early 19<sup>th</sup> century was but a conclusion of the one from the previous century, and it was partly only internal. The goal here will not be to describe again in detail its course and the way it was executed, since this is not very important for our topic, and since a whole library exists about that subject already. We shall confine ourselves to sketching its main features, minding especially certain phenomena and processes which had left a lasting mark on the inter-ethnic relations in Southern Hungary and which, in the last resort, coupled with other factors influenced the situation of the immigrant population which became national minorities after the First World War.

The Colonization of Hungary is usually divided according to rulers under which it had taken place, although (except for Joseph II) they did not play the main role in its planning and execution. Charles VI was the first to start bringing Germans from Southwestern Germany. The first came in 1712, and a somewhat larger group in 1716-1718. These first colonists were men of the army, veterans, military artisans

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flourishing province ruined by the Austrians’ mismanagement. (Petrović, p. 26.) Wolf believes the Banat became pretty desolate, but not to the degree some other authors had claimed. (Wolf, pp. 30-32.)

116 We have already seen what opinion of the Romanians prevailed, and the Serbs enjoyed no better reputation, except as soldiers. (Cf. Hegediš, pp. 210, 233; Seewann, pp. 432-433, 436, 438, 441; Popović, *Srbi*, II, pp. 33-34; Franc Štefan Engel, *Opis kraljevine Slavonije i vojvodstva Srema*, Zbornik Matice srpske za jezik i književnost, knj. 19, sv. 2, 1971, p. 309; Leonhard Böhm, *Geschichte des Temeser Banats*, I, Leipzig 1861, pp. 214-215; *Ibid.*, II, pp. 205-211, 217.)

117 *INJ*, II, p. 808; John O. Spielman, *Leopold I of Austria*, New Brunswick 1977, pp. 178-180. Similar ideas about running the German wedge between the Hungarians and the Turks were shared by the then most important Austrian general, prince Eugene of Savoy. (Cf. Roth, p. 27; Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 7.) There were also many others who pleaded for the same solution. (Cf. Reimund Friedrich Kaindl, *Die Deutschen in Osteuropa*, Leipzig 1916, p. 96; G[eza] C. Paikert, *The Danube Swabians. German Populations in Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia and Hitler’s Impact on Their Patterns*, The Hague 1967, p. 19.)

etc.<sup>118</sup> The first German colonists came to the Darda manor in 1713, and also to the estate of Prince Eugene of Savoy after 1714. Their immigration would continue for the next fifteen odd years.<sup>119</sup> In the first half of 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Germans settled in larger towns of Eastern Slavonia (Osijek, Vukovar, Virovitica), but in that region they started coming to villages only in 1760s and 1770s – usually to manor villages.<sup>120</sup> In 1717-1719 miners, craftsmen and peasants from Bohemia, Carniola, Silesia, from the upper Danube and the middle Rhine came to the Western Banat. Soon afterwards, in the provincial capital Temeswar (Timisoara) a population commission was founded, and already in 1723-1724 larger groups of Germans came to Bela Crkva, Vršac and Bečkerek (today: Zrenjanin). Together with them, Spaniards and Italians meant to develop the silk industry were also settled. All the colonists, and especially the latter, had difficulties adapting to the climate, so most of them died from diseases.<sup>121</sup> As for the colonization of Hungarian peasants, who would probably better survive the prevailing living conditions, it was avoided under Charles VI and Maria Theresa (in the Banat) because they had been viewed as politically unreliable,<sup>122</sup> but also in order not to weaken Hungary economically.<sup>123</sup> Colonization of the privileged German settlers, who were exempted from many obligations incumbent on the “nationalists” (as the Habsburg authorities used to call Serbs and Romanians) during the first years, scared the natives and spurred many to flee to Serbia or Valachia, for fear of having to bear all obligations alone.<sup>124</sup>

During the first wave of colonization between 10,000 and 12,000 Germans were settled – in the Western Banat in most cases in or by Serbian settlements.<sup>125</sup> The majority of the first colonists were unskilled at agriculture and were no great asset for the economy. The plague and marauding raids of Turks and Romanians during the unsuccessful war with Turkey 1737-1739 swept away most of these colonists from the Southern Banat – except for those in larger settlements.<sup>126</sup> Most of the survivors

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118 Sonja Jordan, *Die kaiserliche Wirtschaftspolitik im Banat im 18. Jahrhundert*, München 1967, p. 21; Jankulov, p. 7.

119 Tri stoljeća Belja, Osijek 1986, pp. 47-48.

120 Egon Lendl, *Die Stellung des Slawoniendeutschtums unter den südostdeutschen Volksinseln*, *Der Auslandsdeutsche*, XX, 4, 1937, p. 203; Nikola Gačeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Sremu 1919-1941*, Novi Sad 1975, p. 12.

121 Jordan, p. 25; Popović, *Srbi*, II, p. 39; Jankulov, p. 8.

122 Popović, *Srbi*, II, p. 45; Wolf, p. 51.

123 Jankulov, p. 45. Realizing the need for colonization and higher reliability and productivity of German peasants as compared to their Hungarian counterparts, Hungarian nobility also sought German settlers in the first decades of 18th century. (Cf. Schünemann, p. 184; Wellmann, p. 252; Josef Volkmar Senz, *Die Deutschen im Batscher Land. Pioniere und Märtyrer des Abendlandes im europäischen Südosten*, Wien 1984, p. 38; Paikert, p. 18.)

124 Popović, II, p. 44; Jankulov, pp. 9-10. This fear was by no means groundless. (Cf. Wellmann, p. 263.)

125 The original idea was that Germans should teach Serbs to till the land, but due to mutual strife, the outcome was often ousting of Serbian stock-breeders by German peasants. (Wellmann, pp. 256, 262; Seewann, pp. 421, 437-438.) These goings-on left a lasting mark on inter-ethnic relations, and Serbian politicians in the inter-war Yugoslavia often raised the point when they wanted to harangue against the German minority.

126 Popović, *Srbi*, II, p. 43; Wellmann, p. 265; Felix Milleker, *Die erste organisierte deutsche Kolonisation des Banats unter Mercy 1722-1726*, Vršac 1923, pp. 8-9; HWBGAD, I, Bresalu 1933, pp. 223-224.

fled to the North or to the Northwest.<sup>127</sup> As for the Bačka very few Germans were settled there during the reign of Charles VI. Since it had for greatest part been divided among Hungarian nobles, there was no important state colonization of the Germans there until 1749. Instead, many Hungarian peasants were colonized there, especially on the large estates of the Catholic Church and Hungarian feudal lords, but also on the cameral estates.<sup>128</sup> Under Charles VI the first Slovaks were colonized in Bajša.<sup>129</sup> In Syrmium, just as in the Bačka, few German veterans were settled in Schwabendorf by Sremska Kamenica, whereas count Schönborn colonized Germans from the middle Rhine in Zemun,<sup>130</sup> and count Pejačević in Ruma.<sup>131</sup> In Syrmium archbishop of Kalocsa colonized Ruthenians converted to Catholicism in Petrovci, Mikloševci, Bačinci, and mostly in Šid in 1746.<sup>132</sup> Together with all these settlers, the Habsburg catastrophe of 1737-1739 brought to Syrmium a group of Albanian Kelmendi, headed by captain Atanasije Rašković, which, after a protracted wandering and moving from place to place, finally settled down in Hrtkovci and Nikinci in 1755, where they were gradually Croatized.<sup>133</sup>

During the reign of Maria Theresa colonization was continued along the same lines as under Charles VI, albeit in accordance with the changed strategic and economic situation. Great wars at battlefields all over Europe demanded economic strengthening of the Monarchy in a world where waging of wars was increasingly dependant on material resources. An important role in the economic strengthening of the financially hard-pressed state was assigned to the colonization. Furthermore, Hungarian magnates, increasingly prone to luxury, also strove to augment their revenues, and the brisk sale of foodstuffs during the war years spurred them to colonize in order to enhance agrarian production.<sup>134</sup> They, like the Viennese Court, turned to recruiting German peasants who were considered more productive and more obedient than the Hungarian peasantry who were filled with the kurucz spirit of rebellion. At that time

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127 Jankulov, p. 11.

128 Ibid, p. 45.

129 Popović, Srbi, II, 46; Jankulov, p. 60.

130 Milan Šenoa, Doseljavanje tuđinaca u Srijem, Rad JAZU, knj. 201, razredi historičko-filološki i filozofičko-juridički, Zagreb 1914, p. 4; Jankulov, pp. 12-13.

131 Hermann Haller, Karl Bischof, Zur Entstehung der deutschen Stadt Ruma im Rahmen des Syrmiendeutschthums, Deutsches Archiv für Landes- und Volksforschung, IV, 2, 1940, pp. 295-297. The Germans in Ruma received a reinforcement in 1786. (Ibid., pp. 301-302.) Despite Serbian influx, the town gradually developed into the most important German settlement in Syrmium. (Ibid., p. 284.) About the colonization of Ruma see also: Slavko Gavrilović, Naseljavanje Nemaca u Rumi u doba Josifa II, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 11, 1975; Šenoa, p. 6. These two authors deem Germans came to Ruma only under Joseph II.

132 Jankulov, p. 62.

133 Popović, Srbi, II, p. 51; Frok Zefiq, Albanci Klementinci u Hrtkovcima i Nikincima (1737-1997), Zagreb 1997; Slavko Gavrilović, O naseljavanju srpske milicije i Klimenta u Sremu, Istorijski časopis, IX-X, 1959; Rizaj, o.c.; Luka Kostić, Ustanak Srba i Arbanasa u Staroj Srbiji protiv Turaka 1737-1739 i seoba u Ugarsku, Glasnik Srpskog naučnog društva, VII-VIII, 1930, pp. 219-226; Fr. Š. Kuhač, Die Albanesen in Slavonien, Ethnographische Mitteilungen aus Ungarn, II, 5, 6-8, 1891; Engel, pp. 310-311; Šenoa, p. 5. The unsuccessful outcome of this war brought to the three Banat villages a small group of Roman-Catholic Bulgarians from Valachia. (M. Mitrović, p. 205; Jankulov, pp. 56-57.)

134 Schünemann, pp. 107-108.



the Slovaks, who have been considered almost as desirable as the Germans, were settled down at the manor of Futog, in Bački Petrovac and Bezdan.<sup>135</sup> The colonization of Hungarians in the Bačka was started by archbishop of Kalocsa Imre Csaki, and his example was emulated by the Hungarian Chamber (an apology for a national government).<sup>136</sup> Nevertheless, the early Theresian colonization (1740-1749) was not overly great either in scope or in the quality of the settlers, who were recruited partly among the poor and partly among the deported riff-raff.<sup>137</sup> Moreover, the stock-breeders' lobby in the Banat temporarily got the upper hand so that the colonization there soon came almost to a halt.<sup>138</sup>

The war because of the Pragmatic Sanction and the Seven Years' War have put additional strain on the already overburdened finances of the Habsburg Empire. This spurred a larger, so-called Mid-Theresian colonization (1749-1772). Furthermore, settling of loyal Catholic elements, coupled with improved education, had to ideologically fortify the "patched Monarchy".<sup>139</sup> Just as the wars with the Ottoman Empire had increased the importance of the Banat, the wars in the West and in Central Europe have upgraded the importance of the Bačka,<sup>140</sup> for whose colonization two conflicting plans were made. The first one was by count Antal Grassalkovich, the president of the Hungarian Chamber, and the second one by Baron Anton Cothmann, president of the Impopulation Commission of the Hungarian Chamber. The first of the two dignitaries, being a Hungarian and having landed estates in the Bačka, favored more Hungarian and local interests. He was in favor of a slower colonization that would gradually turn Hungary from a cattle-raising into a land-tilling nation.<sup>141</sup> Agriculture was to be developed along the rivers Tisa (Tisza) and the Danube, whereas the upcountry would be

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135 Rudolf Bednarik, *Slovaci v Juhoslavii. Materialy k ich hmotnej a duchovnej kulture*, Bratislava 1966, p. 35; Popović, *Srbi*, II, p. 46; Jankulov, p. 60; M. Mitrović, p.206; Mila Bosić, *Narodna nošnja Slovaka u Vojvodini*, Novi Sad 1987, p. 18. At the same time the first Ruthenians came to Kula and Krstur. (Gavrilović, *Rusini u Bačkoj i Sremu*, pp. 154-155.)

136 Hungarians were settled in Bezdan, Subotica, Čonoplja, and after 1750 in some places of the Tisa District (Potiski distrikt): Senta, Bečej, Ada, Mol, Kanjiža, Martonoš, but also in Topola, Doroslovo etc. (Popović, *Srbi*, II, p. 45; Mesaroš, p. 8.)

137 Jankulov, p. 14. The enemies of the Volksdeutsche made a great ado about the deported criminals, prostitutes etc, claiming all the Swabians (as the Germans were called in Hungary proper) were their descendants. Their actual number was rather small: for instance, between 1752 and 1768 only 3,130 deportees were sent to the Banat. Many of them were backsliders, which means the actual number was even lower. On the first occasion most of them escaped back to Austria. (Schünemann, pp. 76-88; Wellmann, p. 268.) Joseph II had the deportation stopped because he had realized they were useless. (Schünemann, p. 86; Friedrich Lotz, *Die frühtheresianische Kolonisation des Banats (1740-1762)*, in: *Gedenkschrift für Harold Steinacker (1875-1965)*, München 1966, p. 162.)

138 Jordan, p. 85; Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 11. The pasture-tenants' lobby managed to stop the state-run colonization once again in 1772, although the overall number of settlers had already been much higher by that time. (Jordan, p. 92; HWBGAD, I, p. 308.)

139 Jankulov, p. 15.

140 The colonization of the Bačka was spurred also by the abolishment of Military Border around the Tisa and the Moriš, which led to the emigration of the Serbs from there. (Nikola Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Bačkoj 1918-1941*, Novi Sad 1968, p. 17.)

141 Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Bačkoj*, p.14; Jankulov, p. 16.

left to stock-breeders. He was in favor of the colonization of Magyars and Slovaks in the first place, and only in the second of the Germans and others,<sup>142</sup> although eventually he settled more non-Hungarians than Hungarians.<sup>143</sup> Grassalkovich wanted to push the Serbs away from the big rivers and restore the Hungarian character of the Bačka.<sup>144</sup> It is important to mention that he colonized not only Hungarian Catholics (mostly from the Transdanubia), but also Calvinists (mostly from Alföld), as well as Slovaks and others.<sup>145</sup> Hungarian settlers were for greater part poor peasants and were not given privileges granted to German colonists.<sup>146</sup> Grassalkovich also settled Greek-Catholic Ruthenians in Doroslovo, Kucura, Kulpin, Ruski Krstur and Kula during 1750s and 1760s.<sup>147</sup> The Hungarian Chamber did its best to settle as many Hungarians as possible around Sombor and the Tisa – for national reasons.<sup>148</sup>

During the colonization of the Bačka, the interests of Maria Theresa and Joseph II clashed with those of the Hungarian Chamber: the first wanted to resettle to the Bačka part of the Hungarians from hilly and rebellious parts of Hungary and to weaken them in that way, whereas the Chamber wanted in the Bačka only the hand-picked colonists who had paid all their debts in the old homeland. This met with the resistance of the Neoacquistic Commission in Vienna, which opposed strengthening the Hungarian nobility in the Bačka.<sup>149</sup>

Unlike the mercantilist Grassalkovich, Cothmann was a physiocrat who wished to make a swift transition to agriculture which would oust grazing and confine cattle-breeding to feed lots, only as a secondary occupation of the peasants. His plan foresaw planning and state regulation of everything – from measuring the land to organizing settlements and the way of life in them. Kempele continued to execute this plan in the Banat.<sup>150</sup> The colonists were given three tax-free years, advances, tools and other privileges, but their work was still not an easy one. The soil had yet to be made arable since the Serbs and Romanians who had been forced to do it, have done their

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142 Popović, Srbi, II, p. 45; Senz, p. 42; Jankulov, p. 17.

143 So for instance he colonized Germans in Apatin, Bukin, Odžaci and Kolut. (Popović, Srbi, II, p. 44.) Grassalkovich bragged in 1762 that had brought 2.200 Hungarian, 1.370 Serbian, 1.070 German and 400 Ruthenian, Czech and Roman-Catholic South Slav families into thirty-two places in the Bačka over fifteen years. (Schünemann, p. 118; Wellmann, p. 273.)

144 Schünemann, p. 111. This was not feasible without resistance, especially in the District of the Tisa, to which the Serbs laid claim. (Gaćeša, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Bačkoj, p. 17.)

145 HWBGAD, I, pp. 303-305. Popvić, Srbi, II, p. 45; M. Mitrović, p. 200; Jankulov, pp. 45-46; Bosić, pp. 19-20.

146 M. Mitrović, p. 202. This was certainly one of the reasons they couldn't match the Germans. (Schünemann, p. 112.)

147 Vladimir Biljnja, Rusini u Vojvodini. Prilog izučavanju istorije Rusina u Vojvodini (1918-1945), Novi Sad 1987, p. 19; Popović, Srbi, II, 46; Jankulov, p. 62; Gaćeša, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Bačkoj, p. 18. Vlado Kostelnik claims the first Ruthenians came to Krstur already in 1745. (Cf. Vlado Kostelnik, Prilog historiografiji i bibliografiji o sudelovanju jugoslovenskih Rusina i Ukrajinaca u Narodno-oslobodilačkoj borbi 1941-1945, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 1, 1981, p. 131.)

148 Radivoj Plavšić, Fragmenti iz istorije Sombora, Sombor 1956, p. 25; Jankulov, p. 47.

149 Jankulov, p. 49.

150 Popović, II, p. 42; Jankulov, pp. 17-19.

job only partly and half-heartedly.<sup>151</sup> Many colonists were disappointed by the situation they found, which did not correspond fully to the rosy picture painted by the agents advertising in Southwest Germany, becoming dejected, so that settlement did not proceed as smoothly as Cothmann had hoped for. Problems also arose with repayment of the advances, lack of artisans, dying, flight of the disappointed etc.<sup>152</sup> The natives were obliged to plow and sow the fields for the newcomers, which spurred hatred,<sup>153</sup> whereas to the destruction of their way of life they reacted with plunder and murder of the German colonists.<sup>154</sup>

Protestant Slovaks were settled in 1760 in Lalić and Bač Selenče at the estate of arch-bishop of Kalocsa, but since they refused to convert to Catholicism, they left the latter place, crossed into Syrmium and founded Stara Pazova.<sup>155</sup> During the 1760s a new wave of German colonists came to the Bačka and the Yugoslav part of Baranya.<sup>156</sup>

After the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763, Maria Theresa devoted much attention to the colonization of Hungary, which had supported the war effort to a large degree. In that year a colonization patent was issued calling on the veterans to volunteer for settlement in Hungary, Transylvania and the Banat, promising, among other things, six tax-free years for peasants, and as much as ten for craftsmen. The goal of this scheme was to relieve the state finances of pensions for officers and veterans on the one hand, whereas on the other, the state land was rented to rich entrepreneurs who undertook the obligation of colonizing it. This brought several thousands of settlers from Southwestern and Western Germany to the Banat over the next several years, some of them to the Military Border.<sup>157</sup> They joined in the work of draining the Banat swamps which had been going on ever since 1759. Another push-factor in 1770s was hunger that prevailed in Europe and which made the

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151 The colonists were often billeted in Serbian and Romanian houses, which spoiled inter-ethnic relations on the one hand, and, due to lack of hygiene, also the health of the settlers, on the other. (Jordan, p. 90.)

152 Jankulov, pp. 22, 25. In order to prevent the flight of the disappointed settlers, police precautions also had to be taken. (Wellmann, p. 263.)

153 Popović, Srbi, II, pp. 43-44; Jankulov, p. 23. The claim of Milivoje Erić that the Serbs, allegedly busy fighting for political and religious privileges did not realize the danger of colonization of aliens for a long time, is groundless. (Milivoje Erić, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Jugoslaviji 1918-1941*, Sarajevo 1958, p. 61.)

154 Seewann, pp. 433, 436.

155 Šenoa, p. 6; Jankulov, p. 60; Bosić, p. 33.

156 Tri stoljeća Belja, p. 48; Reimund Friedrich Kaindl, *Geschichte der Deutschen in Karpathenländern*, III, Gotha 1911, pp. 189-204.

157 One of the goals of the colonization of the invalids was to create a loyal Catholic element along the border. For that reason, part of the Serbian population was to be transferred deeper inland. (Roth, p. 45.) Among the settlers there were many Czech, Polish and other non-German families. (Cf. Felix Milleker, *Geschichte der Banater Militärgrenze 1764-1873*, Pančevo 1925, pp. 41-42; Idem, *Die Besiedlung der Banater Militärgrenze*, Bela Crkva 1926, p. 5; Jankulov, pp. 26-27, 30, 34.) Roth claims the majority of these colonists were Czechs. (Roth, p. 51.) Apart from tax exemptions during the first years, the taxes remained lower for the Germans than for the Serbs later too, since the government wanted to enable them to get on their feet as soon as possible (Johann Heinrich Schwicker, *Geschichte der österreichischen Militärgrenze*, Wien, Teschen 1883, p. 126.) Obviously, this was an additional reason that awoke Serbian discontent and envy.

Banat attractive.<sup>158</sup> In the Bačka the Germans from the same parts of Germany were colonized from 1749, throughout 1750s and 1760s in a number of Serbian villages in order to train the Serbs in assiduous agricultural work, teach them better agricultural techniques and – if possible – convert them to Roman-Catholicism and Germanize them.<sup>159</sup>

The late-Theresian colonization (1772-1780) carried on the settlement of the preceding phase, in accordance with the doctrine that Austria should be an industrial country, with Hungary as her complementary agrarian counterpart.<sup>160</sup> In 1772 a new Impopulation Patent came into force. It foresaw measuring of the land so as to ascertain how many Germans should be settled in the existing Serbian and Romanian villages. These colonists were hailing from Silesia, Moravia and Bohemia, and they as experienced agriculturalists, had to teach the “nationalists” the better methods of tilling the land.<sup>161</sup> Together with them, other colonists were also recruited in Alsace and Lorraine, part of whom were French.<sup>162</sup> The 1770s were the time of large German colonization in the Bačka,<sup>163</sup> and since 1779 Hungarian settlement of the Banat was strengthened – mainly by day-laborers who were draining swamps, or working as gardeners and cultivators of tobacco. They were colonized by the state, but also by private landowners – including Serbs.<sup>164</sup> In 1780s the Slovaks too settled down in several Banat villages.<sup>165</sup> Hungarians were sporadically brought to some estates of the landowners in Syrmium (Elz, Sandor) at that time.<sup>166</sup> In 1770s the Czechs were colonized in Bezdan and Kupusina.<sup>167</sup>

The next phase of colonization is called Josephinian, after Joseph II who introduced important changes into it. Under him, the land was redistributed in accordance with the size of the family, which, coupled with the purge of the administration of corrupt officials, contributed to better tax collection.<sup>168</sup> Furthermore, Joseph II fought against the system of advances which the colonists often were not able to pay back: in his opinion, they should have been either given everything free, or they should have brought everything along or they should have made it themselves. Patent of religious tolerance in 1781 for the first time enabled colonization of the Protestants, whom bigotted Maria Theresa would not tolerate in the new territories, and in 1785 the new Urbarial Law divided the District of Temeswar (the counties having been abolished earlier

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158 Popović, Srbi, II, p. 43.

159 Gaćeša, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu, p. 9; Jankulov, pp. 28-29.

160 Jankulov, p. 29.

161 Kaindl, Geschichte, pp. 215-219; Jankulov, p. 31.

162 Jankulov, p. 32. (In that way three French villages were founded in the Yugoslav part of the Banat: St. Hubert, Charleville and Soltour; however, due to the immigration of Germans, they were gradually completely Germanized.)

163 HWBGAD, I, p. 309. Kaindl's opinion that there had been no colonization in the Bačka at that time is obsolete. (Cf. Kaindl, Geschichte, p. 215.)

164 For example count Hristofor Nako. (Jankulov, p. 49; Popović, Srbi, II, p. 47.) Part of the Hungarians who immigrated at that time came into Serbian villages, and part of them founded their own. (HWBGAD, I, p. 213; Wolf, pp. 50-51.)

165 Bednarik, p. 44.

166 Šenoa, p. 9. It is worth noting that Hungarian population colonized along the river Drava, in 15th century still survived at that time. (Ibid., p. 4.)

167 Popović, Srbi, II, p. 46.

168 Jankulov, pp. 34-35.

that year) into the hilly part meant for viticulture and mining, and the flat one reserved for agriculture. Dependant on this scheme, people were settled in accordance with their capabilities and skills.<sup>169</sup> Being a physiocrat, Joseph II paid more attention to the choice of the colonists and to building larger and better settlements than was the case under his mother. Josephinian settlements, partly Protestant, were created mostly in the Bačka, as continuation of the existing Serbian villages.<sup>170</sup> Protestant were also the Slovak colonies founded in this period: Kisač, Veprovac, Bačka Topola, Gložan in the Bačka, and Pardanj, Aradac, Ečka in the Banat, whereas the Czechs were settled in Novi Slankamen in Syrmium.<sup>171</sup> Greek-Catholic Ruthenians got reinforcements in Novi Sad, Kucura and Krstur at that time.<sup>172</sup> Another feature of the Josephinian colonization was further settlement of Magyars in the Banat (including the Military Border), where they had been denied access previously.<sup>173</sup>

In order to strengthen the Border in the Banat after the unsuccessful war with Turkey (1788-1790), it was decided that as addition to the existing ten villages between Kovin and Sakule, nine new ones be built. Thus the Germans from South-west Germany, Switzerland, Alsace and Lorraine founded evangelical Franzfeld in 1791,<sup>174</sup> as the beginning of the Leopoldine colonization, which, however, due to the premature death of the Monarch did not last long.<sup>175</sup> Despite that, colonization was continued also under the new ruler Francis II,<sup>176</sup> whose reign was the golden age of the private settlement.<sup>177</sup>

Wars against Napoleon with their material costs and devastations of which Hungary was spared, spurred further colonization of what was to become the Vojvodina. Colonization of German and other refugees in the Banat ignited Serbian dissatisfaction and rebellion in Pančevo, Bela Crkva and their surroundings. The Serbs considered they did more services in the defense of the Monarchy, and were dissatisfied that despite that they couldn't have an autonomous Vojvodina. The Viennese court for its part strove to strengthen the Military Border which supported the main war effort in the struggle against Napoleon, by colonizing not only

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169 Jankulov, pp. 36-37; Wolf, p. 47.

170 At this period Bujkes, Novi Vrbas, Torža, Crvenka, Filipovo, Sekić, Bački Jarak, Čonoplja, Mali Ker (Bačko Dobro Polje), Bački Brestovac, Bezdan, Stanišić, etc. were founded. (Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Bačkoj*, p. 16; Jankulov, pp. 40-42.)

171 Jankulov, p. 61; Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Bačkoj*, p. 18; Bosić, pp. 28-29, 34.

172 Jankulov, p. 62.

173 Jankulov, p. 50. This was probably the best proof that Joseph's aim was not Germanization, but just firmer ties between the polyglot population. (Paikert, p. 16.) Increased influx of Hungarians was partly due to larger private colonization, which gained momentum under Joseph II. (HWBGAD, I, p. 230.)

174 Felix Milleker, *Geschichte der Banater Militärgrenza*, p. 93; Idem, *Die Besiedlung*, p. 15.

175 During the reign of Leopold II Slovaks were settled in Novi Slankamen. (Slavko Gavrilović, *Naseljavanje Slovaka u Novi Slankamen (1791)*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 3, 1971.) At the same time, a number of refugee families from Serbia was settled, especially in the Military Border. (Slavko Gavrilović, *Seobe Srba u Habsburšku Monarhiju u drugoj polovini XVIII i početkom XIX veka*, in: *Seobe srpskog naroda od XIV do XX veka. Zbornik posvećen tistogodišnjici velike seobe Srba*, Beograd 1990.)

176 At that time New Town in Osijek was founded and spreading of Germans in places in Syrmium started, that would last for the next hundred odd years. (Šenoa, pp. 6-7.)

177 HWBGAD, I, p. 204.

the loyal Germans from the Tyrol and Southwest Germany, but also Hungarians, Slovaks, Romanians and others – regardless of their religion.<sup>178</sup> According to Borislav Jankulov, the intention was to create an imperial melting-pot of a kind (with the Germans as an integrating factor) with the aim of military and economic strengthening and equalizing of the Monarchy. Together with the Germans, the Slovaks were also settled in several places in the Banat and Syrmium Border.<sup>179</sup> Away from the Border the Germans, and also the Romanians, started settling in the civilian part of the Banat on the estates of feudal lords of various nationality at that time.<sup>180</sup> At the same time, some colonists came to the Border in Syrmium, but also to the estates of the nobles there.<sup>181</sup> During the same period a smaller number of Germans came to the Bačka too.<sup>182</sup> In the course of the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century Hungarians came to settle down only in a few places in the Bačka in the first years of the century,<sup>183</sup> unlike the Banat where their influx lasted throughout the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century, so that in that region their colonization was continuous from the late 18<sup>th</sup> to the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>184</sup>

The colonization of South Hungary resulted from the need to use in the best way the vast territories liberated from the Turks. The native population was on the one hand too sparse, and on the other, unsteady cattle-breeders, unskilled at agriculture. For that reason colonization was needed. People of various nationalities, including the Serbs, took part in it. The Germans were favored, but above all for two reasons: on the one hand, they had surplus population, and on the other, their economic prowess enabled them to withstand the competition even of much better agriculturists than could the Serbs and Romanians at that time.<sup>185</sup> Colonization was neither directed from

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178 Milleker, *Geschichte der Banater Militärgrenze*, pp. 113-114; Kaindl, *Geschichte*, pp. 251-252.

179 Jankulov, pp. 85-86; Bednarik, p. 44; Bosić, pp. 29-30. Among them was Kovačica (1803) which would become the largest Slovak centre in the Banat.

180 Jankulov, pp. 75, 83-84, 95-96.

181 Lazar Čelap, *Postanak Francenstala kao ratarskog naselja u Zemunu*, Zadržni arhiv, 7, 1959; Radoslav Marković, *Pravoslavna srpska parohija u Indiji krajem 1900*, Sremski Karlovci 1901 (2nd ed.), pp. 6-7 (The latter author pays special attention to the ousting of the Serbian population by the German newcomers.); Kaindl, *Geschichte*, pp. 270-271; Slavko Gavrilović, *Naseljavanje Slovaka u sremska sela Sot i Bingulu godine 1835*, *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, knj. XII/1, 1969; Idem, *Privredne i društvene prilike u Indiji 1746-1849*, *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, 6, 1961, pp. 145-146; Idem, *Rusini u Šidu od 1803 do 1848*. *Prilog istoriji nacionalnih manjina u Vojvodini*, *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, 1, 1956; Valentin Oberkersch, *India. Deutsches Leben in Ostsyrmien 1825-1944*, Stuttgart 1977, pp. 48-55; Jankulov, p. 85; Hermann Haller, *Die Entstehung der deutschen Tochttersiedlungen in Syrmien*, *Der Auslandsdeutsche*, XX, 4, 1937, p. 234.

182 They settled in Novi Sivr, Čib, Deronje etc. (Jankulov, p. 82.) In 1829 privileges for the colonists were abolished, so that from then on, only well-heeled individuals able to finance their own emigration settled down. (Plavšić, p. 26.)

183 These places were Mol, Feldvarac, Temerin, Bačko Gradište and Novi Sad. (Jankulov, p. 90.)

184 Milleker, *Die Besiedlung*, p. 19; Jankulov, p. 91; Wolf, pp. 50-55.

185 In the USA German farmers competed successfully for 200 years with English and Scandinavian ones, and were reputed as the most successful. (Cf. Don Heinrich Tolzmann, *German-American Achievements. 400 Years of Contribution to America*, Bowie 2001, p. 29.) These qualities were well known in Europe, so that German peasants and artisans

one center, nor did all involved have the same goals. It is certain that it was primarily economic, i.e. economic and military in character.<sup>186</sup> Economic criteria were practically decisive for private colonization, which pursued only economic gains, disregarding broader interests.<sup>187</sup> As we have seen, the state colonization, even when it had been under the influence of the nationalist thinking, gave priority to the economic component which was much more important for the state as a whole.<sup>188</sup>

Ethnic considerations were present in the colonization, but they did not play a major role: quite simply, military and economic exigencies couldn't be brought into line with national preferences of certain organizers of the colonization. When the colonists of a desired nationality were not available in sufficient number, one had to make do with what was available. It should also be kept in mind that different actors who were executing the colonization, had different national preferences. Moreover, one should not forget that colonists of various nationalities possessed different qualities and that they were given roles accordingly in the great task of colonization: Serbs were better as warriors and border-guards, Germans and Slovaks as agriculturists. To claim that the colonization was aimed against this or that people, as one can still find in the modern literature on the subject,<sup>189</sup> is one-sided, to say the least, since it neglects all those various factors which had been directing the colonization, changing their preferences depending on time, place and needs.

The fact is that land and houses were taken away from the Serbs and given to the Germans, or the Germans ousted them from their villages and pastures.<sup>190</sup> One

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were coveted also by other European rulers. In 18th century German colonists were wooed by Britain, the Netherlands, Spain, France and Russia, as well as, the Habsburgs' greatest rival, Prussia. (Schünemann, pp. 235-242; Kaindl, *Die Deutschen in Osteuropa*, p. 27; Tausend Jahre Nachbarschaft. Rußland und die Deutschen, München 1988, pp. 120-129; Benjamin Pinkus, Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen in der Sowjetunion. Geschichte einer nationalen Minderheit im 20. Jahrhundert*, Baden-Baden 1987, pp. 33-41; Ingeborg Fleischhauer, *Die Deutschen im Zarenreich*, Stuttgart 1986.)

186 HWBGAD, I, p. 220; Jordan, p. 22; Mesaroš, p. 7; Andreas Dammang, *Die deutsche Landwirtschaft im Banat und in der Batschka*, Novi Sad 1931, p. 10; Ervin Pamleny (ed.), *Histoire de la Hongrie des origines a nos jours*, Budapest 1974, p. 199; Paikert, p. 16; Wolf, p. 32; Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, 8-10.

187 This can best be seen from the lists of settlements, nationality of their inhabitants and that of the landowners who had colonized them. (Jankulov, o.c.; Adam Vereš (ed.), *Slovenska evanjelicka kerestanska cirkev augšburskeho vyzmania v Kral. Juhoslovenskom v slove a v obrazoch*, Petrovac 1930; B.M. Drobnjaković, Feliks Mileker, *Letopisi opština Podunavske oblasti*, Pančevo 1929. Other examples see in: Branislav Bukurov, *Naselja u južnom Banatu*, zbornik Matice srpske za prirodne nauke, 39, 1970, pp. 35, 57; Miloš M. Ratković, Mramorak, *Geografski prikaz sela i bliže okoline*, Zbornik Matice srpske za prirodne nauke, 24, 1960, p. 90; Milutin Perović, *Nacionalni pokret kod Slovaka od kraja 18. do početka 20. veka*, *Godišnjak Društva istoričara Vojvodine* 1981, Novi Sad 1983, p. 53; HWBGAD, I, p. 231.

188 Cf. the example of Grassalkovich.

189 Bukurov, *Stanovništvo*, p. 30; *Istorija srpskog naroda* (henceforth: ISN), knj. IV, tom 1. *Srbi u XVIII veku*, Beograd [1982], p. 214; Toša Iskruljev, o Vojvodini i njenoj kolonizaciji (preštampano iz "Zastave"), Novi Sad 1925, p. 11; Vera Milutinović, *Srbi i Nemci u Vojvodini*, *Etnološki pregled*, 4, 1962, p. 36.

190 Seewann, pp. 421, 436, 438; V. Milutinović, p. 37; Lackner, p. 79; ISN, VI/1, p. 214; Jordan, pp. 89-90; Roth, pp. 45, 47; HWBGAD, I, pp. 225, 306; Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 12. Jankulov claims even the colonization of the Germans by

should however keep in mind that the Serbs were very movable, semi-nomads, whose houses were not meant to last long anyway. Moreover, for the houses and lands taken away from them, they received compensation and privileges like those for the Germans, and in some cases they received more land as compensation than had been taken away from them.<sup>191</sup> There were also cases when colonization was organized especially for the Serbs.<sup>192</sup> Sometimes the Serbs (and Romanians) took over vacated German houses,<sup>193</sup> and sometimes the Germans were resettled in favor of the Serbs.<sup>194</sup> All this goes to show that the colonization of the Vojvodina had been a very complex process in which many factors, phenomena and processes intermingled and clashed, making a simplified judgment impossible.

What is certain is that the settlement of the Vojvodina during 18<sup>th</sup> and in early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries has left lasting consequences in at least four ways. These consequences were felt until well into 20<sup>th</sup> century, and can partly still be felt today. First was the ethnic make-up of the province, which as we shall presently see, did not change significantly, despite colonization and immigration during the rest of 19<sup>th</sup> century. Second was the ethnically tinged social structure reflected through the landownership patterns and professional division. In connection with this, it can be said that the colonization and its consequences have left a lasting mark on inter-ethnic relations: tensions between Serbian cattle-breeders and the newly-come, privileged and economically versatile German, but also Slovak agriculturists, religious conflicts with the Romanians, clash with the Roman-Catholic Church, Hungarian nobility, and with the Hungarian state (which supported Magyar colonists, especially in 19<sup>th</sup> century), religious and social tensions with the Uniate Ruthenians, diverging ways of life and world views etc. coupled with the events which they produced through 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, determined to a high degree the stance of the Serbs and the Yugoslav state towards national minorities colonized in the region at this period. Finally, colonization of Southern Hungary by German, Slovak and Hungarian populations, made possible their partial spillover into Syrmium and Slavonia (to the neighboring parts already in 18<sup>th</sup> century) in greater numbers in 19<sup>th</sup> century when both in the Vojvodina and in Slavonia and Syrmium a necessary combination of push and pull factors occurred. It was partly a successive transfer of the population: had there been no colonization of the Vojvodina, there would have been almost no settlement in Slavonia - at least not in that proportion and from that direction. For all these reasons, the importance of

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Hungarian nobles was leveled against the compactness of the Serbian people! (Jankulov, p. 84.)

191 Roth, p. 47; Lackner, p. 80; HWBGAD, I, p. 308; Wolf, pp. 45-46.

192 Such was the case in Bela Crkva and its vicinity after the abolishment of the Military Border on the *Moriš* 1751-1752. (Rudolf Steger, *Bela Crkva u XVIII i XIX veku*. Komorski i vojnograničarski period, Novi Sad, Bela Crkva 1982, p. 22.) For the end of 18th century, see: Gavrilović, *Seoba Serba*.

193 That was the case in Southern Banat after the catastrophe 1737-1739. (Lackner, pp. 80-82.)

194 This was happening especially in the Military Border during the reign of Joseph II. (Roth, pp. 170, 172.) On the occasion of resettlement of the Germans and settlement of the Serbs, the authorities made sure to build houses for the colonists and give them other privileges. (Lazar Čelap, *Prilog proučavanju kolonizacije Vojvodine krajem XVIII veka*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 29, 1981, pp. 80, 86.)



the colonization of the Vojvodina in 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> century for the nationality question in the northern parts of Yugoslavia had been just as large as its importance for the development of the economy and civilization in those parts in general.<sup>195</sup>

The colonization in Hungary in the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century had, on the one hand, the characteristics of an internal colonization, whereas it bears the stamp of the statist ethnic engineering in the service of the Magyar national cause, on the other. At that time, the territory of the present-day Vojvodina was partly still receiving immigrants, but as the century drew to an end, internal migrations and "export" of the surplus (above all German, Slovak and Hungarian) population into Syrmium, Slavonia and Bosnia became more common.

If one considers the German colonization in the Bačka in 19<sup>th</sup> century, one can see that it was almost exclusively internal: surplus population from older colonies moves into other places, or founds new, but not very numerous, villages.<sup>196</sup> The colonization of the Germans by the Hungarian nobility in the Banat is perceptible in the first decades of 19<sup>th</sup> century, but it was nothing like so big as in the previous century when unpopulated land still abounded. In the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century it stopped altogether. As for the colonization of the Hungarians in the Banat, it began again after the *Ausgleich* and the abolishment of the Military Border in the last third of the century. Big landowners were the first to start by settling agricultural laborers on their estates. As the nationalist and Magyarizing trend of the Hungarian state policy gained momentum, the government strove to facilitate the colonization of the loyal Magyar and partly German element by juridical measures and financial aid through para-statist banks. Thus Tisza Kalmanfalva (Budisava), Mali Stapar and Svilojevo came into being, whereas several smaller groups were settled in the Šajkaška in order to separate the Serbs in the Bačka from those in the Banat. For the same reasons, the Szekelys from Bukowina were colonized in Hertelendfalva (now Vojlovica) – where a group of Germans and Slovaks had already sought refuge from the flood – and in Skorenovac and Đurđevo in the Southern Banat. Part of these Szekelys could not acclimatize, so they returned to their original homeland.<sup>197</sup> In 1868-1869 the founding of seven German, Slovak and Magyar villages in the South Banat Marsh was tried, but the flood destroyed three and damaged one of them in 1869. The Hungarian government wanted to use that scheme for Magyarization of that "nationally endangered area", since the non-Magyar settlers came from the surrounding Banat villages and were people of already dormant national consciousness.<sup>198</sup> Hungarian national colonization proved in the last resort unsuccessful: the Magyar powers-that-be wanted to conquer

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195 Not enough has been written about the latter aspect of the colonization, and unfortunately for lack of space, this author too cannot dwell on all those technical and cultural achievements brought along or created on the spot by the immigrant population. (Cf. Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, pp. 8-9; Zlatoje Martinov, *Nemački uticaj na ishranu Srba u Banatu*, Pančevo 1997; Nives Rittig-Beljak, *Švapski kulinarij – dodir kultura u Hrvatskoj*, Zagreb 2002.)

196 Jankulov, p. 82.

197 M. Mitrović, pp. 208-210; Jankulov, pp. 87-92; Bukurov, *Naselja*, p. 20.

198 M. Mitrović, pp. 207-208; Jovan Erdeljanović, *Srbi u Banatu. Naselja i stanovništvo*, Novi Sad 1992 (2nd ed.), p. 19; Jankulov, pp. 92-94; Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, pp. 25-26.

the Vojvodina by numbers and not by economic strength.<sup>199</sup> Because of the lack of time, available land and invested money, this attempt failed. A large number of Hungarian colonists remained poorer than the Serbs, and especially Germans with whom they had to compete, with resulting bad consequences for the overall conditions of the Hungarian national minority after the First World War.

Despite very old plans for the colonization of Magyars in Syrmium and Baranya, they started crossing into Syrmium only in 1860s because the land was cheaper there, settling down in Irig, Šid, Ruma, Ilok, Vukovar etc, as day laborers and viticulturists. For the same reason the Slovaks from the Bačka were crossing into Syrmium, whereas the Hungarians were coming from Dunatul into counties of Virovitica, Požega and Bjelovar.<sup>200</sup> As for the Slovaks, they were either crossing from the Bačka into Syrmium on their own accord, (Boljevci, Dobanovci, Ašanja, Bingula, Šid, Ilok etc.),<sup>201</sup> or were invited by manors (into Markovac, Jurkovac, Josipovac, Čaglina etc.) from other counties. The majority of the Slovaks who went to Slavonia remained poor, and never reached the prosperity of their compatriots in the Bačka and Syrmium. Indeed, many fared much worse than in the old homeland, so that many died and the rest almost completely assimilated into Croats.<sup>202</sup>

As for the Germans, we found their settlements in Slavonia ever since the last decades of 18<sup>th</sup> century, but in small numbers.<sup>203</sup> In the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, together with the villages already mentioned above, Novo Selo by Vinkovci and Franztal near Zemun were founded.<sup>204</sup> Unlike the Vojvodina, Slavonia was more densely populated already in 18<sup>th</sup> century, so that the need for colonization was not that great there.<sup>205</sup> For that reason, the second larger influx of the Germans,

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199 Erić, p. 61; Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 26.

200 Jankulov, pp. 95, 97.

201 Bosić, pp. 36-37; Bednarik, p. 47.

202 Jan Siracki, *Slovaci u Jugoslaviji. Prilog istoriji naseljavanja*, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke 44, 1966, p. 21; N. Petrović, p. 52; Bednarik, p. 48.

203 Retfala near Osijek is a case in point, where the counts Pejačević settled the Germans along with the Hungarians. Other examples were Sarvaš, colonized in 1770 by count Palffy, Donji Miholjac, as well as the state colonies Kula and Poreč (Josephsfeld and Josephsdorf) from the time of Joseph II. From the same time dates the evangelical settlement of Nova Pazova in the Military Border. Apart from that, there were private settlements along the Drava in Kapan and Josipovac, as well as several others. Some Germans settled also around the town of Đakovo. (Georg Wild, *Deutsche Siedlungen in Syrmien, Slawonien und Bosnien*, Südostdeutsches Archiv, XIV, 1971, p. 150; Valentin Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen in Syrmien, Slawonien und Bosnien bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkrieges. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Donauschwaben*, Stuttgart 1972, pp. 17-19; Vladimir Geiger, *Nijemci u Đakovu i Đakovštini*, Zagreb 2001, pp. 13-17; Hans Kühn, *Das Deutschtum in Poscheganner Kessel, Der Auslandsdeutsche*, XX, 4, 1937, pp. 208-220; Wilhelm Sattler, *Die Slawonische Drauniederung als deutsche Volksinsellandschaft*, in: E. Meynen (ed.), *Das Deutschtum in Slawonien und Syrmien. Landes- und Volkskunde*, Leipzig 1942, pp. 171, 215-216; Ingeborg Kellermann, *Josefsdorf (Josipovac). Lebensbild eines deutschen Dorfes in Slawonien*, in: Meynen (ur.), pp. 503-504.)

204 Kaindl, *Geschichte*, p. 270; Wild, p. 150.

205 Nevertheless, certain colonization of non-South-Slav populations took place in Slavonia and Croatia proper. Thus the bishop of Đakovo Antun Mandić colonized some Germans in the town and manor of Đakovo. Germans have been coming continuously in smaller numbers to that area until the middle of 19th century. (Geiger, pp. 17-36; Kaindl,

Hungarians and others started only in the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>206</sup> Several factors determined that. On the one hand, the revolution of 1848/49 liberated the peasants and made them more movable. (This was especially important for the Hungarians, who, unlike the Germans, had mainly been serfs.) On the other hand, the land in the Vojvodina and central Hungary had already been divided, whereas the number of inhabitants was increasing. Together with these changes, Hungary was hit by an economic crisis caused by transition from feudal to capitalist economy in 1870s, with concomitant difficulties of the former Border guards who found it hard to adapt to civilian life and economy. This caused great indebtedness of the peasants who were increasingly more often compelled to sell their land at low prices. At the same time, big landowners wanted to catch up with the market economy of the time and increase their revenues. This opened wide the door for German, Hungarian and other peasants who jumped at the opportunity to buy for comparatively little money they got for their land in their places of origin, two or three times more.<sup>207</sup> Already in 1860s group of Germans came to several Slavonian manors under contract,<sup>208</sup> and during those years a number of villages in Syrmium got their German inhabitants.<sup>209</sup> Settlement of the Germans, Magyars, Czechs, and of much smaller number of Ruthenians on estates of the nobility continued until the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, and in some cases even after the First World War.<sup>210</sup> Buying land from large landowners or impoverished Croat or Serb peasants throughout 1870s and 1880s, Germans and Hungarians settled down in a number of villages in Syrmium and Slavonia, becoming gradually the majority population in some of them (Banovci, Gašinci, Mrzović, Slatnik, Tomašanci, Pisak, Vučevci,

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Geschichte, pp. 270-271; Erwin Boehm, *Das Deutschtum und seine kulturgeo-graphische Leistung in den vier slawonischen Bezirken Diakowar, Poscheg, Neu-Gradischka, Brod*, in: Meynen (ed.) *Groups of Czechs were coming to Croatia (the Varaždin Military District) and partly to Slavonia, to the surroundings of Bjelovar, Grubišno Polje, Veliki Zdenci etc, as well as into some Croatian villages, from the last decades of 18th and in the first decades of 19th century. (Vidosava Nikolić, Prilog proučavanju kolonizacije stanovništva Češke i Moravske na području Varaždinskog generalata i Slavonije 1824-1830, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke, 46, 1967; Enciklopedija Jugoslavije (henceforth: EJ), 3, Zagreb 1984, p. 263.) Slow influx of smaller groups of Czechs would continue until 1890s, chiefly around Daruvar, Slavenska Požega and Kutina. (EJ, 3, p. 264.) Similar was the influx of the Germans into Požeška dolina and the valley of the Ilova. (Tomislav Wittenberg, *Doseljavanje Nijemaca u središnji dio Požeške doline*, VDG Jahrbuch/Godišnjak Njemačke narodnosne zajednice, Osijek 2002, pp. 261-269; Egon Lendl, *Das Deutschtum in der Ilowasenke*, in: Maynen (ed.), p. 19.)*

206 Lendl, *Die Stellung*, p. 204.

207 Geiger, pp. 43-46; Sattler, p. 171; Josip Gujaš, "Nacionalna odbrana" Mađara u Slavoniji na prijelomu XIX i XX stoljeća u okviru Slavonske akcije, *Historijski zbornik*, XXIII-XXIV, 1970-1971, pp. 54-60, 64; Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen*, pp. 22-23; Haller, *Die Entstehung der deutschen Tochttersiedlungen*, p. 240.

208 Antunovac, Blagorodovac, Hrastovac by Pakrac, Sokolovac, Đulaves, etc. (Lendl, *Das Deutschtum*, p. 20; Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen*, p. 25; Sattler, p. 218; Boehm, p. 304.)

209 Haller, *Die Entstehung, der deutschen Tochttersiedlungen*, p. 245; Kaindl, *Geschichte*, pp. 271-272.

210 Oberkersch, pp. 26-30; Geiger, p. 49; Haller, *Die Entstehung der deutschen Tochttersiedlungen*, pp. 237-240; Wild, p. 151; Lendl, *Das Deutschtum*, p. 20; Sattler, p. 220.

Krčedin, Bečmen, Beočin, Bežanija, Surčin).<sup>211</sup> However, it remained typical of Slavonia that the newcomers founded even fewer new villages than in the Vojvodina, and usually settled down in the already existing Croatian or Serbian ones, remaining a minority, or even assimilating to Croats (in places where just a few families settled down).<sup>212</sup> Just as previously in the Bačka and the Banat, conflicts with the natives occurred. Different ways of life, disputes over property, and a feeling of being in danger from the local Slavic population have led to conflicts which sometimes ended up in physical violence.<sup>213</sup>

The Hungarians settled down mostly in the counties of Virovitica, Syrmium and Bjelovar-Križevci, and the Germans in the counties of Virovitica and Syrmium.<sup>214</sup> The colonization of Hungarians was somewhat different from the colonization of Germans and other ethnic groups, since the Hungarian government lent its support with a view to tying Croatia more tightly to Hungary, Magyarizing it and building its own "Bridge to the Adriatic". The aid was coming above all through the "Julian Society" which was retaining 75 schools, providing financial help for the purchase of Slavic estates in debt, and even bringing colonists to Slavonia.<sup>215</sup> Moreover, the Hungarian state worked directly at colonizing Magyars by bringing officials and especially railway personnel of Hungarian nationality. For them, special railway schools were founded, which, just like the schools of the "Julian Society," served the purpose of Magyarizing the non-Hungarians.<sup>216</sup> This policy of the Hungarian government which was utilizing people who had come in search of better existence, met with resistance and was spoiling inter-ethnic relations. Since the Germans took the side of the Magyars, and due to their economic prowess were perceived as a danger for the locals, it is clear that the colonization of people of non-Yugoslav nationalities had sown seeds of conflict, which bore fruit at the time of settlement, as well as later on, during the inter-war period.

Unlike the colonization in the Vojvodina which had been to a large degree regulated by the authorities, the colonization of Slavonia, Croatia and Syrmium was largely left to private initiative: first that of big individual landowners,<sup>217</sup> and later on to that of peasants from the Bačka and other parts, desirous of cheap land. Due to denser population in 18<sup>th</sup> century, the need for colonists was not so great in Slavonia. It was only the development of capitalism which, with its concomitant turbulences,

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211 Geiger, p. 49; Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen*, p. 33; Šenoa, pp. 8-11; Wild, p. 151; Laszlo Szita, *Identitätsprobleme der Magyaren in Kroatien*, in: Gerhard Seewann (ed.), *Minderheitenfrage in Südosteuropa. Beiträge der internationalen Konferenz: The Minority Question in Historical Perspective 1900-1990*, Inter-University Center, Dubrovnik, 8-14 April 1991, München 1992, p. 178. The Hungarians reached a majority in twenty-five villages around Slatina and Virovitica, but many emigrated from them after the First World War. (Sattler, p. 209.)

212 Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen*, p. 33; Wild, p. 151; Szita, p. 176. The Czechs, being Slavs and living scattered were especially endangered by assimilation. (Sattler, p. 209.)

213 Geiger, p. 50; Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen*, pp. 34-35.

214 Gujaš, pp. 62-63.

215 Gujaš, pp. 88-93; Szita, pp. 178-179. Some of these colonists were Germans. (Lendl, *Das Deutschtum*, p. 29.)

216 Gujaš, pp. 64-68, 72-87.

217 It should be pointed out, that here, just like in other parts of Hungary, the nationality of landowners and colonists played no role in the colonization. (Even the nationalist bishop Strossmayer, who showed little understanding for the non-Slavs, settled Germans in Krndija. (Geiger, pp. 53-57; Boehm, p. 304.))

made possible a larger settlement of Germans, Magyars, but also of Slovaks, Czechs, and some Ruthenians in Slavonia and Syrmium. It is interesting to note that the colonization of these regions, which had been of lower intensity in 18<sup>th</sup> century, sometimes went on even after the First World War. Typical for these regions was the fact that the majority of settlers did not come from outside the Habsburg Monarchy, and that most of them came from Hungary. Because they were scattered, and because of their smaller numbers (absolutely and relatively speaking) the colonists there never became so important a factor as in the Vojvodina, and because of their relative poverty in the beginning, smaller number of ethnically unified villages, and their shorter stay in the new homeland, until the foundation of Yugoslavia, they did not manage to strengthen economically as their co-nationals in the places of their origin. Nevertheless, they did become a numerical, political and economic factor not to be ignored.

Almost simultaneously with the colonization of Slavonia, began settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was the last phase in the colonization of non-Yugoslav populations in the territory that would become Yugoslav. It was the smallest in scope, economical importance and impact it had left on the ethnic make-up of the province. Just like the previously described ones, it too has been a combination of state and private colonization, and more or less representatives of the same peoples took part in it as in the earlier colonizations of the Habsburg lands, with the addition of Italians (who played but an ephemeral role in the colonization of the Banat in 18<sup>th</sup> century) and some Dutchmen. Unlike the colonization of Slavonia, where the bulk of the settlers came from the Habsburg Empire, colonization of Bosnia had a specific feature in that a considerable number of colonists were subjects of foreign states (Germany and Russia).

Although the colonization of Bosnia was basically an enterprise connected with the Austro-Hungarian rule in that country, it had actually started before the Habsburg domination was imposed. The first to come were German Trappist monks in 1869 who had bought some land near Banja Luka and built a monastery Mary Star (Maria Stern, Marija Zvijezda), with accompanying economic facilities: a brewery, a dairy, brick-works, a mill, a saw-mill, a power station etc.<sup>218</sup> After the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, they launched a campaign to bring in Catholic German settlers.<sup>219</sup> The provincial government of Bosnia-Herzegovina was at first not well disposed towards such projects, since colonists could settle down only on state-owned land, which was not ample. The unclear questions of possession of land that Turkey had left behind and expensive private lands complicated the affair further.<sup>220</sup> As the number of prospective colonists grew, the Government had to issue the Regulations for the Colonization in 1879 which foresaw free grants of the state-owned lands and tax exemptions from five to ten years, free wood for heating and building etc. The goal was to attract foreign peasants who would teach the natives more progressive agricultural methods and who would be a loyal support to the state

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218 To be sure, not all these objects were built right in the beginning, but rather after long years of patient and diligent work. (Cf. Margareta Matijević, Franz Pfanner (1825-1909) – ili kratko o doprinosu njemačkih trapista gospodarskom razvitku banjalučkog kraja, VDG Jahrbuch/Godišnjak Njemačke narodnosne zajednice, Osijek 2002, p. 281-283.)

219 Hans Maier, *Die deutsche Siedlungen in Bosnien*, Stuttgart 1924, pp. 9-12.

220 Tomislav Kraljačić, *Kolonizacija stranih seljaka u Bosnu i Hercegovinu za vrijeme austrougarske uprave*, Istorijski časopis, knj. XXXVI, 1989, p. 122.

authorities.<sup>221</sup> As the situation in the country stabilized, the interest of the Government for colonization grew. At first, economic motives were most important,<sup>222</sup> but later on, the political ones started to get the upper hand.<sup>223</sup> The Austro-Hungarian Finance Minister, in charge of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Benjamin Kállay, issued an order in 1893 that, together with economic considerations, in the colonization of districts of Banja Luka, Gradiška, and Kostajnica, one should keep in mind the need to intersperse the disloyal Serbian elements with foreign colonists, so as to more easily keep the first in check.<sup>224</sup> The disposition of colonies proves indeed that the goal was to shatter Serbian ethnic cohesion.<sup>225</sup>

And yet, the first colonies were founded on private land by buying, leasing or entering relations of serfdom. In 1879 the first group of Germans from Germany came to Brezici near Gradiška. Together with later comers, they founded Windhorst (Nova Topola), named after a German Catholic politician.<sup>226</sup> The next to be founded were further Catholic settlements Rudolfstal (later: Aleksandrovac) by Banja Luka, Šibovska, Kalenderovci Turski, Polje, Sitneš, Opsiječko, Trošelj, Franz-Josefsfeld etc.<sup>227</sup> Although the Government was not willing to allow settlement on state-owned lands before the title deeds were issued, occasionally it made exceptions.<sup>228</sup> The situation with granting state aid was similar, due to the lack of funds.<sup>229</sup>

After the cadaster (or land registry) was completed and the work on issuing title-deeds made headway, the Common Finance Ministry issued directives for colonization, along with the principles that were to be upheld in the process. Local and foreign candidates were eligible. Foreigners could get between 10 and 12 ha, but were obliged to bring at least 600 Forints with them. The land was first to be rented, in order to clear it for cultivation; if the lessees proved reliable and politically impeccable through ten years, they would become owners of their land gratuitously. As

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221 Kraljačić, p. 113; W[ily] Oehler, *Deutsche Kolonisation in Bosnien*, Kulturwart, XXIX, 13, 1918, p. 2; Fritz Hoffmann, Josef Zorn (eds.), *Franz-Josefsfeld – Schönborn. Geschichte einer deutschen Gemeinde in Bosnien*, Freilassing 1963, p. 12; Anton Burda, *Poljski naseljenici u Bosni*, Zbornik krajiških muzeja, III, 1969, p. 186.

222 Ferdo Hauptmann, *Regulisanje zemljišnog posijeda u Bosni i Hercegovini i počeci naseljavanja stranih seljaka u doba austrougarske vladavine*, Godišnjak Društva istoričara BiH, XVI, 1965, p. 160.

223 Adnan Busuladžić, *Pojava grkokatoličkog stanovništva u Bosni i Hercegovini (od 1879 do najnovijeg doba)*, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, XXXV, 1, 2003, p. 171. Thus the plan of colonizing Tyrolians in Herzegovina as a living wall against Montenegro came to being. It was eventually dropped because of complicated agrarian relations and for fear of Montenegrin reaction. (Kraljačić, p. 114.)

224 Kraljačić, p. 115. In the case of Ruthenians, the authorities wanted to weaken their irredenta in Galicia by scattering them all over the Monarchy. (Cf. Vaso Strehaljuk, *Ukrajinci u Bosni*, Godišnjak Društva istoričara Vojvodine, Novi Sad 1978, p. 78.)

225 Šćepan Grdić, *Kolonizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Pregled (Sarajevo), 6, 1912, p. 371.

226 Hauptmann, p. 158; Kraljačić, p. 116.

227 Vladimir Geiger, *Bosna u folksdojčerskoj historiografiji i publicistici*, *Bosna franciscana*, IX, 15, 2001, pp. 230-231; Wild, p. 152; Dušan Drljača, *Kolonizacija i život Poljaka u jugoslovenskim zemljama. Od kraja XIX do sredine XX veka*, Beograd 1985, pp. 26-27.

228 As for instance in the case of colonization of Italians in Mahovljani in 1883. (Kraljačić, p. 117.)

229 Mahovljani and Franz-Josefsfeld got help nevertheless. (Hauptmann, p. 165; Kraljačić, p. 117.)

previously, they were given free building wood.<sup>230</sup> In order to make the colonization palatable for the natives, the Bosnian government claimed it started settling foreigners only after the colonization of the local Muslim population had failed – which did not correspond fully with the truth.<sup>231</sup> During 1890s, which were the golden age of the state colonization,<sup>232</sup> German colonies of Branjevo, Dugo Polje, Dubrava (Königsfeld), Vrbaška (Karlsdorf), Prošara, Korače, Glogovac (Schützberg) and others were founded.<sup>233</sup> In 1895 certain number of Czechs from the Volynyska province of Russia settled in Srbac, Derventa and Prnjavor.<sup>234</sup>

The Poles were settled chiefly between 1895 and 1910. Their largest colonies were Rakovac and Martinac near Prnjavor, founded between 1899 and 1901.<sup>235</sup> In 1899 a large number of Poles came to Derventa from Galicia and Russia. The bulk of the Poles were settled between the rivers of Vrbas and Ukrina, mostly in formerly predominantly Serbian villages.<sup>236</sup> In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century the Poles were mostly colonized in the districts of Prnjavor, Derventa, Bosanska Dubica, Bosanska Gradiška, Bosanski Novi, Tešanj, Žepče and Zenica.<sup>237</sup> At the same time, sometimes together with the Poles, and sometimes alone, the Ruthenians from Galicia were also coming.<sup>238</sup> However, in 1901 the government decided not to accept them anymore because they were not of the best repute,<sup>239</sup> and because allegedly there had already been enough of them.<sup>240</sup> Their number was highest in Derventa with its surroundings, in Stara and Nova Dubrava and in Kamenica.<sup>241</sup>

After Kállay's death in 1903, the number of colonists dwindled perceptibly, and in 1905 the colonization of foreigners was brought to a stop altogether – ostensibly in favor of the colonization of the locals. The reasons for the end of the colonization were problems with the unresolved property rights<sup>242</sup> and the resistance on the part of the natives who demanded not only that the colonization be stopped, but also that the settlers go back where they came from.<sup>243</sup> According to the official data, until 1905 thirty-eight colonies were founded with 15,340

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230 Kraljačić, p. 118.

231 Hauptmann, p. 115; Wild, p. 153; Maier, p. 17. However, the locals did take part in colonization, and indeed they received somewhat more land than the immigrants (231.646, dunum compared to 218.923), but the number of local families who received land was almost four times larger than that of the colonists'. (Grdić, p. 374.) Hauptmann claims the colonization of foreigners was more successful than that of the natives. (Hauptmann, p. 152.)

232 Cf. Hauptmann, p. 151; Maier, p. 17.

233 Maier, pp. 19-22; Wild, p. 153.

234 EJ, 3, p. 264. The Czechs came also to Marovci, Bosanski Kabaš, Nova Ves and Mačino Brdo. (Drljača, p. 27.)

235 Drljača, p. 8.

236 Drljača, pp. 29-30.

237 Drljača, p. 37; Kraljačić, 119.

238 The largest number came in 1898. (Strehaljuk, p. 79.) The first Ruthenians came already in 1889. (Busuladžić, p. 147.)

239 Strehaljuk refutes this. (Strehaljuk, p. 81.)

240 Strehaljuk, p. 80; Drljača, p. 42. According to Busuladžić, the highest number of Ruthenians came between 1910 and 1912. (Busuladžić, p. 175.)

241 Strehaljuk, p. 81.

242 Hauptmann, pp. 153-154, 157.

243 Hauptmann, p. 153; Kraljačić, p. 119; Drljača, p. 43.

settlers on 20,085 hectares of land. Among these colonies (which the powers-that-be wanted to make mono-ethnic in order to prevent their assimilation) there were 12 Polish,<sup>244</sup> 11 German, 4 Czech, 4 Polish-Ruthenian, 3 Ruthenian, 2 Italian, 1 Hungarian and 1 Slovenian.<sup>245</sup>

As for the rural colonies in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because of the poor soil, brief existence, small state aid, poor roads, resistance on the part of their Yugoslav neighbors etc, they never reached the degree of prosperity of the villages in the Bačka, the Banat, Hungary proper or Germany from where most of the colonists had come from.<sup>246</sup> For these reasons, their influence on their surroundings remained limited: their neighbors were not always willing to accept the more advanced agricultural techniques – factors also unknown to some of the colonists themselves, by the way.<sup>247</sup> Furthermore, the colonists looked down on the natives,<sup>248</sup> whereas the latter despised the newcomers, calling them “Swabians” and “carpet-baggers”.<sup>249</sup>

A large part of the colonists in Bosnia were not rural, but urban skilled labor force in industry which started developing gradually under Austro-Hungarian rule.<sup>250</sup> In addition, there were also numerous officials and officers.<sup>251</sup> This population did not show the degree of steadiness as the rural one, so that its larger part left Bosnia-Herzegovina after the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy.

The colonization of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not crowned with success. Only a smaller number of settlers was colonized and they did not alter the ethnic make-up of the population – except in some places on the local level. Being predominantly weak economically<sup>252</sup> (although they often seemed prosperous enough compared to the

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244 It was the Polish who were the most numerous colonists, and not the German and Ruthenian ones, as claimed by Cvijić. (Cf. Drljača, p. 17.)

245 Kraljačić, p. 120. Wild adduces different data: 54 colonies with 9.000 settlers. (Wild, p. 153.)

246 The claim of Tomislav Kraljačić that all Germans have founded exemplary estates cannot be accepted. (Kraljačić, p. 121. Cf. Maier, p. 39; F. Sommer, *Fern vom Land der Ahnen. Geschichte der deutschen evangelischen Gemeinde Schutzberg in Bosnien 1895-1942. Notvolle Heimkehr. Das Schicksal der Bosniendeutschen 1942-1960*, s.l. [1960], pp. 20, 32.) It has only relative congruency, dependent on place and only if the life of the majority of the Germans is compared to the abysmal poverty of the native population. (Lech Pazdzierski, *Maria Dobrowska i Jugoslavija*, *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, XVI/2, 1973, p. 615.)

247 So for instance, the authorities were dissatisfied with the Ruthenians, of whom they thought they stood at even lower economic level than did the natives. (Kraljačić, p. 122.) Part of the Italians from Tyrol also turned to be unserious. (Hauptmann, p. 168.)

248 This picture was however, not universal: the Poles got along well enough with the Croats, but they disliked the Serbs. (Pazdzierski, p. 615; Drljača, p. 16.) The reasons for this lied probably in religious difference. The claim of the *Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia* that the Poles and the natives got along well, needs to be qualified accordingly. (EJ, 6, Zagreb 1965, p. 537.)

249 Kraljačić, p. 124. The privileges the colonists enjoyed, were certainly the cause of animosity too. (Cf. Drljača, p. 19; Oehler, p. 2; Hoffmann, Zorn (eds.), p. 16.)

250 These colonists came to the new budding industrial centres such as Žepče, Zenica, Zavidovići, Sarajevo, Mostar etc. (Maier, p. 24; Geiger, *Bosna*, p. 220.)

251 Drljača, pp. 7, 24-25.

252 Wily Oehler has noticed that the private colonies often fared better than the state ones, the latter being in unsuitable places. (Oehler, p. 2.)



surrounding native population), the colonies were suited neither for the economic nor the political role assigned them by the powers of the Habsburg Empire. The grave turmoil of history would almost completely wipe out the results of the rural Habsburg colonization in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the next few decades. The urban colonist population proved even weaker: it either emigrated after 1918, or, if it had taken root itself earlier, started assimilating, ultimately disappearing as a minority population in the process. Still, because of their more numerous co-nationals in other parts of Yugoslavia, and their mother countries who played a role in the Yugoslav foreign policy, the colonists in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not completely insignificant even during the inter-war period.

The last very small ethnic group in the Yugoslav territory that should be mentioned in this survey, are the Italians – more because of the importance of their mother country and the pressure it used to put to bear upon Yugoslavia than because of their number or their economic power (although the latter was in an inverse proportion to their numbers.) As we have seen, small groups of Italians from Tyrol were settled in Bosnia. For the Italians of Dalmatia who formed the bulk of the Italians in Yugoslavia, the Italian propaganda claimed they had been the ancestors of the Romans and Romanized inhabitants of the Balkans (including the “Morlaks”) who managed to escape assimilation by the “barbaric” Slavs.<sup>253</sup> From the Yugoslav (Croat) side, it was pointed out that the majority of the Italians had come to Dalmatia only in the course of 19<sup>th</sup> century (until 1868), and that before that time their number was small and that they had been assimilating into Slavs fast or had died out.<sup>254</sup> The argument ran similarly as in the case of other minorities: the vast majority of Italians living in Dalmatia during the inter-war period were either Italianized Slavs, or late newcomers.<sup>255</sup> The problem resembled the Slovene-German conflict on a smaller scale: the Italians, being economically and culturally dominant, and for a long time favored by the Habsburg authorities to the detriment of the Croats and the Serbs, managed to a large degree to put an Italian stamp on the Dalmatian towns, preserving the continuity of their presence through assimilation and constant influx from Italy.<sup>256</sup> Similarly to the struggle for power in Slovenian towns in the last third of 19<sup>th</sup> century, a conflict of two nations for dominance in the towns and the whole province flared up, although here the national fronts were not so clear cut, and the situation was made more complicated by the presence of the third player – the Serbs. In that struggle, being Italian was often just a political banner and a cultural trade mark of one of the litigating parties, and not necessarily the nationality of its adherents.<sup>257</sup> Political passions and cultural affinities here also led some from the Croat into the Italian camp,

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253 Tamaro, o.c.; Idem, *L'Adriatico golfo d'Italia. L'italianità di Trieste*, Milano 1915, p. 58; *Dalmazia, Fiume e le oltre terre irredente dell' Adriatico*. Studio storico statistico, Idea democratica, IV, 45, 1916, pp. 30-31.

254 L. de Voinovich, *Histoire de Dalmatie*, II. Des greffes du lion ailé a la libération (1409-1918), Paris 1937 (2nd ed.), pp. 529, 532.

255 Ivo Rubić, *Talijani na primorju Kraljevine Jugoslavije*, Split 1930, p. 11.

256 Josip Vrandečić, *Razvoj talijanskog nacionalizma u Dalmaciji*, in: Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac (eds.), *Dijalog povijesničara-istoričara*, 6, Zagreb 2002, pp. 191-192.

257 Josip Vrandečić, *Nacionalne ideologije u Dalmaciji u 19. stoljeću*, in: Hans-Georg Fleck, Igor Graovac (eds.), *Dijalog povijesničara-istoričara*, 4, Zagreb 2001. A survey of the struggle see in: Voinovich, pp. 697-716; Dinko Foretić, *Borba za ponarodivanje općina u Dalmaciji (1865-1900)* (Ph.D. manuscript), Zadar 1971.

but the latter nevertheless remained tiny, and almost completely confined to towns; concerning the ethnic make-up, Dalmatia was in 1918 one of the “most Yugoslav” provinces.

Settlement of people belonging to nationalities which would become national minorities after the founding of Yugoslavia was basically the consequence of the rule of multi-national empires (the Ottoman and the Habsburg) which ruled the Yugoslav territories for centuries. People who can justly pretend to be descendants of the autochthonous population of South-East Europe, still cannot prove their primacy in the territories they inhabited in 1918. On the contrary, there are enough historical sources and evidence that testify that they came in larger numbers only much later, i.e. during the recent two or three centuries. This does not mean their co-nationals were not to be found in the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia already earlier, but only that their vast majority came only during modern history. The Albanians were gaining ground applying a lot of violence (although not exclusively in that way), whereas the Romanians were coming spontaneously, following their flocks, until the Habsburg authorities started regularizing their settlement – similarly to that of the Serbs. As for the Turks, they used to come as officials, craftsmen, soldiers, but were also colonized on purpose, in order to strengthen the power of the Sultan in the Balkans. The Germans in Slovenia were on one hand the continuation of the German ethnic mass, and on the other, the fruit of the medieval colonizations by German feudal lords, which were repeated time and again throughout the centuries, and solidified through assimilation. To the Vojvodina they came as planned colonists, just like the Slovaks, Hungarians (who had left South Hungary before the advancing Turks in 16<sup>th</sup> century) and others. The situation was similar in Slavonia, although the role of the private initiative was larger there. Bosnia-Herzegovina was colonized according to a plan with clear national and political goals.

All these migrations were undertaken so as to secure higher revenues for the rulers and in order to fortify their grip over certain territories. Spontaneous movements of population sometimes played into their hands, but in other cases everything was planned by the authorities executing the colonization.

Together with colonization, assimilation played a part in the renewing and increase of the non-Yugoslav population. However, it should not be forgotten, that it was never a one way process<sup>258</sup> and that it usually functioned in the favor of the numerically, but also culturally and economically stronger people. Settlements like those we have described in this chapter have left a lasting mark on the ethnic make-up of large parts of Yugoslavia. It also left civilization traces which last to this day whereas conflicts which had occurred during the colonization, were remembered. Even when the situation would calm down temporarily, and when in many territories peaceful life together prevailed, the memory of conflicts would still remain, ready to be revived as ideological ammunition in new conflict situations.<sup>259</sup>

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258 Milorad Ekmečić rightly pointed out the large role the assimilants had played in the history of the Yugoslav peoples. (Cf. Milorad Ekmečić, *Internacionalni i interkontinentalni pokreti iz jugoslovenskih zemalja od kraja XVIII vijeka do 1941*, *Godišnjak Društva istoričara BiH*, XX, 1974, p. 11.)

259 On the broader session of the Serbian Culture Club in Sombor on February 11, 1940, in front of some 1500 people from 180 national associations, one of the speakers said the Serbs had built the houses and ploughed the fields for the Germans who settled only after that. (Vojni arhiv (henceforth: VA), p. 17, k. 92, f. 3, d. 11.)

## Chapter Two

# Numbers and Emigration

Mark Twain once said there were three kinds of lies: a lie, a nasty lie and statistics. By saying this, in his humorous way, he said a big truth with which historians are confronted whenever they have to deal with nationality statistics. The beginning of the nationalist epoch in mid-19<sup>th</sup> century was more or less simultaneous with the beginnings of the modern, scientifically based, statistics – the development of nationalism having always obstructed its development as a science. Nationality struggle got its extensions in economy, but also in historiography and statistics. During the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century censuses were increasingly a weapon in national squabbles and means of proving one's right to power or participation in it, and, in connection with this, the right to possess a certain territory or part of it.<sup>1</sup> Censuses were originally introduced in order to determine the demographic and economic strength of a state, but turned, for the conscripting party, into a furnisher of ideological ammunition in the nationality struggle against the underprivileged or even oppressed peoples, and for the latter, into a red rag and yet another proof of the injustice of their position. In another words, from a purely statistical and clerical affair, censuses became a *Politicum*, (as it was called in the old Austria, the classical example of nationality struggle in 19<sup>th</sup> century).

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes created in 1918, did not inherit from the Habsburg Monarchy only its territories, but their multi-ethnic population which carried on their national conflicts from the pre-war time, but now under the changed circumstances and in the new juridical and state framework. The question of the ethnic make-up reflected through the censuses remained a political one in the new state too. It was not only the matter of drawing the lines of division between the state-building peoples, i.e., of non-recognition of some of them even as “tribes” in the sense the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were (to be sure, only grudgingly) recognized. The question of national minorities in the context of the nation-state that actually wasn't one, played an even greater role. This was even more so since the largest minorities belonged to the formerly privileged peoples whose mother countries sometimes entertained aspirations to parts of the young kingdom's territory.<sup>2</sup> The Yugoslav

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1 Especially notorious were censuses (private ones or just estimates) concerning Macedonia, in which every interested party furnished numbers according to its liking. (Cf. a survey in: Jovan Cvijić, Remarques sur l'ethnographie de la Macedoine, *Annales de géographie*, XV, 81-82, 1906; Stojan Kiselinovski, Nacionalna struktura stanovništva Makedonije (1900-1913), *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, XI, 1, 1979.)

2 In the first place it was the revisionist Hungary, and partly Albania. The first adduced the thousand years of statehood and possession of the territories allotted to Yugoslavia, as well as the quite large Hungarian national minority. Albania, being small, poor and backward and internally unstable, was not so blatant in presenting its claims, having no means of making them good anyway. The only real irredentists in Albania were the refugee Kosovo-Albanians. (Cf. Michael Schmidt-Neke, Entstehung und Ausbau der Königsdiktatur

authorities feared that publication of the numbers of people belonging to national minorities could endanger the interests of the state and give food to its enemies. For that reason the Foreign Ministry vetoed for a time the publication of the results from 1921 census, whereas the results of 1931 census according to mother tongue, were never officially published during the existence of the Kingdom.<sup>3</sup>

During the inter-war period, the censuses in Yugoslavia were made according to mother-tongue, which was then projected to national affiliation.<sup>4</sup> This was done in view of manipulations from the Austro-Hungarian times when the language of everyday communication (Umgangssprache) was asked for – which favored the leading peoples of the monarchy, the Germans and Hungarians, enabling them to implicitly arrogate themselves people living outside their ethnic territory or who were economically dependent on German or Hungarian speaking employers with whom they had to communicate in these languages, or people living in mixed marriages and the like.<sup>5</sup>

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in Albanien (1912-1939). Regierungsbildung, Herrschaftsweise und Machteliten in einem jungen Balkanstaat, München 1987, p. 159; Joseph Rotschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars*, Seattle, London 1974, p. 366.) As for Turkey, she was more interested in obtaining people than distant territories, which materialized through migrations of Muslim population. Austria became a small, impoverished and unstable republic which, unification with Germany having been denied it, struggled for survival and not for expansion, which remained the dream only of regional nationalist hotheads in Carinthia and Styria. The interest in the Volksdeutsche existed but was rather platonic and always overshadowed by economic priorities. (Arnold Suppan, *Jugoslawien und Österreich 1918-1938*, Wien 1996.) Germany too was, in case of Yugoslavia, more interested in economic relations. Although the interest in Volksdeutsche existed there too, it also had to take the back seat in favor of economic and political interests of the Reich. Pretensions to the Yugoslav territory (or at least its greater part) practically did not exist until the run-up to the Second World War. (Cf. Hans-Paul Höpfner, *Deutsche Südosteuropapolitik in der Weimarer Republik*, Frankfurt/M, Bonn 1983; Zoran Janjetović, *Vajmarska republika i nemačka manjina u Jugoslaviji*, Tokovi istorije, IV, 1-4, 1998; Andrej Mitrović, *Ergänzungswirtschaft: Theory of an Integrated economic Area of the Third Reich and South East Europe (1933-1934)*; Lepasava Cvijetić, *The Ambitions and Plans of the Third Reich with Regard to the Integration of Yugoslavia into its so-called Grosswirtschaftsraum*; Hans-Jürgen Schröder, *Südosteuropa als "Informal Empire" NS-Deutschlands. Das Beispiel Jugoslawien (1933-1939)*; Slavko Odić, Slavko Komarica, *Yugoslavia in the German Plans of Conquest*, all in: *The Third Reich and Yugoslavia 1933-1945*, Belgrade 1977.)

3 AJ, 38, 63/166; VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 20. Cf. also Dragan Tešić, *Vojska Kraljevine Jugoslavije i nacionalne manjine u godinama uoči Aprilskog rata*, *Istorija XX veka*, 2, 1996, p. 75. The ethnic make-up according to the 1931 census was first published by the Germans who had laid their hands on the census materials during the Second World War. (Die Gliederung der Bevölkerung des ehemaligen Jugoslawien nach Muttersprache und Konfession nach der unveröffentlichten Angabe der Zählung vom 1931, Wien 1943.) It is interesting that at a conference on May 25, 1938, attended by representatives of the Main General Staff, the Central Press Bureau and the Foreign Ministry, the decision was made to make public the number of Ethnic-Germans in the country according to the 1931 census, in order to counter the German propaganda. (AJ, 38, 93/225; VA, pop. 17, k. 22, f. 2, d. 11.)

4 VA, pop. 17, k. 69, f. 4, d. 6.

5 In the words of the president of the Central Statistical Commission, K. Th. Inam-Sternegg, it was done "for political reasons with which statistics had nothing in common". (Vlado, *Etnična struktura*, p. 290.)

Furthermore, the aim was to encourage the non-native speakers who had opted for German or Hungarian as the language of everyday communication because of education, cultural preferences, opportunism, etc. until 1918, to declare their mother tongue, and thus, in most cases, their true nationality too.

In most cases, but not always. First of all, there was a polyglot Jewish population of 68,405 people (in 1931),<sup>6</sup> only 18,044 speaking Yiddish, and the rest Hungarian (mostly), German, Serbian, Croat etc. In such cases, it was the religion which helped determine nationality. Among other nationalities there were also cases where the mother tongue did not overlap with nationality,<sup>7</sup> this being the consequence of the centuries-long rule of foreign empires and influences this brought about. The linguistic criterion however, was very convenient for determining the nationality of multilingual and multi-national Muslims, many of whom, due to the poorly developed national consciousness, considered themselves Turks – meaning by that loyalty to Islam and not to the Turkish nationality.<sup>8</sup>

However, the problem was that the authorities, although taking census according to mother tongue, arrogated themselves the right to determine the nationality of their subjects. In so doing they not only denied a separate national identity to certain Yugoslav peoples (in the last resort, to all!), but were arbitrarily researching peoples' origin, projecting the nationality of their ancestors onto the present. The procedure was reserved for the members of minority nationalities, whereas, no one tried to "restore" the very numerous Yugoslavs of foreign descent to their "original nationality."<sup>9</sup>

The authorities complained that a certain number of people had not adduced their real mother tongue – to be sure, if this was done to the detriment of the "state people".<sup>10</sup> This was in keeping with the desire of every nation-state (and Yugoslavia was seeing herself as such), to diminish the numbers of the national minorities – if not in reality, then at least in statistics – in order to put a show of homogeneity which it does not possess, which in the eyes of the world suggests solidity and strength. On their part, national minorities are usually not satisfied with their numbers in the official

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6 Die Gliederung, p. 10; AJ, 38, 93/225.

7 There were a lot of Germans speaking Hungarian or Croat as mother tongue, Aromunes speaking Greek etc.

8 Avdija Avdić, Opšti pogled na migracije muslimanskog stanovništva na Balkanu od kraja XIX veka do zaključenja jugoslovensko-turske konvencije (11. jula 1938. godine), Novopazarski zbornik, 9, 1985, p. 154; Hasan Rebac, Islam u Kraljevini SHS, in: Jubilarni zbornik života i rada u SHS1. decembar 1918-1928, Beograd 1929, p. 653; Avdija Mušović, Muslimani u današnjici, Srpski književni glasnik, 59, 1940, p. 276.)

9 This, however, does not mean that some representatives of certain minorities did not wish to "restore" part of their partly or completely assimilated co-nationals. This was particularly typical of the Germans in 1930s, since it was they who had suffered greatest losses due to Magyarization. (Cf. Uj Hirek, December 15, 1937.)

10 Tone Zorn, Dve poročili o nemški manjšini v Sloveniji, Kronika, XXIV, 1, 1976, p. 89. Mariborski večernik attacked viciously the alleged participation of Slovenes in the German Kulturbund as unnatural, on June 18, 1935. On the other hand, it deemed the assimilation of the immigrant Germans into Slovenes as a matter of course: according to this newspaper, the immigrants had to count on the fact that their descendant wouldn't be able to remain Germans. What the Kulturbund was doing, was, according to the newspaper, the continuation of artificial Germanization from the Austrian times.

statistics of the countries in which they live. This was the case in Yugoslavia too, so that attempts at private censuses were undertaken. At least two were actually carried out.<sup>11</sup>

What were then, the numbers of national minorities in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia? It would be difficult to answer this question unambiguously. With certain individuals prominent in their local community, it was possible to observe how they opportunistically changed their national affiliation over time.<sup>12</sup> Sometimes the authorities themselves were venting their doubts as to the accuracy of the census,<sup>13</sup> whereas, as we shall presently see, for the representatives of the minorities, denying its accuracy was a matter of course.

Officially, according to the 1921 census, in Yugoslavia there were 115,535 Czechs and Slovaks (who on the model of regarding the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes as one people, but also in keeping with the prevailing situation in Czechoslovakia, were often considered one people); 20,568 Russians; 14,764 Poles; 25,615 Ruthenians; 12,553 Italians; 467,658 Hungarians; 505,790 Germans; 439,657 Albanians; 150,322 Turks; 231,068 Romanians; 69,878 others – as opposed to 9,931,506 Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (i.e. all Southern Slavs in the parlance of the time).<sup>14</sup> The position of the Romanians was curious in the official statistics and politics: the statistics recorded all Romanians (including the Aromuns), whereas the official policy recognized as a national minority only 69,616 Romanians in the Banat (+1,483 in the Bačka).

The results of the 1931 census, that were published only later on, recorded: 36,333 Russians; 52,909 Czechs; 76,411 Slovaks; 27,681 Ruthenians; 468,185 Hungarians; 499,969 Germans; 508,259 Albanians; 132,924 Turks; 137,879 Romanians; 130,255 others – against 11,866,233 Yugoslavs. Apart from the possible bias of the census officials, declaring false nationality out of opportunism, economic dependence, etc, there is another slight “problem” with the official figures. Namely, in the top secret documents for internal use which contain the numbers of members of minorities, there are numbers which diverge from the official ones from 1921 and 1931.<sup>15</sup> The differences are usually not big, but are sometimes perceptible nevertheless.<sup>16</sup> In order to know how these differences came about, we should know the methodology of the people working at the census.

Although the data from the 1931 census were not officially published as a whole, part of them was. Professor Radojević published in 1933 the data which were somewhat reduced in comparison with those published in 1943.<sup>17</sup> Unofficial, but more

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11 These were private German censuses in Slovenia in 1928 and 1936. (Vladimir Klemenčič, *Nemci v statistiki v jugoslovanski Sloveniji med obema vojnama*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XL, 4, 1986, p. 468; Franjo Baš, *Slovenski Nemci 1918-1945* (a manuscript in the Institute for Nationality Question in Ljubljana, fasc. 152.), p.6; Zorn, *Narodnostni podatki*, p. 367.) Furthermore, various national organizations and religious denominations made their own private statistics.

12 Tone Zorn, *Nemški trgovski obrati v Sloveniji v letih 1938/1939 (Značaj in lastništvo)*, *Kronika*, XVIII, 2, 1970, p. 113; Hermann Rüdiger, *Die Donauschwaben in der südslawischen Batschka*, Stuttgart 1931, p. 41; AJ, 63, 47/145.

13 Zorn, *Dve poročili*, p. 89; AJ, 14, 27/71.

14 *Statistički pregled Kraljevine Jugoslavije [1921] po banovinama*, Beograd 1930, p. 5.

15 Cf. Tešić, p. 75; AJ, 38, 63/166; AJ, F. 398, f. 1.

16 Thus officially there were 52.902 Czechs, whereas one of the quoted documents mentions only 28.905. (AJ, 38, 63/166.)

17 *Basler Nachrichten*, 6.VI 1933.

accurate figures, albeit not for all minorities, were published by the Press Department of the Foreign Ministry in 1935.<sup>18</sup> An interesting feature of this publication is that the number of Albanians was given as lower than in 1921.<sup>19</sup>

In order to get the picture how the number of inhabitants of various nationalities had changed, we shall adduce here the results of the (also much disputed) Hungarian census of 1910 and the Yugoslav census of 1931 for the present-day territory of the Vojvodina.<sup>20</sup>

Year	Yugoslavs	Slavs	Magyars	Germans	Romanians	Others
1910	741,857	819,225	450,646	361,361	77,350	18,965
1931	911,721	101,592	399,175	376,920	64,305	14,716

The change in the number of Germans was particularly drastic in the Slovenian territory:<sup>21</sup>

Year	1910	1921	1931
Number	106,000	41,314	27,786

The decline in the number of the minority population could also be observed in other parts of the country. With certain ethnic groups the numerical decline was not evenly distributed. Thus for instance for the Germans in the Vojvodina an increase in comparison with 1910 was recorded.<sup>22</sup> This can be explained by many Germans who had declared themselves Hungarians in 1910 opting for their original nationality under the conditions when it was more propitious to be a German than a Magyar. The decline of the number of Germans in Slovenia should also be explained in part by the return of many Slovenes who had adduced German as their language of communication in 1910, to the people from which they had originated. Similar examples were to be found in other places too. Part of the Bunjevci also started to awaken from national lethargy and to separate themselves from the Hungarians etc.

The decline in numbers of the minority populations can be observed only partly, and only in the former Habsburg lands, since the former Ottoman territories lacked satisfactory statistics (at least as satisfactory as the much disputed Austro-Hungarian ones) which would make it possible to observe, at least approximately, the decline in the number of the minority population before and after 1918. This goes for the number of the assimilants returning to their native nationalities, as well as for the opportunists and emigrants. The last mentioned played a particularly important role in the diminishing of the number of the minority population, so that we shall deal with

18 La Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui, Belgrade 1935. It is curious that the participants of the above-mentioned conference of May 25, 1938 were not aware of this publication in which the number of Germans was correctly adduced. (O.c., p. 8.)

19 The number was reduced by 97,657. (Ibid., p. 85.)

20 AJ, 66, 72/195.

21 Suppan, pp. 662-663. We cannot agree with Vladimir Klemenčič that the drop in 1921 was caused solely by the language that was recorded, and in 1931 by emigration. (V. Klemenčič, p. 467.)

22 In the today's territory of the Vojvodina there were 324,017 Germans in 1910, and 335,902 in 1921. (Karoly Kocsis, Eszter Kocsis-Hodosi, Hungarian Minorities in the Carpathian Basin, Toronto, Buffalo 1995, p. 89.)

them more extensively – especially since the way they had left their homes remains disputed to this day, and a source of contention in the inter-ethnic relations in this part of Europe.

Emigration of the members of the national minorities from the territory that would become Yugoslavia, was much older than that state. First, it occurred from the territories that Turkey lost to Serbia and Montenegro in 1878, and somewhat later, at the turn of the century, also from the Habsburg territories.<sup>23</sup> However, the differences in emigration from these two zones of civilization were considerable – as they would remain in many aspects later on too. From the former Ottoman territories, people usually migrated under direct or indirect pressure, often spurred by violence. On the other hand, people were leaving the Habsburg lands of their own free will, in search of work, mostly overseas. This trend would basically continue also after the foundation of Yugoslavia, although the First World War would bring coercion and even violence into the former Habsburg territories.

The defeat of Turkey in 1878 started an avalanche of Muslim refugees and expellees from the Balkans, who were, as we have seen, partly changing its ethnic make-up in some places. Together with Ethnic-Albanians expelled from the liberated parts of Serbia and Montenegro, the Turks and Slavonic Muslims started moving too.<sup>24</sup> The number of these refugees was quite uncertain<sup>25</sup> – the Ottoman Empire had no good statistics even in the times of peace, so it would be too much to expect it to have them in the fateful days when its very survival was at stake. For the very same reason, the ethnic make-up of the refugees remains unclear. What is certain, is that large

- 23 Emigration and expulsion of the Muslim population occurred already in Serbia after the first and the Second Serbian Uprising against the Turks in early 19th century, but it seems the majority of these Muslims had been Slavs. (Dragoljub Janković, *Srpska država Prvog ustanka*, Beograd 1984, pp. 66-67; Tihomir R. Đorđević, *Arnauti u Srbiji za vlade kneza Miloša (1815-1839)*, Arhiv za arbansku starinu, jezik i etnologiju, knj. 1, sv. 1-2, 1923; Alexandre Popovic, *La presenza turca e musulmana nei Balcani negli anni successivi alla prima guerra mondiale: problemi e »soluzioni«*, in: Marina Cattaruzza, Maco Dogo, Raul Pupo (eds.), *Trasferimenti forzati di popolazione nel Novecento europeo*, Napoli 2000, p. 15; Vladimir Stojančević, *Politički uzroci promene stanovništva Beograda i okoline u vreme Prvog srpskog ustanka*, Godišnjak grada Beograda, XX, 1973.)
- 24 Hakif Bajrami, *Orijentacija Srbije za kolonizaciju i srbizaciju Kosova*, u: Bahri Cani, Cvijetin Mijatović (eds.), *Kosmet ili Kosova*, Beograd 1996, p. 153-154. (This author denies vehemently that a single Albanian family from Albania settled down in Kosovo during 19th century! On the other hand, he claims the Kosovo Serbs were leaving Kosovo on the instigation of the Serbian government. Cf. p. 153); Radoslav Lj. Pavlović, *Seobe Srba i Arbanasa u ratovima 1876, 1877, 1878. godine*, Glasnik Etnografskog instituta SAN, knj. IV-VI, 1955-1957. This author believes, some 20,000 Albanians had emigrated. (Cf. p. 76); M.Đ. Miličević, *Kraljevina Srbija. Novi krajevi*, Beograd 1884, p. 403; Milovan Spasić, *Podaci o agrarnim odnosima hrišćana u oslobođenim krajevima okruga topličkog i vranjskog za vreme turske vladavine*, Glasnik Srpskog učenog društva, knj. 71, Beograd 1890; Jovan Hadži-Vasiljević, *Arbanska liga – arnautska kongra i srpski narod u Turskom carstvu (1878-1882)*, Beograd 1909, pp. 1-20; Bogdanović, pp. 136-141; Pllana, o.c.; Jagodić, o.c.; Bandžović, pp. 137-139; Avdić, pp. 147-151; Idem, *Tokovi iseljavanja muslimana iz Bosne i Hercegovine i Sandžaka*, Novopazarski zbornik, 17, 1993, pp. 103-105.
- 25 Bajrami quotes the Turkish historian Bilal Shimshir, who adduces British sources according to which 350.000 people fled the lost territories in the Balkans in 1878-1881. (Bajrami, p. 155.)



population shifts in 1876-1878 comprised also members of the peoples who would become national minorities after foundation of Yugoslavia, and contributed to resettlement of parts of these peoples in parts of the future Yugoslav territory. Furthermore, the ethnic cleansing of Serbia in 1878, and the victims it caused, disgruntled the Kosovo Albanians as well as the refugees: in the Serbs they saw only Russian cat's paw and they started believing they could keep the territories they were still holding and reconquer the lost ones only by eliminating the Serbs from their midst.<sup>26</sup> As for the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they continued to emigrate until the Balkan Wars 1912-1913.<sup>27</sup>

The Muslim population was put in a similar situation during the Balkan Wars. Although there has been no planned expulsions this time, there were crimes – murder, pillage, forced christening, rape, etc, which coupled with some other factors, spurred a large number of Muslims from all over the Balkans to migrate. The reasons were manifold: the loss of the leading economic and social position, religious fanaticism, wish for better living (typical of the poor), instigation on the part of the Turkish authorities,<sup>28</sup> refusal to become national minorities or to come under the rule of Christian states, desire to escape war, punishment for crimes, propaganda by mullahs, etc.<sup>29</sup> Just like with the migrations of 1878, it is not known how many people left – due to the lack of historical records, their diffusion or contradiction.<sup>30</sup> The figures are adduced either partly, or for the whole of the Balkans.<sup>31</sup> When the non-Slavic Muslims

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26 Durham, pp. 84, 108.

27 Their numbers are also uncertain and are usually estimated between 63,000 and 150-160,000 for the 1878-1912 period. (Bandžović, Tokovi, p. 105.)

28 In 1914 the Turkish government called on the Balkan Muslims to emigrate to Turkey. (Marko Dogo, Muslimani kao verske i etničke manjine u jugoistočnoj Evropi između dva svetska rata, in: *Islam, Balkan i velike sile (XIV-XX vek)*. Međunarodni skup 11-13. decembar 1996, Beograd 1997, p. 455.) Later on, the Turkish government repeatedly invited Muslims to migrate to Anatolia (1925, 1934). (Ibid, pp. 456, 459).

29 Durham, pp. 235-243, 248-249; Bajrami, pp. 155-156. (This author claims 23,000 people lost their life in the process.); Wolfgang Höpken, *Türkische Minderheiten in Südosteuropa. Aspekte ihrer politischen und sozialen Entwicklung in Bulgarien und Jugoslawien*, in: Hans Georg Majer (ed.), *Die Staaten Südosteuropas und die Osmanen*, München 1989, pp. 225-230; Bandžović, Tokovi, p. 105; Avdić, pp. 154-156; Mušović, pp. 148-149; Branko Babić, *Iseljavanje muslimana iz novih krajeva Crne Gore u proleće 1914*, *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 1-4, 1978; Idem, *Politika Crne Gore u novooslobođenim krajevima 1912-1914*, Cetinje, Titograd [1984], pp. 256-263; Katrin Boeckh, *Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan*, München 1996, pp. 155-156, 257-258, 265; Vladimir Dedijer, Života Antić (eds.), *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije*, knj. VII, sv. 1, Beograd 1980, pp. 463, 476-477, 522, 618, 773-774.

30 Boeckh, p. 257. Justin McCarthy, quoting Turkish census, claims in the territory which fell to Serbia, there were 1,241,076 Muslims in 1911, whereas, according to him, in southern parts of Yugoslavia, there were 566,478 Muslims in 1921. This, however, contradicts the Yugoslav data (which certainly were not exaggerated), according to which only the number of Turks and Albanians put together totaled 589,979. (Cf. Justin McCarthy, *Death, the Ethnic Cleansing and Exile of the Ottoman Muslims (1811-1912)*, Princeton 1996, p. 164.)

31 According to the Turkish foreign minister, some 200,000 people emigrated. (Avdić, p. 156.) The Turkish historian Cevad Garay, claims 440,000 Turks fled the Balkans (Höpken, p. 230), whereas Hakif Bajrami, quoting Serbian diplomatic sources, claims

are concerned, the matter is made more difficult by the emigration of Muslims of all nationalities,<sup>32</sup> whereas the percentage for each nationality couldn't be determined due to the lack of sources.<sup>33</sup> According to the Serbian sources, 20,000 people emigrated to Albania in 1912-1913,<sup>34</sup> most of whom were presumably Albanians.

Ever since they came under the rule of the Kingdom of Serbia in 1912, both the Turkish and the Albanian national minorities started to dwindle in numbers until they were included into Yugoslavia. Furthermore, they continued to lose people through emigration in the course of the inter-war period – which hit especially the Turkish minority. Unfortunately, for this period too, for the Turks, as well as for the Albanians, we lack reliable and complete data. It is only certain that emigration into Turkey was much more massive, since it possessed a historical attraction. Furthermore, thanks to the impossibility of an irredenta, the Yugoslav authorities were inclined to be well disposed towards Muslim emigration into that country – as opposed to Albania where they were reluctant to have many émigrés who proved to be the most rabid irredentists.<sup>35</sup> The question of the numbers of Muslim emigrants from Yugoslavia in the inter-war period is encumbered with the same problems as the earlier Muslim migrations: the exact numbers and ethnic make-up are unknown.<sup>36</sup> The state authorities did nothing to stop the Muslim emigration. On the contrary, they were facilitating it, and even trying to thwart the eventual attempts at returning (which occurred now and then).<sup>37</sup> Officially 19,278 people left for Turkey between 1918 and 1932<sup>38</sup> and 21,500 until October 1935.<sup>39</sup> According to

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320,907 people (children under six excluded) have left via Salonika, and 40,000 via Kavala and 40,000 via land routes, some 500,000 in all. (Bajrami, p. 156.) This author is too prone to identify Muslims with Albanians. In another of his works, he claims 120,000 Albanians left Serbian and Montenegrin territories between 1912 and 1914. (Konventa jugoslavo-turke e vitit 1938 për shpërnguljen e shqiptarëve, Gjurmine albanologjike, Seria s shkencave historike, XII, 1982, p. 269.) Malcolm believes their number was not as high as that. (Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 258.)

32 Mušović, pp. 139-140; Boeckh, p. 257.

33 The Western diplomats only estimated the number of refugees. (McCarthy, p. 160.)

34 Dimitrije Đorđević, Migrations during the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars and World War One, in: Migrations in Balkan History, Belgrade 1989, p. 117.

35 Schmidt-Neke, p. 159.

36 Aydin Babuna, Die Türkei und Kosovo, in: Konrad Clewing, Jens Reuter (eds.), Der Kosovo-Konflikt. Ursachen, Akteure, Verlauf, München 2000, p. 312; Bandžović, Tokovi, p. 111. The Turkish census of 1935 recorded 158,145 people born in Yugoslav territory. (Dudley Kirk, Europe's Population in the Interwar Years, Princeton 1946, pp. 282-283.) However, from this number one cannot tell when the people came to Turkey, what their nationality was, and, how many people died after arriving in Turkey – this being indispensable for determining the actual number of immigrants.

37 Bandžović, Tokovi, p. 106. Vladan Jovanović, Iseljavanje muslimana iz Makedonije (1918-1941) (Msc. of a lecture held at the Institute for Recent History of Serbia in Belgrade on November 19, 2003), pp. 8, 12. I take advantage of this occasion to thank the author once again for having put the manuscript at my disposal.)

38 Bandžović, Tokovi, p. 106. In the response to the complaint by the Albanian government to the League of Nations in 1930, the Yugoslav government adduced the official data that until then 2,576 persons had left for Albania and 16,635 for Turkey. (Popović, p. 27.)

39 Bandžović, Iseljenici, p. 144; Avdija Avdić, Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori o iseljavanju muslimanskog stanovništva u periodu između dva svetska rata, Novopazarski zbornik, 10, 1991, p. 113.

Radmila Radić, the Muslim emigration was most massive from 1923 through 1925,<sup>40</sup> whereas Aleksandar Popović believes the bulk had left in 1920-1921.<sup>41</sup> According to Eugene Kulisher, 60,000 people came to Turkey from the Balkans between 1921 and 1928, whereas 40,000 came from Romania and Yugoslavia between 1931 and 1939.<sup>42</sup> Hakif Bajrami claims 260,000 Albanians have been forced to emigrate between 1919 and 1940, but he does not adduce where he got this number from.<sup>43</sup> Miodrag Jovičić and Vladan Jovanović estimate 45,000 Muslims of various ethnic background emigrated to Turkey during the interwar period.<sup>44</sup> The number of 40,000 to 50,000 "Turks" who had emigrated is adduced in a document of the Interior Ministry from 1939, but only for the first years after the First World War.<sup>45</sup> Veselin Đuretić claims some 35,000 wealthy landowners, feudal lords and others emotionally attached to the Ottoman regime emigrated in 1918.<sup>46</sup> As for the number of emigrants to Albania, quoting a military document, Bajrami gives 28,665 people for the 1919-1937 period.<sup>47</sup> Branislav Gligorijević claims 19,379 people left for Turkey and 4,322 for Albania 1927-1939.<sup>48</sup> A similar number (some 25,000) is adduced also by Venceslav Glišić.<sup>49</sup> The Yugoslav diplomacy adduced that 16,635 people went to Turkey and 2,576 to Albania during the first ten-odd years of the Kingdom's existence.<sup>50</sup> The Albanian government kept complaining to the British in

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40 Radmila Radić, *Iseljavanje stanovništva sa jugoslovenskog prostora sredinom pedesetih godina*, Istorijski zapisi, LXXII, 1-2, 1999, p. 157.

41 Popovic, p. 24.

42 Eugene M. Kulisher, *Europe on the Move. War and Population Changes*, New York 1948, p. 153.

43 Bajrami, *Orijentacija*, p. 158. May be the number originates from the *Dictionaire encyclopedic albanais*. (Cf. Michael Roux, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie. Minorité national. Territoire et développement*, Paris 1992, p. 220.)

44 Miodrag Jovičić, *Ustavnopravni položaj pripadnika albanske nacionalnosti u Jugoslaviji*, in: *Srbi i Albanci u XX veku. Ciklus predavanja 7-10. maja 1990*, Beograd 1991, p. 143; Vladan Jovanović, *Turci u Južnoj Srbiji 1918-1929*, srpska slobodarska misao, III, 10, 2001, p. 131.

45 AJ, Zbirka Aleksandra Cincar-Markovića, fasc. II. The same is said in a circular letter by the Foreign Ministry of June 23, 1938. (AJ, 382, 1/61) According to the British documents, the Turkish authorities kept on purpose blur the difference between terms "Turk" and "Muslim". (Dogo, *Muslimani*, p. 459.)

46 Veselin Đuretić, *The Exodus of the Serbs from Kosovo in the Twentieth Century and its Political Background*, in: *Migrations in Balkan History*, Belgrade 1989, p. 134. At least the social make-up he adduces is not correct.

47 Bajrami, *Orijentacija*, p. 159.

48 Branislav Gligorijević, *Političke, privredne i socijalne prilike na mešanim područjima*, in: *Srbi i Albanci u XX veku. Ciklus predavanja 7-10. maja 1990*, Beograd 1990, p. 219. This author adduces the same figures, taken over from the *Statistički godišnjak Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1927-1930*, also in: *Između pravoslavlja i katoličanstva – islam u Jugoslaviji 1918-1941*, in: *Islam, Balkan i velike sile (XIV-XX vek). Međunarodni skup 11-13. decembar 1996*, Beograd 1997, p. 444. Since 20 to 30 thousand people were leaving Yugoslavia annually, this author deems the number of emigrating Muslims was not overly high. (Idem, *Političke*, p. 219.)

49 Venceslav Glišić, *Albanizacija Kosova i Metohije 1941-1945*, in: *Srbi i Albanci u XX veku*, p. 280.

50 These numbers were given in the reply of the Yugoslav government of December 1930 to the complaint of three émigré Albanian priests of May 5, 1930. (AJ, 305, 8/18. Cf. also footnote 38.)

mid-1930s at the Yugoslav authorities' bad treatment of the Ethnic-Albanians, which allegedly forced 30,000 of them to migrate to Albania.<sup>51</sup>

Two things are obvious from these contradictory data. First is that the Albanian historians adduce the numbers of the emigrants which are much higher than those given by their Serbian counterparts,<sup>52</sup> tending also to identify the terms »Albanian« with »Muslim« (which were by no means synonymous). Second is the obvious inclination of most emigrants to go to Turkey and not to Albania – because Turkey had a better historical image in the eyes of the Muslims, offering larger settlement possibilities and it kept inviting emigrants,<sup>53</sup> and also because the Yugoslav authorities encouraged emigration to that country, unlike that to Albania.<sup>54</sup> The number of emigrants to Albania was small in absolute and relative terms<sup>55</sup> - which (unlike the total number ) can be discerned from the available sketchy sources.<sup>56</sup> Aromunians were also emigrating from the southern parts of the country, diminishing thus their already weak numbers.<sup>57</sup> As for the number and nationality of the returned emigrants (who were also recorded here and there), they are as uncertain as those of the departing.

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- 51 Dogo, p. 460. M. Roux computed that not more than 70.000 Albanians could have emigrated. (Roux, p. 222.) It is interesting to note that Hasan Prishtina asked at a certain point in 1925 of the Turkish government that the Albanians from Yugoslavia be resettled in Turkey. (Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas, III, München 1979, p. 488.)
- 52 Both parties follow the praxis of the politicians of their respective countries who tend to increase or decrease these numbers, as the case may be. (Cf. Stevan Pavlovich, *A History of the Balkans (1804-1945)*, London, New York 1999, p. 263.)
- 53 AJ, Zbirka Aleksandra Cincar-Markovića, fasc. II; Inostrani, Iseljavanje Turaka iz Evrope, Srpski književni glasnik, 10, 1914, p. 779.
- 54 Sometimes fear of a new Balkan war caused by the instability in the region, spurred Muslims to migrate. Such was the case in the Tikveš District in 1923. (AJ, F. 335, f. 18.)
- 55 It seems Albania was not particularly attractive even to the Albanians from Yugoslavia, because, according to an analysis, they considered living conditions there even worse than in Yugoslavia. (AJ, 37, 9/55) This was in keeping with the historical logic of Albanian migrations.
- 56 According to the data of the Yugoslav Intelligence Service, between 1925 and 1934, 9.418 emigrants were installed; there were 3.126 uninstalled, and a certain number of those who did not even ask to be installed. (VA, pop. 17, k. 95A, f. 2, d. 1.) According to a bulletin of the Department of Protection of the State of the Yugoslav Interior Ministry from November 1938, 10.887 refugees (not all of them from Yugoslavia) had been settled in Albania during the preceding ten years. (VA, pop. 17, k. 79, f. 1, d. 24.) Schmidt-Neke says only 1,200 Kosovo-Albanians received land in the course of the Albanian agrarian reform. (Schmidt-Neke, p. 226.) The data of the Yugoslav Chief General Staff confirm this. According to them, 105 families from Yugoslavia with 438 persons, have received land between April 1, 1937 and March 31, 1938. (VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 1, d. 10.) Even the Italian propaganda stuck to small numbers when speaking about emigration to Albania. So for instance, *Corriere della sera* on May 8, 1930, claimed 10,000 Albanians from Yugoslavia had emigrated to Albania, although the authorities tried in a number of ways to prevent it. (As the number of those who had emigrated to Turkey, 100,000 is given.)
- 57 The number of 100,000 Aromunian emigrants mentioned in the Romanian newspaper *Lupta* on April 15, 1929, certainly did not comprise the Aromunian emigrants from the Yugoslav part of Macedonia alone, and was probably exaggerated anyway. The numbers of "Bulgarian" refugees dished up by Bulgarian propaganda were also fantastic in scope, but that matter surpasses the limits of this work. (Cf. G. Bajdaroff, *La question macédoine dans le passé et présent*, Sofia 1926, p. 44; Association Yougoslave pour la

Although they denied they were encouraging emigration,<sup>58</sup> the authorities were actually always keen to have as many Muslims leave as possible.<sup>59</sup> A convention with Turkey was concluded in 1938<sup>60</sup> with this goal in mind, with which we shall deal later.

Emigration of the population which became minorities had been going on also from the Habsburg territories – before and after 1918. For this emigration, due to much better Austrian, Hungarian and Yugoslav statistics, numbers and nationality of the emigrants are much less contentious, but their motives much more so. Adherents to the minority thesis stress national and political reasons for emigration, whereas Yugoslav authors put the main emphasis on economic ones. On closer inspection, it is obvious that both groups of factors played a role, but their relevance depended on time, region and the national minority in question.

According to the statistics of Hungary proper (i.e. without Croatia-Slavonia), (where the largest part of national minorities in northern half of the future Yugoslavia lived), the number and ethnic make-up of emigrants in the 1899-1913 period when emigration became very intensive, was as follows:<sup>61</sup>

Nationality	# of emigrants	% of emigrants	% of population
Hungarians	401,123	28.9	45.4
Germans	232,591	16.7	11.1
Ruthenians	54,980	3.9	2.2
Croats	137,266	9.9	8.7
Serbs	64,180	4.6	5.5
Romanians	184,512	13.3	14.5
Others	15,441	1.1	2.1

From the Vojvodina, between 1900 and 1910, 61,081 Germans, 11,296 Hungarians, 24,466 Southern Slavs and 7,769 Romanians emigrated.<sup>62</sup> In Syrmium the situation was somewhat different than in Hungary proper or in the Vojvodina: together with Germans, the Hungarians, Slovaks and Ruthenians were also overrepresented among the emigrants.<sup>63</sup>

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Société des Nations. Bulgares et Yougoslaves. Langue, religion, traditions, aspect politique, état actuel, conclusion, Belgrade 1928, p. 30.)

58 For instance in the reply to the Secretariat of the League of Nations to the petition of Hasan Prishtina on November 19, 1930. (AJ, 305, 8/18.)

59 AJ, Zbirka Aleksandra Cincar-Markovića, fasc. II; AJ, 14, 178/658.

60 Bajrami, Konventa; Avdić, Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori.

61 Laszlo Katusz, Die Magyaren, in: Adam Wandruszka, Peter Urbanitsch (eds.), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, III. Die Völker des Reiches, Wien 1980, p. 429. It is worth noting that 116.000 German emigrants stemmed from South Hungary which, for greater part, fell to Yugoslavia. (Cf. Friedrich Gottas, Die Deutschen in Ungarn, in: Wandruszka, Urbanitsch (eds.), pp. 351-352.) Emigration from the Vojvodina intensified since 1902, culminating in 1905-1907. (Zoltan Dere, Iseljavanje iz torontalske, bačko-bodroške i sremske županije od 1900. do 1910. godine, Istraživanja, 13, 1990, p. 166.)

62 Dere, pp. 173-174.

63 Lazar Rakić, Iseljavanje iz Vojvodine krajem XIX i početkom XX veka, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 23, 1981, p. 153.

The percentages for Syrmia are as follows:

Year	Serbs/Croats	Germans	Hungarians	Slovaks	Romanians	Ruthenians	Others
1899-04	55.4	31.3	3.7	1.2	0.4	0.6	7.6
1905-07	44.8	29.2	4.4	6.9	0.2	4.1	0.4
1908-13	55.8	31.1	5.6	4.6	-	2.6	0.3

How to explain these data? The Germans were not a “state people,” but they were mostly Hungarian-friendly. As such, except for the few nationally conscious who had been persecuted for their political beliefs, they had no political reason for emigration. Therefore, the causes of their emigration should be found in the desire for greater economic opportunity, which was additionally enhanced by German custom of leaving the whole estate to the eldest son.<sup>64</sup> The increase of immigration in the USA (where most of the migrants were heading) especially from Eastern and Southern Europe, additionally contributed to the increase of emigration, not only of the Germans.<sup>65</sup> As for the Magyars, they were underrepresented among the emigrants from Hungary proper, but they, just like members of other minorities, were overrepresented among the emigrants from Syrmia. This could be explained by political factors, but the present author tends to doubt that: the Hungarian government and para-state organizations did their best to aid the Magyars in Croatia and Slavonia, so that it was not likely the political reasons would be decisive. It is more probable it was the poorer who emigrated. Having only recently settled in Syrmia, and not being able to find their feet there, they decided to try their luck somewhere else.<sup>66</sup> This is confirmed by the finds of Zoltan Đere, who analyzed the social make-up of the emigrants (90% of whom belonged to the poorer strata), and concluded that the main motivation for emigrating was economic.<sup>67</sup> The question of the motivation of the emigrants would remain relevant also during the interwar period.

The break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy and the foundation of Yugoslavia, have brought about a comparatively large emigration from the northern parts of the new state. Unlike in the southern parts, it did not have so epic dimensions and the numbers of political emigrants and expelees were recorded with much greater accuracy – due to the more orderly conditions in the territories that the migrants were leaving, and a better functioning of the bureaucratic apparatus in the countries to which they were migrating.

Among the emigrants and expelees from the northern parts of Yugoslavia, the emigrants to Hungary come first. We used the term »emigrants to Hungary« and not

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64 The Claim of Zoltan Đere that Germans had been most represented among the migrants because the Anglo-Saxon world, culture and mentality were closer to them than to Southern Slavs or Hungarians is very interesting, but needs yet to be researched. (Đere, p. 173.)

65 Henri Bemford Parks, *Istorija SAD*, Beograd 1985, p. 482.

66 Such unsuccessful migrants were to be found in all Habsburg lands. Usually they would return to their native places, or move further on, often overseas.

67 Đere, p. 174. Jan Sirácky has come to the same conclusion when the Slovaks were in question. (Jan Sirácky, *On the Problem of the Lowland Slovak Emigration in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*, in: Juliana Puskás (ed.), *Overseas Migration From East-Central Europe 1880-1940*, Budapest 1990, p. 210.)

Hungarian emigrants on purpose, so as to stress that among the voluntary (optants according to the treaty of Trianon) and among the involuntary emigrants (i.e. expelees) (just like among the emigrants to Turkey) there were people of various nationalities: the majority were most probably Ethnic-Hungarians, but also the number of Hungarian-friendly Swabians (as the Germans were called), Jews, Bunjevci, Šokci, and even some Serbs was significant. These were mostly higher Hungarian officials who had been quickly dismissed, part of the teachers and lower civil servants who refused to swear the oath of allegiance to the new state, professionals, large landowners etc.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, the Yugoslav authorities strove to evict across the demarcation line, and later on, across the border, as many of those persons who did not possess residents' right (naturalization or *Zuständigkeit*)<sup>69</sup> in the newly united territories. By the end of 1921, according to Hungarian statistics, the number of expelled and refugees reached 39,272.<sup>70</sup> Until mid-1924 it reached 44,903 registered, whereas the actual number was estimated around 55,000.<sup>71</sup> In the later years, on occasions when the relations between the two countries would become particularly strained, expulsions of people of wrong ethnic background and unclear legal status occurred on both sides.<sup>72</sup>

As for the people who were expelled or who moved to Austria, they numbered, according to the Austrian statistics, 30,000. Presumably most of them were Germans, although there certainly were some belonging to other nationalities. Between 1919 and 1930, 7,996 people opted for Austria.<sup>73</sup> Among the Banat Romanians, the drain was not that significant in terms of numbers. However, most of the Romanians being peasants, it was the more significant in terms of quality, since the greater part of their already weak intelligentsia, decided to leave and seek better living and career opportunities in the mother country.<sup>74</sup>

Once the first turbulent post-war years had passed and the first large wave of political emigrants and expellees had left, emigration of the minority (and also the Yugoslav) population returned to normal patterns, dependent on the political and

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68 I. Mocsi observed correctly that it was the former elite of these territories. (Istvan I. Mocsi, *Partition of Hungary and the Origins of the Refugee Problem*, in: Béla K. Király, László Veszprémy (eds.), *Trianon and East-Central Europe. Antecedents and Repercussions*, New York 1995, pp. 243-247.)

69 These were persons who had not been born in the territory of Yugoslavia, or did not acquire the so-called "Heimatrecht" (a kind of communal naturalization) in some communes in that territory until 1910.

70 Enikő A. Sajti, *Hungarians in the Vojvodina 1918-1947*, Boulder, Col. 2003, p. 20; Mesaroš, pp. 88, 93-94. In a letter of October 1922, Hungarian foreign minister Bánffy wrote to his Yugoslav counterpart about 52,000 refugees. However, it seems this number was somewhat exaggerated. (AJ, 396, 8/505-508. For this document I'm grateful to Gojko Malović Ph.D. of the Archives of Yugoslavia.)

71 Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, Beograd 1971, p. 274; Mocsi, p. 242; Sajti, p. 20; Đorđević, p. 119. Oddly enough, a Hungarian propaganda brochure from 1941 gives the number of emigrants and expellees as 45,000. (*Die Siedlungsverhältnisse des Ungarntums im besetzten Südungarn*, Budapest 1941, p. 10.) From this one is led to conclude the number did not rise after mid-1924.

72 Mesaroš, pp. 148, 153; Vinaver, pp. 220, 418.

73 Suppan, p. 665.

74 So for instance, from 105 Romanian teachers, by the end of the war, only 32 remained in the territory which fell to Yugoslavia. (Popi, pp. 49-50, 127.)

economic situation in the country and in the world – especially overseas, where most of the emigration from the Yugoslav lands traditionally headed.

The ethnic make-up of the overseas emigrants between 1921 and 1926 was as follows:<sup>75</sup>

Nationality	1921	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
Yugoslavs	9,516	4,880	5,698	8,525	7,824	11,044
Other Slavs	65	117	22	31	271	272
Germans	2,594	760	2,322	4,139	3,692	2,671
Hungarians	700	259	1,169	4,218	3,082	1,563
Romanians	51	46	137	149	81	96
Others	39	24	22	76	55	80

Similar was the situation in 1928, when 13,755 Yugoslavs emigrated overseas, alongside 211 other Slavs, 3,561 Germans, 1,667 Hungarians, and 221 Romanians.<sup>76</sup> Until 1928, 136,016 people emigrated overseas from Yugoslavia. Among them there were 76,201 Yugoslavs, 1,205 other Slavs, 22,931 Germans, 11,643 Hungarians, 971 Romanians, 3 Albanians, 425 others.<sup>77</sup>

It is conspicuous that members of minority nationalities were overrepresented to a great degree among the overseas migrants, forming between one third and a half of all registered emigrants. Were the main reasons of this emigration economic, as was claimed by the Emigrations Commissariat,<sup>78</sup> or political, as it is sometimes still claimed.<sup>79</sup> It can be seen at the first glance, that among the minority emigrants Germans retained their first place – this clearly shows a continuation of the trend that had started already before the First World War.<sup>80</sup> Since the authorities, desirous of estranging the Swabians from the Hungarians towards whom they had traditionally been inclined, were rather forthcoming towards the Germans in the Vojvodina when it came to schools and associations, the emigration of Germans, must be perceived primarily as economically motivated. As for the Magyars, their emigration did increase after the war, but one should not think of it as primarily politically motivated. It is

75 Goran Simović, *Jugoslovenski iseljenici na američkom kontinentu između dva svetska rata* (msc. of a B.A. paper), Beograd 1997, p. 29.

76 Vladimir Margan (ed.), *Monografija Podunavske oblasti*, Pančevo 1929, p. 266.

77 AJ, 63, 47/145.

78 Margan (ur.), p. 266.

79 Andrew Ludany, *The Fate of the Magyars in Yugoslavia: Genocide, Ethnocide or Ethnic Cleansing?*, *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, XXVIII, 1-2, 2001, p. 129. (This author claims an ethnic cleansing under guise of voluntary emigration, was at work.)

80 Goran Nikolić, *Društvena obeležja nemačke nacionalne manjine u Vojvodini u periodu 1918-1929. godine* (msc. of the M.A. paper), Novi Sad 1992, p. 81. A well known phenomenon that one emigrant brings others along – his relatives and countrymen. This held particularly true of the Germans from the Kočevje, who had had a wandering tradition in the Habsburg Monarchy going back to 15th century, and of emigrating to the USA since late 19th century. Thus, according to Grothe, in 1930. there were 13,017 of them living in Kočevje, and 14,462 in the US – two thirds of them in Brooklin. (Grothe, pp. 103-105.) For that reason, there were 3,258 inhabited and 372 empty houses in Kočevje in 1939. (Arhiv Srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti (henceforth: ASANU), 14530-II9.)



more probable that its roots were an economic corollary of the government's agrarian and minority policy. Namely, a number of landless Hungarian peasants, who used to work on large landed estates before the war, lost their livelihood after 1918 when these estates were disbanded and distributed among the Slavic colonists and volunteers of the Serbian Army. Being left out of the land redistribution, the Hungarian poor increasingly started looking for survival by emigrating overseas.<sup>81</sup> The number of people from other minorities was much lower among the emigrants, and in keeping with their percentage among the overall population. In other words, the authorities were not ousting national minorities directly, but many of their measures were directly or indirectly tailored to hit the national minorities, and even to encourage emigration. In secret, the administration did favor emigration of the national minorities,<sup>82</sup> but because of the obligation to formally respect equality of citizens, world public opinion, Convention on Protection of Minorities, mother countries of various minorities, political calculation and even resistance in the country,<sup>83</sup> and especially because of various connections and coalitions on local levels, an overt policy of encouragement of minority emigration could not have been pursued. Finally, one should keep in mind that almost half of the emigrants to the US returned home – which was unimaginable with the emigrants to Turkey – although it seems the Yugoslavs were returning more often than members of national minorities.<sup>84</sup>

It can be concluded that the number of the members of national minorities was decreasing ever since the last third of 19<sup>th</sup> century. The drain was larger and faster in the South, being spurred above all by political factors and open pressure and even violence. In the northern parts, the outflow started somewhat later, after the possibilities of internal colonization had been exhausted, and when the main immigrating country – the USA – experienced an immigration boom, especially from Eastern Europe. The First World War, just like the Balkan Wars, speeded up emigration of certain categories of minority populations. After the situation had normalized, emigration continued in the same pattern that had been determined already before the foundation of Yugoslavia – from the same regions into partly the same countries and parts of the world.<sup>85</sup> Mother countries were not particularly *preferred* as destinations, except for the political emigrants (the Kosovo irredentists, Austrian bureaucrats from Slovenia, Hungarian elite, and to a lesser degree the Romanian one (which had been less numerous anyway) from the Vojvodina).

We have seen what the number of people of minority nationalities in Yugoslavia had been after official censuses, and what had influenced it. Since the number of people belonging to a minority in a certain territory has become a favorite political ammunition of its leaders and leaders of their respective mother country, we shall in

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81 Hirlap, March 22, 1924. Defeated and impoverished Hungary with its archaic agrarian and social system could hardly be the promised land for the Hungarian poor.

82 Simović, p. 19.

83 Hungarian press in the Vojvodina was particularly vociferous in decrying emigration. (AJ, 14, 39/143.)

84 AJ, 63, 47/145. As for the emigrants into European countries, 80% of them were no emigrants at all, but rather seasonal workers. Thus for instance, there were some 60,000 Yugoslav guest workers in Germany in the late 1920s. (Ibid.) After the Great Depression that number dwindled to 17.258 in 1933, 12.982 out of that with German as mother-tongue. (Kulisher, p. 153.)

85 Emigration to South America increased after the First World War.

the end turn our attention briefly to the numbers minority representatives, the press and governments of their respective mother countries and some foreign-interested politicians bandied in the propaganda war in which the question of national minorities achieved much greater salience than was the case before 1918.

The Germans are not only the largest people in Europe after Russians, but also the people who had the highest number of co-nationals living outside of mother countries after the First World War.<sup>86</sup> As a major power with a language that was understood by many educated people all over Europe, a powerful press, Germany, although defeated, was at least able to draw attention of the world to the question of German national minorities in European countries. This was not always done for unselfish reasons, but it is certain that the German minorities could most easily get the desired publicity. For these reasons we shall first deal with the number of the members of the German minority which its representatives and the German press were presenting to the Yugoslav and the world public.

The alleged numbers of the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche ranged between 500,000 and as much as 900,000!<sup>87</sup> The number of Ethnic-Germans in various regions was

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86 Germany and Austria, which perceived herself as a German state too, are meant.

87 Münchner Neuste Nachrichten, December 6, 1935, adduced 500,000. Badische Presse, September 27, 1933, 520,000. The leader of many Volksdeutsche organizations and a long-time MP, Dr. Stefan Kraft talked about "over 500,000" Ethnic-Germans in Yugoslavia. (Nation und Staat, XI, 4, 1938, p. 272.) Obzor (Zagreb) wrote on August 22, 1932 that the Kulturbund had claimed there were 550,000 Germans in Yugoslavia. The former leader of the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche, Dr. Sepp Janko, quoted that number after the Second World War in his memoirs too. (Sepp Janko, Weg und Ende der deutschen Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien, Graz, Stuttgart 1982, p. 18.) The already mentioned Dr. Kraft talked in the Yugoslav Parliament about 600,000 Volksdeutsche. (Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine Kraljevine SHS (henceforth: SBNS), Redovan saziv za 1927/1928, knj. IV, Beograd 1928, p. 149; SBNS KJ, II redovan saziv za 1936/1937, knj. II, Beograd 1937, p. 762. The same number was mentioned by his colleague Dr. Georg Grassl (SB Senata KJ, Vanredni saziv 1932. godinu, knj. I, Beograd 1932, p. 329), Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, November 20, 1929, Kölnische Zeitung, April 15, 1931, Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung, October 19, 1930, etc. The same number appears also in: Ewald Ammende (ed.), Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas. Sammlung von Lageberichten, Wien, Leipzig 1931, p. 342, but it probably originated with the above-mentioned Ethnic-German leaders. Arno Oebser thinks it was between 600,000 and 700,000. (Das deutsche Genossenschaft in den Gebieten der ehemaligen Tschecho-Slowakei, in Rumänien, Südslawien und Ungarn, Stuttgart 1940, p. 18.) The Kölnische Zeitung, December 28, 1932, wrote about 650,000 Volksdeutsche. The German ambassador to Belgrade, von Keller, wrote on October 5, 1922 about 660,000 Germans in Yugoslavia. (PA, Abt IIb, Pressewesen, Politik 12, Jugoslawien Bd. 1.) The same number appeared in the Tagespost on January 28, 1928 and the Hamburger Fremdenblatt, on January 14, 1930. Some Kulturbund leaders talked in their propaganda speeches in the late 1930s about 700,000 Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia. (AJ, 74, 9/17.) They were publicizing the same figure in the magazine specialized in national minorities (Nation und Staat, XIV, 2, 1940, p. 69), and the ambassador von Keller had mentioned the same number already on February 15, 1922 (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien Bd. 1), as has the minority expert Hermann Rüdiger. (Zahl und Verbreitung des deutschen Volkes, in: Paul Gauß (ed.), Das Buch vom deutschen Volkstum, Wesen, Lebensraum, Schicksal, Leipzig 1935, p. 7.) The number of 750,000 features in the Vogtländischer Anzeiger, April 30, 1931, the Wiener Zeitung, June 24, 1935, but also in

increased accordingly.<sup>88</sup> Camillo Morocutti, one of the leaders of the Germans in Slovenia, claimed there were 70,000 Germans in that province,<sup>89</sup> whereas the private German census in the second half of 1930s found 53,900.<sup>90</sup>

Another national minority that had large possibilities of making its complaints known, were the Hungarians. The Hungarian national minority in Yugoslavia possessed a very developed press, read also by many non-Hungarians in the country. The press in Hungary itself was also very well developed, and Hungary was sparing neither effort nor costs to spread the revisionist propaganda. In this propaganda, the national minorities played one of the main roles: every Magyar in the neighboring countries which received Hungarian territories under the peace treaty, was an additional proof of the enormity of injustice of the treaty of Trianon.<sup>91</sup>

It is conspicuous that Hungarians were much more consistent when adducing the number of their co-nationals in Yugoslavia: they usually spoke about 500,000.<sup>92</sup> The reason was probably the fact Hungarian propaganda was much better synchronized than the German one. Sometimes the figures from the pre-war census featured which painted a much more propitious picture for the Hungarians,<sup>93</sup> and sometimes the official Yugoslav data were simply taken over with no comment whatsoever!<sup>94</sup> How can this "moderateness" of the Hungarian propaganda be explained? Maybe by the fact, that the Magyars, being only a minority in the Vojvodina, could not claim its return on ethnic grounds. Because of this, their propaganda was a combination of historical, legal, economic and geographical arguments. (As for the Germans, they being a true Diaspora, could not aspire to unification with Germany or Austria, so they probably believed their sole strength lay in their numbers.) The Yugoslav authorities on their part, did their

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the Freis Heim, the journal of the Croatian Republican Peasants' Party, meant for the Volksdeutsche. (Suzana Leček, "Freies Heim" - Hrvatska republikanska seljačka stranka i folksdojčeri, VDG Jahrbuch/Godišnjak Njemačke narodnosne zajednice, Osijek 2002, p. 214.) Obviously, the leading Croatian party wanted to curry favor with the Volksdeutsche voters. The Tägliche Rundschau upped the number to 770,000 on September 29, 1926, and the Kreuz Zeitung claimed on December 16, 1931, the number of Ethnic-Germans in Yugoslavia ranged between 700,000 and 900,000!!!

88 It is interesting that the British Embassy in Belgrade believed in 1928 there were 700,000 of them in the Vojvodina alone. (Živko Avramovski (ed.), *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, I, 1921-1930, Zagreb 1986, p. 542.)

89 Camillo Morocutti, *Groß-Deutschland, Groß-Südslawien*, Wien, Leipzig 1928, p. 50.

90 Baš, p. 6.

91 The official Hungarian propaganda took up the minority question more vigorously only in 1930s; until then it was left to unofficial organs. (Aniko Kovacs-Bertrand, *Der ungarische Revisionismus nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Der publizistische Kampf gegen den Friedensvertrag von Trianon (1918-1931)*, München 1997, pp. 283-286.) According to Joseph Rotschild, Hungarian tactics was as follows: when Hungary was diplomatically weak, it complained about the position of Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries, and when it was diplomatically strong, it demanded territorial revision. (Rotschild, p. 164.)

92 *Donaukurier*, II, 1938; *Pétition présentée à la Société des Nations au sujet de la destitution en masse des instituteurs de nationalité hongroise en Yougoslavie et de la loi yougoslave du 27. septembre 1929 sur les écoles normales d'instituteurs*, Budapest 1930, p. 4; *The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States*, Budapest 1927, p. 110.

93 *AJ*, 66, 51/105.

94 *Situazione dei magiari in Jugoslavia*, Budapest 1941, p. 4.

best to diminish even the officially recognized number of Hungarians by analyzing ancestry,<sup>95</sup> deducting the number of Hungarian-speaking Jews, foreign citizens, etc.<sup>96</sup>

The third "big" national minority in the interwar Yugoslavia, which in the 1931 census became the largest one, were the Albanians. Between the two censuses, despite some emigration, their number rose by 68,602. However, the Albanians themselves estimated their own number in the interwar period from 720,000<sup>97</sup> to over a million. These claims were accepted by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia which wanted to utilize the nationality question for its subversive aims.<sup>98</sup> After the Second World War these numbers, via the Communist Party propaganda<sup>99</sup> found their way into the nationalistically tinged historiography with scholarly pretensions.<sup>100</sup> The propaganda of the inflated number of Albanians spread by the Albanian interwar representatives bore fruit, which is testified by the fact that those unrealistic figures feature in some of the indubitably important works of the world historiography.<sup>101</sup>

As for the Yugoslav authorities, in late 1930s they were prone to estimate the number of Albanians as being higher than in the 1931 census. This is understandable if one takes into account the high birth-rate of Albanians, but as to how accurate their estimations had been, remains a dubitable matter.<sup>102</sup> To be sure, there were also those who tried to play down the official number by subtracting the Arnautaši, whose number

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95 According to an analysis of Arsa Ivić, a half of the Vojvodina Magyars were of non-Hungarian origin. (AV, 37, 70/419.) A memo by the Sokols (a nationalist gymnastics organization - see chapter eleven) from Donja Lendava claimed 80% of the Hungarians in Prekmurje were of Slovenian descent. (AJ, 74, 16/28.) Lazar Stipić claimed 80% of the Hungarian minority were actually assimilants. (Lazar Stipić, *Istina o Mađarima* (po mađarskim podacima), Subotica, 1929, 43.)

96 AJ, 38, 93/225.

97 The ardent irredentist Hamit Kokalari adduced a "moderate" figure of 720,000. (Kokalari, p. 84.) Italian propagandist Antonio Baldacio estimated in 1925, there were 700,000 Albanians in Yugoslavia. (Hajredin Hoxha, *Proces nacionalne afirmacije albanske narodnosti u Jugoslaviji* (izabrana poglavlja), *Časopis za kritiko znanosti*, IX, 51-52, 1982, p. 239.) J. Milaj estimated in 1930s there were between 700,000 and 900,000 of them. (Islami, p. 40.) The number 800,000 appeared in the Albanian press (Vulneti, 29.II 1930), and the Albanian ex-counsel in Skopje, Sthylla, was assuring the Italian foreign minister count Ciano in 1939, 850,000 Albanians lived in Yugoslavia. (Bernd J. Fisher, *Albania at War 1939-1945*, West Lafayette 1999, p. 71.) In 1928 the same Sthylla estimated there were 900,000 of them. (Avramovski (ed.), *Britanci*, I, p. 507.)

98 So for instance, the CPY secretary for Kosovo P. Jovičević, claimed there were 750,000 Albanians in Yugoslavia, whereas Tito said in 1939, 900,000 members of the Albanian national minority had been living in the country. (Muhamet Pirakku, *Kulturno-prosvetni pokret Albanaca u Jugoslaviji* (1919-1941), *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 1-4, 1978, p. 357.)

99 Ljubiša Stojković, Miloš Martić, *Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji*, Beograd 1953, p. 9.

100 Hoxha, p. 239; Piraku, *Kulturno-prosvetni*, p. 356.

101 The author of the important work on Italian foreign policy Zamboni also fell for this propaganda, not only accepting the number of over one million, but going as far as to claim that more Albanians had been living in Yugoslavia than in Albania itself! (Cf. Giovanni Zamboni, *Mussolinis Expansionspolitik auf dem Balkan*, Hamburg 1970, p. 75.)

102 So for instance an anonymous memo (probably of December 27 1938) estimated the number of Albanians in Yugoslavia was almost 600,000 (VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 1, d. 16), whereas in an, also anonymous, analysis from May 1938, their number was estimated as 700,000. (AJ, 37, 9/55.)

they had been determining completely arbitrarily.<sup>103</sup> The total number of Albanians in Yugoslavia, just like the number of their emigrants, remains one of the thorniest historiographical (and not only historiographical!) problems in the Serbian-Albanian relations.

As for the number of Turks, it was a moot point too, but since Turkey was far distant and was in no way threatening to Yugoslavia,<sup>104</sup> and the Turks (unlike Albanians) being perceived by the Yugoslav authorities as loyal, the question was never politically explosive.<sup>105</sup>

Romania was, throughout greater part of the interwar period, an ally of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, although there were many vociferous irredentist circles in which the refugees from Yugoslavia<sup>106</sup> (often Aromunes) played a prominent role. These circles laid claim to certain parts of Yugoslav territory inhabited by Romanians and were putting forward "their" numbers of national minorities. Their estimates ranged from 350,000,<sup>107</sup> to 500,000<sup>108</sup> and to 600,000.<sup>109</sup> For the Yugoslav part of the Banat figures ranging from 100,000<sup>110</sup> to 150,000<sup>111</sup> Romanians were publicized. Sometimes the number of Romanians was combined with the alleged number of Aromunes in (the whole of) Macedonia. Thus Georghe Bratianu claimed there were 100,000 Romanians in the Banat, 250,000 in Timočka Krajina (in North-Eastern Serbia) and 350,000 "Macedo-Romanians" in Macedonia.<sup>112</sup> The lunatic fringe claimed that, one million Romanians lived to the South of the Danube and to the West from the Timok!<sup>113</sup>

Dissatisfied with their official numbers were also the members of the Slavic minorities who during the interwar period tended to think of themselves not as minorities, but rather as part of the "state people".<sup>114</sup> However, the numbers they were adducing were not that different from the official ones, as was the case with Germans or Albanians. The numbers proffered by Czechs and Slovaks ranged between 138,000<sup>115</sup>

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103 So for example, Avdija Mušović claimed there were only 300,000-350,000 real Albanians. (Mušović, p. 276.)

104 Indeed, the two countries become allies in 1934.

105 The Turkish ambassador to Belgrade Haydar Bey, claimed, according to a Turkish inquiry, there were 250,000 Turks in Yugoslavia. (Dogo, Muslimani, p. 462.) The same number, was adduced as received from Turkish source, in a circular letter of the Foreign Ministry on June 23, 1939. (AJ, 382, 11/61.) The above quoted anonymous analysis from May 1938, estimated the number of Turks as 200,000. (AJ, 37, 9/55.) A. Mušović reduces the number of Turks to under 120,000. (Mušović, p. 276.)

106 Popi, pp. 52-53.

107 *Universul*, May 27, 1938, and August 22, 1938.

108 This number features in a flier confiscated by the Yugoslav military. (AJ, 14, 144/503); *La Bulgarie* May 7, 1938 (quoting the Romanian newspaper *Curentul*).

109 *Națiune româna*, March 17, 1936.

110 *Curentul*, October 15, 1940.

111 *Universul*, January 5, 1930; *Națiune româna*, March 17, 1936.

112 *Curentul*, October 25, 1940.

113 *Porunca vremei*, November 1, 1940.

114 AJ, F. 398, f. 1; *Prager Presse*, March 6, 1932. Sometimes it was claimed the Czechs and the Slovaks were linguistically part of the "Czechoslovak people", but were not a political minority in Yugoslavia. (*Vreme*, December 18, 1932; *Čehoslovaci*, October 9, 1933.)

115 According to the Almanach of the Czecho-Slovak Union for 1925. (Lenard L., *Slovenske narodne manjine u SHS*, in: *Jubilarni zbornik života i rada SHS 1. decembar 1918-1. decembar 1928*, Beograd 1929, p. 856.)

and 150,000.<sup>116</sup> Jan Buljik, one of the Slovak leaders in Yugoslavia, claimed his co-nationals numbered 75,000.<sup>117</sup> The Slovak newspaper "Narodna jednota" even diminished the actual total number of Czechs and Slovaks, claiming on March 4, 1935 they numbered 120,000. For the Ruthenians (at least for the Vojvodina), the number to which their researcher Dr. Tichy arrived at, roughly concurred with the official one.<sup>118</sup>

Numerically the weakest national minority, the Italians, had, or more precisely, their mother country had the obvious need to increase their number, in order to be able to claim Dalmatia on ethnic grounds. In the conservative case, their number was raised to 50,000,<sup>119</sup> reaching hundreds of thousands in the extreme cases – including therein the Romans of the Dalmatian cities, as well as, the once Latin-speaking Vlachs and Morlacs from their hinterland, who had been Slavicized centuries ago.<sup>120</sup>

It is to be expected that many a reader won't be satisfied with this chapter, but it is always the case when it comes to shaky numbers in conflict regions. To investigate each of the numbers mentioned in this chapter would require research of its own – with uncertain outcome – which we are not able to undertake.

What was then, the real number of members of the national minorities in Yugoslavia? Or, to put it another way, how much can we rely on the interwar Yugoslav censuses? The very fact that the results of 1931 were never published because they were deemed "undesirable", speaks in favor of their reliability. Furthermore, the numbers the present author has found in the internal documents, on the whole, differ but slightly from those finally published in 1943. This too seems to speak in favor of accuracy.

Furthermore, we can make a spot-check on a small sample, in the hope a census in a centralized country was made with the same methods everywhere, and that the result of our spot-check can be valid for the Yugoslav censuses in general. For an example we shall take the linguistic enclave of Kočevje, where, according to the 1921 census, 12,680 Germans used to live.<sup>121</sup> After the dismemberment of Yugoslavia by the Axis and their allies in April 1941, the leadership of the German Folk Group (as they styled themselves) which took over, conducted a census of the local Germans with the aim of resettling the enclave which was now deep in the Italian zone of occupation. They found 12,487 Germans.<sup>122</sup> If one takes into account twenty years that had elapsed between the two censuses, the fact that probably none of them was conducted without political strings attached, and if one makes allowances for certain aberrations and lack of clarity (descendants from mixed marriages etc.), as well as the changed political circumstances, and keeping in mind the area had been known for emigration for decades, the results which are almost identical, seem to warrant the correctness of the Yugoslav censuses.

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116 Vreme, December 19, 1932.

117 Obzor, November 19, 1933.

118 Lenard, Slovenske narodne manjine, p. 855; Biljnja, Rusini u Vojvodini, p. 24.

119 Tamaro, L'Adriatico, p. 58. (Based on the elections' results at that!)

120 Idem, Italiani e Slavi.

121 Grothe, p. 80.

122 Hans-Hermann Frensing, Die Unsiedlung der Gottscheer Deutschen. Das Ende einer südostdeutschen Volksgruppe, München 1970, p. 116.

## Chapter Three

# A Short Survey of the Relations between the Yugoslav and Minority Peoples

As we have already seen in the previous chapters, the contacts between the Yugoslav peoples and peoples whose parts became national minorities in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia were pretty ancient. The quality of these relations, just like the way minority peoples settled, very much influenced the way the national minorities were treated in Yugoslavia. For that reason, we shall deal shortly with these relations here, however, without making an attempt to depict the fullness of their diversity. Due to the lack of space, many things which testify to cohabitation, common cultural patterns, mutual intermixing, intermingling and transfers of ideas or inventions will have to be omitted.

It would be logical to expect that the oldest relations existed with the oldest peoples. However, due to the lack of historical records, there are no data about them. Still, the existence of many Slavic place-names in the Albanian and Romanian territories proves that these countries had been comparatively densely populated by the Slavs.<sup>1</sup> However, in the course of the Middle Ages, they were assimilated. On the other hand, there are very few and rather sporadic mentions of the presence of the Albanian population in Kosovo before 15th century.<sup>2</sup> Most probably it also assimilated. As for the Romanians, there are even fewer data, or more correctly put, there are none for Serbia, and only a few for the Yugoslav part of the Banat.<sup>3</sup> Family ties did sporadically exist between the Albanian and Romanian nobility and the Serbian one, but in the case of Albanians they were of slight historical importance, whereas in the case of the Romanians, they facilitated the penetration of the Serbian cultural

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1 Whereas the regional affiliation of the Slavs in Romania was diverse, Albania was certainly settled by the Southern Slavs, albeit by which, remains dubitable. We shall only mention the best known place names: Elbasan (until the Ottoman rule Konjuh), Korça (Gorica), Berat (Belgrad), Porades (Podgradec) etc. (Branko Horvat, *Kosovsko pitanje*, Zagreb 1989 (2nd ed.), p. 29.) The Albanian historiography denies and belittles the importance of Slavic place names in the territory of Albania. (Cf. Pollo, Puto (eds.), p. 38.) About the Slavic place names in Romania cf: Constantin B. Obedeano, *Les Relations historiques et politiques des Roumanis avec les Serbes des temps les plus reculés jusqu'à nos jours*, Bucarest 1929, pp. 16-17. (This author adduces mainly the little known places.)

2 Jireček, *Albanija*, I, p. 689; Gersin, p. 26; Malcolm, pp. 55-57.

3 As for the medieval Vlachs, they cannot be ascribed to Romanians, as Romanian scholars usually do, but to the Aromuns (who are almost always called Vlachs in English texts, regardless of the time they are describing), a people related to Romanians, but a separate people nevertheless. They, not being recognized as a national minority during the inter-war period, do not fit into the framework of this work.

influence.<sup>4</sup> Albanian territories were part of the short-lived Serbian Empire, which, according to some authors, enabled Albanian expansion into Epirus.<sup>5</sup>

At first the fall of the medieval Serbian state left no traces on Serbian-Albanian relations. The number of Albanians in Serbian territories remained small for a long time.<sup>6</sup> The fall was more important for the Romanian lands, where first states had been set up not long before that.<sup>7</sup> They were flooded by Serbian refugees coming as mercenaries, merchants, priests, etc. Several influential Serbs had left their mark on the development of the Romanian culture and Church.<sup>8</sup> The elite of the Romanian

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- 4 Family ties between Serbian and Romanian nobility became increasingly frequent since early 14th century. (N. Gavrilović, Uvod, in: idem, *Srbi i Rumuni*, pp. 9-11; Nicolae Iorga, *Les Relations entre Serbes et Roumains*, Valenii-de-Munte 1913, pp. 4-23.) About the family connections between Albanian and Serbian nobility cf: Jireček, *Albanija*, I, 690. Exhaustive (and exhausting!) about this topic cf. Imami, pp. 25-35. Certainly, the most important were the ties between the Balšići (according to Šufflay, of Vlach origin – p. 204) and the Albanian nobility because of which some Albanian authors claim the Balšići had been an Albanian family. It is interesting to note that the family of Scanderbeg also had Slavic family connections (Jireček, *Albanija u prošlosti*, II, *Srpski književni glasnik*, 12, 1914, p. 936), and according to a tradition, even his mother had been Serbian. (Dogo, *Kosovo*, pp. 22.) According to another version, it was his father who had been of Serbian origin. (Dragnich, *Todorovich*, p. 21.) Even if this tradition is not true, it testifies to ethnic intermingling in these parts during the Middle Ages. The best proof of the strength of the Slavic influence is the fact that the majority of Albanian title-deeds between 1350 and 1470 were written in Old-Slavonic. (Jireček, *Albanija*, II, pp. 931, 936.) In the case of the Romanians, there is also a version that their first rulers had been deriving their roots from the Serbian royal Nemanjić dynasty. (Toma Popović, *Seobe Srba u XVI i XVII veku*, in: *Seobe srpskog naroda. Zbornik radova posvećen tristo-godišnjici Velike seobe Srba*, Beograd 1990 p. 49.)
- 5 Jireček, *Albanija*, II, p. 931; Dragnich, *Todorovich*, pp. 55-56; Momčilo Spremić, *Albanija od XIII do XV veka*, in: *Iz istorije Albanaca. Zbornik predavanja. Priručnik za nastavnike*, Beograd 1969, p. 36; Imami, p. 21. According to Malcolm the majority of the Czar Dušan's army which conquered the Greek territories was Albanian. (Malcolm, *Kosovo*, p. 48.) Over and above, there were several rebellions of the Albanian nobility against the Serbian rule. (Imami, pp. 19-20.)
- 6 Malcolm, *Kosovo*, p. 114. Pulaha denies this. (o.c.)
- 7 Family ties between Serbian and Romanian nobility started in late 13th century and they lasted for three centuries. (Cf. Ilije Barbulesku, *Rumuni prema Srbima i Bugarima naročito s pogledom na pitanje makedonskih Rumuna*, Beograd 1908, pp. 95-101.)
- 8 The most important was by all means the first Romanian (and Serbian too!) printer, father Macarius, who printed the first Romanian books in Old-Slavic language in Cyrillic characters. (T. Popović, p. 50; Nikola Gavrilović, *Srpski kaluđer Makarije osnivač prve rumunske štamparije*, in: idem, *Nikola Gavrilović, Srbi i Rumuni. Srpsko-rumunske veze kroz vekove*, Beograd 1998; L. Demény, *L'imprimerie cyrilique de Macarios de Valachie*, *Revue roumaine d'histoire*, VIII, 3, 1969.) A half-Serb, Nikodim Grčić, was the founder of the first Romanian monasteries and the man who made it possible for the Slavic influence to oust the Greek one within the Romanian Orthodox Church. (Đorđe Sp. Radojičić, *Srpsko-rumunski odnosi XIV-XVII veka, Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu*, knj. I, 1956.) About others see: Barbulesku, o.c.; Louis Leger [Emil Picot], *Les Serbes de Hongrie, leur histoire, leur privilèges, leur église, leur état politique et social*, Paris 1873, pp. 58-67; Vojvodina, I. *Od najstarijih vremena do Velike seobe*, Novi Sad 1939, pp. 460-483; Aleksa Ivić, *Istorija Srba u Vojvodini (od najstarijih vremena do osnivanja Potisko-pomoriške granice (1703))*, Novi Sad 1929, pp. 253-255; Seton-Watson, p. 123.



duchies was occasionally strengthened by Serbian refugees later on too. However, it was not only Serbs who were responsible for the strength and durability of the Slavic influence on the Romanian culture – Slavic influences were coming from several directions, and even before the Serbs.<sup>9</sup>

The Yugoslav people which first fell under foreign rule were the Slovenes. Asking the Bavarians for help against the Avars, they soon fell under the rule of the first, and then that of the Franks. This was the epoch-making event in their history that would determine its course for the next 1100 years, until the foundation of Yugoslavia. The land was carved up by German nobles who gradually assimilated the Slovenian ones. In the territory which remained predominantly Slovenian, the ethnic difference gradually overlapped with the social.<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, the settlement of German peasant and town populations led to the disappearance of the Slovenians in large part of the Slovenian lands, shrinking the Slovenian ethnic territory to the half of its scope from the early Middle Ages.<sup>11</sup> As we have seen, the Slovenian towns have retained their German character until the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century, and sometimes beyond, however, until mid-19<sup>th</sup> century this caused no offense to anyone.<sup>12</sup>

The people that played the greatest role in the medieval history of the Southern Slavs, were the Hungarians. On their coming to Pannonia, the Magyars had found the Slavs there, taking over many words, cultural achievements, political institutions, agricultural technique and tools from them.<sup>13</sup> The contact proved fatal for

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- 9 Romanian and Serbian cultures were connected ever since the Middle Ages, and especially since 17th century. (Emanuel Turczynski, *Konfession und Nation. Zur Frühgeschichte der serbischen und rumänischen Nationsbildung*, Düsseldorf 1976, p. 14.) Serbian and Bulgarian influence on church building was felt in some parts already between 10th and 13th centuries. Old-Slavonic (in its Bulgarian variety) was accepted as the Church language already in 10th or 11th century and during 14th century it became an official language in Walachia and Moldavia. (Krista Zach, *Orthodoxe Kirche und rumänisches Volksbewußtsein im 15. bis 18. Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden 1977, pp. 26-31.) The influence of the Bulgarian Church was felt ever since 10th century, and of some Serbian monasteries since 14th century. (Ibid, p. 23.)
- 10 This remained so until 19th century, when the greatest Slovenian poet France Prešern said: "In this country, German is usually spoken by the gentlemen and ladies who give orders, and Slovenian by those who serve them." (Herman Vendel, *Borba Jugoslovena za slobodu i jedinstvo*, Beograd s.a., p. 200; Janez Stergar, *Njemački nacionalizam i protivslovenska djelatnost u austrijskoj Koruškoj*, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, IX, 1, 1971, p. 137.)
- 11 Kos, pp. 9-17; Kraft, p. 123.
- 12 Ferdo Gestrin, Vasilj Melik, *Slovenska zgodovina od konca osamnajstega stoletja do 1918*, Ljubljana 1966, p. 6. Until mid-19th century, the national consciousness of both Germans and Slovenes was undeveloped which enabled a peaceful coexistence. (Ibid, pp. 83, 105.) As a proof of tolerance, one can adduce the fact that during the first half of 19th century the local German magazines were furthering Slovenian culture, publishing translations of Slovenian poems etc. (Smilja Amon, *Nemško časopisje na Slovenskem*, Teorija in praksa, XXV, 9-10, 1988, p. 1332.) Furthermore, the German nationalists did not deem the Slovenian movement dangerous. (Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire. Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918*, II, New York 1950, pp. 297-298.)
- 13 INJ, II, pp. 150-151; Pamlény (ed.), p. 35; Laslo Katuš, *Istorija veza mađarskog naroda sa narodima Jugoslavije*, in: Laslo Katuš, Jan Kropilak, Jan Siracki, Aron Petrike *Istorija*

the Panonnian Slavs: after a while they all drowned in the Hungarian sea. However, a certain degree of Slavic presence in Southern Hungary remained in existence throughout the Middle Ages.<sup>14</sup> Having consolidated their state, the Magyars started endangering their southern neighbors. After some resistance and division among the Croatian nobility, the medieval Croatian state was annexed to Hungary. The Croatian aristocracy identified itself with the new body politic,<sup>15</sup> so that until early 19<sup>th</sup> century the question if Croatia had been conquered by or united with Hungary, was never asked.<sup>16</sup>

Hungary kept showing aspirations toward Bosnia, but except for temporary oaths of allegiance exacted by occasional incursions, it failed to gain a foothold there.<sup>17</sup> Medieval Serbia was more of an equal partner, and although not quite equal, it managed to keep the northern neighbor at bay. The Northern part of what is today Serbia, with Belgrade, belonged through the greater part of the Middle Ages to Hungary. Interests were turning Serbia toward South, so there were not too many inter-

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veza mađarskog, slovačkog i rumunskog naroda sa narodima Jugoslavije. Priručnik za nastavnike, Novi Sad 1969, pp. 7-14; László Kósa, *Die Ungarn, ihre Geschichte und Kultur*, Budapest 1994, p. 51. The last mentioned author adduces Slavonic words in Hungarian. Some Serbian nationalist authors tried to exaggerate Slavic and other foreign influences on the Magyars in order to prove that the Hungarians did not exist at all. (Cf. Stipičić, *passim*, and especially p. 47; Petar Pekić, *Povijest oslobođenja Vojvodine*, Subotica 1939, pp. 12-15. Another nationalist view of the contacts between Serbs and Hungarians, Germans and Romanians see in: Klicin, *o.c.*) The fact Western missionaries could preach among the Hungarians only in the Slavic language, which was more or less understood by most Hungarians, testifies to the high degree of intermixing of Magyars and Slavs, and its importance for the development of the Hungarian culture. (Görgy Görrfy, *König Stephan der Heilige*, Budapest 1988, p. 67.)

14 Katuš, *Istorija veza*, p. 15-17; Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini*, I, pp. 50-56.

15 INJ. I, pp. 202-204; Katuš, *Istorija veza*, pp. 17-21, 40-42. Croatian nobility was tied to their Hungarian opposite numbers by common class consciousness (Vendel, p. 23), and later on, also by common culture. (Peter Hanak (ed.), *Die Geschichte Ungarns von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Budapest 1991, pp. 71-78; Pamlény (ed.), p. 186.) János Czezmicei (1431-1469), better known as Janus Pannonius, the greatest Hungarian humanist, was of Croatian origin. (Tibor Kalniczay (ed.), *A History of Hungarian Literature*, Budapest 1982, pp. 43-45.) Nikola Zrinjski or Zrinyi Miklos, was not only a great poet, but also a forerunner of the Hungarian critical historiography. He considered himself both a Croat and a Hungarian. (Ibid, pp. 89-94) Croatian history of literature considers him, with equal right, a Croatian author conscious of his origin. (Cf. Marin Franičević, Franjo Švelec, Rafo Bogišić, *Povijest hrvatske književnosti*, III, Zagreb [1974], pp. 245-248. (Katus considers him the apogee of the Hungarian literature. (*Istorija veza*, p. 41.)

16 Ferdo Šišić, *Biskup Štrosmajer i južnoslavenska misao*, I, Beograd 1922, pp. 37-39. In order better to safeguard their class interests, the Croatian nobility strengthened their ties with Hungary in 1790, transferring the right of imposing taxation to the Hungarian Diet, and subjecting the Croatian counties to Pest. (Vendel, p. 173.) The Croatian nobility followed obediently also the first Magyarizing measures enacted by the Hungarian Diet. They offered resistance only when Latin was abolished as the official language – not for national, but for class reasons: the Croatian nobility saw in that the curtailment of their *iura municipalia* and opposed it also because ignorance of Magyar made them ineligible for public offices. (Ferdo Šišić, *Pregled povijesti hrvatskog naroda*, Zagreb 1962, pp. 376-403; Vendel, p. 176.)

17 Katuš, *Istorija veza*, pp. 23-24.

state contacts, although some Serbian nobles played a role in Hungarian interior politics.<sup>18</sup> After the battle of Kosovo in 1389 Serbia became a double vassal: towards the Ottoman Empire and Hungary – where the Serbian rulers were seeking aid against the Turks. From then onwards a more massive settlement of the Serbs in South Hungary starts on the estates of the Serbian nobles in Hungarian service, as well as a large, and sometimes even decisive role of these nobles in Hungarian politics.<sup>19</sup> After the battle of Mohacs and failure of Jovan Zapolja to come to power in the part of Hungary that was still free, this role gradually came to an end. On the other hand, the Turkish authorities colonized large masses of Southern Slavs, especially Serbs in Central Hungary, in the territory vacated by Hungarians.<sup>20</sup>

The great migration of the Serbs in 1690 reinforced vastly the Serbs living in liberated parts of Hungary. As was described in the first chapter, the colonization of non-Serbs throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries diluted their concentration, reducing through wars (Rakoczy's Rebellion),<sup>21</sup> resettlements, displacement and assimilation the scope of the territory they had inhabited. Unlike the Croats, whose nobility integrated well into the Hungarian order, becoming very patriotic, the Serbs, appeared as an "non-historical" people, thoroughly dependant on the good will of Vienna. In the squabbles between the Viennese Court and Hungarian nobility, as a rule, they took for them the only possible side: that of Vienna. Gradually their nobility also integrated into the Hungarian one, just like the older and more numerous Croat one. On the other hand, Serbian masses, being Orthodox Christians, were obnoxious both to the Roman-Catholic Church which wanted to convert them and to the Hungarian nobility because of their loyalty to Vienna and their refusal to become serfs.<sup>22</sup> For these reasons, the relations with Magyars, personified in the nobility (especially the lower one, on county level) were tense and inimical from the very

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18 INJ, I, pp. 349, 357; Ivić, pp. 5-6; Katuš, *Istorija veza*, pp. 22-23.

19 INJ, I, pp. 435-450; Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini*, I, pp. 71-104, 115-172; Katuš, *Istorija veza*, pp. 24-29, 37-39; Sima Ćirković, *Seobe srpskog naroda u Kraljevinu Ugarsku*, in: *Seobe srpskog naroda*; Leger, pp. 34-53; Johann Weidlein, *Balkanische Elemente greifen nach der Macht in Ungarn (1301-1540)*, *Deutsche Forschungen in Ungarn*, IX, 1-4, 1944-1985; [Johann] H[einrich] Schwicker, *Politische Geschichte der Serben in Ungarn*, Budapest 1880, pp. 2-3; Velimir Stefanović, *Kralj Matija i srpska despotovina*, *Letopis Matice srpske*, knj. 330, sv. 1-2, 1931; Ivić, pp. 8-162; Radonitch, *Histoire des Serbes*, pp. 30-80. The last mentioned author speaks about the great role of the Serbian nobility in Hungary already at the time of the Arpad kings. (O.c., pp. 8-13. Cf. also: *Vojvodina*, I, pp. 130-132. About the settlement since 14th century, cf. *ibid*, pp. 132-159, 165-221.)

20 Katuš, *Istorija veza*, pp. 43-46; Radonitch, pp. 81-99; Pekić, 19-20; *Vojvodina*, I, p. 160; Ivić, pp. 181-196.

21 It was by all means the bloodiest conflict of Serbs (and Bunjevci) with Hungarians, which significantly contributed to the decline of their numbers and the loss of some territories. (ISN, IV/1, pp. 59-85; Katuš, *Istorija*, p. 50; Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini*, II, pp. 57-78; Pekić, p. 25.) The fact that Transylvanian Romanians had fought on Rakoczy's side is worth mentioning. (Nicolae Iorga, *Histoire des Roumains et de la Romanité orientale*, VII. *Les Reformateurs*, Bucarest 1940, p. 281.)

22 Fran Zwitter, Jaroslav Šidak, Vaso Bogdanov, *Les problèmes nationaux dans la Monarchie des Habsbourg*, Belgrade 1960, p. 29; Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini*, I, pp. 328-345; *Ibid*, II, pp. 55-57, 191-228; Stefan Čakić, *Velika seoba Srba 1689/90 i patrijarh Arsenije III Crnojević*, Novi Sad 1982, pp. 214-222, 279-323.

start.<sup>23</sup> At the same time, there were conflicts with German colonists too – over pastures, because of ousting of the Serbs from their villages, because the Serbs had to build houses and till the land for the Germans, as well as because of the privileges the Swabian colonists were granted that the older Serbian settlers did not enjoy, or at least not to such a degree.<sup>24</sup> For similar reasons, there were also conflicts with colonists of other nationalities.<sup>25</sup>

In Kosovo and Western Macedonia the Serbs and Macedonians were subject to constant pressure by the Albanian marauders and newcomers since late 17<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>26</sup> Probably for this reason the presence of the peaceful town Turks and cattle-raising Yuruks was not felt that hard.<sup>27</sup> (The first were sometimes suffering from Albanian outrages as heavily as their Slavic neighbors.) The Serbs and Macedonians felt they had a problem, (except for the Albanian pillagers) not with the majority of the Turkish population, but with the Ottoman state. More accurately put, the problems were perceived on the religious and social level, the Ottoman Empire being above all a theocratic and feudal state.

All this does not mean the picture was black and white. The Serbs and Christian Albanians sometimes fought together against the Ottoman rule.<sup>28</sup> This was particularly typical of Montenegrin and Albanian clans, where all combinations of alliances, friendships, enmities or mutual intermixing were possible.<sup>29</sup> Not only conflicts, but also peaceful cohabitation in various forms existed, and even such unexpected phenomena as the guarding of the Dečani Monastery or the Serbian

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- 23 Milleker, *Geschichte der Banater Militärgrenze*, p. 47; C.A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire 1790-1918*, London 1968, p. 93.
- 24 Zoran Janjetović, *Die Konflikte zwischen Serben und Donauschwaben, Südost-Forschungen*, 58, 1999, pp. 120-122. Naive and obviously opportunist is the claim of Ljubomir Kosijer that Serbs and Croats had greeted the German colonists friendly, as well as, that the latter had founded their villages as extensions of Serbian villages or often named a street after Serbs out of sympathy for them! (Ljubomir St. Kosijer, *Großdeutschland und Jugoslawien (aus der südslawischen Perspektive)*, Berlin, Wien 1939 (3rd ed.), p. 43.) A. Belić and St. Mihadžić adduce places from which the Germans had dislodged the Serbs. (La question du Banat, de la Batschka et de la Baranya. La Baranya, Paris 1919, p. 11.) The Yugoslav Franciscans were not spared the eviction either. (Ibid.)
- 25 On conflicts with the Ruthenians cf.: Slavko Gavrilović, *Prilog istoriji Rusina u Bačkoj sredinom XVIII veka*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 48, 1967, p. 113; Idem, *Rusini u Bačkoj i Sremu*, in: Laslo Katuš, Jan Kropilak, Jan Siracki, Aron Petrike, *Iz istorije veza mađarskog, slovačkog i rumunskog naroda sa narodima Jugoslavije*. Priručnik za nastavnike, Novi Sad 1969 pp. 39-43; Sima Tomović, *Šid*. Monografija, Šid 1973, p. 36.
- 26 Malcolm, *Kosovo*, p. 172.
- 27 There were very few real Turks in Kosovo. (Malcolm, *Kosovo*, pp. 210-211.)
- 28 Kostić, o.c.; Idem, *Iz istorije narodnog srpsko-albanskog ustanka protiv Turaka uz austrijsku vojsku 1689/90*, *Istorijski časopis*, 1-2, 1960. Unlike him, Rajko L. Veselinović denies the participation of Albanians in this uprising. (Ko su "Albanci" i "Klimenti" u austrijskim izvorima s kraja XVII veka? (Istorijsko-geografska i etnografska rasprava), *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 25, 1960.)
- 29 Čubrilović, o.c.; Gligor Stanojević, *Pokret brdskih i planinskih plemena uoči Kandijskog rata*, *Istorijski zapisi*, XIII, 3, 1960; Imami, pp. 126-134; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 78; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, p. 10. This symbiosis led, among other things, to great similarity of the Albanian and Montenegrin common law. (Halit Trnavci, *Predgovor*, in: Štefen Konstantin Đečovi (ed.), *Kanon Leke Dukadinija*, Zagreb 1980, p. 6.)

Patriarchal see in Peć by the (not always paid) Albanians.<sup>30</sup> On the whole, however, the situation of the Christians in Turkey tended to deteriorate as the internal weakness of the Empire increased. Attempts at reforms were triggering Albanian uprisings<sup>31</sup> in which the Slavic population often bore the brunt.<sup>32</sup> The liberation of Serbia radicalized the contending parties,<sup>33</sup> although the autonomous Serbian authorities always kept some kind of contacts with certain Albanian leaders.<sup>34</sup>

Whereas the relations in the Ottoman Empire started to grow worse after the late 17<sup>th</sup> century, conflicts in the Habsburg Monarchy started to die down once the colonization ended, as multiethnic populations started getting used to, and learning from each other. However, at the same time the elites started laying down the foundations of conflicts that would explode in mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, and would last into 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The Hungarian national awakening, which bore the mark of xenophobia from the very start, set the assimilation of all non-Hungarian nationalities as its goal.<sup>35</sup> With a view of achieving that, a series of laws which gradually established

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- 30 AJ, 66, 22/51; 74, 11/21; Pravda, August 28, 1924; Durham, pp. 86-87; Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 190.
- 31 Albanian historiography tries to depict Albanian rebellions as progressive, although they had been led by conservatives. (Cf. Stefanaq Pollo, *La révolution nationale albanaise face aux réformes ottomanes (les années 30-70 du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle)*, *Studia albanica*, 1, 1985.)
- 32 Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 178-188. There were also occasional attempts at cooperation. (Cf. Masar Kodra, *Albansko-makedonska saradnja u drugoj polovini XIX veka – doprinos nacionalnoj afirmaciji*, *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 3-4, 1970, pp. 47-49.)
- 33 Vl. Stojančević, *Politički uzroci*.
- 34 Vladimir Stojančević, *Obnovljena srpska država i Albanci 1804-1876*, in: Idem, *Srbi i Arbanasi 1804-1912*, Novi Sad 1994, pp. 19-25, 27-30; Idem, *Politika Srbije prema Albaniji u XIX veku. Prilog poznavanju srpsko-arbanaških veza u periodu od 1844 do 1875. godine*, in: Ibid, pp. 96-113; Dragnich, Todorovich, pp. 81-83, 89; Đorđe Mikić, *Albansko pitanje i albansko-srpske veze u XIX veku (do 1912.)*, *Marksistička misao*, 3, 1985, pp. 139-140; Kodra, *Albansko-makedonska saradnja*, pp. 43-45; Vickers, p. 37; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, pp. 93-96; Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, p. 195; Imami, pp. 116-123.
- 35 Pamlényi (ed.), p. 258; Šišić, *Pregled*, p. 372. One of the leading Hungarian reformers Count István Széchenyi was not immune to this either. The difference was that he wanted the minorities to assimilate peacefully and without coercion, and in his later years he even turned a critic of Hungarian nationalism which he himself had conjured up. (Cf. George Barany, *Stephen Széchenyi and the Awakening of Hungarian Nationalism 1791-1841*, Princeton 1968; Johann Weidlein, *Graf Stephen Széchenyi über die Nationalitäten in Ungarn*, in: *Festschrift für Harold Steinacher (1875-1965)*, München 1966.) Some authors are prone to ascribe the striving toward assimilation of non-Magyar nationalities to Hungarian fear of ethnic isolation and extinction. (Cf. Ludwig von Gogolak, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des slowakischen Volkes, II. Die slowakische nationale Frage in der Reformepoche Ungarns (1790-1848)*, München 1969, p. 22; Györffy, p. 13; Ruprecht Steinacher, *Betrachtungen zur nationalen Assimilation des deutschen Bürgertums in Ungarn*, *Südostdeutsches Archiv*, XXII-XXIII, 1978/80, pp. 73-74; Kósa, p. 338; István Deák, *The Lawful Revolution. Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians 1848-1849*, New York 1974, pp. 44.) Hungarian nationalism of the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century had a strong anti-Slavic trait. (*Histoire de la Hongrie des origines à nos jours*, Budapest 1974,

Hungarian as the official language were passed in the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>36</sup> Liberalism which accompanied this in the social domain did little to blunt the cutting edge of Hungarian nationalism – indeed, the greatest liberals were at the same time the greatest Magyarizers.<sup>37</sup> This spurred the national awakening of the non-Hungarian peoples, especially of the Serbs and Croats.<sup>38</sup> Romanian national awakening started in Transylvania approximately at the same time, with a strong anti-Slavic undertone.<sup>39</sup> Contemporaneously with the conflict with the Hungarians, the Serbian conflict with the Romanians who formed part of the Serbian-dominated Orthodox Metropolis of Carlowitz, grew worse too.<sup>40</sup> Although the Romanians formed the

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- p. 273; Barany, pp. 395, 409.) In that context it is rather curious that livelier cultural relations between the Magyars and Serbs (but not the Croats) developed in the first half of 19<sup>th</sup> century. (Katuš, *Istorija*, p. 55.)
- 36 Robert A. Kann, Zdenek V. David, *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands 1526-1918*, Seattle, London 1984, pp. 231-234. Hungarian was formed as an unified literary language only in 1820s, and already in 1843/44 it became official in almost all spheres of public life. (Palményi (ed.), p. 258; *Histoire de la Hongrie*, pp. 247, 272.)
- 37 Béla K. Király, Ferenc Deák, Boston 1975, p. 100. They believed equal civil rights for all would suffice and everything could be solved just by bestowing them. (Ibid, pp. 130, 145. Cf. also: Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 380; Palményi (ed.), p. 289; Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, I, p. 120; Jászi, p. 308; Deák, *The Lawful Revolution*, pp. 56, 70.)
- 38 Slavko Gavrilović, *Srbi u Ugarskoj i pitanje mađarizacije u prvoj polovini XIX veka*, *Istorijski časopis*, 23, 1976; Šišić, *Pregled*, pp. 407-417; Bogdan Krizman, *The Croats in the Habsburg Monarchy in the Nineteenth Century*, *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. III, 2, 1967; Vendel, pp. 184-194. The Bunjevci in the Vojvodina started their national awakening only much later and their majority remained pro-Hungarian until 1918. (Vasa Stajić, *Mađarizacija i preporod Bunjevaca*, *Glasnik Istorijskog društva u Novom Sadu*, VIII, 1927; Stefan Ilkić, *Bunjevci i mađarizacija*, *Književni sever*, III, 1927; Pekić, pp. 38-45; *AJ*, F. 335, f. 17.)
- 39 Although the Romanian national renaissance had started within the Uniate Church, it soon spread to the Orthodox whose elite had already had the tendency to supplant the Old-Slavonic language and Cyrillic alphabet. (Hitchins, *The Romanian National Movement*, p. IX; Castellan, p. 112.) Old-Slavonic could be ousted from the liturgy only gradually and not without resistance on part of the clergy and the faithful (from 17<sup>th</sup> until the first decades of 18<sup>th</sup> century). Calvinist rulers of Transylvania wanted to impose the use of Romanian, whereas Walachia and Moldavia were exposed to the penetration of Greek. (Zach, pp. 85, 144, 168, 173, 180-187.)
- 40 The Romanians of the Banat and Transylvania were subjected to the Serbian Metropolis of Carlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) during 18<sup>th</sup> century. Whereas those in the Banat enjoyed "Illyrian" (i.e. Serbian) privileges, those in Transylvania did not; the latter's bishop who was appointed at the demand of the faithful who had had no bishop ever since conversion of the majority of their clergy to Catholicism in 1700, was subject to the Metropolitan of Carlowitz only in spiritual matters since 1761. Most of the bishops were Serbian, but if need be they defended Romanian national interests too. (In Transylvania this had several precedents in the past.) The Serbs were the elite and the Romanians the mass, although the Serbian hierarchy made certain concessions in the field of education, use of the language and appointment of bishops to the Romanians since the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century. (Tomas Bremer, *Vera, kultura i politika. Eklezijalna struktura i ekleziologija u Srpskoj pravoslavnoj crkvi u XIX i XX veku*, Niš 1997, pp. 18-33; Turczynski, o.c.; Iorga, *Histoire*, VII, pp. 304, 370-371; N. Gavrilović, *Jurisdikcija*; Hitchins, *The Rumanian National Movement*, pp. 53, 142; Octavian Bârlea, *Die serbische und rumänische Kirche im 18. Jahrhundert*, *Acta historica (academica dacoromana)*,

majority of believers, the leadership was firmly in the hands of the Serbs who did not always (at least in the opinion of the Romanian intellectuals) show enough understanding for Romanian national demands – which were directed towards greater rights within the Church at first, and later towards achieving independence from the common ecclesiastical community.<sup>41</sup> The conflict with the Magyars culminated in 1848/49 when the intractable Hungarians ended up on one side, and the Serbs and Croats on the other (the Habsburg side). At the same time, the Serbian conflict with the Romanians came to a head – however, it was mainly the conflict with the Romanian intelligentsia, as the peasant masses either remained passive, or sympathized with the Serbs (as did some of the clergy).<sup>42</sup> Croatian and Serbian border guards on the Military Frontier, headed by Jelačić, led the anti-Hungarian front of the South-Slavs.<sup>43</sup> As for the Germans

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- VIII, 1968; Leger, p. 161; Schwicker, *Politische Geschichte*, pp. 262, 353-356; Seton-Watson, pp. 138-190; I.D. Suciú, Gr. Popiti, *Relations serbo-roumaines dans l'empire autrichien entre 1780 et 1850*, *Revue roumaine d'histoire*, IX, 2, 1970; ISN, V/2, pp. 40-42.) In the opinion of E. Turczynski, the ties of the Banat Romanians with the Serbs accelerated the development of their national consciousness, although the first remained linguistically, socially and economically inferior within that religious community. (Emanuel Turczynski, *The National Movement in the Greek Orthodox Church in the Habsburg Monarchy*, *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. III, 3, 1967, pp. 106-108.)
- 41 The Romanian leaders wanted to use the revolution of 1848 to gain ecclesiastical independence, trying to cooperate with the Hungarians to this goal, but due to nationalist short-sightedness of the latter this attempt failed. (Seton-Watson, p. 283; Castellan, pp. 130-132; Kann, David, pp. 284, 427; Steger, pp. 209-210.)
- 42 Keith Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality. Andreiu Saguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania 1846-1873*, Harvard 1977, pp. 175-178; I.D. Suciú, *Rumänen und Serben in der Revolution des Jahres 1848 im Banat*, *Revue des Études sud-est européennes*, V, 4, 1968; Emil Niederhauser, 1848. *Sturm im Habsburgerreich*, Budapest 1990, p. 92; Nicolae Iorga, *Histoire*, IV, Bucarest 1944, pp. 170-171; Vasile Maciu, *Les forces sociales et politiques de la révolution de 1848*, *Revue roumaine d'histoire*, XII, 3, 1973, pp. 458-459; Schwicker, *Geschichte der österreichischen Militärgrenze*, pp. 328-329, 333; ISN, V/2, pp. 67-68. The claim of A. Petrieke (o.c., p. 174) that the Banat Romanians joined the Hungarians for social reasons is not correct: the demands of their intelligentsia were mostly ecclesiastical and political. The claim of R. Kann that most of the Banat Romanians were on the Austrian side, is also partly wrong. (Kann, I, p. 311.)
- 43 Jelačić, although himself an enemy of the Magyars, did not hasten to attack them. (Cf. Gunther E. Rothenburg, Jelačić, *the Croatian Military Border and the Intervention Against Hungary in 1848*, *Austrian History Yearbook*, I, 1965, pp. 48, 58.) When he finally did attack, his reservists were pillaging and murdering Hungarian peasants. (Ibid, p. 60.) About the participation of the Serbs and Croats in the revolution and about relations with other nationalities see: Daka Popović, *Vojvođanski gradovi u buni 1848-1849. Prilog istoriji vojvođanskih gradova*, Novi Sad u 1848-49-oj godini, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 9, 1954; Idem, *Uspomene Timoteja Brankovića, paroha senčanskog na 1849-1850*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 10, 1955; Milleker, *Geschichte der Banater Militärgrenze*, pp. 198-206; Eugen Bonomi, *Werschetz 1848/49*, *Südostdeutsches Archiv*, IV, 1961; Lazar Rakić, *Veliki Bečkerek (Zrenjanin) revolucionarne 1848-1849. godine*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 39, 1964; Svetolik Subotić, *Bela Crkva u događajima iz 1848/49*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, XI, 27, 1960; [Siegfried Kapper], *Die serbische Bewegung in Südungarn. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der ungarischen Revolution*, Berlin 1851. An almost contemporary Hungarian description see in: Andreas Vargyas, *Geschichte der ungarischen Freiheits-Kämpfe in den Jahren 1848-1849*, Budapest 1879. The national fronts

and Slovaks<sup>44</sup> during the revolution they usually sided with the Magyars. Being bent on material welfare, they had their interest in liberal reforms, unaware that the Hungarians were endangering their ethnic survival.<sup>45</sup> It was only during the revolution that unbridgeable gaps between nationalities came to being in the ethnically mixed places.<sup>46</sup>

The defeat of the Hungarian revolution brought about a temporary rapprochement between the Serbs and Magyars, and a cooling of relations between the Serbs and the Germans<sup>47</sup> – although considerable part of “Bach’s hussars” (perceived

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themselves were often, due to mixed troops and sympathies, rather intricate. (Cf. István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism. A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848-1918*, New York 1990.) Out of thirteen Hungarian generals executed in Arad (“the martyrs of Arad”) by the Habsburg authorities after the revolution on October 6, 1849, two were of Serbian (and four of German) origin. (Hanak (ed.), p. 128.) In general, it can be said that the role of the Serbian renegades in high posts was comparatively large. This proves that part of the Serbs, especially from upper classes, did not remain immune to the charm of Hungarian liberalism. (Cf. Dušan Popović, *Srbi u Vojvodini*, III, pp. 197, 226; Steger, pp. 54-64; Lazar Rakić, *Najnoviji rezultati mađarske istoriografije o srpsko-mađarskim odnosima revolucionarne 1848/49. godine*, *Godišnjak Društva istoričara Vojvodine*, 1978; Subotić, p. 96.) Kossuth for his part was willing to accede to the independence of Croatia, whereas he allegedly wanted to exterminate the Serbs. (Deák, *The Lawful Revolution*, pp. 157, 283; Katuš, *Istorija*, p. 63.)

44 The pro-Serbian stance of the Slovaks of Stara Pazova was rather an exception despite the enthusiasm of some Slovak leaders from Northern Hungary for the Serbs. (Vreme, September 12, 1932. Cf. Milan Krajčović, *Srpsko-slovački odnosi u revoluciji 1848-1849*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, XXIX, 59-60, 1999; Jan Siracki, *Saradnja Slovaka i Srba u južnoj Bačkoj šezdesetih godina XIX veka*, in: *Ujedinjena omladina srpska*. *Zbornik radova*, Novi Sad 1968, p. 456; Vereš (ed.), pp. 142, 172.) The help the Serbs received from the Slovaks was given as much out of idealism as out of interest. (Krajčović, *Srpsko-slovački odnosi*, p. 14.) It is interesting that the good relations between the elites of the two peoples, as well as education of part of the Serbian intelligentsia at Slovak schools, did not contribute to the better inter-ethnic relations in the Vojvodina. (Gogolak, pp. 45-46, 65-72.) As for the Ruthenians, they too sympathized with the Magyars, and not with the Serbs. (Slavko Gavrilović, *Rusini u Bačkoj i Sremu od sredine XVIII do sredine XIX veka*, in: *Iz istorije vojvodanskih Rusina do 1941. godine*, Novi Sad 1977, p. 34.)

45 Leonhard Böhm, *Geschichte des Temeser Banats*, Leipzig 1861, pp. 338-358; ISN, V/2, pp. 45-78; Mihovil Tomandl, *Prilog istoriji Okružnog narodnog odbora u Pančevu 1848-1849*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 40, 1965; Zrenjanin, pp. 48-49; Gavrilović, *Privredne i društvene prilike*, pp. 158-159; Janjetović, *Die Konflikte*, pp. 124, 126; Slavko Gavrilović, *Zapisi o Vršcu XIX veka*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 1, 1970; Leger, p. 237; Vendel, p. 241; Felix Milleker, *Geschichte der königlichen Stadt Werschetz*, II, Budapest 1886, pp. 4-67; Jan Siracki, *Slovaci u Vojvodini kao istorijsko-etnografski fenomen*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 5, 1972, p. 116. The number of nationally conscious, or at least for Hungary dangerous Slovaks, according to a list of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, remained pretty small until October 1918. R. Seton-Watson estimated their number between 750 and 1000. (Gogolak, o.c. III. *Zwischen zwei Revolutionen (1848-1919)*, München 1972, p. 148.) During the Revolution of 1848/49, Serbian conflict with the Ruthenians in Šid was taken up again. (S. Gavrilović, *Iz istorije*, p. 44.)

46 Wolf, p. 60.

47 Especially cultural ties were strengthened. (ISN, V/2, pp. 120-123; Katuš, *Istorija*, p. 74; Pamlényi (ed.), p. 359; Kann, I, p. 85; Vasilije Krestić, *Srbi u Vojvodini za vreme Bahovog*



by many as the cutting edge of Germanization and absolutism) were actually Czechs, Poles and Slovenes.<sup>48</sup> The relations with the Romanians remained tense, and it was the Viennese Court that cut short this tug-of-war in 1864 by creating a Romanian metropolis, independent from that of Carlowitz.<sup>49</sup> This, however, did not put an end to squabbling with the Banat Romanians. The partition of the ecclesiastical communes, and what was more important, of their property, and several monasteries as well, caused frictions in some places that lasted until the first decades of 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>50</sup> Coupled with other factors,<sup>51</sup> these tensions made political cooperation<sup>52</sup> in the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century more difficult, although it did occur sporadically in a number of places,<sup>53</sup> just as peaceful coexistence, mutual mixing and assimilation occurred in those places where the separation was executed peacefully.<sup>54</sup>

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apsolutizma (1849-1860), Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 13, 1976; Zwitter, Šepić, Bogdanov, p. 85.)

48 Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 442; Vendel, p. 328.

49 Nikola Petrović, *Odnosi Srba i Rumuna u Ugarskoj između 1848-1870*, in: Đerđ Gal (ed.), *Prilozi za istoriju Rumuna, Savremeno obrazovanje*, 3, Novi Sad 1970; Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality*, pp. 179-189; Idem, Andreiu Saguna and Joseph Rajačić. The Rumanian and Serbian Churches in the decade of Absolutism, *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, X, 3, 1972; Idem, Andrei Saguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania During the Decade of Absolutism, *Südost-Forschungen*, XXV, 1966; Idem, Andreiu Saguna and the Restoration of the Rumanian Orthodox Metropolis in Transylvania 1846-1868, *Balkan Studies*, VI, 1, 1965; Leger, pp. 281-298. According to Bidermann, even after the separation of Churches, some 60.000 Romanians remained under the Metropolis of Carlowitz. (Herm. Ign. Bidermann, *Die Griechisch-Gläubigen und ihr Kirchewesen in Österreich-Ungarn*, Wien 1884, p. 7.)

50 Svet. Bradvarević, *Naše hijerarhijske deobne parnice sa Rumunima*, Novi Sad 1913; Leger, pp. 299-300, 338. As to how certain communes were divided see: Erdeljanović, *passim*; Drobnjaković, Milleker, *passim*; Sreta Pecinjački, *Podaci o stanovništvu i naseljima južnog Banata u XVIII i XIX veku*, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke, 38, 1964; Ratković, p. 94; Svetolik Subotić, *Crkveni spor između belocrkvanskih Srba i Rumuna u XIX veku*, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke, 36, 1963.

51 Thus for instance the Romanian elite wanted to pursue the course of Romanian-Hungarian cooperation against the Slavs in 1868-1888. This anti-Slav policy had its roots already in the attitude of the founding fathers of the Romanian renaissance of the "Transylvanian School". (Cf. Kith Hitchins, *Die Rumänen*, in: Wandruszka, Urbanitsch (eds.), pp. 599-600.) About other obstacles to the collaboration see: Arpad Lebl, *Građanske partije u Vojvodini 1882-1918*, Novi Sad 1979, *passim*.

52 Leger, pp. 313-317, 352-353; Arpad Lebl, *Slovačka narodna stranka i Vojvodina (1895-1918)*, *Istraživanja*, 2, 1973, p. 142.

53 Arpad Lebl, *Srpska narodna slobodoumna stranka (1887-1918)*, *Istraživanja*, 4, 1975; Gligor Popi, *Srpsko-rumunska saradnja i zajednička borba ugnjetenih narodnosti u periodu dualizma, Balcanica*, VII, 1976; K.N. Milutinović, *Predratna Mala antanta, Sarajevo 1937*; Vojislav J. Vučković, *Parijski komitet triju narodnosti (1896)*, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke, 15, 1956; *La question des nationalités en Hongrie*, Paris 1896; Milan Vanku, *Mala antanta 1920-1938*, *Titovo Užive* 1969, pp. 12-14; Miodrag Milin, *Rumunski nacionalni pokret u Banatu i antidualistička borba narodnosti (1884-1896)*, *Godišnjak Društva istoričara Vojvodine* 1981, Novi Sad 1983.

54 Leger, pp. 358-359; Milleker, *Geschichte der Banater Militärgrenze*, pp. 285-287. Wolf deems that at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century national consciousness both of the Romanians and Serbs increased, which activated the masses; until then, it was only the elites that had been active. (Wolf, pp. 27, 60.) Generally good inter-state relations between

After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867, Hungarian relations with all non-Magyar nationalities came to a head<sup>55</sup> as their relations with nationally conscious parts of these peoples and their national leaders, deteriorated.<sup>56</sup> As time went by, the complacent Hungarian elites were showing increasingly less understanding for the non-Hungarian nationalities and the Magyarizing measures were becoming more severe.<sup>57</sup> Since a large number of assimilated Germans and Jews were among the ex-ecutors of the Magyarization policy, it only exasperated the minority population, not only against the Hungarians, but also to a degree against the Germans and Jews,<sup>58</sup>

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- Serbia and Romania during the second half of 19th century, did not influence at all the relations between the Serbs and Romanians in the Banat – partly because the Romanian-inhabited territories of the Habsburg Empire remained, for foreign policy reasons, a *noli me tangere* for Romania. (Seton-Watson, p. 379.) About the good inter-state relations see: Nikolae Čakir, *Prilog pitanju o rumunsko-srpskim političkim odnosima u periodu 1867-1868. godine*, in: *Ujedinjena omladina srpska. Zbornik radova*, Novi Sad 1968; N. Gavrilović, *Srbi i Rumuni*, pp. 341-358; Nicolae Ciachir, *La diplomatie roumaine dans les Balkans entre 1878-1900*, Balcanica, VIII, 1977; Jon Dežan, *Stav Rumuna prema borbi Srbije za nezavisnost, Godišnjak Društva istoričara Vojvodine*, Novi Sad 1984.)
- 55 The Hungarians began to behave increasingly exclusively ever since the fall of absolutism in 1861. (Vendel, p. 329.)
- 56 The father of Croatian nationalism, Ante Starčević, has built up his whole ideology on opposing the Hungarians, Germans and – the Serbs. (Mirjana Gross, *Povijest pravaške ideologije*, Zagreb 1973, *passim*, and especially pp. 32, 63, 70, 109, 173.) It should not be forgotten that a pretty strong pro-Hungarian party (the so-called “Magyarons”) had always existed in Croatia, which was attached to the Hungarians partly by interests and partly by genuine sympathies. There were also those who believed Croatian rights can best be safeguarded in concord with the Hungarians. (cf. Josip Horvat, *Politička povijest Hrvatske*, I-II, Zagreb 1990 (2nd ed.), *passim*.)
- 57 All Hungarian parties were agreed as to the preservation of the Magyar supremacy, which practically meant the preservation of the supremacy of the Hungarian ruling classes. The masses of the Hungarian poor could only lose by such policy. (Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire*, pp. 679-725; Katus, *Die Magyaren*, p. 472; Kann, David, pp. 356-359; Jörg K. Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary 1867-1986*, London, New York 1989 (3rd ed.), pp. 28-35, 73-76; Vladimir Margan, *Pomađarivanje u bivšoj Ugarskoj*, *Glasnik Istorijskog društva u Novom Sadu*, VIII, 1935.)
- 58 The Jews assimilated willingly and together with other assimilants, they were perceived as the greatest Hungarian jingoists. (Oscar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy*, Chicago 1961, pp. 174-175, 324, 443; Bogumil Hrabak, *Dezerterstvo, zeleni kadar i prevratna anarhija u jugoslovenskim zemljama 1914-1918*, Novi Sad 1990, p. 21.) Odium against the Jews was on the rise also for economic reasons. (Lebl, *Slovačka narodna stranka*, p. 144.) Slovakian assimilants were also very numerous, but they were chiefly making career in the Church, where they were presumably less exposed to hatred. Furthermore, the number of their assimilants in Southern Hungary was much smaller than in Northern – thanks to their much smaller total number there, and their better national preservation in a region they shared with nationally conscious Serbs. (C.A. Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and its Consequences 1919-1937*, London, New York, Toronto 1937, p. 398.) It is not by chance that the first nationally conscious Swabians appeared in South Hungary, mostly in the territories that would fall to Yugoslavia later on. (Cf. Gottas, pp. 372-374, 395-398, 401-402, 407-410; Wolf, p. 139.) Among the prominent Hungarian politicians it was only Lajos Mocsary who managed to establish friendly contacts with the Serbs; for this he was kicked out of his own 1848-Party. (Gabor G. Kemenj, Lajos Močari i Srbi, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 21, 1958.)

without achieving its goals in minority regions.<sup>59</sup> The Hungarians and Germans, and partly Slovaks were not only disliked as representatives of the authorities, but, as we have seen, also as colonists in Slavonia<sup>60</sup> and economic rivals who were supplanting the Serbs in the Vojvodina.<sup>61</sup>

In Slovenia, a mild national awakening began only in 1848, reaching its highest pitch in the second half of the century. The Slovenes fought (as maximum) for the unification of all Slovene lands, or (as minimum) for the equality of languages in administration, education and judiciary within the then existing crownlands. Although their national rights were much more respected in Austria than was the case with those of "nationalities" in Hungary,<sup>62</sup> the struggle was here probably even fiercer. Already before the Compromise Croatia possessed basic institutions for preservation of its nationhood,<sup>63</sup> and even for assimilation of parts of the non-Croat population:<sup>64</sup> the Serbs were protected from Magyarization by confessional difference institutionalized in their ecclesiastical and educational autonomy. The Slovenes, on the other hand, had nothing comparable, and "Germanness" permeated much deeper all spheres of their

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59 Katus, *Die Magyaren*, p. 433; Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 726.

60 Gujaš, o.c.; Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen*, pp. 35-42, 62-65; Milan Krajčović, *Slovaci u političkom životu Trojedne Kraljevine u drugoj polovini XIX veka*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 14, 1976, p. 196.

61 Marković, *Pravoslavna srpska parohija*, pp. 22-23, 47, 62-65; Wolf, pp. 139-140; Toša Iskruljev, *Raspeće srpskog naroda u Sremu 1914. godine i Mađari. Sa mađarske granice. Bajski trokut. Sent Andrija, Novi Sad 1936*, pp. 309-314, 318-324, 368-370, 434-443; Siracki, *Saradnja*, p. 456. This trend was partly stopped before the First World War thanks to co-operative societies, banks and the money of the returnees from America. (Simonović, pp. 10, 12, 23; Vendel, p. 503; Marković, p. 48; Aleksandar M. Stanojlov (ed.), *Petrovgrad, Petrovgrad 1938*, p. 56.) Sporadic political cooperation with the Slovaks and Romanians began only in 1860s. (Siracki, *Saradnja*, pp. 458-462; Idem, *Mesto i značaj jugoslovenskih Slovaka u istoriji čehoslovačko-jugoslovenskih odnosa*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 48, 1967, pp. 43-48; Lebl, *Slovačka narodna stranka*; Idem, *Građanske partije*, pp. 224-227, 234, 249-251; Milan Krajčović, *Slovački političar Milan Hodža u političkoj istoriji Vojvodine početkom XX veka*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 6, 1972.) Cooperation with the Germans began only in 1890s when their national movement started, and with the Hungarians, except for occasional party flirting it never materialized. (SBNS Kraljevine SHS, *Redovan saziv za 1927/28*, knj. IX, Beograd 1928, p. 198; Ingomar Senz, *Die nationale Bewegung der ungarländischen Deutschen vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Eine Entwicklung im Spannungsfeld zwischen Alldeutschum und ungarischer Innenpolitik*, München 1977, pp. 185, 245-247; Lebl, *Građanske partije*, pp. 88, 118.)

62 Non-German languages were much more in official and semi-official use than was the case in Hungary, where Hungarian was the sole official language. However, the supremacy of German remained unchallenged, especially in higher administrative, judiciary and educational spheres. (Cf. Peter Burian, *The State Language Problem in Old Austria (1848-1918)*, *Austrian History Yearbook*, Vol. VI-VII, 1970-1971; Kann, pp. 308-309; Jászi, pp. 252-253.)

63 This however, does not mean it was spared the penetration of the Magyar language into schools and offices, coupled with colonization of Hungarians with concomitant opening of schools for them – at the time 40% of children in Croatia did not attend any school at all. (Vendel, p. 423.)

64 Hans Schrekeis, *Donauschwaben in Kroatien. Historisch-demographische Untersuchung*, Salzburg 1983, pp. 10, 12; Krajčović, *Slovaci*, p. 196.

national culture and economic life. They did not have to fight only the Germans, but also numerous "nemčuri" (derogatory name for Germanized or German-friendly Slovenes), and indeed Germanness in themselves.<sup>65</sup> This struggle in Carniola gradually yielded fruit,<sup>66</sup> but in ethnically mixed crownlands, the Germans not only managed to keep their supremacy,<sup>67</sup> but also, spontaneously or by applying indirect or direct pressure, to Germanize a certain number of Slovenes.<sup>68</sup> Their political, cultural and

- 65 The best and most detailed survey see in: Janez Cvirn, Trdnjavski trikotnik. Probably the best example of the difficulties the Slovenian national movement had to overcome was represented by the personage of Dragotin Dežman (Karl Deschmann) (1821-1889) who started as a nationally conscious, albeit German-friendly Slovene in his youth, but turned into the leader of the German Party in Carniola later in his life. He believed only German culture can show the Slovenes the way to progress. He became separated from the Slovenian national movement by its conservatism and ultramontanism. (Biographisches Lexikon zur Geschichte Südosteuropas, I, München 1974, p. 395; Vendel, p. 331; Ferdo Gestrin, Vasilj Melik, Povijest Slovenaca 1813-1914, Zagreb 1952, p. 151.) Conservatism of the Slovenian national movement pushed many a liberal Slovene into the German camp since 1870s. (Hartman, Kulturni tokovi, p. 234; Thomas Barker, The Slovene Minority of Carinthia, New York 1984, p. 72; Tone Zorn, Pogled na položaj koruških Slovenaca u prošlosti i sadašnjosti, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, IX, 1, 1971, p. 71; Stergar, p. 141.) Many Slovene intellectuals were corresponding in German in mid-19th century and the majority of books meant for them was in German. (Vasilj Melik, The Representation of Germans, Italians and Slovenes in Ljubljana, Treste, Maribor and Other Neighbouring Towns Form 1848 Until the Second World War, in: Richard Georg Plaschka, Karlheinz Mach (eds.), Die Auflösung des Habsburgerreiches. Zusammenbruch und Neuorientierung im Donauraum, München 1970, p. 126; Gestrin, Melik, Slovenska zgodovina, pp. 15, 83; Idem, Povijest, p. 38.) The greatest Slovene poet of all times, France Prešern, used to write German verses too. (Boris Zihel, Predgovor, in: France Prešern, Pesme, Beograd 1951, pp. XIV-XV; Barker, p. 54.) For these reasons, the journal "Triglav" was stirring Slovenian national consciousness in 1865-1870 in German! (Vendel, p. 332.) It is typical for part of Slovene historiography that it does not manage to come to terms with such (too) big role the Germans used to play in the Slovene culture and economy. Unable to face the facts, it seeks refuge in keeping mum about it altogether. (Cf. Janko Prunk, Slowenien. Ein Abriss seiner Geschichte, Ljubljana 1996.) On the other hand, it is only fair to point out that many of the creators of „German“ culture (which was synonymous with high, non-folk, culture) in Slovenia were of Slovenian descent. (Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, p. 84.)
- 66 Vendel, pp. 332, 336. However, not even there were the Slovene successes continuous. (Marija Lah, Borba ljubljanske občine za slovensko uradovanje, Kronika, V, 3, 1957; Vendel, pp. 427-428.)
- 67 The Slovenes remained underrepresented in all the crownland Diets and their school system remained rudimentary. (Vendel, pp. 491, 494.) Furthermore, the Germans retained power in major towns. (Antoša Leskovec, Upravni in gospodarski razvoj Maribora u XIX stoletju, Kronika, XXXI, 2-3, 1983, p. 170; Orožen Janko, Zgodovina Celja in okolice, II, Celje 1971, p. 43; Kovačič Fran, Slovenska Štajerska in Prekmurje. Zgodovinski opis, Ljubljana 1926, pp. 345-385.)
- 68 Klemenčič, Germanizacijski procesi; Fran Zwitter, Etnična struktura in politična vloga mest v slovenskih deželah od srede XIX. do začetka XX. stoletja, Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis, 3-4, 1973; Arnold Suppan, Zwischen Assimilation und nationalpolitischer Emanzipation. Die Kärntner Slowenen vor und im Ersten Weltkrieg (1903-1918), Österreichische Osthefte, 20, 1978. Especially the Slovenes in the industrial towns within the German ethnic territory were an easy prey to Germanization. ( Cf. Fran Zwitter, Prva štajerska narodnostna statistika, in: Franjo Baš, Janko Glaser (eds.), Kovačičev zbornik, Maribor 1937, p. 193.)

economic preponderance,<sup>69</sup> coupled with their increasingly intransigent nationalism of an imperialist, sometimes even of a racist stamp,<sup>70</sup> was responsible for the relations in 1918 being extremely tense.<sup>71</sup> A similar struggle was going on in Dalmatia between the nationally-conscious Croats and Italians, aided by autonomist Italianists (i.e. Italian-friendly Slavs). The conflict there was similar to the one in Slovenia inasmuch as Italianness pervaded the upper strata: that is, Italian in oneself and around oneself had to be fought.<sup>72</sup> The First World War, not only due to persecution of Slovene, Croat and especially Serb leaders<sup>73</sup>, but also due to its duration, victims, excacerbated conflicts and helped to wean the Southern Slavs from the Habsburg Monarchy. However, national conflicts from the last decades of its existence would spill over into Yugoslavia – those between the Yugoslav peoples themselves, as well as those between them and peoples which would become national minorities.

The liberation of Southern parts of Serbia in 1878 not only triggered the exodus of the Albanians and other Muslims from Serbia<sup>74</sup> and the flight of the Serbs

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69 Gestrin, *melik*, *Povijest*, pp. 170, 175.

70 Cf. Janez Cvirn, *Trdnjavski trikotnik*; Idem, *Nemci v Celju (1861-1914)* (Msc. of the Ph.D. thesis), Celje 1990; Idem, *Celjski Nemci in jugoslovansko vprašanje pred prvo vojno*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XLIV, 4, 1990; Idem, *Nemštvo in poskus demokratizacije občinskega volilnega sistema na spodnjem Štajerskem*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XLIV, 1, 1990; Gestrin, *Melik*, *Povijest*, p. 203.) Inter-ethnic conflicts were sometimes so severe, as to cause physical violence and even victims in Celje, Ptuj and Ljubljana. (Ivan Stopar, Celje, *Motovun* 1986, p. 108; Gestrin, *Melik*, *Povijest*, pp. 153-159, 270; Slovenec, September 20, 1931.)

71 The aversion of the Slovene leaders was leveled against the local Germans and not against the Habsburg Monarchy, to which they generally remained loyal almost until the end of the First World War. (Cf. Janko Pleterski, *Prvo opredeljenje Slovenaca za Jugoslaviju*, Beograd [1976].) Indeed, the Slovenes remained loyal to the Habsburg Empire even as German nationalists cared only for their national interests, and not for those of the state in the last decades of Monarchy's existence. (Andreas Moritsch, *Deutsche und Slowenen in Kärnten. Das nationale Bewußtsein in Kärnten in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, *Österreichische Osthefte*, 12, 1970, p. 243.)

72 The first nationalist newspaper *Il Nazionale*, made propaganda for the Slavic cause in Italian. (Šišić, *Pregled*, p. 470; Krizman, p. 135; Vendel, p. 318.) A very detailed account about all phases of the struggle see in: Foretić, o.c.

73 *Spomenica oslobođenja Vojvodine 1918*, Novi Sad 1929, pp. 6-16; F. Granić, *Stradanje manastira Fenek 1914*, *Glasnik Istorijaskog društva u Novom Sadu*, knj. VIII, 1935; Nikola Petrović, *Nacionalno pitanje i slom Austro-Ugarske monarhije*, *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 1-2, 1966, pp. 53-58; József Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War*, Budapest 1989, pp. 78-79, 95-96, 263; Gestrin, *Melik*, *Povijest*, p. 279; Vendel, pp. 663-665; Suppan, *Zwischen*, p. 314; Lojze Ude, *Boj za severno slovensko Mejo 1918-1919*, Maribor 1977, p. 12. After the assassination of Arch-Duke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo, anti-Serbian pogroms in Sarajevo, Zagreb and Southern Banat broke out. (Hrabak, *Dezerterstvo*, p. 45; Idem, *Logoši i zeleni kadar i zbivanja pri prevratu u Vojvodini 1918*, *Istraživanja*, 8, 1979, p. 114; Danilo Kecić, *Revolucionarni radnički pokret u Vojvodini 1917-1921*, Novi Sad 1972, pp. 41-43; Pekić, pp. 55-63; Radomir Prica, *Autonomna gradska opština*, in: *Sremska Mitrovica, Sremska Mitrovica 1969*, p. 140; Mihovil Tomandl, *Pančevo za vreme Prvog svetskog rata (1914-1918)*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 24, 1959; Iskruljev, pp. 9-186.)

74 Đorđe Mikić, *Društveno-političke prilike u srpsko-albanskim odnosima krajem XIX i početkom XX veka*, *Obeležja*, XIII, 2, 1983, pp. 47-51; Idem, *Albansko pitanje*, p. 142; Vickers, p. 43; Vasa Čubrilović, *Politički uzroci seoba na Balkanu od 1860. do 1880.*

from Kosovo, but also spurred the Albanians to the first national manifestation in their history. The autonomist League of Prizren was formed and was discreetly aided by the Turkish authorities as long as it served the goal of preserving the integrity of the Ottoman territories. The League skipped several phases of national development, striving not only for autonomy, but also to include into its boundaries territories where the Albanians were only a minority.<sup>75</sup> Once the League was suppressed, the Albanians took advantage of the anarchic conditions that prevailed to continue to exercise pressure on the Serbs who continued to leave Kosovo.<sup>76</sup> Montenegro did not manage to acquire all the territories it coveted (and which the

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godine, in: Idem, *Odabrani istorijski radovi*, pp. 541-543; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, pp. 111-112; Imami, pp. 144-148; Skender Rizaj, *Struktura stanovništva Kosovskog vilajeta u drugoj polovini XIX stoleća*, Vranjski glasnik, VIII, 1972; Buda Ilić, *Spomenica 80-godišnjice oslobođenja Toplice i 50-godišnjice gimnazije u Prokuplju*, Prokuplje 1958; Pavlović, o.c.; Jagodić, o.c.; Spasić, o.c.; Milićević, o.c.; Pllana, o.c.; Hadži-Vasiljević, *Arbanska liga*, pp. 1-20; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, p. 289. Đorđe Mikić's claim "there are no accurate data why these Albanians had to abandon these parts" is ridiculous. (Socijalno-ekonomske prilike na Kosovu i Metohiji 1878. do 1912. godine, in: *Srbija i Albanci u XIX i početkom XX veka. Ciklus predavanja 10-25. novembra*, Beograd 1990, p. 206.) The book *Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji* depicts the Albanian exodus as a spontaneous and volunteer emigration, which had been even instigated by the Turks (p. 217). Aleksandar Popović's statement that the Albanians simply fled from the newly liberated territories is groundless. (Popovic, p. 306.)

- 75 The character of the League remained disputed to this day: some saw in it a national organization, others a fundamentalist Islamic one, others yet a revolutionary or a conservative one etc. (Cf. Ljubodrag Dimić, Đorđe Borozan (eds.), *Jugoslovenska država i Albanci, I*, Beograd 1998, pp. 11-16; Ali Hadri, *Nacionalni pokret albanskog naroda od tridesetih godina XIX veka do kraja 1912*, in: *Iz istorije Albanaca. Zbornik predavanja. Priručnik za nastavnike*, Beograd 1969, pp. 137-143; R. Krasniqi, pp. 58-109; Pollo, Puto (eds.), pp. 136-152; Dragnich, Todorovich, pp. 91-93; Hadži-Vasiljević, *Arbanska liga*; Vickers, p. 47; Bataković, *Kosovo*, pp. 27-28; Idem, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, pp. 114-117; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, pp. 221-226; Bogumil Hrabak, *Prizrenska arbanaška liga 1878-1881*, Beograd 1998; *Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji*, pp. 222-223; Mikić, *Albansko pitanje*, pp. 143-144; Đorđe Borozan, *Velika Albanija. Porijeklo – ideje – praksa*, Beograd 1995, pp. 23-39; Bushati, pp. 23-49; Imami, pp. 140-141.) Horvat, unlike most other authors, claims the Albanians were 60% of the population in the four vilayets they demanded as their autonomous territory. (Horvat, p. 39.) About religious differences among the Albanians at the time of the League see: Peter Bartl, *Die Liga von Prizren im Lichte vatikanischer Akten* (Archiv der Propagandakongregation), *Südost-Forschungen*, XLVII, 1988.

- 76 Vickers, pp. 58-61; Mikić, *Društveno-političke prilike*, p. 65; Idem, *Socijalno-ekonomske prilike*, pp. 207-208; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, 119-120, 126-154, 157-158; Idem, *Osnove arbanaške prevlasti an Kosovu i Metohiji 1878-1903*, *Ideje*, 5-6, 1987; Idem, *Istraga oružja u Ibarskom Kolašinu 1901*, in: Antonije Isaković (ed.) *Kosovsko-metohijski zbornik*, Beograd 1990; Vasa Čubrilo, *Vladimir Ćorović, Srbija od 1858. do 1903. godine*, Beograd s.a., pp. 177, 184-185; Milan Rakić, *Konzulska pisma 1905-1911*, Beograd 1985, passim; Mihajlo Vojvodić, *Srbija i albansko pitanje krajem XIX veka*, in: *Srbija i Albanci u XIX i početkom XX veka*, pp. 72, 76-79, 82-85; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, pp. 227-228; *Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji*, pp. 228-272, 277; Vladimir Stojančević, *Prilike u zapadnoj polovini Kosovskog vilajeta prema izveštajima austro-ugarskog konzula u Skoplju 1900. i 1901. godine*, in: Idem, *Srbi i Arbanasi*, pp. 184-206.

Congress of Berlin allotted to it)<sup>77</sup>, although it, like Serbia, only more slowly and less systematically, tried to oust the Albanians and Muslims from the territories it did acquire.<sup>78</sup> And yet, despite these tensions, the governments of Serbia and Montenegro had sporadic contacts with certain Albanian chiefs, trying to use them for their own goals, just like these were trying in return to use the Serbian and Montenegrin governments.<sup>79</sup> Montenegro lent its support to the Malissor insurgents in 1911 and 1912<sup>80</sup>, and Serbia partly armed the Albanian rebels in 1912.<sup>81</sup>

On the whole, the relations of the Yugoslav peoples with the peoples who became national minorities after Yugoslavia had been founded, were tense at the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, but not irreparably spoiled. This held true particularly for the Albanians and Magyars,<sup>82</sup> but also for the Germans in Slovenia. Centuries of living together had done their part – not only by creating gaps, but by building bridges too.<sup>83</sup> Life within common empires entailed often common culture, knowledge of the official language (at least among the upper classes), economic ties,<sup>84</sup> occasional political co-operation in some places, and even personal acquaintances and friendships,<sup>85</sup> which

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- 77 Montenegro did not succeed in conquering Gusinje, but it received Ulcinj (Dulcigno) instead. Furthermore, it managed to annex Bar (Antivari), Podgorica etc. (Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 224.)
- 78 Žarko Bulajić, *Agrarni odnosi u Crnoj Gori (1878-1912)*, Titograd 1959; Đoko Pejović, *Naseljavanje okoline Bara i Ulcinja i način regulisanja odnosa na zemlji (poslije 1878. godine)*, *Istorijski zapisi*, XXIII, 3-4, 1970; Durham, p. 35; Novica Rakočević, *Crnogorsko-albanski odnosi 1878-1914*, in: *Srbija i Albanci u XIX i početkom XX veka*, pp. 123-130.
- 79 Vladimir Stojančević, *Sukob Austro-Ugarske i Srbije u Kosovskom vilajetu 1900-1914*, in: *Idem, Srbi i Arbanasi 1804-1912*, Novi Sad 1994 pp. 287-291; Dogo, Kosovo, p. 108; Mikić, *Društveno-političke prilike*, pp. 55, 57-60, 63-64; *Idem*, *Albansko pitanje*, pp. 148-156; Vickers, pp. 46-47; Imami, pp. 165-167; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, pp. 154-155, 160, 165. There were also financial grants for Albanian leaders well disposed towards Serbia, but all these connections did not manage to stop the Albanian terror over the Serbs.
- 80 Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, p. 276; Šukri Rahimi, *Albanci u borbi za nacionalnu emancipaciju posle Mladoturske revolucije*, *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 1-2, 1970, pp. 80-82; Vojvodić, p. 92; Imami, pp. 181-184; Rakočević, pp. 131-150; Dragičević, o.c.; Sreten Draškić, *Albanci i Mladoturski pokret 1902-1911*, in: Antonije Isaković (ed.), *Kosovsko-metohijski zbornik*, Beograd 1990, pp. 297-300; Durham, p. 218; Vickers, pp. 71-72; Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 243; Hadri, p. 149.
- 81 Mikić, *Društven-političke prilike*, p. 65; Bogumil Hrabak, *Arbanaški ustanci 1912. godine*, *Vranjski glasnik*, XI, 1975, p. 190; Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 250. Serbia was supplying with arms the controversial Isa Boletini too. (Horvat, p. 43.) Through its agents, Serbia partly helped organize the uprising of 1912. (*AJ*, 37, 56/360.)
- 82 Not only did the Croatian Magyarones keep constant political ties with the Hungarians, but there were instances of rapprochement between the Serbs and Magyars on several occasions too. (Cf. Gabor G. Kemenj, *Motivi zbližavanja u istoriji mađarsko-južnoslovenskih veza (1790-1914)*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 6, 1972.)
- 83 Cf. Erdeljanović, pp. 60-70; Martinov, o.c.; Rittig-Beljak, o.c.; *INJ*, II, pp. 138, 349-351, 364-367.
- 84 The first savings bank in Novi Sad was multi-national; however one should note that it had been founded as early as 1864. (Boris Kršev, *Bankarstvo u Dunavskoj banovini*, Novi Sad 1998, p. 31.) Later banks in the Vojvodina were usually founded on ethnic basis. (*Ibid*, pp. 33-34.)
- 85 Even between the Serbs and Albanians sometimes friendly, godfatherly or even family ties existed. (Đorđe Mikić, *The Albanians and Serbia During the Balkan Wars*, in Béla

would survive into the inter-war period and from which, above all, the minorities would benefit. The reasons why the post-war powers began building their minority policy predominantly on the bad experiences of the centuries-long common existence are numerous. They partly lie in the depth of changes to the detriment of the Yugoslav peoples caused by the settlement and activities of the minority populations, partly in the oppressive policies of the defunct empires for whose cat's-paws the Southern Slavs (not quite without a reason) had held the non-Yugoslavs,<sup>86</sup> and partly in the surging nationalism and (not always admitted) feeling of cultural or/and economic inferiority in comparison with the minority populations. At that, valuable contributions of these populations were often forgotten and no one seems to have been aware that an unjust policy of revenge harmed the interests of the state and the majority people.

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Király, Dimitrije Đorđević (eds.), *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*, Boulder 1987, p. 168.)

86 Rexhep Krasniqi himself admitted that the Albanians had been "ein Herrenvolk" in the Ottoman Empire, (Krasniqi, p. 37) and the nationalist German author Reimund Friedrich Kaindl considered the Germans of Hungary as bulwark of Germanness and a stepping-stone for German (economic) penetration into the Balkans. (I. Senz, pp. 276-277; Schödl, p. 118.)



## Chapter Four

# **The Way National Minorities Were United in the Common State with the Southern Slavs**

The ways the peoples that became national minorities in the newly founded Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes became part of that state were different. Those in the South (in Kosovo and Macedonia) first became citizens of Serbia and Montenegro, and through them of Yugoslavia. The fact that between 1915 and 1918 they were not under effective rule of these two states, does not make a difference from the point of view of the law of nations. However, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian occupation played a very important practical role in connection with the behavior of the Albanian and Turkish national minorities – in regard to the states under whose authorities they had been before the occupation, as well as in regard to the local Serbian population. Furthermore, the occupation during the First World War influenced the situation after it and the attitude of the Yugoslav state and the local Serbian inhabitants towards them. The way national minorities in Northern part of the country joined the new common state was also one of the factors which determined their position, numbers, social make-up, political rights, attitudes etc. For these reasons in this chapter we shall deal with that process which did not end with the proclamation of unification on December 1, 1918, but lasted also after it, as a process of accommodation to the new state, or maybe better put, as a process of reconciliation with its existence and with one's own existence in the status of national minorities within it – which, dependent of part of the country in question, lasted until mid-twenties.

The members of the Turkish and Albanian national minorities found themselves within the borders of Serbia and Montenegro after the Ottoman defeat in the First Balkan War. These two kingdoms managed only partly to integrate the newly acquired territories and their inhabitants before the outbreak of the First World War. However, the processes had begun that would continue in autumn 1918 after the interruption caused by Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian occupation 1915-1918.

There is probably truth in the statement that the Albanian rebellions in early 20<sup>th</sup> century, and especially their uprising in 1912, facilitated the victory of Serbia and Montenegro in the First Balkan War. However, claims by some Albanian authors that these insurgencies actually made Serbian and Montenegrin victory possible are certainly exaggerated: both kingdoms proved a military match for a much stronger Habsburg Empire. No less exaggerated is the claim that Serbia and Montenegro attacked Turkey because of the success of the Albanian uprising,<sup>1</sup> although it was certainly a factor that the Serbian policy wanted to use in order to weaken

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1 Rahimi, p. 86.

Turkey. Serbia was supplying Albanian rebels with arms, trying at the same time to set them against each other so as to weaken both adversaries – the Ottoman Empire and the Albanians.<sup>2</sup>

Before the beginning of hostilities between Serbia and Turkey, the Serbian Prime-Minister Pašić contacted some Albanian leaders in order to secure their neutrality. In view of that, he promised them freedom of religion, official use of the Albanian language and Albanian authorities in places and districts inhabited by the Albanians, preservation of their common law, and even an Albanian parliament which would decide on Albanian educational, juridical and religious affairs.<sup>3</sup> This, just like some other contacts, yielded no result.<sup>4</sup> The Albanians, for their part, decided at a rally in Skopje on October 10, 1912 that they would defend Turkey – against which they had recently rebelled – which put 63,000 rifles at their disposal to this end. And yet, despite a strong propaganda (partly conducted by the Austro-Hungarian consuls and their agents), the turnout of volunteers was disappointing: only some 16,000 appeared at the border.<sup>5</sup> Serbian authorities issued several proclamations calling on the Albanians to remain calm, promising nothing would happen to them in that case, whereas Božidar Janković, who had had good contacts with some Albanian chiefs, was appointed commander of the Third Army which operated in the direction of Kosovo.<sup>6</sup> Only the first clashes were severe and Serbian artillery swiftly scattered Albanian irregulars.<sup>7</sup> The Albanians were offering resistance only until the fall of Priština on October 22, 1912.<sup>8</sup> When they were promised they would not be persecuted, the armed Albanians in the Drenica and around Peć surrendered.<sup>9</sup> Thanks to Sadik Rama, who had been a friend of the Serbian consul, Serbian troops were able to pass through the Drenica and Prekoruplje peacefully: in 150 Albanian villages not a shot was fired and even the response to the demand to hand over arms was comparatively well obeyed.<sup>10</sup> As for the Montenegrin troops, in the beginning they had the aid of the Malissors and the Albanians from Rugovo, Plav and Gusinje, but after the first victories, the Albanians started to make their help conditional on the promises of a future autonomy.<sup>11</sup>

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2 Zekeria Cana, *L'insurrection général albanaise de l'an 1912*, *Recherches albanologiques*, 1, 1984, p. 187.

3 Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, p. 282; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, pp. 167-168. It is doubtful if Pašić and the ruling circles would keep these promises. The minority policy pursued after the war seems to indicate they would not, i.e. that the offer was not sincere and that it had not been made with the intention to be fulfilled. It is more likely that it was just a tactical move.

4 Mikić, *The Albanians*, p. 171; Dejvid Mekenzi, *Apis*, Beograd [1996], p. 102; Pollo, *Puto* (eds.), p. 172.

5 Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, p. 282; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 169. Two attempts by Hasan Prishtina to gather Albanian detachments against the Serbs during the First Balkan War failed. (Dogo, *Kosovo*, p. 111.)

6 Mikić, *The Albanians*, p. 171.

7 Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 168; Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, p. 282.

8 Mikić, *The Albanians*, p. 171.

9 Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, p. 282.

10 Mikić, *The Albanians*, p. 172.

11 Mikić, *The Albanians*, p. 173. Serbian experiences on their further way to the sea (which had been one of the main Serbian objectives) were mixed: in the Ljuma and on the Drim Albanian seditions had to be quenched, whereas friendly contacts were established with the Catholic Mirditi. (*Ibid.*)

The goal of the Serbian High Command was to conquer Kosovo, Metohija and Northern Albania with as little resistance on the part of the Albanians as possible, and consequently, with as few casualties as possible. In other words, no plan of extermination or ethnic cleansing of the Albanian population existed – as had been claimed and unfortunately still is.<sup>12</sup> On the contrary, although the ruling Serbian circles cherished no particular sympathies for the Albanians,<sup>13</sup> they wanted to pacify the conquered territory with as few casualties as possible – the one which would eventually fall to Serbia after the delimitation, as well as the one which was occupied by Serbia in the attempt to get an access to the sea and which would eventually fall to Albania. The behavior of the Serbian military on the spot after the first (not overly strong) resistance was crushed, testifies to this,<sup>14</sup> but also the Serbian Government's documents with the instructions to encourage the Albanians to demand annexation of their territories to Serbia;<sup>15</sup> such instructions would not have been issued had there been a plan to exterminate or scatter them.

However, crimes did occur. The question is only how many, under what circumstances, by whom and upon whom. This important matter stirred the feelings of the contemporaries,<sup>16</sup> and has lost little of its explosiveness to this day. It opens the question as to the quality of the historical sources about the Serbian crimes. We have seen that after the first resistance had been crushed, the further penetration of the Serbian troops proceeded peacefully. However, force was used in places where the Albanians offered resistance. This occurred at attempts at disarming in Has, Dukagjin and Ljuma.<sup>17</sup> In regions where weapons had for centuries been not only part of the

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- 12 Imami, p. 202. This author also states that the Serbian Army committed no crimes in the beginning, but that it started an ethnic cleansing after the relations with the Albanians worsened. The accusation of ethnic cleansing (to be sure without actually using the term) was raised by the three refugee Albanian priests in a petition to the League of Nations in 1930. (AJ, 305, 8/18.)
  - 13 Cf. the memo to the Peace Conference in London, of January 16, 1913, in: Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije (henceforth: DSP), VI/1, Beograd 1981, pp. 138-142.
  - 14 DSP, V/3, Beograd 1986, p. 858.
  - 15 DSP, V/3, pp. 257, 631. The victims that fell in Ljuma and Debar, which, according to the Italian colonel Muricchio who had been in inspection there, numbered 2044, with 2800 houses burned (McCarthy, p. 149), even if the numbers were correct, the victims were most probably killed in the course of breaking the resistance.
  - 16 Thus the often quoted report of the Carnegie Commission came to being: Dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale, Enquete dans les Balkans. Rapport présenté aux directeurs de la Dotation par les membres de la Commission d'enquete, Paris 1914 (also available in English). Justin McCarthy thinks the report tended to play down Bulgarian crimes and to put the bulk of the blame on Serbia and Greece. (McCarthy, pp. 166, 171, 173.) The also often quoted books of war reports by Lav Trocki and Edit Durham originated at the same time. (Lev Trocki, Kosovsko vprašanje, Ljubljana 1989; M. Edit Durham, The Struggle for Scutari (Turk, Slav and Albanian), London 1914.) As an example of a Bulgarian propaganda compilation see: M.D. Skopiansky, Les atrocités serbes d'après témoignages américains, anglais, français, italiens, russes, serbes, suisses etc. etc., Lausanne 1919.
  - 17 Mikić, The Albanians, p. 173; DSP, V/3, p. 585. It seems the worst crimes were committed in Ljuma, mentioned in several sources independent of each other. (Cf. also Donation Carnegie, p. 136 – quoting Radničke novine of October 9, 1912 (old style); Bojan Korsika (ed.), Srbija i Albanci. Pregled politike Srbije prema Albancima od 1878. do

national costume, but also a precondition of survival, such a measure could not have been peacefully accepted by the population – as the Turkish authorities also had ascertained themselves on several occasions. The reaction of the Serbian military was not very moderate. There was also Serbian revenge at the border where the Albanians were hoisting white flags, only to attack the troops furtively. This, of course, embittered the Serbs so that they were not squeamish in the choice of means of defeating and punishing their enemy.<sup>18</sup> Clashes occurred also in the cases when the Serbian soldiers tried to supply themselves with food from the local population which itself did not have enough.<sup>19</sup> Trotsky adduced as a reason for cruelty the disappointment of Serbian soldiers that the Albanians turned against them the very weapons they had received from Serbia.<sup>20</sup> Although shooting of POWs was forbidden, according to some reports it occurred in places where commanders did nothing to prevent it.<sup>21</sup> However, Trotsky himself claims the Albanian way of fighting was also merciless and that they too were killing everything before them.<sup>22</sup> According to him, the worst crimes were not committed by the regular army at all, but the reservists and especially the irregulars and Chetniks – whom he described as scum who had joined the Army only for booty.<sup>23</sup> Other sources confirm that the worst crimes were committed by the irregulars of all belligerent parties.<sup>24</sup> Their duty was disarming the populace, in the process of which crimes happened, including those against Christians.<sup>25</sup> Allegedly, their atrocities were sometimes such that the regular army had to intervene against them.<sup>26</sup> There was also looting on the part of the regular army, officers and men.<sup>27</sup> Obviously such behavior provoked Albanian discontent and resistance, and they, in turn, provoked military response on the part of the Serbian army. However, one should keep in mind that part of the looting, arson and murder was not committed by the Serbian army or the Chetniks, but by the local Christian population with whom the centuries-old religious hatred blended with the class one, and exploded in a spate of revenge on the Muslims. This was particularly the case in Macedonia.<sup>28</sup>

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1914. godine, I, Ljubljana 1989, pp. 24-25, quoting the Serbian socialist Dimitrije Tucović.)

- 18 Mikić, *The Albanians*, p. 171. Trotsky claims the Army destroyed mostly the houses of the outlaws. (Trocki, p. 96.)
- 19 Mikić, *The Albanians*, p. 173. Such cases happened only in the case of extreme want. (Cf. Korsika (ed.), p. 33.)
- 20 Trocki, p. 94.
- 21 Trocki, pp. 94-95.
- 22 Trocki, p. 94.
- 23 This claim is not completely correct: in the Serbian war plans the Chetniks ("bush-whackers") were given a much more serious role of guerilla/commando vanguard of the regular army. (Cf. Nusret Šehić, *Četništvo u Bosni i Hercegovini (1918-1941). Politička uloga i oblici djelatnosti četničkih udruženja*, Sarajevo 1971, p. 38.)
- 24 McCarty claims the worst were Bulgarian, and then Serbian irregulars. (McCarty, p. 139.)
- 25 Trocki, p. 96.
- 26 Trocki, p. 96.
- 27 Trocki, p. 97; Korsika (ed.), p. 28, 46; Durham, *The Struggle*, p. 312; McCarthy, p. 149.
- 28 Dotation Carnegie, p. 58; McCarty, p. 150. The British consul from Bitola accused Bulgarian gangs for the crimes around Kruševo. (Ibid, p. 151.) This was still going on in autumn 1913. (Dragoslav Janković, *L'annexion de la Macédoine à la Serbie 1912-1914*, in: *La Macédoine et les Macédoniens dans le passé. Recueil des articles scientifiques*, Skopje 1970, p.

Speaking about the Serbian crimes, one should keep in mind the sources from which information about them are derived. In the first place, they are the writings of socialists (Trotsky, Tucović, Kosta Novaković), or of such pro-Albanian authors such as Edit Durham.<sup>29</sup> The Socialists were opposed to the war of the Balkan allies against Turkey for ideological reasons, labeling it "imperialist".<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, their information, just like much of what Durham and the Carnegies Commission quote, was received second hand, sometimes from the press (which was not overly well disposed toward Serbia). Trotsky was never at the front, only in its greater or smaller proximity, because correspondents were not allowed at the front line.<sup>31</sup> In other words, all those reporting on crimes were dependent on eye-witnesses' statements from both sides. These could not have been particularly objective, especially when it came to the number of the killed. From the Serbian sources we know that pillage, murder and arson did occur, but we may reasonably assume that their number and scope were smaller than parties ill-disposed toward Serbia were trying to make people believe.<sup>32</sup> The fact is that the Serbian Government had no intention of complicating its relations with the Albanians and other locals. On the contrary, the Serbian officials had orders to keep order and security of persons and property of all inhabitants of the occupied territory,<sup>33</sup> and there were, as we have seen, even attempts at cooperation with the Albanians – which was mentioned even by the Socialist authors.<sup>34</sup> As for the Turkish population, the Serbian army established cooperation with it in several places,<sup>35</sup> using it against the Macedonians of Bulgarian sympathies. On the whole, entering the war, the Serbian government wanted to fulfill its territorial goals at the lowest price possible: its aim was conquering of space and not extermination of the population of this or that nationality or creed.<sup>36</sup> That clashes, bloodshed, pillage, rape and arson did occur, was to be ascribed to

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291.) In Strumica where the Serbs held civilian and the Bulgarians military power, a commission of a sort was separating the "good" Muslims from the "bad" ones, with allegedly only some 10% of them staying alive. (Donation Carnegie, p. 58.)

29 Henry Baerlein wrote about her works: "...all the writings of Miss Durham are so warped with hatred for the Slav that they must be very carefully approached." (Baerlein, pp. 88-89.)

30 Cf. Tucović, o.c. (and especially p. 99.)

31 Trocki, p. 92.

32 It can be said that Serbia was a victim of a modern phenomenon in the gristle: of creating a picture in the media about a war. The press in the interested countries spread "its" picture of the Balkan war, and the public was deluged by information on which it couldn't check. The Austro-Hungarian press was leading the way in this, assisted by the Habsburg diplomacy. (Vladimir Ćorović, *Odnosi između Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u XX veku*, Beograd 1992 (2nd ed.), pp. 435-436.) The inspired historians often took such information over at its face value, and from them even those who strove after objectivity. No-one tried to establish the real scope of the crimes and the responsibility, but they would probably prove to have been exaggerated just as the case with the reports about the mishandlings of the Austro-Hungarian consuls. (Cf. Ćorović, p. 451.) Finally, even the Serbs-unfriendly Edit Durham admitted that the stories about the Serbian atrocities probably had been exaggerated. (Durham, *The Struggle*, p. 313.)

33 Janković, p. 285.

34 Korsika (ed.), pp. 137-138.

35 Donation Carnegie, pp. 129, 131.

36 As claimed by Durham for the Serbs and Montenegrins. (*The Struggle*, p. 239.)

irresponsible elements within the army and the irregular units, but also the local Christian and Albanian population which resisted disarmament, attacked the troops from ambush etc. Rough behavior of some officers and army units caused resistance, just like the Albanian resistance and ambushes provoked fierce military response on the part of the Serbian troops. However, it would be difficult to speak about a unified pattern of behavior, of either the Serbian, or Albanian or Turkish party, applicable to all places and all times throughout the First Balkan War. Serbian excesses, which eventually rendered the fulfillment of the Serbian Government's plans more difficult, were the result of human weakness and insufficient discipline of part of the military and civilian personnel, and not the fruit of a deliberate policy. The excesses of the local civilian population only helped to make the situation worse.<sup>37</sup>

The circumstances at the Montenegrin front were similar to those on the Serbian. The Montenegrin army enjoyed initially the support of part of the Northern Albanian Catholic clans which traditionally strove for autonomy. When a possibility of an independent Albania emerged, they changed sides. The Muslim Albanian population from Berane and Rožaj, over Plav and Gusinje, to Peć and Đakovica was inimically disposed, whereas part of the Muslims, especially in the Sandžak, was passive and expectant. After the first resistance was crushed, part of the Muslims fled to Metohija, Albania or even Asia Minor.<sup>38</sup> The Malissors and the Kelmendi of Northern Albania were willing to cooperate with Montenegrin troops and fight against the Turks and Albanian Muslims in exchange for autonomy.<sup>39</sup> Some 3000 Albanian volunteers fought on the Montenegrin side, especially with the Coastal Detachment along the river Bojana. In the process they were burning and pillaging Muslim villages and sometimes the Montenegrin commissariat.<sup>40</sup>

Montenegrin King Nicholas intended to annex these clans to Montenegro after the war, but they, desirous of their traditional autonomy, felt no such propensity. Being heterogeneous and at the low level of social and economic development, they kept changing their attitudes, depending on the situation, influence of foreign powers, relations between clans etc, but over time, they became increasingly prone to join an Albanian state.<sup>41</sup> In Plav, Gusinje and Metohija, Albanian irregulars led by Riza-bey and Bajram Cur offered resistance. Realizing they would be defeated, the representatives of Gusinje and Peć offered to surrender, promising loyalty. The Montenegrin authorities accepted the surrender and promised freedom of religion, security of persons and property, but they did not fail to disarm the Muslim and arm the Serbian and Montenegrin population, as well as to take some hostages. In the beginning the establishment of the Montenegrin power proceeded on the whole without violence which had accompanied the earlier Montenegrin territorial enlargements.<sup>42</sup> Still, the resistance was most tenacious in that area, so the state of

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37 McCarty, p. 140.

38 Babić, *Politika*, pp. 26, 31.

39 *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28; Rakočević, p. 154; Durham, *The Struggle*, pp. 187-188.

40 Babić, *Politika*, p. 28; Rakočević, p. 156; Durham, *The Struggle*, p. 216.

41 Babić, *Politika*, pp. 28-29. Montenegrin attempts to win them over had no great success. (*Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.) It seems, the reason for growing discontent of the Malissors was at least partly the fact the Montenegrins were neglecting them when dividing spoils. (Durham, *The Struggle*, pp. 204, 218.)

42 Babić, *Politika*, pp. 31-33, 171-173. Until spring 1914 the Serbian population which had been armed by the Montenegrin Government, was disarmed too.

war lasted for the next six months. Disarmament proceeded slowly, with difficulties and only gradually, despite the hostage-taking.<sup>43</sup> In spite of court martials and individual shootings, the disarmament could not have been accomplished by spring 1913. However, then a massive Muslim defection started – partly for economic reasons: prohibition of coming to pastures, poverty and disruption of traffic.<sup>44</sup> Because of this, people were fleeing to the Albanian, and even to the Serbian territory, but also because of forcible conversions of Muslims and Roman-Catholics to Orthodoxy, which was probably the most obnoxious trait of the Montenegrin rule.<sup>45</sup> There is no proof that this was done at the Montenegrin Government's order, but the fact it was done in so many places seems to indicate that the action was centrally directed. If nothing else, for long the Government did nothing to stop the conversions. They were discontinued only in May 1913, when the Government realized they were politically nefarious.<sup>46</sup> There were sporadic attempts at forceful conversion in the Serbian territory too, but they were soon strictly forbidden,<sup>47</sup> whereas the Serbian authorities, who were rivaling the Montenegrin ones, according to the Montenegrin allegations, were even encouraging flight into the Serbian territory.<sup>48</sup>

Excesses, pillage and extortion occurred also in the Montenegrin-controlled territory, although the Montenegrin authorities tried to prevent it. Especially prone to plunder were the Montenegrins from the bordering areas who had suffered several times at the hands of their Muslim neighbors. The same held true for part of the liberated local Christian inhabitants. In the Sandžak, it was usually the Turkish state warehouses that were targeted, but also estates of the wealthy or escaped Muslims.<sup>49</sup> On their part, Serbian authorities complained about the general plundering of the Montenegrins in Đakovica (which they controlled jointly with the Montenegrin forces) and its surroundings.<sup>50</sup> It seems pillaging became widespread nevertheless, which was in keeping with the tradition of highlander warfare. The Albanian Malissors, the allies of the Montenegrins, did their best to get their share of the booty.<sup>51</sup>

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43 Babić, *Politika*, pp. 170, 173-184.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 185.

45 All Balkan allies made use of this measure, but to different degrees. (McCarthy, p. 152.)

46 Babić, *Politika*, pp. 185-186, 193, 208-209, 215, 233-238, 241-242; Baerlein, pp. 71, 75; Rakočević, pp. 156-157; Durham, *The Struggle*, pp. 268-269, 275; *Idem*, *Twenty Years*, p. 248. In early March 1913 King Nicholas prohibited forceful conversions, but it seems this order was issued for tactical reasons only, because the conversions went on, albeit with indirect coercive measures. (Babić, *Politika*, p. 208.)

47 Babić, *Politika*, p. 209.

48 *Ibid.*, pp. 96, 239.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 34. On December 3, 1912, King Nicholas ordered ending the pillaging in the Sandžak. (DSP, V/3, p. 483.) The volunteers of the Vasojević clan from the Berane brigade even made a sortie into the Serbian part of the Sandžak plundering, murdering and raping the local Muslims. (Avdija Avdić, *Sporovi između srpske i crnogorske vlasti u Sandžaku posle zaposedanja 1912. gosine*, *Novopazarski zbornik*, 10, 1986, p. 178.) The claim of the British consul in Valona that the Montenegrins burned all Muslim villages is certainly exaggerated. (McCarthy, p. 156.)

50 DSP, V/3, pp. 308, 372. This was not just Serbian malice towards the allies and rivals. (Cf. Durham, *The Struggle*, p. 236.)

51 Durham, *The Struggle*, pp. 198, 204, 218, 225, 302-304.

There were war crimes too. Edit Durham describes in detail mutilation of Muslim corpses, and sometimes even living POWs, by Montenegrin soldiers, but it seems this was not such a mass phenomenon as she would have it.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, she wrote a great deal about Montenegrin war crimes – burning of villages, murders and torture of POWs,<sup>53</sup> but it is a question how often such things actually happened. The causes were probably similar to those in case of the Serbian clashes with the Albanian population. Nevertheless, just like in the case of Serbia, one cannot speak about the deliberate state policy leveled against the survival of the Muslim population. Montenegro was also using carrot and stick policy and the main champion of the carrot side, was King Nicholas who distributed medals, titles, money and weapons to deserving Albanian chieftains, individual and group amnesties, and, even as the Montenegrins advanced, proclaimed equality and safety of citizens, forbade crimes, sent commissions to places from where complaints issued, advised the authorities to be lenient with the people who had offered resistance etc. Furthermore, he dispensed grain to the poor.<sup>54</sup> In other words, Montenegro pursued a policy that wanted to fortify the Montenegrin power in the occupied territories, and if possible, to “adjust” the new subjects of different nationality and different religion to their new state. With that aim, the authorities started pursuing also an educational policy which strove to close down Islamic religious schools (mektebs) and to open state primary schools in Serbian. These met, for religious reasons, with a weak response even on the part of the Slavic Muslims for whom there was no language barrier.<sup>55</sup> Another measure aimed at “nationalizing” the newly acquired areas, especially those alongside the border, was colonization. However, due to the lack of disposable land, unsolved property questions, international obligations, shortness of time until the outbreak of the First World War and other reasons, it did not come into play much.<sup>56</sup>

Setting-up of power in the Serbian territory met with obstacles that differed somewhat from those in the Montenegrin one. Whereas the Montenegrin Government could draw on ties with certain Albanian chiefs, common mentality, history etc, the Serbian authorities appeared as representatives of (compared to Montenegro) more developed European state with more complex social and political make-up. Furthermore, the territories annexed by Serbia were economically somewhat better developed, but also ethnically more mixed: apart from the Albanian and Slavic Muslims, they were inhabited by the majority Macedonian Slavic population, and a considerable number of Turks, and some Aromuns, Greeks, Jews etc. The new territories had not only direction of economic development different from that of the pre-war Serbia, but their heterogeneous population cherished diverging national and religious sympathies. A particular problem was the fact that the Bulgarian propaganda had taken deep roots with considerable parts of the Slavic Orthodox population, so that even it, although partly not nationally conscious, could not be the corner-stone of the Serbian power. Such ethnic, social and economic make-up required a capable and honest clerical, police and military apparatus which would help integrate faster the new regions

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52 Ibid., pp. 191, 237.

53 Ibid, pp. 197-198, 218, 248, 288-289, 302, 314.

54 Babić, *Politika*, pp. 223-224.

55 Ibid., pp. 226-233.

56 Ibid., pp. 253-255, 264-276.



into the Serbian state. Unfortunately, Serbia had no such apparatus. First of all, the conflict between the civilian and military authorities was latent,<sup>57</sup> and then, the latter, combined with gendarmerie, did not measure up in terms of morality and capability.<sup>58</sup> Together with corrupt and partly semi-literate officials who went South only grudgingly, the problem was also lack of gendarmes who would enforce law and order in these parts where the situation was still precarious in every way.<sup>59</sup>

In order to alleviate this lack, but also in order to win over the local Turks and Albanians by show of trust, they were enlisted in the volunteer battalions which were supposed to keep order, instead of the Chetniks who had compromised themselves by all sorts of violence during the disarmament campaign. However, the turn-out was not satisfactory.<sup>60</sup> This was not the only measure aimed at winning Muslim confidence. The Government advised the lower officials to treat the Turks and Albanians well, especially beys through whom they hoped to influence the Muslim masses. For that reason, the authorities were to take side of the beys in their disputes with their serfs who had usurped their land or pillaged their property.<sup>61</sup> In this respect the Serbian Government followed the course of relying on the upper classes, and as we shall see, this policy would be continued after the First World War.

Another measure that was meant to establish the confidence of the Muslims in the authorities was the return of the refugees. This, however, was not only a confidence-building measure, but also a matter of security concern, so that it was not only executed voluntarily, but also coercively.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, in order to bring up the young "in the Serbian spirit", the Serbian authorities opened Serbian schools which were attended, among others, by Albanian and Turkish children. In order to learn the Serbian language, preparatory classes were opened for them – just like in the Montenegrin territory. Since resistance to attendance was strong, mullahs were promised religious instruction in the mother-tongue of the pupils, so as to make them talk the children into going to school.<sup>63</sup> As for minority schools, the authorities tolerated grudgingly only Romanian schools for Aromuns (which were few anyway), a few Greek ones,<sup>64</sup> as well as several Turkish private schools.<sup>65</sup>

Despite the will of the authorities to rely on the beys, their economic strength and numbers were dwindling due to the mass emigration already

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57 Janković, pp. 286, 290. In the beginning, the preponderance of the military, which accused civil servants of corruption, was undisputed. (Глигор Тодоровски, Македонија по Балканските војни. Општествено-економски и просветни прилики во Вардарска Македонија (1912-1915), Скопје 1981, pp. 59-65.)

58 Janković, p. 289; Todorovski, pp. 30, 83-85; Петар Стојанов, Македонија во времето на балканските и првата светска војна (1912-1918) (msc. of the Ph.D. thesis), Скопје 1965, pp. 77-82.

59 Todorovski, p. 82.

60 Ibid., pp. 52-56.

61 Dogo, Kosovo, p. 117; Todorovski, pp. 37, 76; Stojanov, p. 134.

62 An ultimatum was given to the Albanian and Turkish families whose members were still hiding in forests in spring 1913: they were to influence their relatives to return home or the refugees would be persecuted as outlaws and their families expelled. (Todorovski, p. 79.)

63 Ibid., pp. 353, 365-375.

64 Ibid., pp. 296-298, 349, 356-363.

65 Ibid., p. 369; Boeckh, pp. 352-256.

mentioned. This made possible for a number of estates, often of spurious ownership, to be sold for a song. This enabled Serbian ministers, officials, politicians, professors, etc. to buy huge tracts of land that could have been distributed among the local poor.<sup>66</sup>

In the meantime, while the allied armies were still in the areas which would later officially become parts of its state territory, the Albanian state was founded.<sup>67</sup> Its existence would be of great importance for behavior of the Albanian minority in Serbia and Montenegro, and later in Yugoslavia. Although weak and small, economically and culturally backward, and torn by internal feuds from the very beginning, it served the Albanians in Yugoslavia as the hub of national aspirations. Furthermore, it served the interested powers (at first Austria-Hungary, and then Italy) to exercise pressure on Serbia, and later, on Yugoslavia. It served as the first stop for the Albanian nationalists fleeing Yugoslavia, on their way further West. Finally, until mid-1920s it served as a safe haven for the armed bands of outlaws from Kosovo, Western Macedonia or Albania itself which sallied into the Serbian/Yugoslav territory ravaging it and acting as one of the main factors which made more difficult the consolidation of the situation in the Southern parts of the country.

Outlaw (*kaçak*) bands had a long tradition from the Turkish times. They were gangs of robbers, joined by groups of political malcontents, deserters and other outlaws after the First Balkan War. On establishing their power, the Serbian authorities did not manage to root out these gangs which continued to roam Metohija and Western Macedonia as late as Spring of 1913.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, a large number of armed Albanians escaped from the Serbian-controlled territory into Albania.<sup>69</sup> During the Second Balkan War several attacks on Serbian outposts occurred, and, during May 1913, several minor incursions into the Serbian territory too.<sup>70</sup> Attacks on Serbian troops became more frequent in order to force them to evacuate the territory that the London conference of the ambassadors allotted to Albania. For its part, the Serbian government excused the delay in withdrawing its troops because of these attacks.<sup>71</sup>

A large and long-prepared attack, which was meant to be an incursion from Albania combined with the uprising of the Ethnic-Albanians in the Serbian territory, occurred in September of 1913. It is estimated that 6000 – 7,000 people from Albania and a still unidentified number from Serbian territory participated in it. The attackers managed to conquer (with massive support of the locals) Debar, Ohrid, Struga, Ljuma and (for short while) Đakovica, and to besiege Prizren. In several places they were joined by Albanian and Turkish peasants. On the other hand, an Albanian detachment fought on the Serbian side, suffering heavy losses. An

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66 Prime-Minister Pašić himself bought some 3000 ha near Priština. (Dogo, Kosovo, p. 119.)

67 Živko Avramovski, The Creation of the Independent Albanian State, in: Kosovo. Past and Present, pp. 68-71; Pollo, Puto (eds.), p. 174.

68 Mikić, The Albanians, p. 183; Stojanov, pp. 138-142.

69 Bataković and Borozan adduce 20.000 as their number, but it seems exaggerated if one keeps in mind the size of gangs in the Serbian territory. (Bataković, The Kosovo Chronicles, p. 173; Borozan, p. 61.)

70 Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, p. 289; Bataković, The Kosovo Chronicles, p. 173.

71 Mirko Gutić, Oružani sukobi na srpsko-albanskoj granici u jesen 1913. godine, Vojno-istorijski glasnik, XXXVI, 1, 1985, p. 231.

unexpectedly weak support of the uprising among the local population compelled the aggressors to resort to forcible recruitment. However, this measure also failed to secure success and the Serbian forces managed soon to drive them back, and even to cross into Albania again in early October. While repelling the enemy, villages in Serbian and Albanian territory were burnt by Serbian artillery and the retreating Albanians. The Serbian troops reached Elbasan, but due to the Austro-Hungarian threat, they had to withdraw.<sup>72</sup>

The next larger campaign, again combined with rebellion (this time around Orahovac) took place in late March 1914, and it was, just like the previous one, made possible by Austria-Hungary. Albanian leaders Bajram Cur and Isa Boletini wanted to use the attack in order to get the attention of the members of the International Control Committee, before whom, the population would express their wish to have all the territories up to the railway-line Uroševac-Mitrovica annexed to Albania.<sup>73</sup>

With the preparations for the First World War under way, Austria-Hungary was scheming among the Albanians to set them against Serbia in order to divide the Serbian forces for a war on two fronts.<sup>74</sup> Continuous minor sorties were taking place ever since the beginning of the war, but the first larger one happened only in February 1915. It was led by arch-irredentist Hasan Prishtina who made an incursion with 200 men and incited several villages near the border to revolt. This attack was again crushed by the Serbian troops, 20,000 of whom invaded Albania once more, occupying strategic points and strengthening the position of the Serbian protégé Esad-pasha Toptani.<sup>75</sup> The correlation between the situation in Albania, behavior of the Albanian minority and, consequently, the state security was proven once again. Paradoxically enough, in order to keep under control its own territory inhabited predominantly by the Albanians, the Serbian Government had to occupy part of the Albanian territory inhabited by the very same people every now and then.<sup>76</sup>

What was the behavior of the Albanian and Turkish masses toward the Serbian authorities and vice versa during the First World war? According to some reports, the government pressure increased.<sup>77</sup> The peace treaty with Turkey stipulated the Muslims were not to be recruited into the Serbian army throughout the

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72 Gutić, pp. 232-262; Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 257-258; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 174; Borožan, pp. 61-62; Kosovo i Metohija u srpskoj istoriji, pp. 289-290; Mikić, *The Albanians*, p. 191; Janković, p. 294; Stojanov, p. 149-154. According to Stojanov, Bulgarian bandits also took part in the attack, and the reaction of the authorities was very bloody. About the complaints of the Muslims at the crimes of the Chetniks and authorities on that occasion, see: Boeckh, pp. 165-169. (It seems this author accepts too uncritically the testimonies of not completely unbiased Austro-Hungarian sources.) It is interesting to note that Pašić pardoned the participants in the rebellion, except for the ringleaders, at the plea of the Turkish Minister of the Interior Talal-bey. (AJ, 74, 38/56.)

73 Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 175.

74 Andrej Mitrović, *Albanci u politici Austro-Ugarske prema Srbiji 1914-1918*, in: *Srbi i Albanci u XX veku*, p. 85. Even before the First Balkan War Austria-Hungary counted on the Albanians and Bulgarians to keep Serbia in check should the Ottoman Empire be destroyed. (Ćorović, p. 378.)

75 Borožan, p. 69; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 178; Mitrović, *Albanci*, p. 87.

76 Serbian wish to get access to the sea certainly played a part when occupying parts of Albanian territory.

77 Imami, p. 217.

first three years after the treaty had been signed. However, under pressure of war-time necessity the Serbian authorities started inducting them.<sup>78</sup> As before, they offered partial resistance,<sup>79</sup> but later some of the enlisted Albanians fought bravely,<sup>80</sup> whereas other reports said the Muslims were surrendering themselves en masse to the Austro-Hungarian troops.<sup>81</sup> Keeping in mind the previous different patterns of behavior of the Albanian and Turkish population, it is likely that such different behavior continued: some were responding to the call of civic duty, and some not.

In the autumn and winter of 1915/16 on occasion of the Serbian retreat through Kosovo and Albania straggling Serbian soldiers and civilians were constantly ambushed, and the local Serbs were sometimes also attacked.<sup>82</sup> It was only in the territory controlled by the Serbian ally, Esad-Pasha Toptani, that the Albanians helped the emaciated Serbs.

As for the Albanians of Kosovo, they, headed by the irredentist leaders who had returned from emigration, put themselves at the disposal of the occupying authorities, committing crimes against the Serbs in the process.<sup>83</sup> In order to win the Albanians over, the Austro-Hungarian authorities opened Albanian schools, but because of the Albanian recalcitrance, the relations were far from ideal.<sup>84</sup> Still, with the help of Hasan Prishtina, the occupying authorities managed to muster 10,000 volunteers for fighting at the Eastern Front and against the Serbian insurgents, for auxiliary gendarmerie and other duties.<sup>85</sup> The relations with the Bulgarian occupants were even less ideal, although Bulgarian authorities appointed Albanians and Turks as village elders, and although the members of these two minorities took part in fights against Serbian insurgents and committed crimes in the process.<sup>86</sup>

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78 Serbian authorities tried enlisting the Muslims already in August 1913, but they were escaping. For this reason, in February 1914 it was decided not to recruit them for the line troops during the next three years, which was eventually inserted in the peace treaty with Turkey in March 1914. (Boeckh, p. 158.) Although some forcible recruitment took place in April 1914 (Ibid, p. 159), the stipulation of the treaty was observed for some time, because the authorities did not trust the Muslim recruits - and with right too. (Ibid, p. 92)

79 Imami, p. 217. Of allegedly 80.000 men called up in Macedonia, 27.789 did not show up (out of that 6.302 Turks and Albanians). (Иван Катарџијев (ed.), Историја на македонскиот народ, IV, Скопје 2000, p. 88.) According to Malcolm, cca. 50.000 Albanians were recruited. (Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 258.) Vladan Jovanović adduces quite different data. According to him, until mid-1915, 58.798 men were called up in the South (84% Christians, 15% Muslims and 0.5% Jews); further 9.464 (42% of them Muslims) were inducted into the units of the commissariat, which means the number of the recruited Muslims was 8.819+3.990. (Vladan Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država i južna Srbija 1918-1929*. Makedonija, Sandžak, Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini SHS, Beograd 2002, pp. 31.)

80 Imami, p. 217.

81 Stojanov, p. 195.

82 Mitrović, Albanci, p. 88; Bogumil Hrabak, *Povlačenje srpske vojske i vlade preko Kosova i Metohije 1915-1916*. prema zapisnicima srpske vlade, Vranjski glasnik, VIII, 1972, p. 354; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 179.

83 These crimes became so widespread, that the Habsburg authorities had to arrest some culprits and send them to concentration-camps. (Mitrović, Albanci, pp. 92-93.)

84 Ibid., pp. 92-99.

85 Ibid., pp. 100-103; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 181; Borožan, p. 70.

86 Mitrović, Albanci, pp. 102-103; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 181.

Due to the breaching of the Front of Salonica and the retreat of the occupying forces, the Albanians and Turks found themselves again confronted with the prospect of having to submit themselves to Serbian rule, i.e. the Serbian army found itself again obliged to liberate the same territories which it had already liberated in 1912 and possibly to meet with the same difficulties. Both parties acted along the lines of conduct set in 1912/13, with the repeating problems and phenomena. Again sporadic resistance occurred and the Serbian/Yugoslav authorities tried to break it with the policy of stick and carrot. For strategic reasons the Serbian troops occupied parts of Albania's territory again, and the new state tried to annex Scutari and Northern Albania, disregarding the fact that in that way they would increase the number of recalcitrant alien population within the state borders. The only really new moment was that Italy took the place of Austria-Hungary, securing a military foothold in the country.

Like in 1912 the Serbian army was ordered to treat the Albanian population well – if it offered no resistance.<sup>87</sup> At first, Serbian progress was peaceful. The first resistance, combined with plundering, was met around Debar and Tetovo in mid-October 1918.<sup>88</sup> The situation around Debar deteriorated again in late October, although the district chief from Ohrid claimed the majority of the Albanians there were in favor of Serbian rule. The situation was made worse by the soldiers of Esad-Pasha, who were spreading propaganda against the Serbian power which Serbian troops were trying to set up in the neighboring districts in the Albanian territory.<sup>89</sup> Although the local population was pacified there during November and December, from late November incursions of bandits from Ljuma into the Debar, Galica, Gostivar and Tetovo districts started, so that the army had to intervene.<sup>90</sup> From mid-December Italian propaganda, instigating Albanian resistance, started to make itself felt.<sup>91</sup>

In Kosovo, the more active resistance started in mid-October by individual murders of soldiers, whereas the movement against establishing Serbian communal authorities and against disarmament began on October 25.<sup>92</sup> In the Drenica and on the left bank of the Sitnica the communal administrations installed by Serbian troops were deposed in early November, and Serbian villages were endangered.<sup>93</sup> Under such conditions, the authorities resorted to hostage-taking and the use of artillery in order to disarm the rebellious villages and reinstall communal administrations to their liking. Seven villages were destroyed in the process, whereas in several others the results of disarmament were only temporary, so that

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87 Bogumil Hrabak, *Reokupacija oblasti srpske i crnogorske države s albanskom većinom stanovništva u jesen 1918. godine i držanje Albanaca prema uspostavljenoj vlasti, Gjurmime albanogjike*, 1, 1969, p. 261.

88 Bogumil Hrabak, *Stanje u Vardarskoj Makedoniji u jesen i zimu 1918*, *Istorijski glasnik*, 4, 1966, pp. 17-19; Idem, *Reokupacija*, p. 265; Dimić, *Borozan*, I, p. 26.

89 Hrabak, *Stanje*, p. 20; Idem, *Reokupacija*, pp. 268-269.

90 Hrabak, *Stanje*, p. 22; Dimić, *Borozan*, I, pp. 27-28.

91 Hrabak, *Stanje*, p. 23.

92 Hrabak, *Reokupacija*, p. 267. At the same time, since October 17, a new wave of incursions from Albania began, being an echo of the uprising against the Habsburg rule in Northern Albania. (*Ibid.*, p. 270.)

93 Dimić, *Borozan*, I, p. 33; Hrabak, *Reokupacija*, p. 272.

the action had to be repeated several days later.<sup>94</sup> Some of the villages thus disarmed fell prey to Montenegrin marauders from Peć and its vicinity, and the most lasting result of the action was the appearance of gangs, especially East of Peć.<sup>95</sup> According to the military estimates, only some 10% of the weapons could be collected, and the effectiveness of the action was impaired by too little success by the army, incapable and unreliable civilian authorities (including communal ones), lack of discipline among the gendarmes who were abusing their authority etc.<sup>96</sup> The feeling that the Serbian power was only temporary, followed from the presence of French troops and strengthened by the propaganda from Albania (where in Scutari the irredentist Kosovo-Committee was founded on November 7) contributed to the poor success of the disarmament campaign.<sup>97</sup> The situation in Metohija was even more precarious and the Roman-Catholics increasingly agitated for unification with Albania.<sup>98</sup> For these reasons, the disarmament campaign was continued throughout December, as did the attacks by the Albanian bands on postal and other wagons.<sup>99</sup>

Even the local administrations chosen from among the locals and installed by the Serbian authorities did not enjoy the latter's confidence, as the people were dissatisfied with the policies that brought only taxes, corvée, requisitions and prohibition of woodcutting in state forests.<sup>100</sup> Although the Interior Ministry, advised by Prime-Minister Protić, issued "The Instruction for Official Work and Behavior of Officials in Southern Serbia" which stipulated that the local population was to be treated well so as not to stir dissatisfaction:<sup>101</sup> it did not yield the desired results.

Despite good intentions, the situation did not improve. On November 22 Malissors' incursion attempt through Junik was repelled, but resistance continued through the activities of bands of outlaws.<sup>102</sup> This traditional Albanian way of resisting authorities lived on, and often it was not possible to say where common robbery (very widespread, and not only among the Albanians) ended and where national and political struggle began – to be sure, except in the case of the well-known nationalist leaders. Pillage and robbery increased by the end of 1918, and the perpetrators were not always the Albanians.<sup>103</sup> Furthermore, in Plav and Gusinje, traditional strongholds of Albanian recalcitrance, a new hub of resistance developed. In Plav, maybe under the influence of the Italian propaganda, the gathered Albanians proclaimed unification with Albania on December 18.<sup>104</sup> In the first half of December a group of malcontents was preparing an uprising in Metohija.<sup>105</sup> There were several attacks on military columns, and in February 1919, some 3000 bandits made an inroad via

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94 Hrabak, Reokupacija, pp. 272-277; Idem, Džemijet – organizacija muslimana Makedonije, Kosova, Metohije i Sandžaka 1919-1928, Beograd 2003, pp. 19-20.

95 Hrabak, Reokupacija, p. 278.

96 Dimić, Borožan, I, p. 35.

97 Ibid.

98 Hrabak, Reokupacija, p. 279.

99 Ibid, p. 281.

100 Hrabak, Stanje, p. 28.

101 Ibid., pp. 30-31.

102 Dimić, Borožan, I, p. 37.

103 Hrabak, stanje, p. 32; Idem, Džemijet, p. 25.

104 Hrabak, Reokupacija, p. 284.

105 Ibid, p. 288.

Dečani and some 600 via Rugovo in the direction of Rožaj: another rebellion flared up in Plav and Gusinje, which spread toward Peć, Dečani, and Rožaj.<sup>106</sup> The authorities managed to quench this rebellion comparatively easily, but another rebel center – the Drenica and Metohija – continued to smolder throughout 1919.

During that and subsequent years, the authorities tried to establish order and bring the Albanians under control by disarmament, military pacification, occupation of parts of Northern Albanian territory (in June 1919), deportation of bandit families to concentration camps,<sup>107</sup> confiscation of property, and also by installing local administrations, punishments, bribe, creation of spy network etc.<sup>108</sup> The results were meager for a number of reasons. First, in the course of only six years, people had seen authorities and borders change three times, which awoke suspicion that the reestablished Serbian power would be of long duration, and hopes of unification with Albania. These hopes were encouraged by the presence of the French troops and by Italian propaganda. The only ones to show loyalty were the Turks in Macedonia, who, lost all hope that the Ottoman power would be restored. Those who did not emigrate, reconciled themselves to the Serbian authorities who were willing to rely on them from summer 1913 because of the Albanian rebellions.<sup>109</sup> As for the Aromuns, they were, in the opinion of the authorities, prone to side with the party that offered them most.<sup>110</sup> The Macedonian Slavic population was unreliable,<sup>111</sup> and the same held true of the Montenegrin separatists, which strengthened Albanian resistance through occasional cooperation of the malcontent groups. Furthermore, the Albanians had a long tradition of armed resistance to the authorities. For them every state was alien.<sup>112</sup> This was particularly true of a Slavic and predominantly Christian

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106 Ibid, p. 291; Dimić, Borožan, I, 38; Dimo Vujović, *Oslobođenje Skadra 1918. godine i stanje na crnogorsko-albanskoj granici*, Istorijski zapisi, XIII, knj. XVIII, 1, 1960, pp. 111-113.

107 Hrabak, *Reokupacija*, pp. 272, 275; Vuk Vinaver, *Italijanska akcija protiv Jugoslavije na albansko-jugoslovenskoj granici 1918-1920. godine*, Istorijski zapisi, XIX, knj. XXIII, sv. 3, 1966, p. 481; Malcolm, *Kosovo*, p. 275. This was completely in the tradition of the Ottoman gang-fighting: in November 1909 a law was passed which enabled deportation of whole bandit families. (Cf. Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, Princeton, New Jersey 1967, p. 395.) Something similar was foreseen by the ordinance of the Serbian government about public security in the newly liberated territories of October 4, 1913, which had been provoked by the Albanian incursion in September 1913. (Janković, *L'annexion*, pp. 293-294.) However, taking bandit families as hostages was not a measure applied only to the Albanian bandits: families of the outlaws were deported also in Montenegro, the Sandžak and Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Mile Bjelajac, *Vojska Kraljevine SHS 1918-1921*, Beograd 1988, p. 232; Novica Rakočević, *Buna u Crnoj Gori u prvoj polovini 1919. godine*, in: *Srbija na kraju Prvog svetskog rata*, Beograd 1990, p. 169.) The Regime of Ahmed Zog in Albania used the same methods in fighting outlaws. (AJ, 38, 20/61.)

108 Dimić, Borožan, I, p. 45.

109 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 85.

110 Hrabak, *Stanje*, p. 48.

111 Ibid., p. 47; Dimić, Borožan, I, p. 296.

112 Roux, p. 244. According to that author, the Albanians became state-conscious only after 1945. (Ibid, p. 245.) To be sure, the state was also responsible for that. Faik Konica deemed in 1907 that the Albanians had been immature for (Albanian) state and that they needed twenty years to civilize. (Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, p. 181.)

state,<sup>113</sup> which was bringing disarmament, taxation, corvée and an end to privileges they had enjoyed even under the Austro-Hungarian rule. On the other hand, the state, still weak and in the making, with insufficient army, uneducated and corrupt officialdom, undisciplined and violent gendarmes,<sup>114</sup> wicked politicians, underdeveloped economy, social differences, nationalist ideology and other shortcomings, was hardly the kind of state that would delight most of its citizens – as proved by resistance in many parts of the country, even among the Slavic (“state-building”) population.

The main manifestation of the Albanian resistance were the Kaçaks – with a tradition going back to the Ottoman times. Albanian historians see in them above all freedom-fighters and even champions of national unification.<sup>115</sup> Bogumil Hrabak deems the Kaçaks in Western Macedonia to be common robbers and cattle-rustlers, whereas those in Kosovo were also robbers-cum-guerrillas, i.e. ideological fighters.<sup>116</sup> However, even with the latter, it is doubtful whether national ideology was the motive,<sup>117</sup> or whether other factors spurred them to join bands of outlaws, such as: the struggle for traditional liberties,<sup>118</sup> the desire to avoid military service or prison sentence for some crime, blood feud, wish for plunder, refusal to disarm etc.<sup>119</sup> However, the fact remains that the Albanian population gave much support to the Kaçaks – they were recruited from among that very same population, and they were giving an expression to its dissatisfaction.<sup>120</sup>

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113 Writing about the Albanian uprisings against the Ottoman reforms in early 20th century, Skendi adduced the Kosovo Albanians did not want to allow that the subjugated Serbs become eligible for state offices too. (Skendi, *The Albanian National awakening*, p. 295.) For their part, some Yugoslav officials claimed in 1918 that Albanian national consciousness had been at a low level of development. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, 28.)

114 In order to pacify the situation, the government started replacing Chetnik-gendarmes with regular ones in the first half of 1919. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 37.)

115 H. Hoxha believes the Kaçak movement had primarily national-liberation features until 1927, and predominantly marauding character since then. (Hoxha, p. 250.) However, if one takes into account their make-up (according to the reasons for joining bands), the structure of their (mis)deeds (attacks on the authorities and property), as well as the structure of their victims (civilians/officials), it seems his conclusion cannot be accepted as valid. (Cf. V. Jovanović, p. 188; Ljubodrag Dimić, Đorđe Borožan, *Političke i bezbedonosne prilike na Kosovu i Metohiji u prvoj polovini 1920. godine*, *Istorija* 20. veka, 1-2, 1999, p. 102; Ljubodrag Dimić, Đorđe Borožan, *Izveštaji Ministarstva unutrašnjih dela o zločinu i terorizmu na Kosovu i Metohiji i Zapadnoj Makedoniji u prvim mesecima 1920. godine*, *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju*, V, 1-3, 1998, pp. 114-118.)

116 Bogumil Hrabak, *Kačaci u bivšem Novopazarskom sandžaku (Staroj Raškoj) 1918-1928. godine*, *Seoski dani Sretena Vukosavljevića*, XVI, 1995, p. 237. Dimić and Borožan claim that among the bandits of Donji Debar some sort of political undertone started to make itself felt only in the second half of April 1920. (Dimić, Borožan, *Političke*, p. 98.)

117 Skendi writes there were very few real nationalists in Kosovo and Western Macedonia at the time of the Young-Turk revolution. (Skendi *The Albanian National Awakening*, p. 391.)

118 Throughout the last years of the Ottoman rule, this was the chief motive of Albanian rebellions in the territories that would fall to Serbia and Yugoslavia (Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, pp. 391-392.)

119 Dimić, Borožan, *Političke*, p. 95.

120 This, however, needs to be qualified: the Albanians were suffering at the hands of the marauding gangs in proportion to their share in the total population, and Albanian peasants took part in possess on several occasions. (Hrabak, *Stanje*, p. 19.) It would be a gross



The bandit problem remained important throughout the first half of 1920s, and outlaws as such never disappeared altogether. However, since 1925, because of the show-down of Zog's regime with them in Albania, which had served them as a safe haven,<sup>121</sup> they stopped being the first-class problem for the Yugoslav authorities in the South.<sup>122</sup> The appearance of the Albanian bandits (and they were not the only ones!),<sup>123</sup> was engendered, except for reasons enumerated above, by the state of general anarchy which prevailed in the southern parts of the country in the first years after the First World War.<sup>124</sup> Anarchy was spurring, even compelling people to fend for themselves – in a number of ways. Among the factors that contributed to anarchy was the behavior of the local and colonized Serbian and Montenegrin populations. The latter was especially in disrepute for its inclination to plundering and violence on ethnic and religious grounds.<sup>125</sup>

The issue that stirs spirits and national passions to this day is the number of victims in the clashes between the government forces and the Kaçaks. It is disputed no less than the number of Muslim emigrants. The Albanian delegate to the Paris Peace Conference stated to the French and the League of Nations that the Yugoslav forces had burned down completely or partially 140 villages, 6,428 houses, 101 shops, 113 mills, 50 religious schools, 18 mosques etc, and killed 738 Albanians during August and September 1920. Fan Noli, the then Albanian representative in the League of Nations, claimed in September 1921 that the Yugoslav authorities had burned down 140 villages and killed 100,000 Albanians.<sup>126</sup> According to the Kosovo Committee, only in January and February of 1919, 13,107 Albanians were killed, and 5,968 houses burned.<sup>127</sup> According to other statistics adduced by Malcolm for January and February of 1919, 6,040 Albanians were killed and 3,873 houses burned. In their petition to the League of Nations, three refugee priests quote the publication *Les droits de l'Albanie a ses frontieres naturelles: Appel aux nations du monde civilisé, Valone 1921* which claims the Yugoslav forces killed 12,371 Albanians, arrested 22,110, destroyed 6,025 houses and plundered 10,525 families.<sup>128</sup> Some of these figures are impossible to compare

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overstatement to say that the Kaçaks “enjoyed support of the whole Albanian people” (Hoxha, p. 250). Both the people and the bandits were much too heterogeneous for such a statement to be valid, although they were aided by the majority – out of sympathy or fear.

121 Živko Avramovski, *Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi 1918-1939*, Ideje, 5-6, 1987, pp. 72-73.

122 Cf. Hoxha, o.c; Hrabak, Kačaci; Dimić, Borozan, *Jugoslovenska država*, I-II, passim; Bjelajac, pp. 197-207, 227-232; Borozan, pp. 75-103; Malcolm, 273-279.

123 Hrabak, Kačaci; Bjelajac, p. 232.

124 About the situation in Montenegro which was torn by the separatist-unionist fights resembling a civil war, see: Ivo Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji. Porijeklo, povijest, politika*, Zagreb [1988], pp. 269-272.

125 Some disarmed villages were plundered by the Montenegrin civilians, giving thus the Albanians the reason and/or pretext not to disarm. (Hrabak, *Reokupacija*, p. 277; Idem, *Džemijet*, pp. 20, 25, 33, 37, 41; Dimić, Borozan, *Jugoslovenska država*, I, 162, 166, 169, 179, 217, 222, 228, 229, 232, 253, 260, 271, 272; Idem, *Političke*, p. 99.)

126 Bjelajac, pp. 204-205.

127 Bajrami, p. 156.

128 AJ, 305, 8/18. The same numbers feature in a letter by the Kosovo Committee to the newspaper *Daiti*, as the numbers for the span between October 15, 1918 and June 1, 1924. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, 225.) Does this imply that from 1921 until mid-1924 no Albanians were killed? Or is this a proof how uncertain the statistics are - if they are not invented altogether.

because they speak about different periods. However, the data for January and February 1919 can be compared, with the result that the numbers of the murdered people and the burned houses are two times higher in the statistics first adduced. This is enough to awaken suspicion as to the correctness of these data. But what is astonishing about these numbers is the Japanese-like precision with which illiterate Albanian peasants under almost wartime conditions managed to collect the statistical data and convey them to the diplomatic service of their mother country. All this indicates that these numbers, just like many others mentioned in this context, are arbitrary. The Serbian documents, even if we make allowance that many do not survive, mention only a few burned villages.<sup>129</sup> Even in the worst of cases, their total number must have been way below the numbers adduced in the Albanian propaganda documents. Just how arbitrary the numbers of Albanian victims are is proven by the fact that the Yugoslav authorities, never even tried to give a survey of the total number of the Serbs killed and houses burned that would be at least nearly so exact as the alleged Albanian reports on Albanian losses,<sup>130</sup> this even having some kind of control over the Albanian-inhabited areas and in spite of numerous reports about the Serbian victims of the Albanian gangs.

Just as ridiculous as the numbers of victims, are the claims of some Albanian authors that the Yugoslav authorities started persecuting the whole Albanian people.<sup>131</sup> Attempts at winning over the population,<sup>132</sup> making pacts with the upper strata,<sup>133</sup> occasional participation of Albanian peasants in fights against the bandits,<sup>134</sup> the existence of Albanian units with the same task,<sup>135</sup> participation of the Albanians in the local administration,<sup>136</sup> etc. plainly rebut such claims. It is certain the Serbian Leaders were not delighted by Albanian presence in the state territory, but they were nevertheless, willing to augment it by annexing parts of Northern Albania, even at the price of increasing the number of the Albanian population.<sup>137</sup>

129 Dimić, Borožan, *Jugoslovenska država*, I, *passim*.

130 *Ibid.*, pp. 155, 166, 276, 313, 315, 317, 327-328, 343, 353, 665. Over and above, the Yugoslav forces were repeatedly instructed not to shed more blood than necessary and not to destroy villages except in case of utmost need. (Dimić, Borožan, *Političke*, pp. 90, 98.)

131 So for instance Bajrami (*Orijentacija*, p. 157). He strives to prove his statement by the fact the authorities had set up concentration camps in Niš and Leskovac for the families of the outlaws, who numbered, according to him, 640 in the first, and 241 in the latter camp. (*Ibid.*) However, deportation was not reserved for Albanian outlaws' families alone: relatives of other bandits were also deported. (Cf. Hrabak, *Kačaci*, p. 227; *Rakočević*, p. 169; *Bjelajac*, p. 232.)

132 Dimić, Borožan, *Jugoslovenska država*, I, pp. 263-264, 484.

133 Hrabak, *Stanje*, p. 50; *Vinaver*, *Italijanska akcija*, p. 493; Dimić, Borožan, *Jugoslovenska država*, I, pp. 264, 268, 355, 537.

134 Dimić, Borožan, *Jugoslovenska država*, I, pp. 196, 199.

135 *Bjelajac*, p. 207; *Vujović*, p. 117; Dimić, Borožan, *Jugoslovenska država*, I, pp. 53, 264.

136 Dragoslav Janković, Bogdan Krizman (eds.), *Grada o stvaranju jugoslovenske države* (1.I – 20.XII 1918), Beograd 1964, p. 363; 136 Dimić, Borožan, *Jugoslovenska država*, I, pp. 44, 137, 141, 144, 170, 203. A case of a pardoned Kačak who even became the mayor of Radovište because he joined the ruling People's Radical Party was also recorded. (V. Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 187.)

137 This claim was contingent on possible Italian territorial gains in Albania. (*AJ*, F. 335, f. 28; Sreten Draškić, *Albansko pitanje na konferenciji mira u Parizu 1919. godine*, *Ideje*, 5-6, 1987, p. 26; *Imami*, p. 230.)

The process of integrating the national minorities of Kosovo and Western Macedonia (especially the Albanians and Turks) into the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, and then Yugoslavia, was a lengthy, intermittent, pretty arduous and even a bloody one. Whereas the Turks quickly reconciled themselves to the new situation, the Albanians continued to resist until the mid-twenties. Their recalcitrance made itself manifest mostly in the Kaçak gangs which combined plundering with resistance to the authorities and partly with ideology. Only when the bands were stamped out in Albania itself were the Yugoslav authorities capable of putting an end to them in the Yugoslav territory too. During the first half of 1920s, the Albanians had two-lane relations with the state: on the one hand, there were the Kaçaks who endangered public security and order in the state with weapons in hand, and on the other, there was the Albanian (and Turkish) elite which integrated into the political system of the country, using it to safeguard their own material interests. In this, the Albanians were unique among the national minorities in Yugoslavia. What the other "large" national minorities (the Germans and Magyars) had in terms of economic, social and cultural capital, the Albanians didn't: the latter offset this by the chronic threat presented by their bands of outlaws.

Let us next look at how the integration of the national minorities into the new state proceeded in its Northern regions. Unlike the Southern parts, where the international borders had already been drawn (albeit not always quite clearly) before the First World War, this was not the case to the North of the Sava and the Danube Rivers.<sup>138</sup> This fact created a completely new situation in which the Serbian government (as the main player on the international scene) had to overcome not only the military-technical obstacles, but diplomatic ones too.

In the Northern part of Yugoslavia, the situation was clearest in the Triune Kingdom of Croatia. Its territory (with the exception of Međumurje which lay outside its frontiers) had borders that had been recognized within the Kingdom of Hungary, and within which it simply seceded in 1918.<sup>139</sup> Not even the Hungarian Government could take exception with that. As for the minority population within Croatia, they were asked nothing – as were the vast majority of the Croat and Serb population. The members of national minorities were numerically weak compared to the Yugoslav inhabitants, and were almost everywhere scattered among them. As (often) recent newcomers, frequently without the domicile rights, in a country where only a tiny percentage of the population had the right to vote and in which "historical rights" were alpha and omega of the political life and political culture, they could in no way influence the making of the fateful political decisions.<sup>140</sup> As for the anarchy during the upheaval, it was only partly leveled against the members of the minorities<sup>141</sup> (mostly against the richer Germans), and much more against the Jews and large landed estates of owners of various nationalities who usually lived somewhere far away.<sup>142</sup>

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138 The rivers Sava and the Danube formed the Northern borders of the pre-war Serbia.

139 Horvat, *Politička povijest*, II, pp. 85-98.

140 This completely held true also for the small national minorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It seems the upheaval of 1918 passed peacefully for the minorities there. (Cf. Hoffmann, Zorn (eds.), p. 57.)

141 Minorities as defined in this work.

142 Hrabak, *Dezerterstvo*, pp. 222, 224, 226, 231-243.

Međumurje was an area inhabited by the Croats and Magyars, but outside of the historical Croatia. To acquire it, a Croatian military action was needed, but it was not supported by the Serbian High Command for foreign-policy reasons. Nevertheless, it was launched on December 24, 1918, after the Hungarian authorities had quashed in blood the unrest and pillage that had occurred in Autumn.<sup>143</sup> Despite the fact that the majority of the population was either Hungarian-friendly or at least not nationally conscious, the action was executed in only seven hours. The Hungarian officials stepped down with a protest, although the pro-Hungarian population continued to offer passive resistance for some time, hoping Hungarian power would be reestablished.<sup>144</sup>

The situation in the Slovenian lands was even more complicated. They had traditionally been divided into historical crownlands. At the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy the question of new borders was raised. The Germans insisted on the integrity of the ethnically mixed crownlands in which they were the majority (Carinthia, Styria). The Slovenes, for their part, wanted not only to comprise all the Slovenes within Yugoslavia (even in the territories where they were just a minority), but also to annex those territories which had been predominantly Slovene fifty to seventy years before, and had been Germanized in the meantime.<sup>145</sup> However, there was not enough force to fulfill these exaggerated demands, so that their military and diplomatic effort concentrated mainly on the bordering regions of Carinthia: Italy being too strong for Yugoslavia to achieve Slovenian and Croatian national aspirations against it. Prekomurje, as we shall presently see, was gained at the green table and not at the battlefield.

The main Slovenian foe was the Germans – particularly at the fringes of the Slovenian ethnic territory. Those of the Kočevje, who had their German National Council since 1906 for protection of their interests, at first, during the days of the upheaval, tried to proclaim themselves part of the Austrian Republic that was in the making. When this failed, they decided to proclaim an independent republic under American protection (since almost half of them lived in the USA) which was nipped

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143 Vinko Žganec, Međumurska revolucija u godini 1918, in: Petar Jelavić (ed.), *Hrvati u borbama za oslobođenje sjevernih krajeva Jugoslavije: Međumurja, Prekomurja, Koruške i Štajerske*, Zagreb 1940.

144 Dragutin V. Perko, *Oslobođenje Međimurja*, in: Jelavić (ed.).

145 AJ, F. 335, f. 84; Barker, p. 97; Bogo Grafenauer, *Narodnostno stanje in slovensko-nemška etnična meja na Štajerskem kot dejavnik osvoboditve severovzhodne Slovenije 1918/1919*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XXXIII, 3, 1979, p. 396; Hrabak, Krizman (eds.), *Zapisnici*, pp. 348-350; Arnold Suppan, *Ethnisches, ökonomisches oder strategisches Prinzip? Zu den jugoslawischen Grenzziehungsvorschlägen gegenüber Österreich im Herbst und im Winter 1918/1919*, in: Saint-Germain 1919. *Protokoll des Symposiums am 2. und 3. Mai 1979 in Wien*, Wien 1979, pp. 120, 144, 152-153. In their first, megalomaniac, claim, Slovenian nationalists demanded the whole of Carinthia – as an economic whole, and as compensation for “historical injustices”. Having realized that this was unrealistic, they trimmed their demands only to the territory inhabited by the Slovenes. (Martin Wutte, *Kärntens Freiheitskampf*, Klagenfurt 1922, p. 38; Lajos Kerekes, *Von St. Germain bis Genf. Österreich und seine Nachbarn 1918-1922*, Wien, Köln, Graz 1979, p. 131.) On the other hand, Austria, laid claim, at least until the delimitation, to some predominantly German settlements deep in the Slovenian ethnic territory. (Suppan, *Ethnisches*, p. 155.) It also demanded the whole of Styria in the beginning – for economic reasons. (Grafenauer, *Narodnostno stanje*, p. 385.)

in the bud by the Slovenes who arrested several ringleaders.<sup>146</sup> Thanks to a bluff, the Slovenes took command of the military in Celje, driving away the non-Slovene officers. The German city administration, being left with no effective power, then resigned.<sup>147</sup> A military detachment from Ljubljana disarmed the Civic Guard (Bürgergarde) in Ptuj on November 7, 1918, and by the end of the month, the town council was also disbanded.<sup>148</sup> In Marenberg, the stronghold of the Germans in Northwestern part of Lower Styria, the Slovenian National Council took power in early November. In the valley of the Mežica Slovenian National Councils were set up before November 8, 1918. When pillaging had started, the German authorities called for help from Klagenfurt (Celovec), but it was the Slovenes from Celje who came instead, reestablishing order, and deposing German authorities in the process.<sup>149</sup>

The more numerous Germans of the larger town of Maribor, situated almost on the ethnic border, offered stronger resistance. As early as October 30, 1918, the city council decided in the name of the local Germans, that Maribor would fall to Austria. Slovenian major Rudolf Majster, thanks to his audacity took control over part of the military, and the Slovenes managed to install their co-nationals as district chiefs in Lower Styria, which enabled them to blackmail the city administration with the threat of provisioning stoppage.<sup>150</sup> Majster took over all the key objects with his soldiers, while the city administration continued functioning. In early November the German "Guard" (Schutzwehr) was set up – which was approved by the Slovenian National Council for tactical reasons. On November 10, the Maribor Infantry Regiment was founded with which Majster (after a skirmish) disarmed the Schutzwehr on November 23. However, the German city administration remained in place.<sup>151</sup> Because of the dismissal of German railway officials, a strike of railway men started on November 28. They demanded the removal of Slovenian guards and overseers, return to work of German officials etc. The strike lasted until December 13, and was ended by what was basically a Slovenian victory: the Slovenes remained in the leading posts in all major railway stations and the Slovenian language was introduced as official. In that way, one of the strongholds of Germanness, the railways, fell into the Slovenian hands.<sup>152</sup>

However, Maribor remained a German fortress. Therefore Slovenian forces disbanded the city administration on January 2, 1919 and took over.<sup>153</sup> But the Germans were not giving up. They decided to use the visit of the American Commission led by colonel Sherman Miles, which, as part of the Commission of Professor Coolidge

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146 Frensing, p. 10; Grothe, p. 180; HWBGAD, III, p. 76; Biber, Kočevski Nemci, p. 27.

147 Orožen, II, p. 314.

148 Ude, p. 64.

149 Ude, pp. 65-66. Obviously, not even Slovenia was spared the pillaging which occurred elsewhere, as Hrabak incorrectly claims. (Hrabak, Dezerterstvo, p. 273.)

150 Anton Vončina, Maribor v letih 1918-1919, Kronika, IV, 2, 1956, p. 94; Kovačič, p. 399.

151 Lojze Penič, Konec avstrijske oblasti v Mariboru 1918-1919, Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje, L, 1-2, 1979, pp. 385-387; Ude, pp. 40-63, 66-80; Vončina, p. 95; Kovačič, pp. 400-401.

152 Penič, p. 388; Ude, pp. 87-94. The large majority of the railway personnel in Maribor was of Slovenian nationality, although not nationally conscious. Since the "temporary" takeover of the railway management was executed with the approval of the central management of the Southern Railways in Vienna, the workers did not resist. (Ibid, p. 67.)

153 Penič, p. 389; Ude, p. 101; Vončina, p. 96.

from Vienna, came to meditate in the border-drawing in Styria and Carinthia.<sup>154</sup> On January 27, 1919, the day on which the Commission (which the Germans of Radgona and Cmurek had already presented with their complaints) was to arrive in Maribor, a large German rally was organized (at which, according to the Slovene allegations, the Germans from Celje, Ptuj and even Graz came). During the demonstrations, first scuffling, and then shooting started in which 9 Germans were killed and 18 severely wounded. To this day the two parties accuse each other of having started the shooting: the Slovenian authors claim the first shots came from the aggressive German crowd and their German counterparts, that the Slovenian soldiers and policemen opened fire without provocation. The immediate consequence of the bloodshed was that the provincial authorities in Graz deliberated about attacking Maribor during that and the next day, but the Social-Democrats, snowy weather and Austrian military weakness precluded that.<sup>155</sup>

Clashes occurred in the zone where both parties were trying to draw the line of delimitation in Styria, and even more in Carniola until the second half of 1919, but these were increasingly more often clashes between the forces brought from outside the area,<sup>156</sup> rather than between the locals, who did not evince any great pugnacity.<sup>157</sup> In Styria, a ceasefire was concluded between January 10 and 12 of 1919, and only an attack by German Carinthian (!) volunteers at Sobota tried to break it.<sup>158</sup> Skirmishes in Carinthia continued until mid-1919 when the Peace Conference decided the question of the border to be settled by a plebiscite,<sup>159</sup> the outcome of which will be dealt with later.

In Prekomurje, the majority of the population (Slovenian, German, Magyar), was not inclined to radical changes. The Hungarians repelled the attack of the forces of the National Council strengthened by the local Croats and Slovenes on December 24, 1918, as they did on several earlier weaker attempts. Temporarily more successful was the arbitrary attack of Captain Jurišić, who managed to take Donja Lendava and Morska Sobota with his troops on December 26, 1918, only to lose again on January 9, 1919.<sup>160</sup> After that, the Prekomurje (despite an eight-day independent Soviet republic)<sup>161</sup> remained under Hungarian rule until August 12, 1919, when it was

154 On the Coolidge mission see: Bogdan Krizman, *Djelatnost američke misije Arčibalda Kulidža u južnoslavenskih (sic!) zemalja bivše Austro-Ugarske* (1919.), *Istorijski glasnik*, 1-4, 1962.

155 Penič, p. 389; Ude, pp. 104-115; Suppan, *Ethnisches*, p. 172; Kovačič, p. 401; Vončina, p. 98.

156 The Ljubljana Government ordered Maister, who had been promoted to general on his own request, to possess the Slovenian ethnic border in Carinthia and Styria. (Vončina, p. 94; Kovačič, p. 400.) The desired territories were first to be occupied, and only then should one negotiate. (Janković, Krizman (eds.), p. 443.) A survey of all clashes, apart from the quoted work by Ude, see in: Lojze Penič, *Boj za slovensko severno mejo 1918-1920*. *Kratek oris bojev za slovensko severno mejo po razpadu Avstro-Ogrske*, Maribor 1988.

157 Ude, pp. 54, 68, 160, 211, 218. The local Germans showed inclination to offer resistance only around Sobota and Radgona, but they were pacified by the provincial government from Graz which even barred access to the volunteers from Carinthia. (Walter Schneefuß, *Das Deutschtum in Südost-Europa*, Leipzig 1939, p. 56.)

158 Ude, p. 118.

159 *Ibid.*, pp. 137-228; Wutte, pp. 44-113.

160 Ude, pp. 272-274.

161 The "Republic" lasted from May 29 to June 5, 1919, under the leadership of the Social-adventurer Vilmos Tkalec. (Julij Til, *Murska republika 1919*, Murska Sobota 1970.)

handed over to Yugoslavia, in accordance with the decision of the Peace Conference.<sup>162</sup> Like in other cases when the Peace Conference determined the borderline, it was a political decision – the local inhabitants had no say in the affair.

Besides Kosovo, the area having the highest percentage of the minority non-Yugoslav population was the territory of the Bačka, the Banat and Baranya. To draw a fair frontier there would be even less possible than in other parts. The situation there was rendered more difficult by the very diverse and intermixed population that shared various political sympathies and desires. The South Slavic population was a minority, and not even all of them were firm adherents of the idea of unification with Serbia. In the final part of this chapter we shall deal with the unification of the Vojvodina with Serbia and Yugoslavia, and the behavior of the minority population during that process.

What strikes the reader at the first glance is the peaceful way the Vojvodina was united with Yugoslavia – which distinguishes it favorably from the way minority regions in the South have been joined to the new state or from the situation in what became the Slovenian border with Austria and Hungary, or from the Međumurje. Primarily, this was due to the so-called Belgrade truce concluded between the Hungarian revolutionary Károlyi government and the Serbian and Entente forces on November 13, 1918.<sup>163</sup> It stipulated the military occupation up to the Moriš - Subotica – Baja – Pecs line. The convention envisaged the withdrawal of the Hungarian troops from this area, but with the Hungarian civilian authorities remaining.<sup>164</sup> However, the actual occupation had started already before the convention was concluded.<sup>165</sup>

As early as the beginning of November 1918 the Serbian National Committee that would become the champion of Serbian desires for unification with Serbia was founded in Novi Sad.<sup>166</sup> A few days earlier, on October 25, the Hungarian National Council had been set up in Budapest, and already on October 31 its leader, Count Károlyi became Prime-Minister.<sup>167</sup> The Hungarian government and the Serbian National Committee initiated the foundation of National Committees throughout the province – with conflicting aims: Hungarian National Councils (in which the government wanted to muster representatives of all nationalities) were to fight for the preservation of the integrity of the Hungarian Republic (proclaimed on November 18, six days after Austria had already done the same),<sup>168</sup> whereas the Serbian

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162 Ude, p. 286; Idem, *Boj za severno slovensko mejo 1918/1919 v Prekmurju*, Kronika, XXIV, 2, 1976; M[atija] Slavič, *Prekmurje*, Ljubljana 1921, pp. 41-55, 78.

163 After its secession from Austria, Hungary stopped recognizing the truce Austria-Hungary had signed in Padua on November 3, 1918 and started demanding a truce for the independent Hungary. (Andrea Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Grenzziehung in der Dobrudscha und im Banat und die Friedensprobleme*, Frankfurt etc. [1994] p. 199.) The text in: Francis Deák, *Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference. The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon*, New York 1972, pp. 359-361.

164 Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska*, p. 21; Bogdan Krizman, "Beogradsko primirje" od 13. novembra 1918, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 47, 1969, pp. 124-126; Mihály Károlyi, *Vjera bez iluzija. Memoari "crvenog grofa"*, Zagreb, 1982, pp. 149-151; Mária Ormos, *The Military Convention of Belgrade* in: Béla Király, László Vészpremy (eds.), *Trianon and East Central Europe. Antecedents and Repercussions*, New York 1995.

165 Sajti, *Hungarians*, pp. 4-5.

166 *Spomenica oslobođenja Vojvodine*, p. 29.

167 Károlyi, pp. 118, 132; Hoensch, p. 81.

168 Hoensch, p. 82.

National Committees were to prepare the take-over and unification with Serbia.<sup>169</sup> The Serbian party had the advantage in the process because it could increasingly rely on the support of the Serbian military,<sup>170</sup> thereby gradually ousting Hungarian official organs<sup>171</sup> and Hungarian National Councils. In some ethnically mixed places conflicts over power between Serbian and non-Serbian National Councils ensued.<sup>172</sup>

Since the Hungarian state apparatus was to a great extent demoralized, weak, and partly crumbling,<sup>173</sup> National Councils were almost the only, if weak, power in the first days before the arrival of the Serbian troops. These Councils were either monoethnic<sup>174</sup> (Serbian) or multiethnic, organized by the Magyars from among representatives of all nationalities, but usually without the Serbs who organized National Councils of their own.<sup>175</sup> In some places national councils of other

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169 *Spomenica oslobođenja*, pp. 30, 124; Pejić, pp. 129-130, 242. These aims were not avowed openly in the beginning: the Serbian National Committee of Novi Sad said in its proclamation that it wanted to help the Serbs and other Yugoslavs in Hungary to achieve their rights, based on self-determination. (*Spomenica oslobođenja*, p. 32.)

170 For instance, in Sombor, the Serbian army on its entry into the town, turned the government over to the Serbian National Committee, which immediately disbanded the Hungarian National Council. In the predominantly German-inhabited Bela Crkva, the Serbian army immediately transferred power to the local Serbs. The same thing happened in Pančevo. (*Spomenica oslobođenja*, pp. 95, 153; Pekić, 116, 134, 249; Tomandl, *Pančevo u Prvom svetskom ratu*, p. 117.) In Vršac, a new, predominantly Serbian town administration was elected. (Pekić, p. 196.) In Novi Sad the town administration was deposed four days after the entry of the Serbian troops. (Dim[itr]ije Kirilović, *Novi Sad u danima oslobođenja*, *Glasnik Istorijskog društva u Novom Sadu*, knj. VI, sv. 3, 1933, pp. 174-175) The Serbian National Committee in Novi Sad believed in the beginning that neither the nationality question could be solved nor order restored without the help of the Serbian army. (Pekić, p. 145.) There and in Subotica, the Serbian military helped the Serbian National Committees to take over all offices and initiated dismissal of civil servants. (*Ibid*, pp. 150-151, 156, 230.)

171 *Spomenica oslobođenja*, pp. 106, 108.

172 *Ibid.*, p. 125; Pekić, p. 275.

173 Pekić, pp. 89-90, 97-98, 142, 175; Sajti, p. 10. This, coupled with fear of Communism, were the reasons the Hungarian officials handed over power peacefully. (Pekić, p. 286.)

174 In Stari Bečej a Serbian-Hungarian National Council was formed at first, but on November 11, a purely Serbian one was set up. (*Spomenica oslobođenja*, p. 115; Pekić, p. 258.)

175 In Subotica on November 1, a National Council was founded into which two Serbs and one Bunjevac were elected too. However, they refused to swear the oath. (*Spomenica oslobođenja*, pp. 97, 102; Pekić, p. 169.) The Serbs and the Bunjevci founded a National Council of their own only on November 10. (*Ibid*, p. 98.) Their National Council refused to merge with the common (Hungarian) one. (*Spomenica oslobođenja i ujedinjenja grada Subotice*, Subotica 1938, p. 13.) In Senta only one Serb joined the common National Council. (*Spomenica oslobođenja*, p. 107.) In Veliki Bečkerek the Serbs refused to join the common National Council and they founded their own. (*Ibid*, p. 120; Mesaroš, p. 37.) In Pančevo the Serbs refused to participate in the common National Council with the excuse they had already elected their own National Committee. (*Spomenica oslobođenja*, p. 146; Pekić, pp. 123-124; Tomandl, *Pančevo*, p. 104; Арпад Лебл, Народни совети во некои градови на Банат (ноември 1918. година), *Гласник на Институтот за национална историја*, 3, 1968, pp. 58-59.) In Sombor, the Serbs and Bunjevci refused the Hungarian invitation and they set up their own council. (Pekić, pp. 239-240.) In Bela Crkva, however, a National Council was built by the Germans, Serbs, Romanians and Magyars. (Pekić, pp. 111-112; Lubica Šijački, *Privreda Banata između*



nationalities were organized too.<sup>176</sup> These National Councils cooperated in some places – but as a rule only in provisioning and keeping order.<sup>177</sup> National Guards were set up in many places to this aim, but both parties counted on using them at the right moment to overcome their rivals.<sup>178</sup>

Security forces were really badly needed. The old police apparatus, if it existed, was insufficient to keep order under new circumstances.<sup>179</sup> The German army was retreating, evacuating often large quantities of goods, whereas the Austro-Hungarian army disintegrated and hosts of former soldiers and POWs were contributing to the general insecurity and disorder.<sup>180</sup> Almost everywhere looting and deposition

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- dva svetska rata, Novi Sad 1987, p. 62.) In Stari Vrbas, the Hungarians, Germans, Ruthenians and Serbs participated in the common National Council. (Mesaroš, p. 43.)
- 176 Thus for instance, a German National Council was formed in Kikinda. (Spomenica oslobođenja, p. 136; Šijački, p. 62.) In the Spomenica, in another place it is claimed the Germans demanded to set up their own National Council once the Serbian National Committee took over, but were refused. (p. 140.) If it is no mistake, it is possible that the Germans tried to found two national councils here, which would be in keeping with ideological differences among them. In Vršac the non-Serbian National Council had predominantly German members – in accordance with the ethnic make-up of the town. (Pekić, p. 190; Mesaroš, p. 37.) In Sombor a National Council was founded by the Bunjevci, but it soon disintegrated. (Pekić, p. 244.) Certain number of the Bunjevci Social-Democrats joined the Hungarian National council there. (Mesaroš, p. 42.) The Germans of Bela Crkva seceded from the common National Council and founded their own, but only after the arrival of the Serbian troops. (Lebl, Народни совети, p. 55.)
- 177 Thus for instance in Novi Sad. (Spomenica oslobođenja, p. 35.) In Stari Bečej parts of Serbian and Hungarian population joined hands in plundering, but other part of the two nationalities united in the common National Council and National Guard in order to stop the looting. (Spomenica oslobođenja, pp. 111-112.) Temporary cooperation occurred also in Kikinda and Pančevo, whereas a common National Guard was founded in Vršac. (Ibid, p. 135; Pekić, pp. 127, 191-192, 288; Arpad Lebl, Klasne borbe u Vojvodini i revolucionarne veze Vojvodine sa Mađarskom 1918-1919, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke, 22, 1959, p. 32.)
- 178 The Serbian National Committee was strictly against forming common National Councils and National Guards with the non-Slavs. (Toma Milenković, Radnički pokret u Vojvodini 1918-1920. (Od kraja Prvog svetskog rata do Obznane), Beograd 1968, p. 24.) Serbian National Guard was founded in Novi Sad at the request of the prefect Matkovich. (Spomenica oslobođenja, p. 29.) The severest clash between Serbian and Hungarian National Guards happened in Veliki Bečkerek on occasion of taking the railway station: having prevented the evacuation of five million Kronen from the branch office of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, the Serbian National Guard precluded the evacuation of railway coaches too. (Ibid, pp. 123-124; Pekić, pp. 271-273.) In that town the Serbian National Guard took over power in the town and county by force from Hungarian officials. (Hrabak, Logoši, p. 129; Spomenica oslobođenja, pp. 129-130.) In Kikinda the Hungarian National Guard was disbanded on November 16, and the police and the military were disarmed under threat of force. (Spomenica oslobođenja, p. 137; Šijački, p. 61.)
- 179 So for instance, the police in Novi Sad had 10 to 15 men in early November! (Spomenica oslobođenja, p. 54.) In Kikinda the Serbs joined the Hungarian national Guard in order to outnumber the Magyars in it. (Ibid, p. 133.)
- 180 Danilo Kecić, Oktobarska revolucija i agrarno-seljački pokreti u Vojvodini 1918. i 1919. godine, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke, 49, 1968, p. 51; Spomenica oslobođenja, p. 50.

of the local authorities occurred.<sup>181</sup> Property – state and private alike – was being carried away, and the Jews,<sup>182</sup> perceived as exploiters, were one of the pet targets. Otherwise, it would be impossible to speak about the nationality of the victims of looting – anyone well off was a potential victim of marauders.<sup>183</sup> On the other hand, it may be assumed with considerable accuracy, that in most cases the looters were the Serbs and Romanians, and partly poor Hungarians, whereas others participated only sporadically.<sup>184</sup> National Guards managed to put down the unrest in some

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181 Mesaroš, pp. 45-51; Spomenica oslobođenja, pp. 103, 110-113, 134; Pekić, pp. 99, 128-129, 136, 142-143, 290.

182 In Stari Bečej Hungarian women burned down the Serbian Foundation House, but then the Serbs and Hungarians jointly started plundering the Jews. (Spomenica ujedinjenja, pp. 111, 114; Hrabak, Logoši, p. 132.) Although some authors tried to link these anti-Semitic excesses to the war and its consequences, the fact is that Anti-Semitism was widespread already before the First World War. (Cf. Lazar Rakić, Radikalna stranka u Vojvodini (do početka XX veka), Novi Sad 1975, pp. 179-184.) In this Serbian Anti-Semitism tallied harmoniously with the development of Central-European Antisemitism. (Cf. Peter G. J. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, New York, London, Sydney [1964].)

183 It is a question if Bogumil Hrabak's claim that pillage and destruction turned into a kind of revenge on the Germans and Magyars is tenable. (Hrabak, Logoši, p. 127.) Considerable part of the wealthy, if they were not Jews, were of German and Hungarian nationality, but it is dubitable if the encroachment on their property should be construed as revenge on the Germans and Magyars in general, or it was simply a case of class hatred. In some places Hungarian and Romanian poor jointly attacked the rich. (Ibid, p. 131.) The fact that the retreating German army was pillaging the Volksdeutsche villages in Syrmium, speaks in favor of the supposition that pillaged were those who had something to be pillaged. ( Cf. Hrabak, Dezerterstvo, p. 294.)

184 This can be concluded from the lists of villages where looting occurred. As a rule, they were Serbian and/or Romanian villages, or mixed ones where also members of these two nationalities lived together with a few Hungarian villages. (Cf. Hrabak, Logoši, pp. 133-134; Idem, Dezerterstvo, p. 301; Tomandl, Pančevo, p. 110; Drobnjaković, Mileker, passim; Kecić, Oktobarska revolucija, pp. 53-55; Idem, Revolucionarni radnički pokret, pp. 103-105.) Toma Milenković reached the same conclusion, although he failed to formulate it thus. (Banatska republika i mađarski komesarijat u Banatu (31.X 1918-20.II 1919), Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 32, 1985, pp. 111-114.) Bogumil Hrabak says openly that the looters were mostly the Serbs and Romanians. (Logoši, p. 126.) Maybe the higher percentage of the Hungarians and the lack of the Romanians is the reason for less pillaging in the Bačka. (Hrabak, Logoši, p. 134.) The claim of Gligor Popi, that the Romanian villages of the Southern Banat remained exemplary peaceful is taken over from the contemporary laudatory literature and is not correct. (Gligor Popi, Banatski Rumuni 1919. godine, in: Prisajedinjenje Vojvodine Kraljevini Srbiji 1918, Novi Sad 1993, p. 215.) Gačeša noticed the Romanians remained quiet during the agrarian unrests in the Northern Banat, and he explains this by claiming they were concerned with the question of delimitation. (Gačeša, Agrarne reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu, p. 266.) From the lists of places where looting and unrest occurred, predominantly German villages are conspicuously absent. (A memo by the Serbian Orthodox bishopric of Temesvar for the Peace Conference from August 19, 1919, praises the Germans for their peaceful demeanour during the upheaval of 1918. (AJ, F. 336, f. 3.)) One of the few German villages where plundering did occur was Ridica in the Northern Bačka. (Pekić, p. 100.) There were ringleaders of plundering from each nationality there: one Serb, one German and one Hungarian. The Serbian military reestablished order, disbanded German and Hungarian National Guards (also prone to

places,<sup>185</sup> but in others, an intervention of the Serbian army or of former Serbian POWs was necessary.<sup>186</sup> Although it seems obvious that the majority of troublemakers stemmed from the oppressed nationalities, it would be wrong to draw far-reaching conclusions about their political sympathies from that: people were simply aware that the hated regime was tumbling down, and they scurried to take advantage of that. In other words, although deposing, and even murders of notaries installed by the Hungarian authorities occurred,<sup>187</sup> it was an expression of spontaneous dissatisfaction<sup>188</sup> and not a deliberate national revolution. Despite an undeniable social component of the events, this was also by no means a social revolution which some wealthy contemporaries feared, and which, partly for this reason, some Communist historians imagined.<sup>189</sup>

With the arrival of the Serbian troops,<sup>190</sup> as a rule, non-Serbian National Guards were disbanded, and soon afterwards, National Councils too.<sup>191</sup> A selective disarmament was conducted: non-Slavs and unreliable Slavs were deprived of their

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disorder) and installed a Serbian notary-public. (Jugoslovenski dnevnik, September 27, 1933.) In Novi Sad too, the poor from all the nationalities jointly started looting. (Pekić, p. 148.) In Timisoira, the Serbian national Council claimed looting had been going on predominantly in Romanian parts. (Bogumil Hrabak, Zapisnici temišvarskog Narodnog veća, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke, 10, 1955, p. 81.) All this indicates that the claim by Arpad Lebl that violence against the authorities had no national colours can be accepted only as a very general remark. (Lebl, Народни совети, p. 47.)

185 However, there were also such cases where National Guards also participated in the looting. (Pekić, p. 101.)

186 Spomenica oslobođenja, p. 56.

187 Ibid., p. 151. Part of the deposed notaries were reinstated in 1919 and 1920, and those who had deposed them were tried and punished. (Milenković, Radnički pokret, p. 27; Istorijski arhiv Pančeva (henceforth: IAP), 91, k. 2, predmet 11.)

188 Milenković, Banatska republika, p. 114.

189 Kecić believed the unrests in the villages had a revolutionary character. (Oktobarska revolucija, p. 57), although it was obvious that it was just a spontaneous gush of dissatisfaction marked by plunder and occasional violence against some officials. For a movement to be truly revolutionary, a clear leading idea is needed, but it is not very likely the marauders of 1918 had one. His remark about national exaltation in towns is more correct. (Ibid.) The "Republic" in Kusić and Zlatica had some kind of confused ideological underpinning, but it was even more naïve and ridiculous than the attempt at forming an independent republic in the Kočevje. A threat of caning sufficed to call the would-be revolutionaries to their senses. (Spomenica oslobođenja, p. 154; Milenković, Banatska republika, pp. 119-120; Popi, Rumuni u jugoslovenskom Banatu, p. 7.) Similar absurd attempts occurred also in Moravice, Debeljača, Kruščica and Gaj. (Hrabak, Logoši, p. 135; Lebl, Народни совети, p. 50.)

190 In general, there were very few complaints about the behaviour of the Serbian army in the Northern parts. (Mesaroš, p. 68.) According to some reports, Serbian troops behaved better in the Banat than in Serbia. (Bjelajac, p. 213.) There were also claims to the contrary, but it is questionable how much they were influenced by the later events, including the Second World War and its consequences. (Cf. Adalbert Karl Gauß (ed.), Erinnerungen an Palanka, Freilassing 1958, pp. 20-21.)

191 Although the official order that this be (very discretely) done was issued only on November 18, most of the commanders were already doing it. (Milenković, Banatska republika, p. 121; Measroš, pp. 57-58.) Serbian National Councils were disbanded at the Government's order on December 21. (Spomenica oslobođenja, p. 47.)

weapons.<sup>192</sup> At the same time, the process of purging Hungarian officials was going on – first on top levels, and then on the lower ones too, if they were offering passive resistance.<sup>193</sup> As Serbian officials were lacking to fill all posts, a lot of old officials, teachers and railway men had to be retained in service, having been assigned commissioners to supervise their work in some places.<sup>194</sup> However, Hungarian officials, railway men and teachers had to swear an oath of allegiance to the new authorities by November 25, 1918.<sup>195</sup> Those failing to do so, were sacked, and often transferred across the line of demarcation – which was a euphemism for expulsion,<sup>196</sup> or left due to the government pressure.<sup>197</sup> Part of the minority intelligentsia left for their mother country on their own free will – out of nationalism, or expecting better living and working conditions there.<sup>198</sup> The Serbian language was introduced into administration and judiciary.<sup>199</sup> Pictures and symbols of Hungarian power were removed

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192 Milenković, *Radnički pokret*, p. 34; Mesaroš, p. 70. In Turski Bečej the Serbian troops saved the Serbian National Guard from being disarmed by the Hungarians. (Arhiv Vojvodine (henceforth: AV), F. 91, 4488/919.)

193 Arhiv Vojvodine, 81, 11031/1919; 9589/1919; Mesaroš, pp. 62, 73; *Spomenica oslobođenja*, pp. 38, 40, 42, 45, 60, 138, 142; Pekić, pp. 155, 294, 320, 323. The Hungarian Government openly supported this opposition until September 1919 when it ordered that the officials in Yugoslavia should ostensibly reconcile themselves to the prevailing circumstances. (Sajti, p. 12.)

194 Pekić, p. 150.

195 AV, 81, 1218/1919; 9206/1919; Milenković, *Radnički pokret*, p. 25; Mesaroš, p. 72; Kecić, *Revolucionarni radnički pokret*, p. 125. There were cases where the Romanian Catholic clergy, independently from the state authorities, instigated population against the teachers who had sworn the oath of allegiance. (AV, 81, 1583/1919.) Part of the Romanian clergy was also showing opposition by mentioning in their prayers the Romanain and not the Yugoslav king. (AV, 81, 248/1919.)

196 AJ, 69, 7/14; AV, 81, 113/1919; 69/1919; 52/1919; Mesaroš, pp. 63-64; Milenković, *Banatska republika*, p. 127; Idem, *Radnički pokret*, p. 26. According to French sources, some of the Hungarian officials who had refused to swear the oath of allegiance, were deported to Albania! (Schmidt-Rösler, p. 211.) Due to sacking of the recalcitrant Hungarian railway men, and the lack of Slavic ones, some railway stations were out of operation for quite some time. (Šijački, p. 59.) In the opinion of I. Mocsy, the policy of the Karolyi Government which promised wages even to the officials who had not sworn the oath of allegiance, only encouraged the drain of Hungarian officials. (Mocsy, p. 248.) The lack of judges was also felt, because many refused to swear or emigrated. (Milenković, *Radnički pokret*, p. 27.) The situation with other civil servants was similar. (Ljubomirka Krkljuš, *Pitanje organizacije vlasti u Vojvodini 1918-1919*, in: *Srbija na kraju Prvog svetskog rata*, Beograd 1990, p. 148.) Since the lack of cadres was chronic, the Yugoslav authorities were not always very strict, and sometimes satisfied themselves only with a statement of loyalty.

197 Schmidt-Rösler, p. 216.

198 AV, 81, 463/1919; 922/1919. Part of the Romanian intelligentsia (priests, teachers) from the Southern Banat was interned immediately after November 13, after demonstrations at which the local Romanians demanded annexation to Romania. (Schmidt-Rösler, p. 204.)

199 Krkljuš, p. 153. Litigating parties could use their mother tongues in court. (Ljubomirka Judin, *O radu Narodne uprave Banat, Bačku i Baranju 1918-1919*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 51, 1968, p. 16.) Because of the obstruction of part of the officials and lack of language skills, the decision about the introduction of Serbian could not be

and those of Serbian put up. Censorship of the press and letters was introduced,<sup>200</sup> which was done in Novi Sad for the whole Vojvodina.<sup>201</sup>

The event which was crucial for the Slavic, and especially Serbian, elite of the Vojvodina was summoning of the Great Popular Assembly in Novi Sad for November 25, 1918. It was convoked at the instruction of the Serbian Prime-Minister Pašić,<sup>202</sup> but it certainly tallied with the wishes of the political elite of the Vojvodina Serbs, which believed that only the Great Popular Assembly had the right "to speak in the name of the Serbian people".<sup>203</sup> The elections for the Assembly were far from democratic. The members of non-Slavic nationalities (as opposed to the Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenians) had no right to vote. Furthermore, not even all Slavs took part in the election of the representatives: many were not notified at all that the elections would take place, or were informed only few days in advance. There was no regularized procedure, control etc., and the lists of candidates were usually made by the members of local National Councils. Basically, the elections were assemblies of the interested who, as a rule, elected Members of Parliament (MPs) by acclamation.<sup>204</sup>

A total of 757 MPs were elected, some from the territories that would eventually remain outside of Yugoslavia. Of the total, 578 were Serbs, 89 Croats, 62 Slovaks, 21 Ruthenians, 6 Germans and 1 Hungarian.<sup>205</sup> The number of the Slovak MPs was conspicuous, and that of the Ruthenians was also comparatively high. Although little is known about the Slovaks during the upheaval of 1918,<sup>206</sup> it seems most of them took the Serbian side.<sup>207</sup> Their representatives in the Great Popular Assembly read a statement in which they demanded to become part of the Yugoslav (and not

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put to practice everywhere right away. For this reason the People's Administration introduced Serbian as the official language on January 13, 1919. (Pekić, p. 329.)

200 In early 1919 the control on the demarcation line slackened, and Hungarian and Romanian press was imported, although this was still officially forbidden. (AJ, 14, 143/497) It seems this situation lasted, because the People's Administration asked of the Ministry of the Interior to reduce the number of Hungarian and German newspapers (local and imported). (Mesaroš, p. 65; Kecić, *Revolucionarni radnički pokret*, p. 127, 130-131.) This goes to show that the control was not so "drastic" after all, as Kecić would have it. (Kecić, *Revolucionarni radnički pokret*, p. 130-131.)

201 *Spomenica oslobođenja*, p. 64. The censorship of letters coming from the countries which formerly belonged to the Central Powers continued several years after the end of the war. (Ibid.)

202 Kosta Millutinović, *Vojvodina i stvaranje Jugoslavije*, Koreferat na drugom kongresu jugoslovenskih istoričara u Zagrebu, 24. novembra 1958, p. 124. Among other things, in that way Pašić wanted to put pressure to bear upon the People's Council in Zagreb, the representative body of the Slavs from Austria-Hungary.

203 Krkljuš, p. 146.

204 Pekić, pp. 201-203; Krkljuš, p. 146.

205 Pekić, p. 310.

206 Nikola Gačeša, *Vojvođanski Slovaci u agrarnoj reformi posle Prvog svetskog rata*, in: *Idem, Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije*, Novi Sad 1995, p. 270.

207 Siracki, *Mesto*, p. 48; Vereš (ed.), pp. 12, 165. There is a memo by the Slovak National Council for the Banat, which, in the name of the Slovaks of the Banat, the Bačka and Symrium demanded of the Entente powers, annexation of their territories to Yugoslavia, so as to escape Magyarization. The document bears no date, and may be from March 1919. It is not to be excluded that it was one of those documents demanding annexation of certain territories to Yugoslavia, which had been inspired by the Yugoslav Government. (AJ, F. 336, f. 3.)

Serbian!) state, but expressed their regret ("with tears in their eyes") at the same time that "cruel fate had torn them from the Czechoslovak body politic".<sup>208</sup> From their statement it is clear that Yugoslavia was better for them than Hungary, but still not as good as Czechoslovakia. In that way they announced their own unclear perception of their position within the new state, which was crucified between the wish to be part of the "State People" and the actual minority status. Four Slovak MPs became members (together with 47 Yugoslav) of the Great People's Council elected by the Assembly.<sup>209</sup>

As for the less numerous Ruthenians, their support to the Great People's Assembly and the new state was even more qualified: they did vote for the unification, but their representatives, probably influenced by the pro-Hungarian and anti-Yugoslav uniate clergy, did not appear at the second session of the Assembly in February 1919.<sup>210</sup> It is interesting to note that six Germans and one Hungarian were elected to the Great People's Assembly. Unfortunately, the relevant literature does not say anything about who they were and under what conditions they were elected. In any case, the supposition that they were elected thanks to some general national sympathies between the Slavs and Germans and Magyars, cannot be confirmed by other sources. To all appearances, it was the matter of personal trust in very concrete individuals in their local communities.

The main decision of the Great People's Assembly dealt with the unification with the Kingdom of Serbia "which, by its work and development up to now, guaranteed freedom, equality, progress in every way, not only for us, but also for all Slavic, and even non-Slavic peoples who live with us" as the resolution couched it. Moreover, in the special paragraph the Great People's Assembly also promised to the national minorities all rights needed for the preservation of their nationality. At the same time, the Assembly demanded these very same rights for the Yugoslavs remaining outside of the Yugoslav borders.<sup>211</sup> These guarantees and demands were added only subsequently at the initiative of Jaša Tomić,<sup>212</sup> which testifies to the fact that the majority of the MPs did not think that in a very multi-ethnic region, the rights of the non-Slavs should also be taken into consideration, especially since that population actually formed the majority in the province.<sup>213</sup>

Apart from proclaiming unification with Serbia, the Great Popular Assembly elected the Great People's Council of 50 members. It in turn elected the People's Administration as its executive organ. The latter was a kind of interim government of the Bačka, the Banat and Baranya, with departments for political affairs, interior, judiciary, education, finances, traffic, economy, food and provisioning, social reforms, health and defense. It was stipulated that the People's Administration would "work on the basis of the principle of complete freedom and equality for all

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208 Siracki, Mesto, p. 50. *Spomenica oslobođenja* mentions only the pro-Yugoslav part of the statement. (p. 166.)

209 *Spomenica oslobođenja*, p. 318.

210 Biljnja, Rusini, p. 26. The Uniate Ruthenian priests remained inimical towards the Yugoslav state until its end in 1941. (*Ibid.*)

211 *Spomenica oslobođenja*, pp. 163-164.

212 Pekić, p. 313.

213 In practice, the right to communicate with the authorities in mother tongue was often not observed due to the Radicals of Jaša Tomić. (Kecić, *Revolucionarni radnički pokret*, p. 124.)

peoples.”<sup>214</sup> However, despite protestations of equality, only the commissioner for judiciary Dr. August Roth was a member of a minority community, whereas all other commissioners and their deputies were Serbs.<sup>215</sup> Over time, increasingly more authority was transferred from the People's Administration to the central authorities in Belgrade, and the People's Administration finally ceased functioning on March 11, 1919.<sup>216</sup> Despite the useful work it had done, the People's Administration also complicated the running of the new territories – due to the overlapping authorities of the Army,<sup>217</sup> the central government,<sup>218</sup> People's Administration, pretensions of the Hungarian Government that some still obeyed,<sup>219</sup> and the existence of the Banat National Council (in the Banat.)

The political situation in the Banat was additionally complicated by two facts. The first was the declaration of the so-called Banat Republic on October 31, 1918. It was basically the work of the German Social-Democrats of Timișoara, headed by dr. Otto Roth, and its aim, in the last resort, was that the autonomous Banat should remain within Hungary.<sup>220</sup> The Banat National Council, headed by Roth as civilian commissioner and Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Bartha as a military one was founded on the same day.<sup>221</sup> The publicly proclaimed goals of the Council were preservation of peace and order, provisioning, striving to prevent the Banat from becoming a battlefield and preservation of its economic and territorial unity.<sup>222</sup> On November 8, the Hungarian Government appointed Bartha Commissioner of the Banat, but several days later he was appointed Hungarian Defense Minister, so that he was superseded as commissioner by Roth. Toma Milenković writes the Banat Republic ceased to exist on November 7, under unclear circumstances, but that the National Council continued functioning.<sup>223</sup> To all appearances, the abolition of the Banat Republic was also agreed upon with the Hungarian Government.

In order to put an end to the widespread looting, the Banat National Council set up National Guard and introduced court-marshals, and in some places it enjoyed the support of the remnants of the Army. However, its influence outside of Timișoara was not strong.<sup>224</sup> Its existence, as well as the happenings in Timișoara and the

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214 Judin, p. 12.

215 Spomenica oslobođenja, p. 173.

216 Judin, p. 28.

217 Ibid., p. 23.

218 Ibid., pp. 26-27.

219 Mesaroš, p. 70; Judin, pp. 17-18; Kecić, *Revolucionarni radnički pokret*, p. 125.

220 Schmidt-Rösler, pp. 204-205; Popi, *Banatski Rumuni*, pp. 216-217. To all appearances, the Hungarian Government knew about this action. (Andrea Schmidt-Rösler, *Der Gedanke einer Banater Autonomie 1918-1920*, *Südostdeutsche Vierteljahresblätter*, XLIV, 1, 1995. p. 58.) This means Roth and Barta did not become Hungarian agents soon, as claimed by Lebl, but had been that from the start. (Cf. Lebl, *Klasne borbr*, p. 44.) As for the German members of the Banat National Council, they opted for the integrity of Hungary in early November. (Hrabak, *Zapisnik*, p. 85.)

221 The Serbs also joined the Banat National Council, but their aim was unification with Serbia. (Judin, p. 21.)

222 Milenković, *Banatska republika*, pp. 101-107.

223 Ibid., p. 110.

224 Ibid., p. 108; Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, p. 206. It seems its influence was felt in Vršac and some other places with a larger number of Germans. (Pekić, pp. 190-191.) Open

territories which later on fell to Romania in general, have importance for our subject only in the context of winning over the Swabians of the Banat (but indirectly in the Bačka and Baranya too) for Yugoslavia and weaning them away from their Hungarian sympathies or possible preferences for Romania in the days when the fate of the Banat was being decided.<sup>225</sup>

The People's Administration was bent on the more radical policy of grabbing power and preparing annexation of the Western Banat as far as East of Timișoara, than the Serbian army or the Government were prone to undertake.<sup>226</sup> However, just as the influence of the Banat National Council remained weak in the Western Banat, so was that of the People's Administration deep in the Banat territory (in the counties of Timis, Timișoara and partly Crasso-Severin).<sup>227</sup> The Yugoslav Government accepted the policy of the People's Administration only in the second half of December 1918, which eventually led to the deposition of the Hungarian authorities headed by Roth on February 20, 1919, and – which was important in the context of the policy of winning the Germans over – to the appointment of Reinhold Heegn as the head of the Timișoara county. The Serbian and Banat National councils were disbanded on the same day.<sup>228</sup> It should be pointed out that this policy of radical changes was condemned by the command of the French Eastern Army deployed in the Banat, but also by the Serbian High Command, which was opposed to drastic changes in the administrative apparatus of these territories before the peace conference, deeming them politically nefarious. Similar to the situation after the First Balkan War in the Southern parts, the High Command was in favor of the leading role of the military in the temporarily occupied territories.<sup>229</sup>

The removal of the Hungarian authorities in the Banat led to a general strike on the railways the next day, which spilled over into the Bačka and Baranya.<sup>230</sup> It proved that the policy of concessions towards Germans was more or less futile: quite numerous German Social-Democrats remained faithful to the party line which

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support of the Republic was manifested only in Vršac on November 1. (Popi, Banatski Rumuni 1918, p. 217.)

- 225 One of the ways of winning them over was the prospect of founding a German university in Timișoara in case the Swabians lent support to Serbian territorial claims. (Josef Volkmar Senz, *Das Schulwesen der Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien*, München 1969, p. 33; Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, p. 254; Anton Scherer, *Die Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien. Ihr Verhältnis zum Staatsvolk. Soziale Struktur und politisches Bewußtsein*, Halbjahresschrift für südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik, II, 1, 1990, p. 10.)

- 226 Milenković, *Banatska republika*, p. 132.

- 227 *Ibid.*, p. 132.

- 228 *Ibid.*, p. 136; Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, pp. 210, 254. (Milenković gives falsely the name of the new head of the county as Rajner Heg.)

- 229 Milenković, *Banatska republika*, p. 137. The Serbian authorities took more radical steps in the Timisoira and Torontal counties where they desired to create *fait accompli*, whereas they behaved more moderately in the Eastern parts of the occupied Banat. (Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, pp. 208, 212.)

- 230 Mesaroš, pp. 76-79; Milenković, *Banatska republika*, p. 137; Kecić, *Revolucionarni radnički pokret*, pp. 135-139; William Marin, *Kurze Geschichte der Banater Deutschen mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Beziehungen zur rumänischen Bevölkerung und ihre Einstellung zur Vereinigung von 1918*, Temeswar 1980, 1221-123; Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, p. 211; Sajti, p. 14.



supported Hungary's integrity.<sup>231</sup> (As for the rest of the Swabians, those who stayed outside the Yugoslav state remained of diverging opinions as late as August 1919. Some favored Hungary, some Romania, some were for independence or a confederation with Yugoslavia.)<sup>232</sup> The strike lasted only two days (except in Pecs) and was predominantly national and political in character.<sup>233</sup> Its immediate consequence was a temporary halt in sacking of officials and the demanding of a loyalty oath.<sup>234</sup> (Hungarian workers in the occupied territory were adherents of Hungary until the fall of Béla Kun's regime; after that they preferred Yugoslavia as the lesser evil. As for the Hungarian bourgeoisie, they preferred Yugoslavia to Hungary only during the Kun dictatorship.)<sup>235</sup>

Another political fact that complicated the situation in the Banat was the declaration of the unification of the former Habsburg territories inhabited by the Romanians with the Kingdom of Romania on December 1, 1918 in Alba Iulia.<sup>236</sup> Just like the Slavs of the Vojvodina, the Romanians of these territories gathered and unanimously proclaimed unification. The delegates from the Serbian-occupied territory, and even from the one that would eventually fall to Yugoslavia were also present, although the Serbian authorities tried to prevent that.<sup>237</sup> The Romanian Grand National Assembly laid claim to all Romanian-inhabited territories,<sup>238</sup> which was of course adverse to the wishes of the Great Popular Assembly in Novi Sad and the Serbian Government. However, it left the peace conference to determine the future borders.<sup>239</sup> National minorities were promised free national development.<sup>240</sup> The Romanian Government, which,

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231 Unlike them, the Social-Democrats of other nationalities lent support to the national goals of their respective bourgeoisies. (Milenković, *Banatska republika*, pp. 101-104.)

232 Schmidt-Rösler, *Der Gedanke*, p. 58; Idem, *Rumänien*, pp. 256-262. It seems the reasons for weak sympathies for Yugoslavia were to be found in the pro-Hungarian sentiments and the fact the larger portion of the Banat with Timisoara, was allotted to Romania.

233 To call it a Hungarian-German coup, as Ljubivoje Cerović did, is exahgerated. (Cf. Ljubivoje Cerović, *Srbi u Rumuniji od ranog srednjeg veka do današnjeg vremena*, Beograd 1997, p. 63.)

234 Mesaroš, p. 79.

235 Lebl, *Klasne borbe*, p. 47; AJ, F. 336, f. 18.

236 Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, p. 207. The Serbian occupation speeded up the Romanian secession from Hungary (with which they had been negotiating about autonomy until the Belgrade armistice) and unification with the Old Kingdom. (Seton-Watson, p. 533; David Sherman Spector, *Romania at the Peace Conference. A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan I.C. Bratianu*, Iași 1995, p. 86.)

237 Miron Constantinescu, *L'acte de l' union du 1er décembre 1918*, in: Idem, *Études d'histoire transylvaine*, Bucarest 1970, p. 148. According to the Romanian sources, the Serbian authorities stopped trains in order to prevent Romanian delegates from Vršac, Bela Crkva and Southern Banat from attending the assembly, and temporarily arrested 105 Romanians. (Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, p. 245; Popi, *Banatski Rumuni*, pp. 220-221.) Only 60 delegates were allowed to attend. (Popi, *Banatski Rumuni*, p. 220.)

238 Constantinescu, p. 164. The Romanian National Council demanded rule over all predominantly Romanian communes already on November 9. (Othmar Kolar, *Rumänien und seine nationalen Minderhiten 1918 bis heute*, Wien, Köln, Weimar 1997, p. 30-31; Köpeczi (ed.), p. 645.)

239 Seton-Watson, p. 533. The Entante powers did not recognize the unilateral Romanian act. (Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, p. 207.)

240 Seton-Watson, p. 533; Kolar, p. 33; Köpeczi (ed.), pp. 647-649; Constantinescu, pp. 161-154; Vladimir Bugarski, *Stvaranje rumunske moderne države i prilike u Banatu*

according to the treaty with the Entente of 1916, laid claim to the whole of the Banat, approved the decisions of the Grand National Assembly and proclaimed annexation of Transylvania, the Banat and other Romanian-inhabited parts of Hungary on December 11, 1918.<sup>241</sup> This led not only to the diplomatic conflict with Yugoslavia (which was verging on open war, at a certain point), but also to the propaganda campaign against Yugoslavia on the part of the Romanian Government,<sup>242</sup> which was also felt among the Romanians and Germans in the Serbian-controlled territory.<sup>243</sup> Before the peace conference drew the borders in the Banat, but also afterwards, this propaganda strove to win over not only the diplomats of the victorious powers, but also the population.<sup>244</sup> In order to realize their own territorial aspirations, the Serbian authorities started their own campaign of winning hearts and minds of the non-Serbian population, as well as the action of sending petitions by the Serbian and non-Serbian inhabitants, demanding unification with Yugoslavia.<sup>245</sup> As in other cases,

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1918/1919. godine, in: Đerđ Gal (ed.), Đerđ Gal (ed.), *Prilozi za istoriju Rumuna, Savremeno obrazovanje*, 3, Novi Sad 1970 p. 106. Despite the promises, the Romanian authorities introduced state of siege and censorship, and even punishment by beating, and suspended the rights of assembly and traveling. (Köpeczi (ed.), p. 651.)

241 Kolar, p. 34. The Vojvodina Great Popular Assembly protested against these decisions. (Janković, Krizman (eds.), *Građa*, p. 668.)

242 Spector, p. 89; Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, p. 247. The question of the Romanians of the Timok Valley in Serbia proper was utilized in the campaign too. (Ibid., pp. 467-469.)

243 The centres of the Romanian propaganda in the territory that would eventually become Yugoslav were Vršac and Kovin, where even Romanian demonstrations occurred. The ringleaders being former Austro-Hungarian soldiers, the Serbian authorities took severe measures against them, arresting them as POWs. The treatment was eased only later for fear of diplomatic complications. (Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, pp. 216-217.)

244 AJ, F. 336, f. 5. A memo for the Peace Conference by the Serbian bishopric of Timisoira of July 3, 1919, complained at mishandling of the Serbs and wooing of the Germans by the Romanians in the part of the Banat under Romanian control. (AJ, F. 336, f. 3 and 4.) To be sure, the Romanian delegates claimed before the Peace Conference the Swabians were in favor of unification with Romania. (F. Deák, p. 377), and even after the peace treaty and delimitation, the Romanian officials were spreading their propaganda among the Germans in the Yugoslav part of the Banat. (AJ, 14, 144/503.)

245 Pašić demanded from Paris that petitions to the Peace Conference asking for unification with Yugoslavia be sent from Vršac, Bela Crkva and Kikinda as soon as possible. (AJ, F. 336, f. 4.) So on March 16, 1919 a rally of mostly Serbs in (the predominantly German-inhabited) Bela Crkva voted a resolution demanding of the Peace conference unification with Yugoslavia. The goal was to depict this as the will of the majority of the population. (AJ, F. 336, f. 3.) It seems over time the Serbian authorities managed to win over only the German radicals of Vršac, Pančevo and Veliki Bečkerek (Marin, p. 105), although Protić wrote in late May 1919 that in Timisoira 70% of the people were in favor of unification with Yugoslavia. (AJ, F. 336, f. 5.) In the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry such beliefs were cherished as late as August 1919. (Ibid.) On winning the population over cf.: Andrej Mitrović, *Razgraničenje Jugoslavije sa Mađarskom i Rumunijom 1919-1920. Prilog proučavanju Jugoslavije na konferenciji mira u Parizu*, Novi Sad 1975, pp. 277-278, 280. Similar actions were staged in other coveted territories. (Ibid, p. 276; AJ, F. 336, f. 17; 14, 145/510.) As for the demands for unification from 116 Baranya comunes, professors advising the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace Conference, Jovan Radonić and Stanoje Stanojević, judged them on June 13, 1919 bad and applicable only with caution and in smaller quantities. They were mostly unhappy with the typified form of the statements, which was repeated almost word for word over and over again, as well as with the

struggle for territories was what mattered, and not the nationality of their respective inhabitants.

As for the non-Serbian population, it reconciled, before and after delimitation, only gradually to the new state affiliation. It can be said that this process was not fully completed until 1941. Just like in the Southern parts, changes in the internal and foreign policy and the propaganda from the mother countries were awakening the hope of frontier revisions every now and then, whereas the Yugoslav policy, as we shall presently see, did little to win the population of the newly-acquired territories. The policy of the state, turned out to be clumsy – to say the least – so it quickly dissipated the sympathies of even those who in the beginning had them for the young kingdom. It was even more difficult to pacify the minorities if not to win over. As soon the turmoil of the upheaval for which the propertied classes feared they could turn into a social revolution and the Communist regime in Hungary passed away, the Hungarian and the Hungarian-friendly elite started casting longing glances over the border again. The officialdom, for which there was still no adequate replacement, partly continued to offer passive resistance, so that dismissing and expelling continued.<sup>246</sup> Among other unpopular measures that provoked (sometimes violent) resistance of the ordinary people was the military draft – not only of the members of the minorities, and not only in the Northern parts of the country.<sup>247</sup> This led to hostages being taken in German and Hungarian villages.<sup>248</sup> Dissatisfaction with the draft, otherwise a normal measure in any country, was caused by the four-year long bloody war and other factors. The dissatisfaction of the minorities in the Northern parts of the country was increased by the attempts of the authorities to recruit them before the time set for opting has run out (in 1922), whereas they were preventing them from voting with a shabby subterfuge that the citizenship option term set by the Versailles accord had not yet lapsed.<sup>249</sup>

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demands of certain communes which asked to remain under Yugoslav rule (but under Hungarian laws!), only as long as the Communist regime was in power in Hungary. (AJ, F. 337, f. 17.) Some of the statements are to be found in AJ, F. 337, f. 16 and 18.

- 246 The Huszár Government allowed on January 3, 1920 the Hungarian civil servants abroad to swear the oath of allegiance if it were not against their conscious. (Sajti, p. 12.) The Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior ordered on March 21, 1920 that the Hungarian officials who had not sworn the oath of allegiance, be sent to the places where they had residents' rights, within and without Yugoslavia. Since the Finance Ministry decided to keep, under certain conditions, part of the fired staff, those willing to take those terms were not to be expelled until April 15. (AJ, 14, 143/497) An approval of the Ministry of the Interior was needed for expulsion, but some subaltern organs were doing it off their own bat. (Ibid.) A document from December 1921 proves expelling the undesirables to Hungary was a routine police activity. (AJ, 14, 145/510)
- 247 The resistance occurred even in the martial Montenegro. (Rakočević, p. 164.)
- 248 They were allowed to move around freely, but were responsible for peace in the places they were living in. (Sajti, p. 15.)
- 249 AJ, 14, 143/497; 145/509; IAP, 91, 1920, kut. 6, pr. 3; kut. 7, pr. 34; Mesaroš, pp. 82-83; Lebl, *Klasne borbe*, p. 54; Kecić, *Revolucionarni radnički pokret*, pp. 143-145. Part of the Slovaks also resisted being called up. (AV, 81, 201/920; IAP, 91, kut. 7, pr. 34.) On April 26, 1920 the Ministry of the Interior ordered that the members of minorities born outside of Yugoslavia who refused to opt for the Yugoslav citizenship and to serve in the Army, were to be expelled. Others were to be put under surveillance, sacked, and used above else for the corvée. (AJ, 14, 143/497)

The major show of resistance, combining social and national grievances, was a large strike of railway men that started on April 16, 1920. It was triggered by the repealing of the protocol about the agreement between the Government and the Union of the Traffic and Transportation Workers and Employees and the imposition of the new temporary rules.<sup>250</sup> 50,000 railway men went on strike, and were soon joined by the members of the Union of Miners. The protest was very vehement, and it spread to the whole of the Vojvodina. The Government responded by mass layoffs and expulsions to Hungary. The peak of the strike was the attack by 300 Communist extremists led by Istvan Rutai on the guards in Subotica, which was repelled, and the whole movement was soon stifled. (During the next few days some 400 people were arrested in Subotica and its vicinity.) The true nature of the strike remained disputed. The leftist press ascribed it to the Horthy propaganda in order to fend off persecutions from the Communists. The bourgeois press claimed the Communists and adherents of Horthy were behind it, this being the usual way of looking at the "anti-state" occurrences among the working class,<sup>251</sup> the majority of which in the Northern parts consisted of the members of the minority nationalities, especially the Hungarians and Germans.

The entry of the national minorities in the Northern parts of the country into the new state was shorter and less turbulent than in the South. There were several reasons for that. The members of the national minorities lived partly scattered among the Yugoslav population, so that they were not able to influence their own fate in the days of the upheaval. Political decisions were also partly responsible: Hungary allowed peaceful occupation of its Southern parts, believing it would eventually preserve its integrity at the peace conference; the Styrian Government, due to military weakness and dependence on provisioning, showed no great bellicosity and no particular desire to keep the German enclaves; diplomatically and militarily (thanks to the presence of the French troops in the Banat) a Serbian-Romanian war over the Banat was prevented; Međumurje was taken by a small scale blitz action, whereas a similar attempt in Prekomurje proved a failure. Further reasons contributing to mostly peaceful annexation were (paradoxically enough) social riots which started spreading throughout the former Habsburg lands which enabled the local elites at first to come to terms with the Serbian military occupation – in order to safeguard their material interests. The make up of the inhabitants and its dispersion were also more favorable for the victors than in Kosovo. Geography also played a role: plains are convenient for clashes of armies, but not for guerilla warfare. Last, but not least, the mentality of the people and their relations before and during the war were different from those in the South. All this made the inclusion of the Northern parts (of which the Banat, the Bačka and Baranya were markedly minority-inhabited) much less violent than was the case with the inclusion of the Southern minority regions.<sup>252</sup> For these reasons, although some measures undertaken also in the

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250 Until January 1920 the railways in the Vojvodina were directed from the central office in Budapest which was also paying salaries. (Sajti, p. 13.)

251 Sajti, pp. 13-14; Toma Milenković, Generalni štrajk železničara u Vojvodini i pobuna u Subotici 1920. godine, *Istorijski glasnik*, 2-3, 1966; Mesaroš, pp. 83-84; Pekić, pp. 346-347.

252 Still the Romanian propaganda claimed between 100 and 200 Romanians had been killed only between 1920 and 1922. (Schmidt-Rösler, Rumänien, p. 419.)

Southern parts were introduced here too (hostage-taking,<sup>253</sup> internment camps,<sup>254</sup> disarming, arrests<sup>255</sup>), brutal force in the form of massive military operations with the use of artillery, was never applied here. Furthermore, peaceful measures of pacification of the non-Yugoslav population were also applied – but it is only fair to say that it was even more underrepresented in the local government<sup>256</sup> than were the Turks and Albanians in the Southern parts. However, it should be kept in mind that the events of 1918 and 1919 were just a beginning of the integration of the national minorities into the new body politic. That process was continued in time, albeit with less turbulence. But this held true for the members of the Yugoslav peoples as well.

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253 AV, F. 91, 4488/91; Kecić, *Revolucionarni radnički pokret*, p. 131; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 128. In Bela Crkva the hostages were taken proportionally from each nationality, which shocked the local Serbs. (Hrabak, *Logoši*, p. 131; Pekić, pp. 117-118; Šijački, p. 63.)

254 Goran Miloradović, *Logori za izolaciju u Kraljevini SHS (1919-1922)* (MA paper, mscr.), Beograd 1999 p. 274.

255 AV, 81, 1526/1919; Archiv des Instituts für donauschwäbische Geschichte und Landeskunde (henceforth: AIDGL), HA 1588. (The author of this particular report claims the Serbs were also arrested.)

256 Kirilović, *Novi Sad u danima oslobođenja*, p. 177; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska*, p. 106. In Vršac, two times more Romanian council members were appointed than Germans, although there were 14 times more Germans in the town than the Romanians! (Pekić, p. 196.)



## Chapter Five

# Legal Status of the National Minorities and Documents Defining it

The legal position of the national minorities in Yugoslavia was defined by three kinds of documents: by international treaties, conventions and agreements, by internal legislation and by ordinances, decrees, orders and other acts of temporary character. The acts from the last group mentioned were rather numerous and they mirrored constant changes in the minority policy. For that reason they shall not be dealt with in this chapter, but the most important documents from this group will be mentioned later on at appropriate places.

Protection of minorities is a very old institution. Some tend to see its roots in antiquity – in the obligation to protect guests and to give certain rights to foreigners.<sup>1</sup> Some point out Emperor Constantine's Edict of Milan of 313 as one of the first documents on religious tolerance.<sup>2</sup> Having become the dominant religion, Christianity showed little understanding for other confessions. Islam was more tolerant in that respect, so that it was probably no accident that the next phase in minority protection was recorded in the Muslim world – in the form of capitulations, i.e. in granting rights to foreign, Christian, subjects:<sup>3</sup> they were the fruit of foreign policy necessities, but because of the relative religious tolerance previously, they were certainly granted more easily.

At approximately the same time, the first agreements guaranteeing the freedom of religion appeared in Europe too. They were a corollary of the Reformation and the wars it caused.<sup>4</sup> International minority protection was granted exclusively to

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1 Dragolioub Krstitch, *Les minorités et la communauté internationale*, Paris 1924, pp. 25-36; Ilija Pržić, *Zaštita manjina*, Beograd 1933, pp. 26-28; Helmer Rosting, *Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations*, Geneva 1922, p. 2.

2 Krstitch, p. 43; Pržić, p. 28.

3 The first capitulation was given by Soliman II to Francois I in 1535. (Milan Marković, *Zaštita manjina u sklopu međunarodne zaštite ljudskih prava* (Ph.D thesis, Mscr.), Belgrade 1956, pp. 46-47; Krstitch, pp. 46-48; Rosting, p. 3; Silvio Devetak, *Manjine, ljudska prava, demokratija. Međunarodna zaštita ljudskih i etničkih prava*, Sarajevo 1989, pp. 71-72; Georg H.J. Erler, *Das Recht der nationalen Minderheiten*, Münster in Westfalen 1931, pp. 77-78.) Pržić claims the first capitulations were given by prophet Mohammed, whereas the subsequent Muslim rulers regulated the status of Christians, guarding partly their religious rights. (Pržić, p. 36.) Rehak mentions the regulation of the status of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, but he does not see it as protection of their rights, but as their limitation. (László Rehak, *Manjine u Jugoslaviji. Pravno-politička studija* (Ph.D. thesis, Mscr.), Novi Sad, Beograd 1965, p. 23.)

4 The first such contract was signed in Nuremberg in 1532. Contracts in Passau in 1552, Augsburg in 1555 followed. The most famous peace treaty guaranteeing religious freedom – but only for princes – was the Westphalia peace treaty which ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648. France, which had religious wars of its own, tried to establish freedom of religion by a series of edicts, the best known of which was that of Nantes in 1598. (Pržić, pp. 30-35; Rosting, pp. 3-5; Krstitch, pp. 54-68; Devetak, p. 72; Liga naroda i manjine, *Ženeva* [1924], pp. 7-8; Marković, pp. 47-48; Erler, pp. 72-76.)

religious minorities until the Congress of Vienna in 1815. It is understandable, since until that time, and indeed in many parts of Europe long afterwards, religion was much more important than nationality. The Congress of Vienna guaranteed national rights of the Poles in the three states which had carved up their territories (Austria, Prussia and Russia),<sup>5</sup> this being the first instance of protection of a national minority. However, throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century protection was granted to religious minorities – since the middle of the century increasingly to the Muslims who, with the decline of the Ottoman Empire and shrinking of its borders in ever increasing numbers became subjects of the newly-liberated Christian states, and to the Jews, who were to be granted the same rights in the countries of South Eastern Europe that they had already enjoyed in Western Europe. The protection of religious minorities remained dominant until the First World War. Protection of Muslims and Jews was imposed on Serbia and Montenegro (just like on Bulgaria and Romania) by the treaty of Berlin in 1878, as a precondition for independence.<sup>6</sup> As we have seen, both countries managed to circumvent the imposed obligations by ousting the majority of Muslims, but the Berlin treaty, by making independence conditional on the acceptance of the protection obligations and by infringing the state sovereignty of the new states, set an example for regulating the minority protection in the Paris peace treaties after the First World War.<sup>7</sup>

Apart from these international treaties, in the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, during which the importance of the nationality question increased, a whole series of decrees and laws regulating the status of religious and national minorities was passed. For the territory that would become Yugoslav in 1918 the most important were the Austrian Constitution of 1867 (the article 19 about the equality of nationalities) and the Hungarian Article of Law XLIV/1868 about the rights of minorities.<sup>8</sup> While the first was at least partly observed, the greatest shortcoming of the latter was that it was never put into practice – which contributed to deterioration of inter-ethnic relations in Hungary. As for the article 19 of the Austrian Constitution, it served as a model for the minority protection after the First World War.

The Balkan Wars did not signify a great headway in the legal regulation of the minority status, not only because the treaties which had terminated them were in force for just a short time. Although the USA demanded that minority protection clauses be written into the peace treaties after the First Balkan War, the Balkan states refused it with the explanation that the guarantees of equality were already contained in their constitutions.<sup>9</sup> The sole exception was made in the case of the Aromuns, who were granted autonomous churches and schools, through the

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5 Liga naroda, p. 8; Devetak, p. 73; Krstitch, p. 167; Rosting, p. 5; Pržić, pp. 49-51; Erler, pp. 89-91; Marković, p. 48.

6 Marković, pp. 49-53; Pržić, pp. 58-69; Rosting, pp. 6-7; Krstitch, pp. 190-194; Devetak, pp. 73-74; Liga naroda, p. 9; Rehak, p. 30.

7 Rehak, p. 38; Erwin Viefhaus, *Die Minderheitenfrage und die Entstehung der Minderheitenschutzverträge auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz 1919. Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Nationalitätenproblems im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Würzburg 1960, p. 47.

8 Rehak, pp. 45-46; Devetak, p. 74. In accordance with the Article of Law IX/1868 which regulated the status of the Orthodox Church, the Serbian ecclesiastical and scholarly autonomy was legalized in Hungary in 1887. (Erler, pp. 107-108)

9 Momir Stojković, *Istorijski razvoj zaštite manjina i savremena međunarodna aktuelnost manjinskog pitanja u balkanskim odnosima*, in: *Položaj manjina u SRJ. Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa održanog 11, 12. i 13. januara 1995*, Beograd 1996, p. 553; Pržić, p. 75.



exchange of notes between Romania and the Balkan allies.<sup>10</sup> The peace treaty that Serbia signed with Turkey on March 14, 1914 contained the stipulations that the London Treaty of May 30, 1913, as well as other treaties, remained in force, and that Muslims were guaranteed the same rights and religious liberties as the rest of the population. It was foreseen that all of them would be granted Serbian citizenship, with the right to opt for Turkey within the next three years and the right to take all their movable belongings with them, free of duty, if they chose to emigrate. According to the treaty, they would retain the rights over their immovable property too. The treaty also regulated the status of the Islamic Religious Community and religious schools. The Serbian Parliament ratified the treaty, but it was declared null and void when Turkey entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. As for Montenegro, it never signed a peace treaty with Turkey.<sup>11</sup>

The First World War was waged in the name of nationality, and it was a watershed in the international protection of minorities.<sup>12</sup> The map of Europe was re-drawn, the multinational empires disappeared and were replaced by young nation states. Since not everyone could be granted the right of self-determination,<sup>13</sup> a centuries-honored substitute<sup>14</sup> was found – protection of minorities.<sup>15</sup> The initiative was given by Jewish organizations,<sup>16</sup> and protection was granted to religious, linguistic and national minorities. The victorious powers saw in it the guarantee of peace, endangered, in their opinion, by the existence of minorities.<sup>17</sup>

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10 Stojković, p. 553; Boeckh, p. 68; Rosting, p. 7; Pržić, pp. 76-77; Marković, p. 55; Max Demeter Peifuss, *Die aromunische Frage. Ihre Entwicklung von der Ursprüngen bis zum Frieden von Bucarest (1913) und die Haltung Österreich-Ungarns*, Wien, Köln, Graz 1974, p. 124; Milan Bartoš, *Međunarodno javno pravo*, I, Beograd 1954, p. 424. According to the Serbian interpretation, this obligation seized since Romania canceled the Bucharest peace treaty during the First World War. For this reason all Aromunian schools in Serbian territory were closed down after 1918. (Pržić, p. 150; Peyfuss, p. 124; Boeckh, p. 355.)

11 Boeckh, p. 98-91; Bartoš, p. 425.

12 Erler, pp. 109-115; Pržić, pp. 77-82.

13 According to Joseph Schechtman there were some 60 million people belonging to national minorities before the war; after it, their number declined to some 20 million. (Joseph B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers 1939-1945*, New York 1946, p. 4.) The Bulletin # 15 of the Minority Press Bureau wrote on April 12, 1928 it was 40 million. (AJ, 305, 9/9) The same number was mentioned in Ammende (ed.), p. XII. The difference was certainly dependant of the definition of national minorities, accuracy of the census, political factors and the like.

14 If the way the minority protection was (not) observed throughout the 19th century is considered, it is plain that it was a method that existed rather in theory than in praxis.

15 Krstić believed the minority protection was an extension of the nationality principle which was applied when territories were divided, i.e., that self-determination and minority protection were two ways of applying the principle of nationality. (Krstitch, p. 273) The legal advisor to the American delegation at the Peace conference David Hunter Miller was of the opinion, that since just borders were impossible to draw, the only basis of the durable peace could be the protection of minorities. (Viefhaus, pp. 106.) This would remain the guiding principle in minority question, not only of the Peace Conference, but also of the League of Nations.

16 Erler, pp. 124-126; Viefhaus, pp. 92, 111, 123.

17 In other words, not the interests of minority communities as such were protected, but the stability of the political settlement in the form of the peace treaties. (Pržić, pp. 104-

The question of minority protection at the Peace Conference was relayed to the Commission for New States and Minorities. By May 31, 1919 it wrote a draft of the Convention on Protection of Minorities and handed it over to the Yugoslav delegation which refused it with the explanation that its acceptance would amount to tacit confession that Serbia had not fulfilled the obligations of the Treaty of Berlin.<sup>18</sup> This was the beginning of the Yugoslav opposition to the acceptance of the obligations concerning minority protection which would last until December 1919. Although it ostensibly had nothing against the protection of minorities, the Yugoslav government was actually opposed to it for several reasons. The main objection was that accepting the Convention would endanger the state sovereignty and would make possible foreign interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. The fear of this was particularly strong in view of Italian demands for autonomy of Macedonia. Yugoslavia was a mono-ethnic state, it was claimed, so minority protection was superfluous. Like other new or enlarged states which were opposing obligation of minority protection (Poland, Greece, Romania, and Czechoslovakia), the Yugoslav Government, and all political parties too, deemed the new states were brought into an unequal position compared with the big powers that accepted no such obligations – which was basically true.

The question of signing the Convention on the Protection of Minorities became acute in the second half of 1919 as the signing of the peace treaty with Austria containing stipulations about minority protection and the concomitant Convention on Protection of Minorities, Transit and Trade was drawing nearer. The Yugoslav delegation was particularly unhappy with the article 51 of the treaty with Austria, which they interpreted as giving a free hand to great powers to interfere. Furthermore, the Yugoslav Government and the delegation demanded that the minority protection be limited to the former Habsburg and Bulgarian territories. This failed. The treaty with Austria and the Convention were signed on September 10, 1919 without Yugoslavia and Romania who put up the most tenacious resistance. A fall of the Government was stage-managed in Belgrade in order to postpone the signing. At the same time, during the autumn, the pressure of the big powers for signing the treaty and the Convention, was getting stronger. The Yugoslav demand for some corrections was denied, and the sole consolation for the Yugoslav delegation was the statement by the great powers that the aim of the Convention was not to privilege the minorities, but only to prevent national strife, as well as that protection did not exempt the minorities from their civic duties. Pressed against the wall, the Yugoslav Government agreed to sign the peace treaty with Austria and the concomitant Convention on Minorities and Transit on December 5, 1919.<sup>19</sup>

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105; F.P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, London, New York, Toronto 1969 (5th ed.), p. 405; Helmut Pieper, *Die Minderheitenfrage und das Deutsche Reich 1919-1933/34*, Hamburg 1974; P. de Azkarate, *League of Nations and National Minorities. An Experiment*, Washington 1945, pp. 14-16.)

18 Viefhaus, p. 217.

19 About the resistance against the signing of the minority protection Convention by the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace Conference, cf.: Zoran Janjetović, *Pitanje zaštite nacionalnih manjina u Kraljevini SHS na mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919-1920*, *Istorija 20. veka*, XVIII, 2, 2000; Andrej Mitrović, *Jugoslavija na konferenciji mira u Parizu 1919-1920*, Beograd 1968, pp. 52, 200-206; Ivo J. Lederer, *Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study in Frontiermaking*, New Haven, London 1963, pp. 225-226, 239-249, 254-257; Krizman, Hrabak (eds.), *Zapisnici*, pp. 141, 143-144, 164, 168, 170, 176-195; Pržić, pp.

Signing the agreements was an unconditional surrender of Yugoslavia under the pressure of the great powers. However, it was not as important as the contemporary Yugoslav politicians feared. The international protection of minorities was not pursued too strictly<sup>20</sup> by the League of Nations (which was in charge of its implementation), and the rights of minorities were very narrowly defined in the Convention and in the article 51 of the Austrian Peace Treaty. In other words, fierce resistance on part of the new and enlarged states, and especially of Yugoslavia and Romania, proved to be a tempest in a tea-cup. This does not mean the Yugoslav authorities which had to implement the Convention throughout the inter-war period, stopped frowning at it.

Let's see what the famed article 51 of the Austrian Peace Treaty and the Convention on Protection of Minorities contained. The article 51 ran thus: "The State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes accepts all regulations, agreeing that they be inscribed in a treaty with the main allied and associated powers, that these powers may deem to be necessary in order to protect the interests of those inhabitants of the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes who differ from the majority of the population by race, language or creed."<sup>21</sup> The articles 70 and 76-80 regulated the matters of citizenship and the option, in a way that all inhabitants "domiciled" in a commune, were given the citizenship of the state in which their "domiciled" commune was located. People who came to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia after January 1, 1910, were not automatically granted citizenship – they had to apply for Yugoslav or Czechoslovak citizenship respectively. The article 78 prescribed a one year's opting period for the people who would lose their Austrian citizenship under this treaty, and the article 80 dealt with the right of the members of national minorities to opt for citizenship of Austria or of some successor state.<sup>22</sup>

The Convention on Protection of Minorities contained in chapter 1 the following stipulations: article 1 prescribed that the articles 2-8 of the Convention would be recognized as basic laws that no other laws could contradict. Article 2 guaranteed the protection of life and liberty of the members of minorities, as well as freedom of worship; Articles 3-6 regulated matters of citizenship and option within two years, preserving real estate property rights; <sup>23</sup> Article 7 guaranteed equality before the law, regardless of nationality and religion, as well as the right to use the mother-tongue in private and commercial affairs, religion, press and at

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111-118; Rehak, pp. 163-175. The main part of the relevant Yugoslav documents about this topic is to be found in the Archives of Yugoslavia, F. 336, f. 48.

20 The main reason was the fact that the Convention made provisions for no institutions for protection of minority rights in case they were violated, that the League of Nations failed to create such institutions and because minority question remained a second-class concern in the international relations. (Azkarate, pp. 116, 118; Walters, p. 404) Until the end of 1920, there were some 300 minority petitions (half of which were refused); 1929-1939, there were 585, 243 of which were scraped. (Rehak, p. 128)

21 The rest of this article deals with transit and trade. (Ugovor o miru sa Austrijom, Zbirka zakona, sv. 61, Beograd 1927, pp. 49-50.)

22 Ibid, p. 60. The same provisions were to be found in the peace Treaty with Hungary from 1920: the article 44 corresponded to the article 51 of the Austrian treaty, whereas the matters of citizenship and option were regulated in the articles 61-65. (Ugovor o miru sa Ugarskom, Zbirka zakona, sv. 64, Beograd 1927, pp. 42-44.)

23 However, the question of the citizenship of some colonists from Germany and Galicia in Bosnia was still not regulated in early 1930s. (AJ, 14, 227/812; Burda, pp. 185, 187.)

public meetings; Article 8 made it possible to found humanitarian, religious and social institutions, schools and educational establishments; Article 9 obliged Yugoslavia to grant “appropriate facilitations” so that minority children receive primary education in their mother tongue, with concomitant instruction in the “state language”. In the places and districts in “considerable degree inhabited by members of minorities,” it was also obliged to set aside a proportional part of the public funds for educational, religious and humanitarian purposes of the minorities. Article 10 regulated family and personal status of the Muslims in accordance with their customs, protection of their buildings and institutions, and possibility of founding new ones. This article put all these obligations under the guarantee of the League of Nations and they were not to be changed without the consent of the majority in the Council of the League of Nations. With this article Yugoslavia accepted that any member of the Council was allowed to draw the attention of the body to possible infringements or the danger of infringement of these obligations, whereas the Council was granted the right to undertake the necessary steps. Yugoslavia also agreed to regard the eventual disputes in these matters as international disputes (in accordance with the article 14 of the Pact of the League of Nations) and, if the other litigant party so wished, to submit it to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the verdict of which would be final.<sup>24</sup> It is plain to see that the Convention was most succinct. The number of the guaranteed rights was extremely small, and it does not include even the use of the mother-tongue in communication with the authorities or in courts. Neither does it include the instruction in mother-tongue in secondary schools, nor does it provide for proportional participation in the administration and many other things which would be in keeping with the modern standards of minority protection. However, at the time it came to being, the Convention still guaranteed a modicum of minority rights. Since until then national rights were hardly protected at all, the stipulations of the Convention were a thorn in the side of the champions of strong nation-states in Eastern Europe. For their part, the authors of the Convention, mindful of the (over)sensitivities of the countries which were supposed to implement it, were rather moderate in definition of the minority rights. Thus demands for territorial, and even cultural autonomies were dropped, minorities were not granted the status of legal persons (protection was meant only for individuals), so that individuals and minority organizations couldn’t directly petition the League of Nations.<sup>25</sup> It is important to note that the article 9 was valid only “for the territories allotted to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after January 1, 1913”. According to the Yugoslav interpretation, which was consistently upheld throughout the inter-war period, this meant the minorities in the Southern parts of the country were exempted from protection.<sup>26</sup> Obviously, this interpretation was in accordance with the wishes of the ruling circles. However, it was not based on the Convention itself: Article 9 clearly stipulated the Convention was not valid only for the territories

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24 Momir Stojković (ed.), *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi 1876-1996. Dvostrani i višestrani međunarodni ugovori i drugi diplomatski akti o državnim granicama, političkoj i vojnoj saradnji, verskim i etničkim manjinama*, II tom (1919-1945), Beograd 1998, pp. 34-38.

25 Stojković, p. 554; Bastian Schot, *Nation oder Staat? Deutschland und Minderheitenschutz. Zur Völkerbundspolitik der Stresemann-Ära*, Marburg/Lahn 1988, pp. 6-7.

26 AJ, 38, 93/225.

Serbia/Yugoslavia acquired before January 1, 1913 – which effectively meant, in the territory of Serbia before the Balkan Wars. This meant only the Vlachs (Romanians) of North-Eastern Serbia were deprived of the right to have schools in their mother tongue and proportional part of public funds for educational, religious and humanitarian purposes. According to this, the claim is untrue that one finds in the relevant literature that the Albanians had no treaty protection:<sup>27</sup> they did have it, but it was not implemented in practice. On the other hand, they were not apt enough nor politically influential to enforce its implementation, whereas scholarly and educational matters were not the prime concern of their elite and masses.

Apart from this Convention that Yugoslavia concluded with the allied powers, it also concluded several conventions regarding the protection of minorities with Italy, as well as the convention about minority schools in the Banat with Romania in 1933.

Conventions with Italy came to being as an attempt to appease the constantly menacing aggressive neighbor from the other shore of the Adriatic. The first of these agreements was signed in Rapallo on November 12, 1920. Article 7 of this agreement confirmed the economic privileges that the Italians in Dalmatia had enjoyed under Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, the Italians, former Austrian subjects, were granted one year to opt for Italian citizenship, but without the obligation to emigrate to Italy. Moreover, they were guaranteed the right to use their language and freedom of religion, and the validity of academic titles acquired in Italy until that time was recognized too.

The Convention for General Understanding was concluded in Rome on October 23, 1923, which granted the Italian optants in Dalmatia the same rights that other minorities were enjoying under the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, stressing especially the right to maintain Italian schools with teachers who would be Italian citizens. Furthermore, the right of employment in industry, commerce, and professions was granted, with the sole exception of the legal profession and notary duties. (The note of August 21, 1924, under certain conditions, made possible the work of lawyers too.) The letter of the Yugoslav ambassador of October 23, 1923 specified the right of the Italians to have teachers and catechists of Italian citizenship in private Italian schools, as well as, the inspection of these schools by Yugoslav educational authorities. Moreover, Italian text books were allowed in these schools.

Another in the series of conventions with Italy were the Nettuno Conventions concluded on July 20, 1925. They provided for the right to communicate with the authorities (except with customs officials) in Italian and the validity of documents in that language. Furthermore, the Italian citizens who acquired that status through the Treaty of Rapallo, were exempt from the limitation for buying and owning land in the 50 km broad border zone. A special treaty postponed the agrarian reform on the Italian-owned estates and set the indemnification for the seized land.<sup>28</sup>

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27 This was claimed for instance by Ali Hadri (Cf. Ali Hadri, *Kosovo i Metohija u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, Istorijski glasnik, 1-2, 1967, p. 72) and *Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia* (EJ, 1, Zagreb 1980, p. 5). Reuter claims correctly the authorities considered the Convention on the Minority Protection was valid only for the Northern parts, but is wrong when he claims the Albanian minority was not officially recognized. (J. Reuter, p. 28)

28 Pržić, pp. 143-149; Rehak, pp. 182-196; Pierre Jaquin, *La question des minorités entre l'Italie et la Yougoslavie*, Paris 1929, pp. 49-52.

Conventions with Italy had greater importance as a sign how far the Yugoslav authorities would go in their appeasement policy towards Italy than they had for the general position of national minorities in the country. However, they showed that even a numerically insignificant minority can receive large concessions when backed by a potentially dangerous mother country, i.e., it stressed the fact that even large minorities could not count on concessions if they did not have backing of a major power. This was sending a dangerous message – to the state, but also to the national minorities who were hoping they would achieve their (often rightful) claims by relying on their respective mother countries, who often did not regard national minorities as their first concern, but rather as just another piece on the diplomatic chess-board.

Whereas the conventions with Italy were concluded with a potential foe, the relations with Romania were much more friendly, and from 1921 even allied. For that reason, the need to regulate the status of the Romanian Schools in Yugoslavia, and the Serbian ones in the Romanian part of the Banat arose. To this goal, an agreement in Bled was concluded in 1927, but Yugoslavia failed to ratify it,<sup>29</sup> so it was never put to practice. Five years later, another, similar convention was signed, ratified and implemented by both parties,<sup>30</sup> but it will be dealt with in the later chapter about minority education.<sup>31</sup>

Apart from international legal documents, the status of minorities was defined also by some Yugoslav ones. The so-called Vidovdan Constitution of 1921, while giving general guarantees for the equality of all citizens, guaranteed only the right to primary education in the mother-tongue, as a special minority right.<sup>32</sup> This was the only mention of the national minorities in the supreme legal act. The so-called “Granted Constitution” of 1931 which alleviated the royal dictatorship which had been introduced in 1929, made no mention of the minorities whatsoever. The Primary Schools Act of 1929<sup>33</sup> regulated in an article the matter of parallel classes in minority languages, but this will be dealt with in the chapter about education.

Further laws regulating the status of the national minorities were some laws defining the status of certain religious communities which partly or predominantly had minority following. First of them were the Law on Evangelical Christian Churches and on the Reformed Church in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia of 1930<sup>34</sup> and

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29 Pržić, p. 151; Rehak, p. 205; Branislav Gligorijević, *Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija o uređenju manjinskih škola Rumuna u Banatu 1933. godine*, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 7, 1973, pp. 82-85; Gligor Popi, *Jugoslovensko-rumunski odnosi 1918-1941*, Novi Sad 1984, p. 76.

30 Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 102; Idem, *Jugoslovensko-rumunski odnosi*, p. 98; *Die jugoslawisch-rumänische Schulkonvention: eine vorbildliche Regelung*, Nation und Staat, VII, 10/11, 1933, pp. 657-658; Rehak, p. 204; Gligorijević, *Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija*, pp. 86-88. The text of the Convention see in: SBNS KJ, *Redovan saziv za 1932/33. godinu*, knj. IV, Beograd 1933, pp. 121-126; Stojković (ed.), pp. 363-369.

31 An international agreement was also signed with Turkey about the emigration of 40.000 Muslim families to that country, but since it does not actually deal with minority protection, it will not be discussed here.

32 The last paragraph of article 16 reads: “The minorities of different race and language shall be given primary school instruction in their mother-tongue, under conditions to be prescribed by law.” (*Ustav Kraljevine SHS, Službene novine Kraljevine SHS*, III, 142 a, June 28, 1921.)

33 *Službene novine Kraljevine SHS*, 289, December 9, 1929.

34 *Službene novine Kraljevine SHS*, April 28, 1930.

the Law on the Islamic Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,<sup>35</sup> also from 1930. Whereas the believers of the Evangelical and the Reformed Churches were mostly all members of national minorities, the Islamic Religious Community consisted only in part of the members of the Albanian and Turkish minorities. These laws shall be dealt with in the chapter devoted to religious communities, since the make-up of these communities was determined, apart from their internal documents, by these laws.

The number of legal documents (orders, ordinances, instructions, and other temporary acts excluded) regulating the status of the national minorities was not large. There were several reasons for this. The Yugoslav governments were loath to accept international obligations concerning minorities, even in the cases of bilateral agreements with friendly countries such as Romania, seeing in them a breach of their sovereignty and fearing that such obligations could become a basis of foreign intervention in Yugoslav internal affairs. As for the Yugoslav legislature, it remained scanty because Yugoslavia was seeing itself as a nation-state, whereas the presence of the national minorities was played down – their number, importance and even mention in legal acts. Furthermore, the Yugoslav authorities were not willing to tie their hands by laws, but were rather trying to regulate as many questions as possible by decrees, ordinances etc, which could easily be repealed, abrogated or changed. (In a country of complicated parliamentarism, where it was often difficult to pass even the basic laws, this is understandable to a certain degree.) However, regulating the status of the minorities through decrees, orders or instructions, had also the advantage for the controlling powers because it could be used as a means of blackmail or pressure, or as a pawn in the political haggling. Furthermore, this kind of acts enabled the Government to grant certain privileges to a minority, without a legal obligation to grant the same to all others. This enabled the Government to prevaricate in respect to minority demands. For these reasons the number of legal acts defining the status of the national minorities remained small, with their stipulations being narrow in scope, making a restrictive minority policy, with occasional ad hoc concessions, possible.

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35 Službene novine Kraljevine SHS, February 7, 1930.





## Chapter Six

# Social Structure of the National Minorities and their Participation in the Economic Life

Due to the lack of sources, but also due to their frequent inconsistency when they are available, this chapter cannot pretend to be but a sketch about these matters.<sup>1</sup> Because of such conditions of the relevant literature and archival sources, this chapter will sometimes be somewhat “impressionist” and certainly less exact than it would be desirable, but we still hope it will be able to convey the essential – namely how and by what the people lived. In that context, the participation in economic life will be only touched upon, because to elucidate that topic one would need research in its own right, and a separate monograph.<sup>2</sup>

First we shall deal with the Northern parts for which the reliable data are more abundant. Since 78.8% of the population of Yugoslavia (in 1921), i.e. 76.58% (in 1931)<sup>3</sup> was employed in agriculture, forestry and fishery, we shall first turn our attention to the question of land-possession on the part of the minorities, leaving for the moment aside the very important question of the agrarian reform, to which a separate chapter will be

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1 Statistics about the social make-up and economic activities are either non-existent or snippy, not only for the former Ottoman territories well-known for their sloppy administration, but also for the incomparably more developed former Habsburg lands. (Mesaroš, p. 88. Toma Milenković, *Stav Radikalne stranke prema agrarnoj reformi (1918-1929. godine)*, Istorija 20. veka, XI, 1970, p. 32; Jozo Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia*, Stanford, London 1955, p. 209; Todor Avramović, *Privreda Vojvodine od 1918. do 1929/30. godine s obzirom na stanje pre Prvog svetskog rata*, Novi Sad 1965, pp. 10-11, 257, 267-267; Zorn, *Nemški trgovski obrati*, p. 113; Marijan Žnidarič, *Prispevek k zgodovini Nemcev v Mariboru med obema vojnama*, *Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje*, LIV, 1-2, 1983, p. 221.) As an example how contradictory the statistics can be, see several different statistics of land possessions in the Vojvodina, in: VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 18, d. 1; AJ, 38, 88/498.

2 To reconstruct participation in economic life, particularly when industrial enterprises, commercial firms or artisan shops are in question, even in an underdeveloped country such as Yugoslavia has been, where their number was not overly large, even if reliable statistics were at our disposal, would be an extremely difficult task. The owner(s) of each and every firm would have to be established, the amount and origin of its capital, its business success and many other relevant facts. Particularly hard nut to crack would be joint-stock companies with ethnically mixed stock-holders, as well as firms in which one partner belonged to a Yugoslav, and the other to a minority nationality. Finally, it would be important to investigate what owners belonging to minorities were spending their income on, i.e. were they supporting cultural, political, economic and other minority institutions, or were they integrated in the corresponding strata of the majority population.

3 Branko Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije, I. Kraljevina Jugoslavija 1918-1941*, Beograd [1988], p. 67.

devoted. The greatest part of the Northern territories inhabited by national minorities being taken away from the Kingdom of Hungary, the Hungarian statistics will be our starting point. However, we shall keep in mind that it concerned historical Hungary as a whole, and not only those parts which would subsequently fall to Yugoslavia.

This is how the ethnic make-up of the landowners in Hungary (without Croatia) looked like in 1915:<sup>4</sup>

Nationality	% of population	% of landowners
Hungarians	54.51	59.9
Germans	10.4	9.9
Slovaks	10.7	7.7
Romanians	16.1	16.0
Ruthenians	2.5	2.3
Croats	1.1	0.5
Serbs	2.5	2.5
Others	2.2	1.2

According to the data by Bogumil Hrabak, the distribution of the land (in hectares) in Southern Hungary looked like this:<sup>5</sup>

Size of holdings	Hungarians	Germans	Romanians	Serbs	Others
Under 2 ha	27.5 %	24.6%	9.5%	26.5%	11.8%
2.5-5 ha	21.7%	18.5%	12.9%	34%	12.9%
5-25 ha	21.3%	24.3%	—	31.9%	12.7%
25-50 ha	19.3%	37.4%	4.3%	27.4%	11.6%
50-500 ha	25.8%	31.6%	2.2%	27.7%	12.7%

The shortcoming of this table is that it puts large groups of owners into one category which makes a more detailed insight into the social structure impossible. According to Nikola Gaćeša, national break-down of the landowners in Syrmium County was as follows:<sup>6</sup>

Size of holding	Serbs	Croats	Hungarians	Germans
Up to 1 morgen	46.3%	30.92%	4.29%	13.63%
1-5 morgen	50.15%	30.92%	2.31%	8.17%
5-20 morgen	50.53%	26.32%	2.11%	18.45%
20-100 morgen	42.88%	15.95%	4.21%	36.22%
100-200 morgen	36.71%	13.79%	12.90%	33.28%
200-1000 morgen	4.42%	41.20%	10.98%	27.16%
Total	42.50%	31.19%	40.18%	17.36%

4 Laslo Kevago, Statistička ispitivanja društveno-ekonomskog položaja južnih Slovena u Ugarskoj početkom XX veka, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke, 54, 1969, p. 53.

5 Hrabak, Dezerterstvo, p. 15.

6 Nikola Gaćeša, Posedovni odnosi u Vojvodini pred Prvi svetski rat, in: Idem, Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije, Novi Sad 1995, p. 44.

In Syrmium County in 1895 the number of households according to the nationality of their owners looked like this in percentages:<sup>7</sup>

<b>Size of holding</b>	<b>Serbs</b>	<b>Croats</b>	<b>Germans</b>	<b>Hungarians</b>
Up to 1 morgen	16.98%	18.43%	36.32%	33.86%
1-5 morgen	20.78%	20.06%	25.91%	21.16%
5-20 morgen	43.33%	46.82%	27.04%	24.31%
20-100 morgen	18.45%	14.51%	9.71%	19.28%
100-200 morgen	0.35%	0.19%	0.44%	1.02%
200-1000 morgen	0.10%	0.60%	0.34%	0.29%
Over 1000 morgen	0.01%	0.02%	0.24%	0.08%

This table has the same shortcoming as the previous one, but still it is obvious that more than a half of the Germans and Magyars belonged to small holders, whereas the Serbs and Croats were most often to be found in the two medium categories. Among the German and Hungarian landowners large ones were overrepresented, but this meant little from the point of view of ordinary Germans or Magyars. Some of the first were somewhat better off than was the average in their ethnic group. These were mostly people living in older colonies where the Germans were enlarging their landholdings at the expense of the Serbian and Croatian population, although by the turn of the century this expansion was slowing.<sup>8</sup> The German expansion was due to better tilling methods, greater diligence, thriftiness and soberness in comparison with the natives.<sup>9</sup> German land ownership was expanding not only in Syrmium and Slavonia, where the land was cheaper, but also in the Bačka, the Banat and the rest of Hungary.<sup>10</sup> Although it is not quite adequate, we reproduce here the structure of the land ownership for the whole of Yugoslavia according to Branko Petranović:<sup>11</sup>

<b>Size of holding</b>	<b>% of owners</b>	<b>% of land</b>
Up to 5 ha	67.8	28
5-20 ha	29.3	49.3
over 20 ha	2.9	22.7

This table can serve just for overall orientation, since it sums up various kinds of land holdings throughout the country, with soil of various quality, including large estates etc. The actual living standards of people was dependent not only on the size of holdings, but also on many other factors; so that the economic strength and living standards of the members of minorities can be judged best if compared to their Yugoslav neighbors, rather than with the national average.

7 Ibid, p. 46.

8 Marković, *Pravoslavna srpska parohija*, pp. 48, 65; Simonović, p. 10.

9 Marković especially points out the last mentioned thing. (Cf. pp. 22, 27, 31-34, 64.)

10 AIDGL HA, 117; Zoran Janjetović, *O širenju zemljoposeda vojvođanskih Nemaca između dva svetska rata*, *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju*, V, 1-3, 1998, pp. 104-105; Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 34; Slavko Stanić, *Švabe u Vojvodini*, *Letopis Matice srpske*, knj. 330, sv. 1-2, 1931; Wolf, pp. 139-140.

11 Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije*, I, p. 62.

According to a document from the 1930s, when the main part of the agrarian reform had already been executed, this is how the ethnic make-up of the landowners in the Bačka, the Banat and Baranya looked like:<sup>12</sup>

### The Bačka

	Serbs	Croats	Slov.	Ruthen.	Germ.	Jews	Other
% of holdings	26.79	4	6.15	3.23	30.80	0.49	9.32
size in %	23.70	2.07	3.18	2.22	27.94	1.27	19.10

### Baranya

	Serbs	Croats	Ruth.	Germans	Magyars	Jews	public
% of owners	11.8	20.80	0.04	21.40	34.40	0.20	1.32
Size in %	5.88	13.87		12.73	14.3	0.62	52.7

### The Banat<sup>13</sup>

	Serbs	Croats	Slov.	Bulgar.	Ruth.	Germ.	Mag.	Czechs
% of owners	43.88	0.79	3.81	0.66	16.58	19.73	13.18	0.43
Size in %	36.19	0.68	1.86	0.62	11.97	16.06	6.69	0.19

According to Gaćeša, the arable land in the Vojvodina in 1938 was distributed as shown: <sup>14</sup>

Nationality	area in morgen	%
Serbs	1,210,090	42.38
Germans	663,572	23.22
Magyars	403,626	14.12
Romanians	148,213	5.18
Autonomous corporations	102,950	3.58
Slovaks	99,851	3.48
Bunjevci	89,213	3.12
Croats	64,148	2.24
Jews	33,215	1.16
Ruthenians	24,957	0.86
Other Slavs	11,799	0.41
Other non-Slavs	7,218	0.25

- 12 VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 18, d. 1. Quite different figures for the Banat and the Bačka in 1940/41 are quoted by Egger. (Leopold Egger, *Das Vermögen und die Vermögensverluste der Deutschen in Jugoslawien*, Sindelfingen 1983, pp. 34-35.)
- 13 Šijački quotes a report by the Ministry of Agriculture for 1938, which paints a considerably different picture – which is yet another example of contradictory sources. (Šijački, p. 85)
- 14 Nikola Gaćeša, *The Germans in the agrarian Reform and Land Ownership Patterns in the Vojvodina Province During the Period from 1919 to 1941*, in: *The Third Reich and Yugoslavia 1933-1945*, Belgrade 1977, p. 155. The same data in: Šijački, p. 85.

These data are illustrative if we consider the economic strength of whole ethnic groups, but they do not tell us enough about the social make-up of each of them. Unfortunately, the data for all national minorities nationwide are lacking. For this reason, we are compelled to reconstruct the social make-up of certain minorities fragmentarily, often based on the data for just one region, or even just for few places.<sup>15</sup> Here is the national make-up of the landless in the Bačka according to Slavko Šećerov:<sup>16</sup>

Nationality	# of the landless	% of the landless
Magyars	23.863	41.41
Serbs	13.071	22.68
Germans	10.475	18.18
Croats & Bunjevci	5.628	9.77
Slovaks	3.153	5.47
Russians & Ruthenians	1.372	2.38
Jews	16	0.02

This is how it looked like in relation to the total number of people of various nationalities:<sup>17</sup>

Nationality	total	# of landless	% in nationality
Hungarian	260,988	23,863	9.14
Serbs & Croats	246,598	18,699	7.58
Germans	173,796	10,475	6.02
Slovaks	30,993	3,153	10.17

This was, according to the same author, the ethnic make-up of the owners of plots between 0 and 10 morgen:<sup>18</sup>

Nationality	#	%
Hungarians	9,978	35.26
Serbs	6,774	23.94
Germans	6,171	21.81
Bunjevci & Croats	2,534	8.96
Slovaks	2,180	7.7
Russians&Ruthenians	654	2.31
Others	6	0.02

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15 For the Banat in 1919 only the statistics of estates over 200 morgen and estates of legal persons survive. (Nikola Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu 1919-1941*, Novi Sad 1972, p. 29.)

16 Slavko Šećerov, *Socijalno agrarni odnosi u Bačkoj pred izvođenje agrarne reforme*, Beograd 1929, p. 119.

17 Šećerov, p. 125.

18 Ibid.

On the other hand, here is the ethnic make-up of the big landowners and the combined size of their estates:

Nationality	morgen	%
Magyars	61,846	45.36
Germans	38,202	28.02
Serbs	17,345	12.73
Jews	13,827	10.14
Bunjevci	5,110	3.75

From these tables it is obvious that the greatest social differences existed among the Hungarians who had at the same time the highest number of landless and small peasants and large landowners.<sup>19</sup> With other ethnic groups, the landowner-ship patterns corresponded better with their share in the overall population.

This is what the break-down of the Hungarian landowners in Croatia looked like:<sup>20</sup>

Morgen	<1	1-5	5-10	10-20	20-50	50-100	100-200	200-1000	>1000
No.	1,803	2,05	1,769	1,641	564	58	22	35	46
%	22.6	25.8	21.2	20.1	7.1	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.6
Morgen	851	5,708	12,921	22,848	15,694	4,016	2,932	15,894	263,437
%	0.2	1.6	3.8	6.6	4.6	1.2	0.8	4.6	76.8

From the above table one can see, that the social make-up of the Magyars was replicated in Croatia too, although estates over 1000 morgen were not listed. Small and dwarf landowners make up  $\frac{3}{4}$  of Hungarian landowners, whereas a handful of large owners had more land than all others put together. Furthermore, according to Gujaš, among the Hungarians in Croatia there were many agricultural servants, and especially many tenants of plots under 50 morgens.<sup>21</sup>

The Romanians in the Yugoslav Banat were 90% peasants. There were a few Romanian artisans in towns (Vršac, Kovin, Pančevo, Veliki Bečkerek, Bela Crkva). According to Popi, the make-up of Romanian landowners was in keeping with the Vojvodina average.<sup>22</sup>

As for the Ruthenians, the data about their landholdings are even more fragmentary than for other nationalities. They are known for two of their largest settlements in 1918:<sup>23</sup>

19 Something more will be said of the large landowners in the chapter on agrarian reform.

20 Gujaš, p. 64.

21 Ibid.

22 Popi, Rumuni, pp. 13-14.

23 Arpad Lebl, Rusini od 1890. do 1918, in: Iz istorije vojvodanskih Rusina do 1941. godine, Novi Sad 1977, p.107.

<b>morgen</b>	<b>Ruski Krstur (# of families &amp; %)</b>	<b>Kucura (# of families &amp; %)</b>
0-5	511 (69.88%)	428 (72.50%)
5-15	201 (24.60%)	102 (16.12%)
15-25	36 (4.40%)	63 (10.13%)
25-50	9 (1.12%)	6 (1.25%)

Summary data available for other Ruthenian settlements show that they possessed somewhat more land only in few places, but even that was little per person.<sup>24</sup>

<b>Place</b>	<b># of Ruthenians</b>	<b>morgen</b>
Bačinci	750	966
Berkasovo	850	808
Đurđevo	1,915	2,964
Kucura	2,654	5,000
Mikloševci	750	1,622
Novi Sad	502	?
Petrovci	818	2,045
Piškurevci	603	1,490
Rajevo Selo	510	871
Ruski Krstur	6,300	11,776
Sremska Mitrovica	900	?
Šid	1,130	860
Vrbas	700	186
Other	2,000	?

Vladimir Bilnja claims the situation in Syrmium was somewhat better since there around one half of the Ruthenians had either the whole "session" (12 morgen), a half or a quarter of it. On the other hand, the soil was of poorer quality there, and therefore cheaper – which was the reason for emigrating, not only for the Ruthenians. The Ruthenian way of tilling the land was rather old-fashioned so that the majority of them could not make progress. The exceptions were those who adopted German working technique.<sup>25</sup> Claims by L. Lenard that "these "Yugoslav Russians" stood economically very well, that they had fertile land, neat villages, and that one could notice prosperity at the first glance", must be discarded as exaggerations.<sup>26</sup>

Let's see now how the make-up of the landholdings among the Vojvodina, Swabians, about which legends were spun, looked like according to the Volksdeutsche researcher Johann Wuescht. His table does not include 11% of the Swabian holdings belonging not to peasants, but to burghers, artisans and workers.<sup>27</sup>

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24 Bilnja, *Rusini*, p. 28.

25 *Ibid.*, pp. 30-33.

26 L. Lenard, *Slovenske narodne manjine u Jugoslaviji*, Narodna odbrana, 52, 1929, p. 855.

27 84% of the Ethnic-Germans in the Vojvodina lived in villages, 65% of the village, and 30% of the urban population was employed in agriculture: this points out to a large number of craftsmen in Swabian villages, but also to the incomplete separation of towns

Morgen	% of holdings	% of all arable land
5-10	36.6	13.5
10-20	32.3	23.3
20-50	25.4	39.7
50-100	4.9	16.6
over 100	0.8	7.0

This table shows clearly how wrong was the wide-spread belief the Germans had been particularly wealthy. Practically 2/3 of the Swabians had only small holdings, ¼ middle, whereas large estates were few. How then is the myth of “the opulent Swabian” to be explained? It seems it was the comparison with the even less wealthy non-Germans on the one hand, and the German expansion through buying of land on the other, in which the wealthy, but also not so wealthy (in Syrmium and Slavonia) were engaged, which created the impression among the Slavic population that all those buying were rich. Finally, it was the better living standards of the Swabians, made possible as much by wealth as by the life-style culture they had brought from their old homeland, which presupposed not only better hygiene, but also more orderly and sober way of living that facilitated faster acquisition and better preservation of landholdings, than was the case with the Slavic (except for Slovak), Hungarian or Romanian population. However, there were differences among the Swabians too – not only between those of the Vojvodina and those of Syrmium and Slavonia, but also between those of the Banat and those of the Bačka: German holdings in the Banat were somewhat smaller, with less cattle, and also less industrial crops were cultivated there than in the Bačka.<sup>28</sup>

In Đakovština, part of Slavonia with considerable portion of minority population, the ethnic make-up of the holdings looked thus:<sup>29</sup>

Nationality	Croats & Serbs	Germans	Jews	Hungarians
% of land	78.8	15	2.1	4.8
morgen	86,917	16,554	2,314	5,289

Since the Germans were 21% of the population in Đakovština,<sup>30</sup> it is plain that the myth about “the rich Swabian” was here even less true than in the Vojvodina. For the Germans in Slavonia, it was typical that a somewhat smaller percentage (52%) of them was employed in agriculture than in the Vojvodina.<sup>31</sup>

As for the Germans in Slovenia (even if we leave aside the several landowners with really huge estates),<sup>32</sup> their share of the landholdings was comparatively large.

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from villages (so-called Bauernstädte, Stadtdörfer). (Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien, Augsburg 1994, p. 15E.) A somewhat different social structure of the Swabians in the whole of Southern Hungary see in: Gottas, p. 367.

28 HWBGAD, I, p. 282.

29 Geiger, Nijemci u Đakovu, p. 62.

30 Ibid., p. 61.

31 Das Schicksal, p. 18E.

32 Dušan Biber, Socijalna struktura nemačke nacionalne manjine u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji, Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis, 1-4, 1978, p. 406; Idem, Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji 1933-1941, Ljubljana 1966, p. 28.



Around one half of the Slovenian Germans lived in towns.<sup>33</sup> The largest number of German who were peasants lived in Kočevje. In Southern Styria only 14% of the Volksdeutsche were employed in agriculture, and in other parts of Slovenia this percentage was even smaller. However, German land holdings in some parts of Slovenia was sizable. In Lower Styria, out of 53,671 ha, the Germans possessed 21,146 ha. Almost one half of the vineyards around Maribor, Ormož and Slovenska Bistrica, and over one half in Halozi, Gornja Radgona and Gornji Cmurek belonged to the Germans.<sup>34</sup>

The main German-inhabited region in Slovenia was Kočevje, where, according to the Volksdeutsche census from March 1941, 12,498 Germans (2,754 families) lived. Out of that, 1,889 families were engaged in land-tilling and cattle-raising, and 346 in crafts. The total German landholding in that area, according to this census, was 47,528 ha.<sup>35</sup> However, it should be kept in mind that Kočevje was an economically neglected forest area with unproductive (although not everywhere equally bad) soil and backward agriculture, so that large part of the population went peddling since 15<sup>th</sup> century – first wooden articles, and then tropical fruits. A large emigration to the USA ensued in the last third of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Due to the weak agriculture, crisis of industry and peddling during the inter-war period, the area managed to survive to a large extent thanks to donations from the relatives from America, so that in remote village shops one could pay in Dollars even in the late 1930s.<sup>36</sup>

The Czechs and Slovaks (especially the Czechs), due to their small numbers and dispersion, appear in statistics under “others” or “other Slavs”. Until the First World War, the majority of the Czechs and Slovaks in the Kingdom of Croatia were day-laborers and landowners of up to 50 morgen; their material prosperity was greater in the Bačka.<sup>37</sup> The Czechs in Croatia were 60% peasants, 4,5% day laborers in agriculture, 4,5 % village artisans (who were also living predominantly by agriculture).

Here is a survey of their landownership patterns in the four places with higher numbers of the Czechs:<sup>38</sup>

Place	# of families	morgen
Daruvar	1,125	10,606
Pakrac	115	1,282
Grubišino Polje	563	5,031
Garešnica	209	2,652

33 Franjo Baš, Slovenski Nemci (Mscr. in the Institute for Nationality Questions in Ljubljana, file 152), p. 4.

34 Biber, Socijalna struktura, p. 406; Idem, Nacizem, p. 28.

35 Kočevska, p. 26. Jože Rus claims 47,8% were employed in crafts and industry. (Rus, Jedro, p. 152.)

36 Grothe, pp. 103-105; Kočevska, p. 24; Josef Kranland, Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Gottscheer Landes, in: Jubiläums-Festbuch, pp. 99-103; Wilhelm Turer, Die Entwicklung der Landwirtschaft, in: Ibid., pp. 88-89; HWBGAD, III, pp. 70-72, 78. Some Slovenian authors explained the economic backwardness of Kočevje by sloth of the population and its lack of attachment to the native soil. (Rus, Jedro, pp. 166-168.) Whatever the reasons, it was the fact that in bad years (such as 1931 and 1937) Kočevje was literally starving. [A], 37, 46/299; Deutsche Zeitung (Celje), August 9, 1931.]

37 Krajčovič, Slovaci u političkom razvitku, p. 206.

38 Josip Hanzl, Josip Matušek, Adolf Orct, Borbeni put prve čehoslovačke brigade “Jan Žižka z Trocnova”, Daruvar 1968, pp. 23, 25.

These statistics suggest greater opulence than the previous, but one should keep in mind that *they don't* include families of craftsmen, but *they do* their land, which means it also needs a correction. What cannot be seen from them is the size of the land holdings that would enable us to see the actual social make-up of the Czech population. One should also keep in mind that the situation of the later colonists who settled down in late 19th century around Bjelovar, Slavonska Požega and Kutjevo was somewhat more propitious.<sup>39</sup> The Slovaks were almost exclusively peasants,<sup>40</sup> and we have already seen their landownership patterns in some of the previous tables. It should also be pointed out that the Slovaks, together with the Germans, were famed as the best agriculturists, and the only ones capable of competing with the Germans on an equal footing.

Certainly, the poorest group among the minority peasant colonists in the former Habsburg territories, were the colonists of various nationalities in Bosnian villages. Except for a few, they never succeeded. The reasons were: poor soil (which often had to be cleared first), the short time since their arrival, an overall backwardness of the country, poverty among the large part of the colonists, little government aid, and, what is very important, the lack of the market for agricultural products. Most of these colonies could barely make ends meet, so it was not difficult for many of them to make the decision to emigrate either during the Second World War (the Germans), or after it (the Poles.)<sup>41</sup>

Some members of certain national minorities, or some minority villages, specialized in cultivating certain crops. Thus the Hungarians of Horgoš, Martonoš and Stara Kanjiža in the Bačka and of Đala and Čoka in the Banat specialized in cultivating peppers which sold well on the European market.<sup>42</sup> Hemp was very much cultivated, especially in the 1930s, in Novi Sad, Bačka Palanka, Bač, Odžaci, Novi Vrbas, Bogojevo, Vajska, Svetozar Miletić, Sv. Ivan, Čib and Kulpin – almost all of them minority places.<sup>43</sup> The Slovak center of Bački Petrovac became for a while a hop market of European importance, from where hops was exported to Germany, and also to France, Belgium and Czechoslovakia.<sup>44</sup> Some Banat towns with sizable portions of German inhabitants (Vršac, Bela Crkva) were important centers of wine production, but they were hard hit by the drawing of the Yugoslav-Romanian border which had cut them off from their hinterland.<sup>45</sup>

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39 Ibid., p. 23.

40 Lenard, *Narodne manjine u SHS*, p. 732.

41 HWBGAD, I, pp. 498, 500; Lenard, *Slovenske narodne manjine*, p. 856; Sommer, p. 38; AIDGL, HA 1327; Dušan Drljača, Marija Dombrovska o Poljacima u Bosni, *Zbornik Matice srpske za slavistiku*, 10, 1976, p. 144. Because of the bad living conditions in villages, part of the colonists used to work in industry. When it was hit by crisis in the inter-war period, women started working as maids in towns, supporting their families. Some of them lapsed in the process. (Ibid.)

42 Avramović, p. 170.

43 Ibid., pp. 99, 172. A corresponding manufacturing industry developed in these places, most of it owned by members of minorities.

44 HWBGAD, I, 337. In 1929 hop prices slumped which ruined entire villages. (Avramović, pp. 99-100.)

45 Helmut Frisch, Werschetz (Versacz - Vršac). *Kommunale Entwicklung und deutsches Leben der Banater Wein- und Schulstadt*, Wien 1982, pp. 280-302; *Heimatsbuch der Stadt Weißkirchen im Banat*, Salzburg 1980, p. 127; Branislav Bukurov, *Naselja u južnom*

As we have seen, together with colonization of the non-Yugoslav agricultural population, craftsmen were settled down too. Considerable part of them were village artisans catering to the needs of their respective villages and doing some land tilling on the side. For this reason there were many craftsmen among the minority populations (especially German, Hungarian and Czech) in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Germans as craftsmen were above all to be found among masons, carpenters, stone-masons, locksmiths, tin-smiths, white-washers, weavers, knitters, but also in the production of ropes, wool and wagons.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, they were pursuing modern crafts which industry did not hinder, but rather promoted: electricity, plumbing, mechanics.<sup>47</sup> Just like agriculture, crafts were better developed in the Bačka than in the Banat.<sup>48</sup> The Hungarians were increasingly going into metal-processing crafts, which was conditioned by the need to repair agricultural machines and by work at the railway and in industry.<sup>49</sup> Among the Ruthenians crafts started developing more only after the First World War.<sup>50</sup> Crafts were developed in Đakovština in late 19<sup>th</sup> century, with the local Germans playing a prominent role in them.<sup>51</sup> German crafts were very developed in Lower Styria too, where one fourth of the crafts were in German hands.<sup>52</sup> There were many German artisans in Kočevje too – according to an author, 47.8% of the population was employed in crafts and industry.<sup>53</sup> There were 2,117 independent Hungarian artisans in Croatia in 1895, which out of the total of 106,000 Magyars there isn't that much.<sup>54</sup> It should be supposed that the number of artisans grew somewhat until 1918, but that it then probably declined a bit due to emigration. In Bosnia part of the colonists turned to crafts out of necessity (smiths, tailors, bakers, carpenters, masons, locksmiths).<sup>55</sup>

As for commerce, because the data for the main minority region in the North, the Vojvodina, are fragmentary,<sup>56</sup> the share of each ethnic group in it can be even

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Banatu, Zbornik Matice srpske za prirodne nauke, 34, 1968, pp. 42, 49. According to the mayor of Vršac, Kosta Georgijević, that town was at the brink of bankruptcy in 1940, i.e. even after 20 years in Yugoslavia it was in a desperate situation because it had been cut off from its surroundings. (Pravda, May 14, 1940). This shows how difficult the process of economic accommodation and integration into the new state framework was on the one hand, and how little ties of alliance with Romenia meant for the economy, on the other.

46 Avramović, p. 225.

47 D. Nikolić, p. 150; Daka Popović, Banat, Bačka i Baranja. Savremeni nacionalni i društveni profil, Novi Sad 1935, p. 13; According to Petranović 18% of the Germans in the Vojvodina worked in crafts, and in 1940 the Kulturbund claimed they were responsible for 30-40% of artisan production in that province. (Petranović, p. 58.)

48 HWBGAD, I, p. 282. In the Vojvodina the crisis of crafts began since mid-1920s. It was caused by illegal artisans and industry and too many workshops. (Šijački, p. 151.)

49 Avramović, p. 255.

50 Bilnja, p. 35.

51 Geiger, Nijemci u Đakovu, pp. 65-67.

52 Biber, Socijalna struktura, p. 405. There were 670 German and 172 Slovenian shops in Maribor at the eve of the First World War. (Hartman, p. 235.)

53 Rus, Jedro, p. 152; Grothe, p. 186.

54 Gujaš, p. 65.

55 Burda, p. 187.

56 Avramović, p. 286.

harder to determine than in the case of crafts.<sup>57</sup> In any case, the members of the minorities we are dealing with were less represented in trade than in crafts or other branches of the economy.<sup>58</sup> Traditionally, better represented in commerce were the Serbs,<sup>59</sup> and since mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the Jews.<sup>60</sup> Furthermore, wholesale trade was being taken over by large Viennese and Budapest firms since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>61</sup> The share of the members of a minority in commerce was largest where their share in the town population was also largest – in Lower Styria – where 21,7% of commerce was in German hands.<sup>62</sup> In Maribor wholesale trade was predominantly in German hands, whereas in Celje the German share in commerce was also extraordinarily significant (wholesale firms Rausch, Rebewschek, Stayger, Jelenz).<sup>63</sup> However, this was not the case only in Lower Styria: until 1918 most of the trade was in German hands in Ljubljana too, and afterward the “nationalization” measures did not bear the fruit the Slovenian authorities had hoped for.<sup>64</sup> In Kočevje many people were engaged in commerce, but profits were small since it was retail trade or peddling which had become obsolete.<sup>65</sup> There were also several mixed Slovenian-German trading firms.<sup>66</sup> To sum it up, it can be said that the presence of the minorities in commerce was stronger in places where it had longer tradition – in towns of the Vojvodina, Slavonia and Slovenia and in Kočevje. Still only a tiny fraction of the minority population lived by it. In the Vojvodina, Slavonia or Bosnia it was controlled to a large extent by members of the peoples in whose hands it had already been before (the Serbs, Jews, Aromuns) or by large firms from Vienna or Budapest before the First World War, and big wholesale Yugoslav firms after it.<sup>67</sup>

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- 57 Popi claims the Romanians had no merchants at all, shop-keepers in their villages being usually Jews or Germans. During the inter-war period, there were only few Romanian trading firms. (Popi, Rumuni, p. 16.)
- 58 According to Petranović only 3% of the Germans in the Vojvodina were engaged in commerce. (Petranović, p. 58.)
- 59 HWBGAD, I, pp. 221, 224; Popović, O Cincarima.
- 60 Geiger, Egger and Mesaroš mention no German or Hungarian merchants, which also proves their number, especially outside of small towns, was insignificant. There were only 667 Hungarians employed in commerce and banking in Croatia in 1895, out of the total of 106.000 Hungarians. (Gujaš, p. 65.) In the Vojvodina it seemed at first glance there were a lot of Magyar merchants, since many Jews gave out to be Hungarians. (Popović, Banat, Bačka i Baranja, p. 13.) A small number of Czechs worked as merchants in Croatian towns. (Lenard, Narodne manjine u SHS, p. 732.)
- 61 Šijački, p. 40. Part of the Slovaks who had not enough land, turned to commerce after the First World War. (Vreme, September 12, 1932.)
- 62 Biber, Socijalna struktura, p. 405. According to some data, the Germans controlled 45% of trade in Ptuj and 30% in Celje in the late 1930s. (Zorn, Nemški trgovski obrarti, pp. 115-116.)
- 63 Zorn, Dve poročili, p. 91. Biber says the Germans in Slovenia had 18 wholesale firms during the inter-war period. (Biber, Socijalna struktura, p. 406.)
- 64 Zorn, Dve poročili, p. 91.
- 65 According to some, there were 239 shops in Kočevje. (Rus, Jedro, p. 150.)
- 66 Zorn, Nemški trgovski obrarti, pp. 115-117.
- 67 Sometimes a national minority firm was hidden behind a Yugoslav name. The best-known such case was Jugo-Agrar, which was a Volksdeutsche firm representing big German manufacturers of agricultural machines on the Yugoslav market. (VA, pop. 17, k. 32, f. 1, d. 28.)

The situation prevailing in industry was quite different. In Northern parts of the country it was disproportionably owned by members of the minorities<sup>68</sup> – to be sure, not of all minorities. Thus, for instance, the Romanians and Slovaks had no industrialists.<sup>69</sup> This means the industry owned by the non-Yugoslavs belonged to the Jews, Germans, partly to the Magyars and to a few Czechs. The data about the number of industrial firms are not complete, so the exact share of each nationality among the owners cannot be determined; but judging by names of owners and firms, it can be supposed with high degree of probability, which firms belonged to owners of which minority nationality.<sup>70</sup> Foreign capital was penetrating the industry through joint-stock companies,<sup>71</sup> and there were also a few industrial enterprises in which one owner belonged to a minority, and the other to a Yugoslav nationality.<sup>72</sup> Among industrial plants in the Vojvodina, mills and brickworks were numerous; there were six breweries, and several food-processing firms, as well as textile and metallurgical firms.<sup>73</sup> The situation in Đakovština was similar.<sup>74</sup> As for the numbers and percentages of the labor force, those are even more difficult to obtain reliably.<sup>75</sup>

The influence and power of the minority-owned industry was most strongly felt in a small country like Slovenia. The real economic and social power of the German national minority in that land was, for greatest part, probably based on the

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68 In the Bačka and Baranya, there were 317 industrial, commercial and artisan firms in 1920s. 222 out of that were owned by members of the minorities, three were mixed, 49 Yugoslav, 40 were joint-stock companies and 6 were state-owned. (Gordana Krivokapić-Jović, *Oklop bez viteza. O socijalnim osnovama i organizacionoj strukturi Narodne radikalne stranke u Kraljevini SHS (1918-1929)*, Beograd 2002, p. 312.) In Syrmium and around Osijek there were 96 firms, only 14 of them Yugoslav. (*Ibid.*, p. 314.) To be sure, many minority-owned artisan workshops were included in these figures.

69 Popi, Rumuni p. 15; Biljnja, pp. 32-33. Popi mentions only one Romanian industrialist, a returned emigrant from the USA. (Popi, Rumuni p. 16.) Gaćeša claims not even bourgeois groups were formed among these peoples. (Nikola Gaćeša, *Specifičnosti društvene strukture Vojvodine u međuratnom razdoblju (1918-1941)*, in: *Idem, Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije*, Novi Sad 1995, p. 237.)

70 Šijački, pp. 197-230; Avramović, pp. 140-145, 154-157, 163-200.

71 Avramović, p. 145.

72 Avramović, pp. 179, 189, 190, 195.

73 The Volksdeutsche claimed in a memo for the government of 1940, that 46,7% of all industry in the Vojvodina belonged to them. (Petranović, p. 58.)

74 Geiger, *Nijemci u Đakovu*, p. 68.

75 According to the pre-First World War literature, 50% of the workers in the Vojvodina had been of Hungarian nationality. However, if the Magyarizing tendencies of the time are kept in mind, this should be taken with a grain of salt. (Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 90.) According to the same author, the ethnic make-up of the workers in the Vojvodina roughly corresponded to the ethnic make-up of the overall population in the province. (Šandor Mesaroš, *Mađari u Vojvodini 1929-1941*, Novi Sad 1989, p. 20.) There were 4.579 Hungarians among the auxiliary industrial personnel in Croatia in 1895. (Gujaš, p. 65.) There were 3.052 German workers in the Vojvodina according to the 1931 census (*Das Schicksal*, p. 17E). A report by the First Army District of October 23, 1938 claimed 65% of the employees (workers and clerks) in industry in the Bačka were Germans and Hungarians, whereas in the Banat 46% were Yugoslav, 37% German and Magyar, i.e., 53% were non-Slavs. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 2, d. 1.) There seems to be an error in this: 37% of German and Hungarian employees would imply 16% of the labour force in industry was most probably Romanian, which contradicts the facts.

strength of the Ethnic-German industry.<sup>76</sup> It was concentrated in Maribor, Celje, Jesenice, Zidani Most, and in a few other smaller places.<sup>77</sup> Kočevje was an economic loser in this respect too – attempts at founding industrial plants there were not particularly successful, and some of the industrial firms there were not German-owned.<sup>78</sup>

The bulk of the industry in Bosnia-Herzegovina was in the hands of foreign capital, and the immigrant foreign workers made up a considerable part of the labor force, and almost one half of all newcomers in the province. However, after the First World War a greater part of them emigrated or was assimilated.<sup>79</sup> Part of the second-generation rural colonists, for whom there was not enough land, sought work in the urban industry.<sup>80</sup> However, they sometimes met with discrimination when applying for a job, although this seems not to have been a rule.<sup>81</sup>

Finally, we should say something about another vital branch of the economy, of which the overall economic strength of a minority depended to a large degree: banking. In the Vojvodina this economic branch started developing only in the last third of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>82</sup> This, among other things, encouraged the influx of Budapest capital until the First World War.<sup>83</sup> In order to get the picture of the financial situation in Hungary at the eve of the founding of Yugoslavia we shall use the following tables showing the situation of banks, saving-banks and institutions of agricultural credit in Hungary in 1915.<sup>84</sup>

Nationality	# of institutions	Average capital in 1000 kronen
Hungarians	1,468	9,267
Romanians	156	1,262
Germans	95	5,214
Slovaks	36	2,612
Serbs	30	1,018

76 According to Biber, the Germans in Slovenia owned 29 factories and one mill, 11 saw-mills, 2 mines, 1 brick-yard, and 1 water saw-mill (Biber, *Socijalna struktura*, p. 406). On some occasions when Slovenian workers were laid off, the Slovenian authorities were prone to explain that by nationalist reasons (for instance in Slovenske Konjice in 1937 and in Maribor in 1940) (AJ, 37, 54/351; VA, pop. 17, k. 528, f. 2, d. 13.)

77 Zorn, *Dve poročili*, p. 91; Kržičnik, pp. 15-30, 35-41; Žnidarič, p. 221; Karner, pp. 47-52, 58-60. The Yugoslav customs policy favored the development of some big German industrial firms, such as Westen, of Celje. (Franjo Baš, *Kulturbund v Celju med dvema vojnama*, *Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje*, XXXVIII, 2, 1966, p. 218.)

78 Grothe, pp. 171-174. For greater part it was the Slovenes and Croats who were employed in the local wood industry. (Rus, *Jedro*, p. 170; HWBGAD, III, p. 69.)

79 HWBGAD, I, pp. 498-499.

80 AIDGL, HA 1327.

81 Ibid.

82 Kršev, p. 31.

83 Ibid., p. 33.

84 Kevago, p. 40.

The situation of credit cooperatives was as follows in 1915:<sup>85</sup>

Nationality	# of cooperatives	average principal capital in 1000 kronen
Hungarians	2,574	375
Germans	271	249
Romanians	101	103
Slovaks	24	176
Serbs	12	228

Such ethnic make-up of the proprietors of land and financial institutions was hiding social differences within each ethnic group. Due to greater social development, the social differences within the ethnic groups which became national minorities in Yugoslavia were larger than among the members of Yugoslav peoples. This would have particularly painful consequences for their poorest strata (especially of the Hungarians) after the Yugoslav agrarian reform.

This is how the number of financial institutions and their share in the total capital in the Vojvodina looked like in 1914:<sup>86</sup>

Nationality	# of institutions	% of institutions	capital in million k.	Capital in %
Serbs	86	38	12,817	21.7
Hungarians	70 <sup>87</sup>	30.5	18,733	31.7
Germans	59	25	24,436	41
Romanians	9	3.9	1,872	3.2
Slovaks	6	2.6	1,442	2.4

All these institutions together had the capital equivalent to that of an average Budapest bank. They made up approximately 14% of Hungarian banks, but their own capital did not exceed 7% of all banks in Hungary.<sup>88</sup> Obviously, these were small provincial banks. As for the capital in each of them, it remains a question of how much was the fruit of local conditions and to what extent it came from the outside of the region (from Budapest, Vienna, or abroad).

In any event, the Yugoslav authorities were aware of the importance even of such modest capital and set about putting it under their control. The first measure, which not only hit the banks in the Vojvodina, but the whole population of the former Habsburg territories, was the exchange of the kronen for the Serbian dinar in ratio

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85 Ibid.

86 Kršev, p. 34. Mesaroš claims there were 168 Hungarian banks in the Vojvodina until 1918 with 75 million kronen of their own principal capital, and with 289 million kronen of external accumulated capital. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 313; Idem, Položaj, p. 104.) It seems Mesaroš took over these figures from the inter-war Hungarian propaganda. (Cf. Sir Robert Gower, *The Hungarian Minorities in Succession States*, London 1937, p. 69.)

87 Sajti recons with the total of 168 Hungarian banks, branches and savings-banks. (Sajti, pp. 164-165.)

88 Kršev, p. 33.

4:1, which caused dissatisfaction in all former Austro-Hungarian lands.<sup>89</sup> We won't discuss here whether this exchange rate was justified or not. We shall just remark that this measure was not leveled against the national minorities, because it affected all inhabitants of the former Austro-Hungarian territories. What is important is that its effect was to reduce the financial power of the banks in the former Habsburg territories to one quarter.

Another measure that was applied, was the so-called "nationalization", which was, as with the exchange of currency, introduced not only in the Vojvodina, but in all the former Habsburg lands. Its aim was that foreign banks and firms, as well as those controlled by the members of national minorities go over into the hands of the "state people". This was to be done either through assimilation of assets and liabilities or through sequestration. In practice, many institutions ended with few more or less prominent Yugoslav politicians joining their executive or supervisory boards.<sup>90</sup> However, in many cases, the "nationalization" actually took place.<sup>91</sup> Some financial institutions sought rescue from sequestration by merger with some Yugoslav institution.<sup>92</sup> As for the German and Hungarian depositors, until the lapse of the option period in 1922, they were treated as citizens of enemy countries and were allowed to encash only 10% of their deposits.<sup>93</sup> Thus, not only institutions, but also individuals were discriminated against. Furthermore, banks themselves had difficulties with the Austro-Hungarian war loan, which was treated as assets by the new authorities, and taxed as profit.<sup>94</sup>

The results that the "nationalization" process achieved in the banking sector in the Vojvodina is shown below:<sup>95</sup>

Nationality	# of institutions	principal capital in dinars	% of capital in Vojvodina banks
Germans	41	43,321,000	25.09
Serbs	35	104,710,000	60.63
Hungarians	34	17,795,000	10.30
Slovaks	7	5,312,000	3.08
Romanians	6	548,000	0.90

If we compare the situation of the Vojvodina banks in 1914 to that of 1923 we come to the following conclusions: the number of Hungarian banks halved

89 Popi, Rumuni, pp. 16-21; Kršev, pp. 48-49.

90 Kršev, p. 45; Avramović, pp. 310-311; Sajti, p. 164; Branko Bešlin, Nacionalizacija banaka sa isključivo stranim kapitalom u Vojvodini posle Prvog svetskog rata (Mscr.), p. 16. (I would like to use this opportunity to thank the last mentioned author once again for putting this paper at my disposal.)

91 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 313. "Nationalization" was taking place at a smaller scale throughout the inter-war period. (Aleksandar Kasaš, O jednoj predstavi jugoslovenskih Mađara iz 1940. godine, Istraživanja, XIV, 1992, p. 200.)

92 Bešlin, Nacionalizacija, p. 14.

93 Ibid.

94 Kršev, pp. 49-50.

95 Kršev, p. 43; Mesaroš, Polizaj, p. 105; Nikola Gaćeša, Privreda Vojvodine između dva svetska rata, in: Idem, Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije, p. 200.



(despite financial aid from Hungary)<sup>96</sup> and their share in the Vojvodina capital fell to one quarter of its pre-war amount. On the other hand, the number of German financial institutions also fell, but their share in the overall Vojvodina capital increased. Slovak banks increased their share in the Vojvodina capital, and that of the Romanian ones dropped. In order to explain these changes, comprehensive research would be needed. As a working hypothesis for such research, we would put forward the following explanation: Hungarian banks were hard hit by the severing of ties with their money sources in Budapest – which explains their diminished capital; many banks closed down due to government measures or merged with Yugoslav institutions. German banks were also cut off from the sources of capital, but despite their reduced number, their share in the Vojvodina capital increased. The possibility that part of the Hungarian-friendly Swabians transferred their money from Hungarian to German banks after the First World War is not to be excluded. In the context of the policy of winning the Swabians over and weaning them from the Magyars, their banks were probably put under less pressure than the Hungarian ones.<sup>97</sup> Serbian banks experienced huge growth, which was certainly due to government benevolence and support. For part of their increase, they probably had to thank Hungarian (and maybe other minority) banks, some of which merged with them. Probably the benevolence of the government made the increase in number and their share in the Vojvodina capital possible.<sup>98</sup> The division of the Banat and (probably unfriendly) government policy in the first post-war years, caused the number and capital of Romanian banks to decrease. All these are just suppositions which should be proven by research in archives. In any case, according to the situation of 1923 (if the adduced statistics are correct), we couldn't quite agree with some authors that the "nationalization" was a complete failure.<sup>99</sup> However, the success was qualified, since the banks in the Vojvodina remained dependant on foreign capital throughout the inter-war period, and it was coming mainly through the same channels as before the First World War.<sup>100</sup>

In later years, the minority banks were sharing the fate of other banks in the country. Foreign capital which started to increase in the later years,<sup>101</sup> probably went

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96 Sajti, p. 164. The Hungarian government was helping Magyar credit cooperatives through the National Commercial and Credit Bank (Országos Kereskedelmi és Hitelbank), saving 80 of them. Subventions were discontinued in 1930s due to financial difficulties. (*Ibid.*, p. 165.)

97 However, the policy of forthcoming towards the Germans had its limits – which was best proved by the fact they were not allowed to found a central Volksdeutsche bank. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6 Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.)

98 The Czech Bank was founded in Daruvar in 1921. Its seat was transferred to Zagreb later on. It experienced fine development in the 1930s and it opened branch offices in Bjelovar and Daruvar. Its credit policy was turned above all to nationally conscious Czech farmers, artisans and merchants. (Hanzl, Matušek, Orct, p. 28.) Apart from it, the Slovak Bank in Nova Pazova and several other smaller ones also existed. The Slovenska Banka (= Slovak Bank) existed in Bački Petrovac since 1897, with branches in Novi Sad, Pivnice, Kisač and Sekić. Its capital was 15 mil. dinars. Furthermore, Slovak financial institutions existed in Šid, Ilok and Kovačica. (Lenard, Narodne manjine u SHS, p. 733; Lidové listy, July 26, 1933.)

99 Bešlin, Nacionalizacija, p. 19.

100 Avramović, p. 42.

101 Kršev, p. 40.

partly to minority banks – but this remains to be explored too.<sup>102</sup> It is a moot point to what degree these banks had access to the credits of the National Bank of Yugoslavia. According to some authors, they had none whatsoever.<sup>103</sup> On the other hand, contemporary politicians and nationalists claimed all the money of the National Bank of Yugoslavia meant for the Vojvodina went into minority establishments.<sup>104</sup> It seems the truth was somewhere in between: minority institutions did receive favorable credits from the central bank, but smaller and fewer than banks owned by the Yugoslavs.<sup>105</sup> It remains to be researched how important in this connection were national preferences, the Bank's policy towards particular regions, and the lack of funds with the National bank of Yugoslavia.<sup>106</sup>

As for the Germans in Slovenia, they had several large financial institutions, the main being the Maribor Credit Institution, with capital of 10 million dinars, the Credit Institution in Ljubljana, which was formally in German-Slovenian ownership but actually controlled by the Germans, the Credit Institution in Ptuj which possessed 23.7 million dinars in 1935, the Kočevje Savings Bank etc.<sup>107</sup> Even if one takes into account the changes of currency rates over time, these few data testify to large financial power of these German banks in Slovenia. At the same time, one should keep in mind that some German banks in that province were confiscated right after the First World War.<sup>108</sup>

Sequester, as the first step toward possible confiscation, was imposed on many firms owned by nationals of enemy states and members of national minorities immediately after the First World War. It was often used (together with occasional confiscations), particularly in Slovenia – due to the great economic power of the Germans which the new powers wanted to break.<sup>109</sup> It was put over all firms suspected of sending their profits abroad.<sup>110</sup> The aim was to pressure owners into “nationalizing” their property, i.e. into putting it under control of Yugoslav authorities.<sup>111</sup> Sequester was also used in other parts of the country which once belonged to Austria-

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102 According to the commander of the First Army District, 89% of deposits in the Vojvodina in 1940 belonged to members of minorities. (VA, pop. 17, k. 32, f. 1, d. 40.)

103 Cf. Damman, p. 156; Kasaš, O jednoj, p. 200; The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession States, Budapest 1927, p. 108.

104 Thus for instance Duda Bošković (SBNS Kraljevine SHS, Redovan saziv za 1926/27, knj. V, Beograd 1927, p. 391) and Daka Popović (AJ, 66, 72/195).

105 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3 and Bd. 5.

106 Avramović, p. 316.

107 Biber, Socijalna struktura, p. 406; Idem, p. 28.

108 Karner, p. 54; Martin Wutte, Oskar Lobmeyr, Die Lage der Minderheiten in Kärnten und Slowenien, Klagenfurt 1927, p. 72; Morocutti, p. 41; HWBGAD, III, p. 331.

109 PA, Abt. IIb, Unterrichtswesen, Politik, 17 Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.

110 Adolf Lenz, Die deutsche Minderheit in Slowenien, Graz 1923, pp. 46-47; Bešlin, Nacionalizacija, p. 4.

111 PA, Abt. IIb, Deutschtum in Jugoslawien, Politik 25, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Wutte, Lobmeyr, p. 72; Arnold Suppan, Zur Lage der Deutschen in Slowenien zwischen 1918-1938, in: Arnold Suppan, Helmut Rumpler (eds.), Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Slowenien 1848-1941, Wien, München 1988, pp. 174, 219; Bešlin, Nacionalizacija, p. 13; Gligor Popi, Formiranje, razvoj i delovanje Rumunske stranke (1923-1929), Istraživanja, 3, 1974, p. 317.

Hungary, and it was applied especially during the agrarian reform, which we shall deal with in one of the coming chapters.<sup>112</sup>

The question which did much to awaken discontent in the inter-war Yugoslavia was that of taxes, which differed drastically in various historical provinces. Although the statistics of how much was imposed and levied differ from year to year, Northern parts – more developed and untouched by the war – were actually paying much more than the Southern ones. And the main minority region, the Vojvodina, was paying most.<sup>113</sup> According to Macartney, it was not only that the taxes were highest there: the payment was enforced more strictly than in other places too.<sup>114</sup> Some historians explained such a position of the Vojvodina by the attitude of the authorities towards national minorities.<sup>115</sup> It is questionable if this claim is tenable since complaints were arriving from other parts of the country too.<sup>116</sup> There were complaints that the taxes were assessed with bias against the Germans, Hungarians and Jews, which entered modern historiography,<sup>117</sup> although it seems, they were sometimes due to the propaganda of the time. On the other hand, the nationalists of the “state people” admitted the taxes were high, but claimed that members of the minorities, being better-off, evaded paying more often.<sup>118</sup> Keeping in mind the regional differences in the assessment of taxes, the leader of the German national minority, Stefan Kraft, was probably closest to the truth when he said the taxes were assessed

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112 Sequester against citizens of enemy state was no Yugoslav specialty: Great Britain and France used it against citizens of Austria-Hungary too. (Bešlin, Nacionalizacija, p. 13.)

113 Bogumil Hrabak, *Autonomizam u Vojvodini 1919-1929. kao reakcija na finansijsko iscrpljivanje i političko zapostavljanje pokrajine*, *Godišnjak Društva istoričara Vojvodine* 1982, pp. 69, 75, 78-80; Idem, *Borba demokrata za samosvojnost Vojvodine (1919-1928)*, *Zbornik Historijskog instituta Slavonije i Baranje*, XIX, 1, 1982, pp. 35-39; Rehak, pp. 281-284; *Situazione dei magiari in Jugoslavia*, Budapest 1941, pp. 11-12; Kršev, p. 53; Avramović, pp. 335-337, 353; Macartney, Hungary, p. 397; *Politika*, December 9, 1925; SBNS Kraljevine SHS, *Redovan saziv za 1925/26*, knj. II, Beograd 1926, p. 588; *Ibid.* za 1926/27, knj. V, Beograd 1927, p. 391; *Ibid.*, knj. III, p. 15; *Ibid.* za 1927/28, knj. VII, Beograd 1928, p. 204; SBNS, *Vanredni saziv za 1931/32*, knj. IV, Beograd 1932, p. 221. Dissatisfaction found its expression in the ditty “Srem, Banat i Bačka, Srbijanska pljačka” (Syrmium, the Banat and the Bačka, the Serbians’ plunder). (SBNS, *Redovan saziv 1927/28*, knj. I, Beograd 1928, p. 151.) However, it is only fair to point out that the taxes levied in the Vojvodina in the first ten-odd years were those inherited from Hungary. (Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 100.)

114 Macartney, p. 397.

115 Čedomir Popov, *Vojvodina u Narodno-oslobodilačkom ratu i socijalističkoj revoluciji*, Novi Sad 1984, p. 12.

116 Cf. Rudolf Bičanić, *Ekonomska podloga hrvatskog pitanja*, Zagreb 1938.

117 Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 177; Idem, *Mađari*, p. 20; Gower, p. 68; Andrija Bognar, *Položaj Mađara u Vojvodini od 1918. do 1995*, in: *Međunarodni znanstveni skup Jugoistočna Europa 1918-1995*, Zagreb 2000, p. 94; Scherer, p. 14; PA, Abt. IIb, *Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien*, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2. Hungarian leaders complained in a memo to the Prime-Minister Cvetković from 1940, the taxes in the Vojvodina were too high, so the Hungarians (sic!!!) were paying more than others. (Kasaš, pp. 200-201.) The Slovaks complained bitterly about the taxes too. (Pribečević über die Lage der Wojwodinaer Slowaken, *Nation und Staat*, II, 3, 1928, p. 211.)

118 Fedor Nikić, *Revizija naše politike u Vojvodini – povodom desetogodišnjice Oslobođenja i Ujedinjenja*, *Letopis Matice srpske*, knj. 319, sv. 2, 1929, p. 256.

according to party affiliation in the 1920s<sup>119</sup> – which, of course, sometimes coincided with the affiliation to a (minority) nationality.

Apart from the regional differences in tax assessments (and of course the general economic situation throughout the country), economic activity and social stratification of the national minorities in the Northern parts of the country were influenced by the decree that limited transfers of property rights for real estate in Slovenia, issued at the demand of Slovenian public on September 4, 1936.<sup>120</sup> On February 18, 1938 its validity was extended to the territories of the Courts of Appeal in Zagreb and Novi Sad. The Decree concerned transfer of immovable property rights in a border zone 50 km wide, if it served speculation, creating of large landed estates or if it infringed on the interests of national security.<sup>121</sup> In fact, this concerned the Germans and Magyars, who were buying much more than the Slavs or Romanians, and who were, due to the developments within these two minorities and in Europe, perceived as disloyal and particularly dangerous for the state.<sup>122</sup> In practice it meant, special commissions had to approve transfer of property rights. As a rule, their decisions were negative if the seller was of a Yugoslav nationality and the buyer of a minority one.<sup>123</sup> Although it was not strictly enforced,<sup>124</sup> it caused widespread discontent among the minorities,<sup>125</sup> and it also led to great corruption.<sup>126</sup> German and Hungarian representatives (including the diplomatic ones) protested on several occasions demanding that the Decree be abrogated,<sup>127</sup> which was eventually done after the fall of France, on September 19, 1940,<sup>128</sup>

119 SBNS, Vanredni saziv za 1931/32, knj. IV, Beograd 1932, p. 221.

120 Beschränkung des Erwerbes der Liegenschaften, Nation und Staat, XI, 2, 1937, pp. 145-147; Suppan, Zur Lage, pp. 185, 231; Idem, Jugoslawien, pp. 790, 919; HWBGAD, III, p. 77; Erić, p. 524; Biber, Nacizem, p. 203. There were two attempts at legalizing such limitations during the 1920s, but they were thwarted by the representatives of the Party of the Germans. (Oskar Plautz, Das Werden der Volksgemeinschaft in Südslawien, Novi Sad 1940, pp. 58, 64.) The Town Council of Subotica introduced a similar measure in its territory already in November 1930. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 40.) Similar, or even more stringent measures existed also in some other countries – none of them a paragon of democracy – in Germany (since 1938, extended to Austria after the Anschluss), Hungary, Romania and the USSR. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 21; k. 90, f. 1, d. 11.) Austria had its own similar regulations already in the 1920s. (Wutte, Lobmeyr, pp. 70-71.)

121 Biber, Nacizem, p. 203; Gaćeša, The Germans, pp. 158-159.

122 The amount of land that had changed hands between 1918 and 1938 was not known at that. (Gaćeša, Privreda, p. 208.)

123 Gaćeša, The Germans, pp. 159-161.

124 Gaćeša, The Germans, p. 161.

125 The former Volksdeutsche official Josef Beer wrote in his memoirs the Decree had hit the Ethnic-Germans much more than the unsolved school question their representatives kept carping about throughout the inter-war period. (Josef Beer, Donauschwäbische Geschichte aus erster Hand, München 1987, p. 63.)

126 SBNS, Vanredni saziv za 1939. godinu, knj. I, Beograd 1939, p. 698; Gaćeša, The Germans, p. 167. Many members of minorities held for years the land they had already paid for, but due to the Decree, they were not able to register it. The Main General-Staff demanded in 1940 that attention be paid to such occurrences and that they be prevented. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 32.)

127 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 196, 211-212; Biber, Nacizem, pp. 204-206; Gaćeša, The Germans, pp. 162, 167; SBNS Kraljevine Jugoslavije, Vanredni saziv za 1939, I, pp. 655-657; Volksfreund, February 4, 1940; Magyarország, June 6, 1940.

128 Gaćeša, The Germans, p. 168.

in keeping with rapprochement with Germany. However, there are indications the Decree remained in force – albeit in somewhat changed form.<sup>129</sup>

The Decree on limiting the transfer of property rights came into being also as a result of the pre-war psychosis caused by the strengthening of the Third Reich and the spread of its influence among the Volksdeutsche in the second half of the 1930s. A conspiracy theory appeared in part of the ruling circles and nationalist public, according to which, the Ethnic-Germans, aided by large sums of money from Germany (300 million dinars, according to the Minister of the Interior, Anton Korošec),<sup>130</sup> were buying land systematically and with a plan, especially near the border, often paying too much for it.<sup>131</sup> More sober observers pointed out to the greater concentration of capital in the Volksdeutsche banks, better organization, greater diligence etc, which combined with the starting position somewhat more favorable than the average, enabled the Yugoslav Germans to buy more land than others.<sup>132</sup> Final proofs that the Germans had been receiving larger sums of money from Germany for buying land are lacking, and the financial situation in the Reich was not speaking in favor of paranoid fears of the nationalists.<sup>133</sup>

Turning our attention next to the other major minority-inhabited region – Kosovo, Metohija and Western Macedonia, we see that if statistical data are incomplete or, even more often, contradictory for the Northern parts, they hardly exist at all for the Southern part – especially for the last years of the Ottoman rule and the first years of Serbian and Yugoslav power. Chaos reigned supreme in agrarian relations already in the Turkish times, with agas and beys appropriating the land of peasants, of the state or of communes, with Turkish authorities sometimes issuing title deeds and sometimes not, with the possibility of obtaining by bribe a title deed without a valid proof of possession, etc. During the Balkan Wars and after them, as well as during the First World War and during its aftermath, part of the Muslims emigrated, whereas their land was being appropriated by the former serfs, auto-colonists, officials and others, so that it can be said that agrarian situation in the Southern parts in 1918 was chaotic.<sup>134</sup> There are no data about the size of landholdings before 1914, but it is known that there were a lot of small holdings in the hills, and many chyfliks in the plains.<sup>135</sup> During the agrarian reform, Muslim serfs were treated

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129 Bраниmir Altgayer, *Elaborat o njemačkoj narodnoj skupini, I* (Mscr.), s.l. 1947. (VA, Nemačka arhiva, k. 40-D, f. 3, d. 1; Kasaš, pp. 184, 198; AIDGL, Nachlas Lichtenberger, a letter by Sepp Janko, former Volksgruppenführer in Yugoslavia (1939-1941) and the occupied Banat (1941-1944) to Wolf Oschlies. The limitation remained officially in force only in the surroundings of border fortifications. (Esti Kurir, September 26, 1940.)

130 Gaćeša, *The Germans*, p. 162; Biber, *Nacizem*, p. 203.

131 AJ, 38, 7/27; 37, 58/371; VA, pop. 17, k. 32, f. 1, d. 26; k. 36, f. 4, d. 38; k. 528, f. 2, d. 10; Janjetović, *O širenju*, pp. 101-103. It seems Gaćeša also tends to accept the opinion about the planned buying. (Gaćeša, *Privreda*, p. 209.) Apart from fear the Germans would buy up land, there was also fear they would buy up industrial plants too. (VA, pop. 17, k. 92, f. 1, d. 2; k. 76, f. 1, d. 54.)

132 Janjetović, *O širenju*, pp. 108-109.

133 Gaćeša, *The Germans*, p. 162; Idem, *Privreda*, p. 209; Janjetović, *O širenju* pp. 109-111.

134 Tomasevic, p. 358; Milan Obradović, *Agrarni odnosi na Kosovu 1918-1941. godine*, *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 3-4, 1978, pp. 442-443; Đorđo Krstić, *Kolonizacija u Južnoj Srbiji*, Sarajevo 1928, pp. 32, 55.

135 Tomasevich, p. 209.

the same way as Christian ones who received 5 ha free of charge.<sup>136</sup> Because of the lack of statistics, it is impossible to say how large a stratum of free peasantry was created in this way, and what its ethnic make-up was. It may be supposed the majority were Christians, who formed the majority of serfs.<sup>137</sup>

This is how the social structure of landowners in Kosovo looked like in 1921 according to Ali Hadri:<sup>138</sup>

Size of holdings	# of families	%
0-0.51 ha	3,100	5
0.51-1 ha	4,000	6
1-2 ha	9,300	15
2-5 ha	24,300	37
5-7 ha	16,800	26
over 10 ha	7,400	11

Unfortunately this table says nothing about holdings over 10 ha and about the nationality of the owners. There are no reasons to believe that when it came to land possession the Albanians were worse off than the Serbs, as claimed by Hoxha.<sup>139</sup> On the contrary, since the beys who owned most of the land, were predominantly the Albanians and Turks, it stands to reason that the Albanians (and Turks) as ethnic groups possessed more land than the Serbs.<sup>140</sup> This does not exclude the possibility that individual Albanian families had on the average less land than the non-Albanian ones,<sup>141</sup> but there is nothing in the statistics to prove it – as Hoxha imputes.<sup>142</sup> What was typical of the Southern parts was a large number of landlords, but few large estates, with agas and beys making up some 10% of the Muslim population.<sup>143</sup> On the other hand, Trotsky noticed that Muslim villages were richer than Christian ones, with more poultry and cattle – which were raised less by Christians because they were stolen by Albanian bandits.<sup>144</sup> The only certain thing is that during the agrarian reform the authorities proceeded much more harshly against Albanian peasants than against the German or Hungarian ones in the North, as will be seen in the chapter on the agrarian reform.<sup>145</sup>

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136 Hoxha, p. 298.

137 Tomasevich, p. 359.

138 Hadri, Kosovo, p. 58; Hoxha, p. 285.

139 Hoxha, p. 285.

140 According to Ali Hadri, the beys had 40% of the land in 1910. (Hadri, Kosovo, p. 57.)

141 Hadri points out to the large number of members in Albanian families. (Hadri, Kosovo, p. 58.)

142 Hoxha, p. 285.

143 Jovanović, Turci, p.135.

144 Trocki, p. 99.

145 Jovan Hadži-Vasiljević noticed the poverty of the Muslim villages around Skopje, but he simply ascribed it to the impossibility of plundering the Christians any longer. (Hadži-Vasiljević, Skoplje, p. 121.) As we have seen, plundering was far from over, so that impoverishment of Muslim villages should be explained by other reasons: agrarian reform, emigration of part of the population, economical maladjustment to the new circumstances and new borders etc.

Unlike the bleak statistics about arable land, it is easier to get an overview of the industry in the Southern parts of the country – due to its modest development. There were just few a mills working for the military in the Southern parts until 1912.<sup>146</sup> Unstable political and security situation, banditry, lack of capital and skilled labor force, raw materials, roads, railways and the general backwardness of the Ottoman Empire, hindered the industrial development during the Turkish times. Although throughout the inter-war period the Southern parts failed to catch up with the economic development of the former Habsburg lands, over 120 industrial firms were founded by 1933.<sup>147</sup> Apart from the mills, there were textile, leather and food factories. Out of 128 enterprises only three (mines excluded) were owned by foreigners.<sup>148</sup> It is not known how many of the remaining 125 firms were owned by members of the Turkish or Albanian national minority, but judging by the names M. Gavrilović adduces, it seems their number was not high. Much more frequent are the names implying Greek or Aromun origin.<sup>149</sup> Hadži Vasiljević has noticed increasing inter-ethnic business connections in founding firms, but that trend had started already in the last years of the Ottoman rule.<sup>150</sup>

As for commerce, until the 1870s it was thoroughly controlled by the Serbs (and Macedonians, whom the inter-war authors of course don't mention). Since 1878, after the railway lines Thessalonica-Skopje-Kosovska Mitrovica and Skopje-Ristovac were built, an influx of the Aromuns and Jews began, who took over the greater part of trade. Furthermore, part of the town Muslims turned to commerce too.<sup>151</sup> After the Balkan Wars as the new border cut off ties with Thessalonica and a number of Muslims emigrated, the Serbs and Macedonians managed to recapture their positions in trade.<sup>152</sup> On the other hand, the new borders led to the downfall of several old commercial towns (with a large proportion of minority inhabitants), whereas new railway lines enabled new ones to come into being or to expand (Uroševac, Obilić).<sup>153</sup>

Crafts were very developed under the Turkish rule, and almost one half of the town population was engaged in it.<sup>154</sup> Unfortunately, we know neither the ethnic make-up of artisans, nor professional preferences by members of certain nationalities. After the First World War, due to industrial competition and changes in fashion, the crafts connected with traditional dress declined, whereas, due to the upswing in building, those crafts connected with architecture flourished.<sup>155</sup> Despite this, Jovan Hadži Tomić, noticed in the capital of "Southern Serbia", Skopje, that there were very few rich people, and that only one third of the people could have a decent living. He singled out the poorest as being those Albanians and Turks who worked neither in crafts nor in industry, but who lived from hand to mouth.<sup>156</sup> These poor partly found jobs as

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146 Mil. R. Gavrilović, *Privreda Južne Srbije*, Skoplje 1933, p. 92.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid., p. 112.

149 Ibid., pp. 92-112. For some firms around Bitola in 1911 Hadži-Vasiljević states clearly they were founded by the Aromuns. (Hadži-Vasiljević, *Grad Bitolj*, pp. 51-55.)

150 Hadži-Vasiljević, *Skoplje*, p. 180.

151 M. Gavrilović, pp. 120-121.

152 Ibid., pp. 121-122.

153 V. Jovanović, p. 53.

154 M. Gavrilović, p. 134.

155 Ibid., p. 135.

156 Hadži-Vasiljević, *Skoplje*, p. 121.

servants in various state offices or as night watchmen, but by the end of the 1920s, the newly arriving employees started ousting them.<sup>157</sup>

Banking started developing in the Southern parts only after 1918, because before that security reasons prevented it and economic needs did not call for it. Leading in laying foundations of the banking system were members of the People's Radical Party.<sup>158</sup> Out of "religious separatism", the Muslims founded their own Commercial Bank Ibar in Kosovska Mitrovica in 1921, with the capital of 1 million dinars.<sup>159</sup>

As can be seen from this brief survey, to reconstruct the social make-up of national minorities in the South is even less possible than of those in the North. It is only certain that it was an extremely backward region in which the vast majority of the population (belonging to the ethnic "majority" or "minority" – whatever that meant in the South), to a much larger extent than in the North, could barely keep body and soul together.

Finally, we shall mention another factor that influenced the social make-up of the national minorities in Yugoslavia, i.e. emigration. Emigration of the poor caused a numerical loss for each minority. From the point of view of a minority as a whole, there was a much greater impact, as we have already seen, from the emigration of the intelligentsia and people from upper strata.<sup>160</sup> This process weakened significantly all the large national minorities, and only the small and comparatively poor Slavic ones (the Ruthenians, Czechs, Poles), which had no elite worth mentioning remained spared, since, unlike the Banat Romanians they did not even have a larger number of priests and teachers who would choose to emigrate to their respective mother countries after the founding of Yugoslavia. It seems the Albanians, despite a comparatively massive emigration, suffered the smallest losses in this respect, due to strong clan connections that tied Albanian leaders (except for those politically most compromised) to their homeland.<sup>161</sup> Most hit by the drain of the elite were the Magyars, who lost not only a great part of their intelligentsia and officials, but also (at least formally) of landowners. The Germans in Slovenia were also hit hard, particularly by the loss of the intellectual and official elite, whereas the economic magnates remained in their places. The Germans in the Vojvodina and in Slavonia only started creating their elite in Yugoslavia, because before then their elite was absorbed to a large extent, by the Hungarians and Croats. With the Turks, the drain of the elite went hand in hand with the emigration of the rest of the population, and the remaining Turkish inhabitants reconciled themselves to the new situation to such an extent, that one gets the impression they felt no strong need of an elite at all.

If we were to summarize the social structure of the national minorities in Yugoslavia between the two world wars, we would have to say that it is impossible to reconstruct it as a whole, especially for the Southern parts. Politically favored

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157 Ibid., p. 122.

158 Krivokapić-Jović, p. 154.

159 M. Gavrilović, p. 154; Idem, *Razvitak bankarstva i privrede u Južnoj Srbiji, Skoplje 1931*, p. 23.

160 The Hungarian national minority lost also a larger number of railway men – which had also impact on the structure of the labour force. (Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 157; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, p. 320.)

161 If one takes a look at the names of the Albanian leaders playing a role before the Balkan Wars and the First World War, one can see the same names featuring, or at least the names of their sons and relatives.



position of certain nationalities in the defunct empires, did not always influence their social make-up, i.e. living standards. This held true particularly for the Magyars, among whom the greatest social differences existed, which was in keeping with the class structure of the old Hungary. Even the Germans in Slovenia, who enjoyed many advantages in the old Austria, could not brag about great material well-being on the whole: Kočevje, just like some other parts of the old Austria (Tyrol, partly Carinthia) remained a poor and comparatively backward area. Only a small fraction of multi-ethnic colonists in Bosnia prospered economically. Furthermore, a large number of workers and officials emigrated from there after the First World War, thereby weakening numerically and structurally the immigrant population. As for the Romanians, after 1918 they continued to live the modest economic and cultural life they had been accustomed to in Austria-Hungary, albeit deprived of part of their intelligentsia, which had been scanty anyway. In the upcoming chapters we shall see how two more factors – the agrarian reform and cooperatives – influenced the social structure and economic clout of each national minority.



## Chapter Seven

# Participation of the National Minorities in Political Life and Government Organs

Since participation in political life and government are one of the important indicators of quality of the status of national minorities, we shall see in this chapter in what way and to what extent members of the national minorities participated in the political decision-making (on national and, partly, local level) in the inter-war Yugoslavia. The peoples and national minorities that found themselves united under one state umbrella (in the territory that was politically reunited within common state borders for the first time since the Roman Empire), stemmed from various political, state and cultural traditions. Political systems and the body politic that had dominated regions inhabited by individual peoples, differed greatly in the breadth and the way population participated in public affairs, in political traditions and political culture. Furthermore, different peoples had different political priorities, and the great upheaval of 1918 caused some to change their political goals and tactics. This was particularly true of the national minorities, who found themselves in a new and alien body politic, politically cut off from their co-nationals, and often stripped of the privileged status the defunct former empires had guaranteed, or at least provided for.

The old Austria had general suffrage (to be sure, only for men) since 1907 for the national Parliament, whereas the right to vote for diets of the crown lands and for the local government remained archaic and restricted.<sup>1</sup> Hungary had a very narrow suffrage right, which was further restricted for minorities through gerrymandering. The voting process itself was famous for its corruption and various kinds of pressure.<sup>2</sup> In Croatia, the right to vote was even more restricted than in Hungary proper.<sup>3</sup> The annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina was only making its first steps on the road to a slightly more modern participation of at least parts of the population in the political life.<sup>4</sup> Similar was the situation in the Ottoman Empire after the Young-Turk

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1 Stefan Vajda, *Felix Austria. Eine Geschichte Österreichs*, Wien 1980, p. 538; Taylor, pp. 262-263.

2 Lazar Rakić, *Radikalna stranka u Vojvodini (do početka XX veka)*, Istraživanja, 3, 1974, pp. 281-282; Oskar Jászy, *Magyariens Schuld, Ungarns Sühne. Revolution und Gegenrevolution in Ungarn*, München 1923, p. 11; Idem, *The Dissolution*, pp. 227, 333-334; Margan, *Pomađarivanje*, pp. 147-151; R.W. Seton-Watson, *Ungarische Wahlen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Korruption*, Leipzig 1912; I. Senz, pp. 90, 248.

3 Less than 3% of the population had the right to vote after the electoral reform of 1911. Until then, suffrage rights had only 2% of the inhabitants. (Milorad Ekmečić, *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1918*, II, Beograd [1989], p. 568.)

4 In 1910 curial electoral system was introduced which made disproportionate representation of social classes in the Bosnian Diet possible. (Ibid., p. 618.)

Revolution.<sup>5</sup> The paternalist system of rule in Montenegro was far from modern. To be sure, the Kingdom of Serbia had a liberal political system, but it was neither old nor stable. Furthermore, it was tailored for a state that was small and ethnically more or less homogeneous. At the same time, Serbian politicians were used to thinking and acting within the framework of a small and homogeneous country. They had little understanding for different political traditions, just as the politicians from other territories had difficulties growing accustomed to the rules of the political game as played in Yugoslavia. This lack of knowledge and understanding, coupled with conflicting interests, contributed to numerous political conflicts in the inter-war Yugoslavia.

The whole political history of Yugoslavia between the two world wars can be divided into two major periods: the first one until the imposition of the "January Dictatorship" in 1929, and the second after it. The first was characterized by parliamentary life marred by frequent interference of the Court, whereas, after the introduction of the dictatorship, and even after it was mitigated in 1931, authoritarian tendencies visibly prevailed over democratic ones. All this influenced the political activity of the national minorities.

As we have seen, the first minorities to get a chance of political activity were the Slovaks, Ruthenians and Czechs in the Vojvodina. They were called upon to participate in the Great Popular Assembly that declared unification with Serbia. Obviously, it was a tactical move aimed at showing that not only the Vojvodina Serbs, but also all other Slavs in the province, were in favor of unification with the Kingdom of Serbia. Their participation in the political life would never again have the same importance. Ever since, their role on the political scene was confined to voting at the elections, at which, due to their small numbers, political divisions and geographic dispersion, they didn't represent a compact political force. Because of that, and because of being Slavs and unable to opt for another country, they were given suffrage in the Vojvodina much earlier than the Germans, Magyars or Romanians. As for the participation in the local government, until the first communal elections in the Vojvodina in 1927, it remained as little accessible to them as to members of other Vojvodina minorities, and indeed, the members of the "state people", i.e., it remained dependant on party, rather than on national affiliation.<sup>6</sup>

However, it was clear from the start, that minorities would be only decoration on the political stage of the newly founded kingdom. As for the Germans, Hungarians and Romanians, they were denied suffrage with the subterfuge that the right of option has not yet lapsed, so that they, as potential foreign citizens could not be allowed to decide on the supreme legal act in the state (i.e. the Constitution).<sup>7</sup>

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5 The constitution of 1876 which prescribed high property census, was reintroduced there. (Ibid., p. 640.)

6 There were representatives of national minorities in town and communal administration installed by higher authorities from the very beginning, but they were always underrepresented.

7 Branislav Gligorijević, *Parlament i političke stranke u Jugoslaviji (1918-1929)*, Beograd 1979, p. 71; Zlatko Matijević, "Građani na odkaz". *Njemačka nacionalna manjina i 9. članak Zakona o izboru narodnih poslanika za Ustavotvornu skupštinu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (1920)*, *Godišnjak Njemačke narodnosne zajednice*, X, 2003. There was a dilemma in Croatia if the right of option applied only to the Germans and Hungarians in the Bačka, the Banat and Baranya, or to those in Croatia too. There were different

That the Slavic minorities would play only a third-rate role was seen in the attitude of the Vojvodina Serb parties toward the Slovak Peoples Party (SPP),<sup>8</sup> the only minority party to survive the break-up of Austria-Hungary. It welcomed the unification already on December 4, 1918, demanding at the same breath equality between the Serbs and Slovaks.<sup>9</sup> However, its members were soon disappointed. Despite 67 representatives in the Great Popular Assembly and one in the People's Administration, the People's Radical Party (PRP) offered them only one representative in the Temporary People's Representation (interim parliament) (TPR) which was to prepare the elections for the Constitutional Assembly. For that reason SPP approached the Democratic Party (DP) and didn't take part in the elections for the TPR. The official explanation of the SPP was that the elective assembly was not convened by the Great People's Council, as prescribed, that Slovak communes were not officially apprised of the elections and that the SPP did not want to widen the gap between the PRP and DP. Yet, the Elective Assembly elected as a representative in the TPR the Slovak Igor Štefanek too. He accepted the mandate, despite the wish of his SPP to refuse it, so he left the party.<sup>10</sup> In spite of this, he wanted to represent the interests of all the Slovaks, and even of the Czechs in the TPR. Therefore, in a petition to the Government, he submitted a number of ambitious demands, which testified not only to his lack of realism, but also that of other Czechs and Slovaks.<sup>11</sup>

As we have seen, the situation in the Southern parts was much different. The circumstances normalized much more slowly there due to the different ethnic make-up, activities of the *kaçak* (Albanian) and *committagy* (Bulgarian) gangs, different traditions, and a number of other factors. We have seen that the authorities started installing communal administrations from the ranks of the locals whom they (often erroneously) considered reliable, as a means of pacification. This enabled a number of Albanians and Turks to become involved in leading the local communities from the very start. Under the conditions of chaos and anarchy, this local power was often much more important than it was in the areas having more settled conditions.

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interpretations, but there was a possibility of at least some of the Hungarians and Germans getting the right to vote there. (Geiger, *Nijemci u Đakovu*, pp. 93-98.)

8 The Slovak People's Party was founded in late 19th century and it was active in all parts of Hungary inhabited by the Slovaks, including the Vojvodina. After the break-up of the historical Hungary, part of the Party in Yugoslavia became independent. (Lebl, *Gradanske partije*, pp. 213-253.)

9 Branislav Gligorijević, *Politička istupanja i organizacija Slovaka i Čeha u Kraljevini SHS*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 24, 1981, p. 138.

10 Gligorijević, *Politička*, 139.

11 He asked for: a Slovak secretariat at the Ministry of education, a Yugoslav consulate or a legation (sic!) in Bratislava, creation of a Slovak district comprising Slovak settlements, with the centre in Bački Petrovac, where the communal court and the local office would officiate in Slovak, that, apart from the high school, an economic school and a communal school be founded in Bački Petrovac, that free use of Slovak language in schools and local government be allowed, that the Slovaks be granted full freedom of organization and association, that in Slovak communes, in the first place Slovak officials be installed, that the Slovaks be equal in the agrarian reform with the Serbs, that the Slovak evangelic church be separated from the German and Hungarian one and set up as independent, that persecution of the Czechs by German and Jewish officials be prevented. (*Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.)

As yet another pacification measure, the validity of the Constitution by the then no longer existing Kingdom of Serbia was extended to the territories that Serbia and Montenegro conquered in the Balkan Wars in early August 1919.<sup>12</sup> In that way, the possibility of normal political organizing was created, and of influencing political decisions through the institutions of the establishment, as well as of participation in the shaping of these institutions. Furthermore, as part of the Ottoman legacy in the South, a number of personal connections, political and business ones, survived, through which the formally disempowered Muslim elite tried to integrate into the new political system that was in the making and to influence its shaping and functioning. Since that time the PRP strove to win over the Southern Muslims, through the main Albanian leaders, Nexib and Ferhat Draga.<sup>13</sup> For this reason, it was no wonder that the founding congress of the Muslims of the "Southern Serbia" was held in Skopje on December 17, 1919 in cooperation with the People's Radical Party.<sup>14</sup> On this occasion the Cemiyet, Society for the Protection of Rights of the Muslims (İslâm Muhafaza Hukuk) was founded, as a joint association of the Albanian, Turkish and Slavic Muslims of the Southern parts for protection of their religious, cultural and also political rights.<sup>15</sup> Since mid-1920 this organization turned into a real political party. Its newspaper the *Hak* (justice) wrote that the association was the organic continuation of the Young Turk movement which championed "the holy right of private property",<sup>16</sup> admitting thus the main intentions of its founders and leaders. The program of the Cemiyet, adopted at the founding congress, foresaw above all the struggle for preservation of the beys' land holdings and indemnification for the estates already seized. The program included the preservation of the integrity and retrieval of the pious foundations (*vakufs*) and some matters of religious autonomy. It also demanded ties to the Islamic religious community in Turkey, Muslim schools, indemnification within a year for the seized estates, that the landowners who work the land be left as much land as possible and Muslim candidates at the local elections. As goals, religious autonomy, unification of the religious administration in the whole country, contacts with the caliphate, Muslim religious courts for family and hereditary cases, preservation of *vakuf* and *mearif* estates, use of the mother-tongue in religious instruction and autonomous schools, proportional representation of the Muslims in the Constituent Assembly, exemption of the beys' lands from agrarian reform, indemnification for the beys by their serfs for the unpaid dues, return of the confiscated land etc, were set.<sup>17</sup> Although the Cemiyet was founded in cooperation with the PRP,<sup>18</sup> the opinion of M. Memić is exaggerated that it was just an appendix of the largest Serbian party which existed only as long as it supported the Radicals.<sup>19</sup> It managed to build up its organization chiefly as an urban party,

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12 Ljubodrag Dimić, *Istorija srpske državnosti*, III. Srbija u Jugoslaviji, Beograd, Novi Sad [2001], pp. 64-65.

13 The attempts at rapprochement started already in early 1919. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 86-87.)

14 Mustafa Memić, *Velika medresa i njeni učenici u revolucionarnom pokretu*, Skoplje 1984, p. 14.

15 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 7.

16 Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 73.

17 Memić, *Velika medresa*, pp. 14, 264; Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 82.

18 Александар Апостолов, *Колонизација на Македонија во стара Југославија*, Скопје [1990], p. 177.

19 Memić, *Velika medresa*, pp. 14-15.

representing the interests of the urban Muslim businessmen, artisans and landowners, who, despite being weakened morally and materially, were still setting the tone in the towns in Southern parts of the country.<sup>20</sup> According to this, the leadership was first taken over by town Turks, who tended to rely on the Democratic Party. They were soon superseded by Albanian beys, but from August 1920, the leading role was taken over by the Macedonian Turks again.<sup>21</sup> At first, the Cemiyet was strange to the peasant Muslim masses, which was neither politically wise nor desirable in a predominantly peasants' country with universal suffrage, and especially if one took into account constant weakening of the Ottoman towns. The Cemiyet managed to overcome this contradiction by 1923, establishing ties with the Muslim peasantry,<sup>22</sup> which, uneducated and uninformed, following the tradition from the Turkish times, allowed itself to be led by agas and beys, unable to realize (partly due to the government policy) the selfish interests of the leaders.<sup>23</sup> Thanks to that, the Cemiyet managed over comparatively short time to become a political force with which one had to reckon – on the local and regional level, but also in the Belgrade central Parliament.

The elections for the Constitutive Assembly were the occasion for those members of the national minorities who had the right to vote to take part in shaping the supreme legal act of the country. Apart from the foundation of the Cemiyet in the South, a group of Czech centralist intellectuals founded the Czechoslovak Democratic Peasants' Party (*Čehoslovenska pokrovska rolnička strany*) (CDPP) in Daruvar on October 10, 1920. The founders wanted to separate the masses of the Czech voters from the "separatist" Croatian Republican Peasants' Party (CRPP) – with which they nevertheless negotiated about common tickets for the elections for the Constitutive Assembly. These negotiations failed, since the CRPP offered only one MP candidate, whereas the CDPP demanded two who would represent only the interests of the Czechs, i.e. of the CDPP. For this reason the CDPP ran with its own ticket, which, however failed to gain enough votes because most of the Czechs voted for the CRPP, the Croatian Community or the Communists. The party did not survive the defeat.<sup>24</sup> Due to dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation, most of the Czech voters supported the CRPP or even the Frankovci (extreme Croat nationalists) throughout the inter-war period.<sup>25</sup> The Czechs of Croatia were split into the intelligentsia of Belgrade leanings, which was convinced of the fateful ties between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and the masses that were increasingly falling under the

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20 Krivokapić-Jović, pp. 164-165.

21 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 82. Cemiyet was repelled from the DP by its too radical agrarian programme and the activity of Svetozar Pribičević as the Minister of the Interior. (*Ibid.*, pp. 7, 73, 82, 90, 119.)

22 Krivokapić-Jović, p. 165.

23 Apostolov, pp. 175-176; Bogumil Hrabak, Sreten Vukosavljević – politički aktivista i narodni poslanik 1919-1927, in: *Seoski dani Sretena Vukosavljevića*, XVIII, Prijepolje 1996, p. 21. Hrabak denies the party was bey-dominated, basing his opinion on the social structure of the Cemiyet MPs in the Constitutive Assembly. (*Hrabak, Džemijet*, pp. 109-110.) However, he claims, from early 1920 the Albanian feudal element was dominant, failing to explain these contradictory statements. (*Ibid.*, p. 117.)

24 Gligorijević, *Politička*, pp. 141, 143; Hanzl, Matušek, Orct, p. 49; Lenard, *Narodne manjine u SHS*, pp. 730, 732.

25 Gligorijević, *Politička*, p. 140; Hanzl, Matušek, Orct, p. 48.

influence of the Croatian Republican Peasants' Party.<sup>26</sup> As for the not very numerous and quite scattered Ruthenians, they, just like the Poles, never founded a party of their own, voting usually for the Yugoslav parties – the better off for the ruling ones, and the worse off for the opposition.<sup>27</sup>

The SPP was older, more respected and more ambitious than the CDPP. It wanted to represent not only the Slovaks, but also the Czechs and even the Ruthenians. Deliberations on the election tactics took place in Novi Sad on October 6, 1920. The party set its sights on five MP mandates: three for the Slovaks, one for the Czechs and one for the Ruthenians. The opinion was that such a thing could be achieved only with the support of some big Yugoslav party. The PRP was discarded from the beginning, for fear of its Serbian exclusiveness. The appropriate partner was found in the DP, which sailed under Yugoslav colors and was in favor of a faster agrarian reform – in keeping with SPP's wishes for participation in the distribution of land. The agreement foresaw four Slovak MP candidates who, if elected, would have the right to act in the spirit of the SPP. This combination also proved a failure at the elections. The SPP remained without MPs because a large number of the Slovaks, dissatisfied with the way the agrarian reform was executed, voted for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY).<sup>28</sup> The only Slovak to be elected to the Constitutive Assembly was Igor Štefanik, who had joined the PRP in time. At later elections the Slovaks did not manage to elect a single Slovak MP.<sup>29</sup>

The minority party which managed to become a factor of major political importance almost at the beginning of its existence and in a short time, was the Cemiyet, which, allied with the PRP, managed to have 12 MPs in the Constituent Assembly.<sup>30</sup> Cooperation was continued after the elections,<sup>31</sup> so, by taking advantage of the situation, the Cemiyet became the factor on which the passing of the supreme legal act of the country depended.<sup>32</sup> The reason was the fact that none of the government's Constitution drafts could muster the necessary majority in the Parliament. The Cemiyet's MPs (who were divided between the clubs of the DP and the PRP) used the stalemate to come forward in April 1921 with their demands of religious and educational autonomy, proportional participation of the Muslims in local

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26 Hanzl, Matušek, Orct, p. 50.

27 Vlado Kostelnik, *Klasno i nacionalno u emancipaciji i konstituisanju jugoslovenskih Rusina-Ukrajina*, in: *Klasno i nacionalno u suvremenom socijalizmu*, II, Zagreb 1970, p. 575.

28 Gligorijević, *Politička*, pp. 142-143.

29 Lenard, *Narodne manjine u SHS*, p. 732. However, Lenard's claim the Slovaks did not appear as a political group is not quite correct. (Lenard, *Slovenske narodne manjine u Jugoslaviji*, p. 856.)

30 The Cemiyet went to the elections either alone or in cooperation with the PRP – depending on the local conditions. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 95.) Hrabak adduces only 8 MPs for the Cemiyet, but the difference in number came to being due to insufficiently determined party affiliation of some MPs. (*Ibid.*, pp. 109, 113.) Some Muslim MPs were elected on the DP ticket, but then joined the Cemiyet parliamentary club.

31 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 95.

32 In that way the Cemiyet proved once again that, national minorities, although often at the fringe of political developments and public interest, can at certain junctures, decisively influence the development of historical events. In a way, this was proven by the Serbs in Austria-Hungary. The role of the Albanians in the break-up of Yugoslavia since early 1980s is still not rightly understood and evaluated.



government, exemption of the beys' landholdings from the agrarian reform, indemnification for the arrears of the serfs and taking away from the serfs the land of the beys they had usurped since 1912. Because of the resistance of parts of the PRP and DP clubs (the DP MPs from "Southern Serbia" were particularly uncompromising) the negotiations were hard. On May 12, 1921, the Cemiyet even voted in principle against the government's Constitutional draft.<sup>33</sup>

The agreement between the Cemiyet and the government was reached literally five minutes before midnight, on June 27, 1921. The Cemiyet's MPs agreed to vote for the Constitution, and received promises of just indemnification for the confiscated landholdings dependant on the economic price of land and local circumstances, payment of the land rent (as provided for by the Temporary Orders for the Execution of the Agrarian Reform), guarantee of the beys' estates up to 300 ha and even the return of the land the serfs had usurped since 1912. In keeping with this agreement 11 out of 12 Cemiyet MPs voted "yes", enabling thus the passing of the Constitution.<sup>34</sup> The question of the Constitution set an example for the relations between the PRP and the Cemiyet in the Parliament: the Cemiyet was willing to support, without undue discussion, the Radical or semi-Radical governments, receiving concessions in exchange, above all concerning agrarian matters, but also in the form of amnesty for the *kaçaks*.<sup>35</sup> Whenever it was possible or necessary, the Cemiyet used the support of the (Bosnian Muslim) Yugoslav Muslim Organization (YMO), remaining, however, permanently mistrustful of it.<sup>36</sup>

The lapse of the opting time enabled the Germans, Magyars and Romanians in the Northern parts of the country to get suffrage: there was no excuse for withholding it any longer, the Constitution having already been passed, anyway. The new electoral law, passed for the 1923 elections, stipulated that members of the minorities, who had not opted, gain the right to vote, provided they had been living in Yugoslav territory for at least ten years. However, in August 1923, the Ministry of the Interior issued a confidential order to its subaltern organs not to enter the members of the minorities into the electoral rolls, because the time for option had allegedly expired six days after the electoral law came into force. The intervention of some distinguished Yugoslav MPs and the Yugoslav Association for the League of Nations was needed to have this order annulled as politically damaging.<sup>37</sup> However, the law

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33 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 130-131.

34 Milovan Obradović, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija na Kosovu (1918-1941)*, Priština 1981, p. 56; Gligorijević, *Parlament*, pp. 103-104, 108-110; Nikola Gaćeša, *Agrarni programi građanskih političkih partija u Jugoslaviji između dva svetska rata*, in: Idem, *Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije*, Novi Sad 1995, pp. 132-133; Milenković, *Stav*, pp. 58-60.

35 At the congress in July 1921 the Cemiyet came forward with the following demands too: free living, easier procedure for issuing passports for Muslim merchants, return home of the interned *kaçak* families, civil servants who know the language, religion and customs of the population, religious schools (from primary school to university) in Turkish, with the curricula which would be made by the Cemiyet. Furthermore, the party raised its voice against the arbitrariness of the officialdom. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 135, 139, 143, 144.)

36 Mistrust was caused by diverging interests of the two Muslim groups and by hegemonic tendencies of the Bosnian Muslims who (supported by the authorities) aspired to posts of muftis and religious teachers in Southern parts. (Ibid., pp. 144-146.)

37 AJ, 14, 126/457.

was not fully implemented since there were complaints about non-registration of voters in many places.<sup>38</sup> At the communal elections in Slovenia in April 1921 the electoral rolls were the reason that, despite the lapse of the opting time, members of the minorities couldn't take part because the electoral rolls from the elections for the Constitutive Assembly were used.<sup>39</sup>

The members of the minorities likely to opt didn't await its expiration unprepared. The Volksdeutsche press started writing about political organizing, and in early 1922 preparations for the foundation of the German Party began. Already in February 1922 the Kočevje Peasants' Party (Gottscheer Bauernpartei) declared it was collectively joining the new party in the making,<sup>40</sup> and by early July 47 local committees were already set up (22 in the Banat, 17 in the Bačka and 4 in Syrmium).<sup>41</sup> The Hungarian elite, influenced by Budapest which wanted the Yugoslav Hungarians to take part in the political life of the country,<sup>42</sup> decided in February 1922 to set up an Organizing Committee to prepare the foundation for a party. In April of the same year, the local organization was founded in Subotica, which proceeded to found local branches in the area. Founding of local branches was slow due to the passivity of the Hungarian elite, weighing whether it would be better to join some of the Yugoslav parties and prohibition of rallies by the Yugoslav authorities.<sup>43</sup> There was also antagonism between the former members of the Independence Party (Függetlenségi Párt) and the Work Party (Munka Párt), as well as the local rivalries.<sup>44</sup> Preparations for the founding congress

38 Gligorijević, *Parlamentarizam*, pp. 131, 366-367.

39 Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 696; Lenz, p. 57; Wutte, Lobmeyr, p. 22; Karner, p. 38.

40 It was headed by priest Josef Eppich, and in the leadership of the GP it was represented by Hans Arko. Due to special conditions prevailing in Slovenia, it continued to work as a subdivision of the GP in Slovenia until 1929. Being too weak to muster the 6.000 votes necessary for an MP it made election deals with the largest Slovenian party, the Slovene People's Party. (Biber, *Kočevski Nemci*, p. 30; 500 let, p. 42; HWBGAD, III, p. 77; *Kočevska*, p. 26.) Furthermore, in a few towns the German Economic Party (Deutsche Wirtschaftspartei) was active. It achieved noteworthy results at the communal elections in 1924 in Ptuj, Celje and Maribor. (Melik, *Nemci u Sloveniji*, p. 69; Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 696.) We cannot agree with Suppan that the election results in these three towns, which brought more votes for this German party than were the Germans according to the census, prove that the census was flawed, because it is not to be excluded that part of the (German-friendly) Slovenes voted for the German Economic Party (which in the Slovenian translation of its name did not feature the word German!). V. Melik is of the same opinion. He thinks the German Party received a higher percentage of votes in Slovenia than was the percentage of the Germans in the overall population, due to the fact that some Slovenes voted for it because of the German economic power and social prestige. This is even more plausible, since it is known that some of the German workers voted for the Socialists. (Vasilj Melik, *Nemci in volitve v jugoslovanski Sloveniji med obema vojnama*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XL, 3, 1986.) At first, part of the Germans in Slovenia were adherents of the Socialist Party, but they turned Nazis in the late 1930s. (SBNS KJ, II redovan saziv za 1936/37, Beograd 1937, p. 356.)

41 Oskar Plautz, *Das Werden der deutschen Volksgemeinschaft in Südslawien*, Novi Sad 1940, pp. 47-48.

42 Sajti, pp. XII, 34.

43 The police considered the Hungarian Party an irredentist one, even before it was officially founded. (AJ, 14, 124/444; 148/514; 105/404; 98/385.) The party would not get rid of this label throughout its existence.

44 Sajti, pp. 32-33.

were made in May. The people who initiated the founding of the party were getting ready for local elections, but the law on them was not passed in 1922. In the meantime the people of the party submitted their critique of the electoral law and their proposal of the law that would be more favorable for the national minorities.<sup>45</sup> At the same time, the leaders of the new party in the making, offered to cooperate with the PRP, but this met with cool reception. They also approached other parties, but this yielded no results either, which strengthened passivity among the Magyars.<sup>46</sup> The Yugoslav parties had no interest in national minorities, i.e. they deemed they should join the Yugoslav parties.

The Hungarian Party's (HP) (Magyar Párt) work was constantly overshadowed by suspicion of irredenta and espionage.<sup>47</sup> Several arrests ended up in acquittals for lack of evidence.<sup>48</sup> And yet, to a much larger degree than the German Party, the Hungarian Party could not shake off accusations of disloyalty heaped on it.<sup>49</sup> After having previously been prevented from doing so in Subotica and Sombor, the party was formally founded at a large rally in Senta on September 17, 1922 at which some 3000 people took part. The president of the party György Santha talked about the loyalty to the King and the Fatherland, but he failed to convince skeptical representatives of the authorities. He said the Hungarian Party wanted to achieve only by legal means the fulfillment of the Convention on the Protection of Minorities, as well as that it was hoping to gather all the Hungarians into the party.<sup>50</sup> As the main planks of the party platform the following issues were singled out: the struggle for observation of the Minority Convention; the passing of the law on citizenship (the

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45 Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 150-151.

46 Ibid., p. 154.

47 Due to the wish of the Budapest government to use Hungarian minorities for irredentist purposes, these suspicions were not quite groundless. (Sajti, pp. 34-38.)

48 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 155. Mesaroš claims the higher authorities kept suspecting the HP of irredenta and espionage, whereas the State Secret Police denied this. However, he forgot that this institution was desperately undermanned, so that it is very dubitable how able it was to keep under surveillance such a big territory. Furthermore, the police officers being poorly paid and poorly equipped, had no great motive to be diligent in performing their duties. (The Banat policemen complained in mid-1922 that they had received no salary for four months. (AJ, 14, 93/375)) This was the reason for so many carbon-copied reports from various places, which claimed everything was in order and members of the minorities quiet. (Cf. the documents in: AJ, 14, 105/404.) On June 5, 1923, the new chief of the State Secret Police described the conditions thus: "It is a sad fact that there is more desire to be respected and comfortable in this police force, than consciousness. With due respect to not very numerous exceptions, the majority is more concerned with their private business, mutual intrigues and unimportant trifles, at the expense of the service...The majority is happy to solve the acts mechanically, even if negatively, thinking in that way they have done their duty." (AJ, 14, 135/479.)

49 Aleksandar Kasaš, *Mađari u Vojvodini 1941-1946*, Novi Sad 1996, pp. 14-15. However, if one looks at the behaviour of some of the leaders of the party during the Second World War, one sees that suspicion was not thoroughly unfounded. (Cf. *ibid.*, *passim*.)

50 Sajti, p. 43. Already during the founding phase, the Hungarians from Croatia, Slavonia and Međumurje joined the party. (Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 151.) There was no party organization in Baranya and Prekomurje. In Prekomurje the Unified Prekomurje Party was active for a time, championing local interests, but it petered out when its leaders emigrated to Hungary. (Sajti, pp. 46-47.)

Hungarians being particularly liable to be arbitrarily expelled on grounds of spurious citizenship); freedom of the press, assembly and organizing (and in this context of resumption of activities of those Hungarian organizations which had been banned before the Constitution was passed); free use of the mother-tongue in administration and judiciary; such administrative division that would enable the Vojvodina districts to have their centers in the Vojvodina; general suffrage for communal assemblies and the right to use the mother-tongue in them; Hungarian primary and secondary schools, as well as a chair of the Hungarian language and literature at a university; religious freedom and autonomy of religious communities, but also state support for them; amnesty for political offenders; freedom of economic enterprise coupled with abolition of the system of administrative permissions for founding co-operatives and joint-stock companies: the autonomy of industrial and commercial chambers; unified and progressive tax system; participation of members of the national minorities in the distribution of land, as well as compensation for the land-owners for the confiscated estates. Granting of land to the Vojvodina colonists outside the province was condemned, and freedom of work and protection of workers were demanded, as well as doing away with partiality in the judiciary and administration, as well as proportional participation of the Magyars in communal and state institutions. Over and above, the party demanded financial support for Hungarian cultural, social and economic associations and an end to the assimilationist policy. They also demanded revision of the district electoral system - so that the Vojvodina as a whole could elect MPs - as well as the revision of the voters' lists.<sup>51</sup>

The next minority party to be founded was the German Party (*Partei der Deutschen*). It was also founded in the Vojvodina since the bulk of the Yugoslav Germans lived there, but its goal (which it partly fulfilled) was to be the party of all the Germans in the country. Its founding convention was held in Žombolj<sup>52</sup> (which still belonged to Yugoslavia at that time) on December 17, 1922. Out of 50 local branches which had been founded in the course of the year, several hundred representatives from 34 branches were present.<sup>53</sup> The party platform adopted on that occasion contained a general part about civic rights, economic liberties, demands for more equitable tax system, improvements in passenger, commercial, postal and financial traffic, stability of the national currency and military service in one's area of origin in peacetime. They demand that those matters which should be regulated by laws would not be regulated by decrees and secret orders<sup>54</sup> (for which the government has already shown a propensity.)

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51 Mesaroš, Položaj, 156.

52 According to the German ambassador Keller (who was minutely informed of the meeting), the congress was held in such a peripheral place in order to reduce the danger of attacks - most probably by nationalist organizations. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6 Jugoslawien, Bd. 2; Josef Volkmar Senz, Politische Aktivitäten der Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen, Deutsche Forschung in Ungarn, IX, 1-4, 1944-1985, p. 302.)

53 Matthias Annabring, Volksgeschichte der Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien, Stuttgart 1955, p. 31; Plautz, p. 48. A terse police report about the foundation of the party's branch (wrongly called Deutsch-Schwäbisches (sic!) Partei) in Žombolj from February 26, 1922, is interesting, not because it contains interesting information, but because it shows how superficially the police was doing its job. (AJ, 14, 104/401.)

54 Plautz, pp. 48-50.

A particular part of their program concerned national demands. In it constitutional guarantee of the freedom of national development was demanded, the right to found private schools with proportional state subventions, the right of parents to choose the school for their children, as well as the right of attending schools abroad, the right to use the mother-tongue in oral and written communication in communes, districts and town communes, in the protocols of the German communes, oral communication in German in all administrative, financial and juridical offices, freedom to use the German language in German associations, cooperatives, commercial and other firms. In the administrative field, separate national units were demanded, and within them, the autonomous rights of the communes, towns, districts and municipalities, including free election of officials and proportional participation of German officials in the administration. Equal participation in the agrarian reform, works at reclamation of land, repealing of arbitrary acts concerning German associations and institutions were demanded. In order to represent the German cultural and economic interests, the foundation of the National Cultural Council and a state secretariat was asked for. Furthermore, preservation of German place-names and free use of national symbols was demanded.<sup>55</sup> Both the Hungarian and German minority parties were immediately put under police surveillance.<sup>56</sup>

The last minority party to be founded in the North was the Romanian. The delay, compared to other parties, was not big. Just like in the Hungarian and German cases, the action to gather, first the intelligentsia, and then the members, was going on throughout 1922 when the Romanians were entered into the electoral rolls. The party program was made in Pančevo in November 1922, and supplemented on December 25 in Vršac at the Romanian congress at which the Central Committee of 30 was founded as the Romanian representation. It convened the founding congress for February 10, 1923. The Congress, attended by some 5000 representatives from all Romanian settlements, adopted the program of the party and elected the candidates for the elections called for March 18. At the same congress, it was decided to publish in Pančevo the *Graiul Românesc*, as the party newspaper. At the same time, the Romanian Cultural Association was founded.<sup>57</sup> Less than a month later, the police accused the Romanian Party (RP) that it was responsible for (sometimes even violent) excesses of the Banat Romanians against the authorities, which did not occur earlier, and because of which some members of the Romanian minority were persecuted not only according to the Criminal Law, but also according to the Law on Protection of the State.<sup>58</sup>

The program of the Romanian Party was divided in five parts. The first one dealt with foreign policy: it championed friendship of Yugoslavia with Romania and Czechoslovakia and the big powers which enabled their creation, as well as the unchangeability of Yugoslavia's borders. The second part dealt with matters of domestic policy, pleaded for democracy, civil liberties and equality, that civil servants in

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55 AJ, 14, 127/462; Plautz, pp. 50-52; Gligorijević, *Parlamentarizam*, p. 138.

56 AJ, 14, 123/438; 148/514.

57 Popi, *Rumuni*, pp. 54-55; *Idem*, *Formiranje*, pp. 323-326.

58 AJ, 69, 8/18. The document probably alludes to the rebellion of Romanian peasants against local authorities in Sv. Mihajlo (now: Lokve). (Gligor Popi, *Iz političke aktivnosti Rumuna u Banatu posle Prvog svetskog rata*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju*, 6, 1972, p. 175.)

Romanian places have the knowledge of Romanian and that public signs in places with larger number of Romanians be in Romanian. The party was in favor of progressive taxation and lower taxes on goods needed by the peasantry. It also favored building of roads and railway tracks, free passports and just participation of the Romanians in the distribution of the land during the agrarian reform, i.e., that poor Romanians receive the land first in Romanian settlements. The third part considered culture, where the first concern was the Orthodox Church and its property and assets – which mirrored the great role the Romanian clergy played in the party. Furthermore, instruction in Romanian, and teachers from Romania, until a Romanian teachers training college is opened in Yugoslavia and schoolbooks from Romania were demanded, whereas the instruction in the “state language” was foreseen only for the higher primary school. It was foreseen that, lacking Romanian teachers, non-Romanians with good command of Romanian language could impart instruction, and Romanian priests as well. The party fought for improvement of the material situation of the clergy and teachers and free work of cultural and artistic associations. Recognition of diplomas from Romania was also asked for and retaining of Romanian place-names. The fourth part dealt with economic questions, demanding that peasants be enabled to sell their products as favorably as possible, favorable railway prices for transport of goods and creation of conditions for wine export and customs agreements with the neighboring countries in order to facilitate trade. Finally, it was demanded that Romanian banks too could get credits from the National Bank of Yugoslavia.<sup>59</sup>

If these three programs are compared, the following can be noticed: all of them are in favor of basic civic freedoms, like the programs of other parties. The program of the Hungarian Party puts much stress on political and cultural rights, leaving aside economic matters almost completely. This was the reflection of the leadership of the party, which comprised mostly, politicians, landowners, former civil servants and other professionals – primarily lawyers. For these reasons this party remained quite elitist throughout its existence and thus failed to attract the Hungarian masses.<sup>60</sup> The program of the Romanian Party showed other characteristics that reflected the make-up of the party's leadership as well as the situation of the Banat Romanians as a true border-minority. For these reasons, the party's leaders very much looked across the border. That is the reason they demanded free passports. The rupture of the old established economic ties caused demands that roads and railway-lines be built to the new markets, and also demands for trade agreements with the neighboring countries, friendship with Romania and finding the way to export wine. In the cultural field, much was said about the Church – which reflected the make-up of the Romanian elite in the Western Banat,<sup>61</sup> and also problems caused by the separation of the Romanian metropolis from the Carlowitz one in 1864 –

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59 IAP, 12/1245; Popi, Rumuni, pp. 56-57; Idem, Formiranje, pp. 329-332.

60 A police report from early 1926 claimed the Hungarian poor were more inclined toward the Socialists and the Union of Agriculturalists'. In another one from the middle of the same year, it is claimed, the adherents of the HP were only the rich, whereas the poor Hungarians had Communist leanings. Elitism remained a chronic problem of the Hungarian Party. (AJ, 14, 120/432; Magyarország, March 14, 1937; László Rehák, Nacionalni i politički razvoj Mađara u Jugoslaviji, in: Klasno i nacionalno u suvremenom socijalizmu, II, Zagreb 1970, pp. 326-327.)

61 Almost one half of the members of the Executive Committee of the party were priests. (Popi, Formiranje, pp. 326-327.)

problems that were not completely solved and some of them having been made even more complicated by the new border. The demand for teachers and schoolbooks from Romania was the corollary of the consciousness of the minority's cultural weakness caused by the "brain-drain" right after the First World War. In the program of the German Party, together with the usual minority demands for equality and participation in power, those about cultural self-reliance (based on the Convention on Protection of Minorities), i.e. about founding private schools, stand out. It can be presumed with a great dose of certainty that for this purpose the party leaders expected, apart from state subventions, grants from Germany and Austria, since such examples had existed in the past (especially in Slovenia). Since the thrifty, and partly still nationally dormant Swabians who formed the bulk of the German population in Yugoslavia, were not very liberal when it came to giving money for cultural needs,<sup>62</sup> such aid was almost a *conditio sine qua non* for possible existence of private educational facilities. A large part of the program was devoted to economic demands. This mirrored the traditional interest of the majority of the Germans in economic activities on the one hand,<sup>63</sup> and partly personal overlapping of the leadership of the German Party with that of German economic organizations on the other.<sup>64</sup> The leading Serbian parties, the DP and the PRP were not delighted with the foundation of the minority parties because they hoped members of the minorities would join them (DP and PRP).<sup>65</sup> The reactions of the Yugoslav press, the party newspapers included, were also only partly positive.<sup>66</sup>

Since the elections were drawing near, the minority parties were faced with a dilemma that would become eternal: how and with whom to participate at the elections. Despite opinions within the party that favored cooperation with the DP, the CRPP or an independent participation, the HP concluded an agreement about the common running with the PRP, but it eventually fizzled due to the tendency of the PRP to interpret it in a narrower way at the HP's expense. This caused disunity in the Hungarian Party itself over the agreement because of the publication of the alleged order of the Minister of the Interior that members of the minorities were not to be added to the electoral rolls, and because too many Hungarians were excluded from them. For these reasons, the leadership of the party decided to abstain from participating.<sup>67</sup> The Romanian Party also contacted the PRP, and the DP too, with the view of cooperating with them, but nothing came of it because it asked for three MPs.<sup>68</sup> Eventually, the party ran alone. The same was done by the German Party.<sup>69</sup>

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62 Zoran Janjetović, *Duhovni profil vojvodanskih Švaba*, Tokovi istorije, VII, 1-2, 2000, p. 58.

63 Ibid., pp. 57-58.

64 Until 1927 Stefan Kraft, the co-president of the German Party was also the leader of the central German agricultural cooperative, the "Agraria" which was founded in 1922. (Plautz, pp. 52, 90.)

65 Indeed, part of members of the minorities joined the DP and the PRP even before the opting time expired. (Altgayer, p. 48.)

66 VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 2, d. 3; PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Gligoričević, Parlament, p. 146; Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 160, 164; Popi, Rumuni, p. 59; Idem, Formiranje, p. 336.

67 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 160; Sajti, pp. 48-49.

68 Popi, Formiranje, p. 334; Idem, Rumuni, p. 59.

69 Plautz, p. 53; Gligoričević, Parlament, p. 138.

The SPP offered cooperation to the Radicals in early 1923, but since they offered only two candidates for deputy-MPs, nothing came of the collaboration. For this reason, the party established connections with the fraction of the Radical renegade Stojan Protić, enraging thus the PRP and the DP, which reproached it that it was not up to the Slovaks to decide about the Constitution, and even that the SPP was an anti-state party.<sup>70</sup>

During 1920-1923 the Cemiyet formed an alliance with the PRP in the local government in many places, especially towns in the South.<sup>71</sup> The same was true of the Parliament in which in April 1921 the Cemiyet demanded a solution of the agrarian question such that it would be propitious for the landowners.<sup>72</sup> The third congress of the Cemiyet in April 1922 decided on narrower cooperation with the PRP, especially with a view of solving the agrarian question, but the agreement on elections collaboration could not be reached.<sup>73</sup> The fourth party congress issued an election proclamation on January 20, 1923 in which it listed cultural and educational progress first, and then the agrarian question. They addressed conditions for production of tobacco, political liberties and equality for the Muslims and abolition of arbitrariness and intolerance of the authorities.<sup>74</sup> The satisfaction with the cooperation with the PRP was not universal at that time, and some were accusing the PRP's partner in the government, the DP, of non-fulfillment of the Cemiyet's demands.<sup>75</sup> It was decided at the congress that the party run independently at the elections, except in those precincts where the Muslims were a minority: there it was allowed to compromise with other parties, especially with the PRP.<sup>76</sup>

The PRP and DP tried to win over the minority parties, or to neutralize them and prevent them from running independently. In doing this the DP relied on the bul-lies' nationalist organization the ORJUNA, whose members attacked rallies of the minority parties and demolished premises of minority newspapers.<sup>77</sup> The SRNAO was active in the South too, but not in such a brutal way.<sup>78</sup> The minority parties were disturbed also by the police, and especially the Hungarian and Romanian Parties were suspected of irredentism.<sup>79</sup>

What results at the elections did the minority parties achieve with their tactics? The absolute loser was the Hungarian Party, which, due to abstention never had a chance of getting MPs.<sup>80</sup> Hungarian voters split their votes between the PRP, DP

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70 Gligorijević, *Politička*, p. 146.

71 Krivokapić-Jović, pp. 168-170.

72 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 130.

73 Bogumil Hrabak, *Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija prema muslimanima Sandžaka, Kosmeta i Makedonije 1919-1929. godine* (henceforth: JMO), *Novopazarski zbornik*, 19, 1995, p. 166.

74 Hrabak, JMO, p. 168; Idem, *Džemijet*, p. 127.

75 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 122.

76 Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 138; Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 122-123. It was decided to support the PRP in the Parliament and to devote attention to pious foundations and religious courts.

77 Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 140; Idem, *Organizacija jugoslovenskih nacionalista, Istorija 20. veka*, 5, 1963, p. 336; Mladen Đorđević, *Organizacija jugoslovenskih nacionalista (ORJUNA)* (Msc. of BA paper), Beograd 1998, p. 38; Wutte, *Lobmeyr*, pp. 23-24.

78 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 172.

79 *AJ*, 14, 118/430; Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 371; Popi, *Formiranje*, p. 336; Idem, *Rumuni*, p. 59.

80 Few independent candidates of this party failed to secure enough votes to qualify for the Parliament in Novi Sad, Subotica, Sombor and Veliki Bečkerek. (Sajti, p. 52.) Plaszkovich managed to get through but on the DP ticket. (*Ibid.*, p. 53.)



and partly the Socialist Party.<sup>81</sup> The SPP also suffered defeat because a considerable part of the Slovaks either abstained from voting or voted for the DP.<sup>82</sup> The Romanian Party managed to secure the mandate only for its secretary Jiuanu.<sup>83</sup> In some places (Uzdin, Deliblato, Mramorak, Seleuš) the Romanians voted for the DP en masse.<sup>84</sup> The real winners among the minority parties were the German Party which secured 8 MPs<sup>85</sup> and the Cemiyet with as many as 14 MPs!<sup>86</sup>

After the elections the Romanian Party entered a precarious collaboration with the PRP and its MP Jiuanu joined the Radicals' parliamentary club. The Romanian Party demanded proportional participation in the administration of the Romanian communes and the land from the agrarian reform for the Romanian poor. After the Democrats came to power under Davidović, the RP renounced the agreement with the PRP that never yielded much anyway.<sup>87</sup> After the 1923 elections, despite the cooperation that was at first agreed upon,<sup>88</sup> the strengthened Cemiyet also started distancing itself from the PRP: the fraction of (the Turk) Cenani Zija grew weaker, and that led by (the Albanian) Ferhat bey Draga, the brother of the founder of the Cemiyet, Nexhib, a man of murky past and disguised irredentist, grew stronger.<sup>89</sup> This was the sign of the ever deeper gap among the Muslims of the South, which to a large extent went along ethnic lines. The Albanians were increasingly taking over in the process.<sup>90</sup> Simultaneously, the campaign of the DP against the Cemiyet began.<sup>91</sup> In fact, that was the beginning of the Cemiyet's end. Until August 1924 the Cemiyet MPs sat in the Radicals' parliamentary club and voted with the PRP, but almost never took part in parliamentary debates.<sup>92</sup> Their demands remained centered around the agrarian reform (questions of indemnification and tenants' rents), participation of the Muslims in the local government, education in mother-tongue and religious courts.<sup>93</sup> Furthermore, national (Albanian) demands appeared in this period.<sup>94</sup> Although little of their demands was

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81 Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 161; Sajt, p. 50.

82 Gligoričević, *Politička*, p. 146; Idem, *Parlament*, p. 142.

83 Popi, *Formiranje*, p. 336; Idem, *Rumuni*, p. 60.

84 Popi, *Formiranje*, p. 336; Idem, *Rumuni*, p. 59.

85 Plautz, pp. 53-55. In the places without the GP ticket in Slavonia and Syrmium, the Volksdeutsche voted for the CRPP, and for the Croatian Community in towns, whereas in the Bačka, according to the German ambassador Keller, two socialists were elected thanks to German votes. (Altgay, p. 48; PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2.)

86 Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 168.

87 Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 61.

88 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 175, 181. However, the cooperation was forced upon the Cemiyet since almost all of its MPs were disputed.

89 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 170. Ferhat Draga (1873-1945) was the most popular Albanian politician in the inter-war Yugoslavia. A short biography (the main shortcoming of which is that it is mainly based on the memories of his son-in-law Faik Račak) see in: *Biographisches Lexikon*, I, p. 426.

90 The Albanians were the majority in the parliamentary club, and the Turks in the party headquarters in Skopje. The parliamentary club could undertake nothing without the consent from the headquarters. (Gligoričević, *Parlament*, p. 157.)

91 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 176-183.

92 Hrabak, *JMO*, pp. 168-169; Idem, *Džemijet*, p. 187.

93 Gligoričević, *Parlament*, p. 157; Hrabak, *JMO*, pp. 170-171; Idem, *Džemijet*, p. 187.

94 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 188.

met, they remained loyal to the government – despite occasional criticism that couldn't be avoided – usually after some bloodshed.<sup>95</sup> The criticism on the part of the opposition that the Cemiyet was “anational”, Turkish and socially conservative, were partly responsible for such behavior of the Cemiyet MPs.<sup>96</sup> In August 1923 a turbulent party convention discussing relations with the PRP was held. The agreement on problem solving and decision-making was reached, but the contours of the rift, which would deepen the next year over the same main moot question, appeared in the offing.<sup>97</sup>

At the talks with the PRP on December 8-9, 1923, the main Cemiyet demands were repeated. The PRP agreed to everything except for the agrarian question, which allegedly needed to be looked into more thoroughly. The school question was also put off. Finally an agreement was reached, the main point of which was the raising of the rents for the landlords. With this the PRP managed to prevent the Cemiyet from joining the opposition.<sup>98</sup> However, the distancing from the PRP became increasingly more obvious in early 1924.<sup>99</sup> This course was sealed when Cenani Zija and some other leading advocates of the cooperation with the PRP were expelled from the party. Joining the opposition was gradual, in mid-February 1924.<sup>100</sup> Zija couldn't salvage his position at the counter-congress in late July since the majority of the party members remained loyal to Draga.<sup>101</sup> In August 1924 the Cemiyet lent support to the new government, but demanded an end to violence of the government organs and installation of new teachers.<sup>102</sup> The Cemiyet started establishing increasingly visible contacts with the leader of the CRPP, Stjepan Radić, and the party congress in December approved continuation of collaboration with the opposition.<sup>103</sup> At the same time, the decision about the forthcoming elections was reached and cooperation with other parties allowed, depending on local circumstances.<sup>104</sup> Contacts with the DP and the Independent Radicals were also established in December, at which the Ministry of the Interior promptly banned the party newspaper the “Hak”.<sup>105</sup>

The behavior of the German Party was similar to that of the Cemiyet. Their representatives criticized the government in the Parliament – much more often and much more volubly than the Cemiyet MPs – but they still hoped to achieve their goals by relying on the government. Just like the Cemiyet, the German Party leaned on the government partly because the opposition parties were rejecting it. (The GP accused the CRPP and the main Slovenian party, the Slovenian People's Party of national selfishness and work against the Volksdeutsche.)<sup>106</sup> When the German Party openly sided

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95 Such a bloodshed was for instance the one at the local elections in Kosovska Mitrovica, when 14 Albanians were killed. The perpetrators were from the SRNAO. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 190-193; Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 158.)

96 Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 157.

97 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 199.

98 *Ibid.*, pp. 203-209.

99 *Ibid.*, p. 213.

100 *Ibid.*, pp. 214, 253-254.

101 Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 173.

102 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 229.

103 *Politika*, December 11, 1924; Hrabak, *JMO*, pp. 169, 173.

104 Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 173.

105 *Ibid.*, p. 174.

106 Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 158.

with the opposition, the German minority was punished by disbanding of the central Volksdeutsche cultural association, the Kulturbund, at the order of the nationally intolerant, Minister of Interior Svetozar Pribićević, on April 11, 1924.<sup>107</sup>

The Hungarian Party, although with no MPs, decided to quit passivity, although its activities were not overly lively. It continued mainly to complain about schools and the work of cultural associations. The arrest of some of its leaders (László Graber, Ödön Nagy, Benedek) charged with ties to the leading Hungarian irredentist organization, the *Awakening Magyars* (Ebrede Magyarok Egyesület), gave the party bad press.<sup>108</sup> Although the charges proved groundless, it was typical of the conditions under which the party had to work. The Hungarian Party kept trying to establish cooperation with the PRP, whereas the opposition parties showed no interest in the Hungarians, and the CRPP was even opposed to them.<sup>109</sup> The PRP was not overly willing to hear the complaints the Hungarian Party tried to convey. Obviously the Radicals were aware of the weakness of the HP, which failed to muster even the whole of the Hungarian bourgeoisie. Although the party kept trying to establish cooperation with the PRP, it was not only unsuccessful, but lived to be banned in May 1924, for its alleged ties to irredentists. It was all part of the pressure brought to bear upon opposition, and the government suspected that the CRPP wished to win the Hungarians for itself.<sup>110</sup> Just like the ban of the Kulturbund, this one was lifted by the Davidović government, and the Prime Minister told the Germans and Hungarians he would not treat them as second class citizens.<sup>111</sup> The renewal of the party brought no changes to its work – like other minority parties it wanted to achieve its goals by leaning on some of the big Yugoslav parties – in this case, the Independent Radicals of Stojan Protić.<sup>112</sup> Apart from the problems with the authorities and the opposition, the Hungarian Party met with the opposition on the part of the conservative Magyar bourgeoisie, especially in Novi

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107 The official explanation was that the measure was retaliation for the bad situation of the Slovene national minority in Austrian Carinthia. The Davidović government repealed the ban, but most of the property of the association was not returned and local branches reopened slowly. (Plautz, pp. 35-36; Annabring, pp. 35-36, 41; J.V. Senz, Politische, p. 311.) In that way the PRP showed what uncooperative national minorities had to expect. Although some Kulturbund branches continued to work clandestinely (AJ, 14, 118/430), the disbanding of the Kulturbund disappointed and passivized part of the Germans, whereas others became disgruntled and driven to the arms of the opposition CRPP. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Bd. 2.)

108 Under this name the Yugoslav documents often subsume other Hungarian irredentist organizations, or even the Hungarian irredenta as such. The Hungarian Party never managed to acquit itself of charges it was just a branch of the EME.

109 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 162. After the elections the fraction in favor of cooperation with the PRP gained strength, because the belief gained ground that the HP was too weak to get its MPs into the Parliament alone. (Sajti, p. 53.) However, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Tibor Sztitovszky was against a rapprochement with Serbian parties. (Ibid., p. 55.)

110 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 165. It is interesting to note that the party was banned according to secret decrees of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior from 1875 and 1894! (Sajti, p. 51.) The party continued working in secret even after it had been banned. (AJ, 14, 120/432.)

111 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 167.

112 Ibid., p. 168.

Sad and Subotica. Furthermore, splits occurred in some local branches, and the party platform for the upcoming elections failed to satisfy the adherents of its three fractions.<sup>113</sup>

During the time between the elections, the SPP also tried to establish cooperation with the PRP, but its demands, formulated on October 11, 1923 seemed too ambitious to the Radicals. In particular, the Radicals from the Vojvodina reproached the Slovaks for insisting on a separate political organization instead of joining the PRP. The Radicals were also dissatisfied that the Slovaks pursued the same policy as the Germans and the Magyars, always asking for compensations.<sup>114</sup> When the next elections had already been called, the PRP made known its proposal for cooperation in early December 1924. It presupposed enrollment of the Slovaks into the Slovak sections of the PRP, proportional participation in local administration, two Slovak deputy-MPs, Slovak school classes where enough Slovak children would be available, teachers from Czechoslovakia – if necessary, enlargement of the Slovak high school – if possible, Slovak civil servants in Slovak communes – if possible, and rectification of the past errors.<sup>115</sup> These conditions, and especially the first one, were not accepted by the SPP, but a compromise was reached based on its counterproposals: the PRP promised to lend support to the Slovak ecclesiastical demands; to secure proportional participation in the local administration, two deputy-MPs; to open Slovak school classes where there were enough children, to provide the teachers, to secure a certain number of Slovak officials in Slovak communes and equality in the agrarian reform.<sup>116</sup> Finally the Radicals showed themselves as forthcoming, but then they were always liberal in promises, especially before the elections.

The cooperation of the Radicals with the Romanian Party after the elections of 1923 was not of long duration. An agreement was reached, especially on the agrarian question in August 1923, and the question of the school and the Church was left to be settled on the principle of reciprocity.<sup>117</sup> The RP tried to uphold the cooperation, but it was accused of irredentism by the PRP in December of that year<sup>118</sup> – in order to make it pliable by pressure. Nevertheless, the RP decided in May 1924 to try to maintain cooperation. The district conference of the PRP in Pančevo wanted the same. At the negotiations in Belgrade the PRP agreed to common tickets for the next elections. In exchange, the RP asked for the confiscated land to be returned so it could be used by communes and the local poor, and for communal clerks who would enjoy the support of the people. The RP annulled the agreement after the fall of the Pašić-Pribičević government.<sup>119</sup> It announced the conditions under which it would lend support to the new government. They were more ambitious than those set before the Radical government, and they concerned passing the law on communal administration, equality of the Romanians in the agrarian reform, reciprocity with Romania in education, signing and ratifying of a convention about schooling in that country, approval of the statutes of the cultural society, and observing the order

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113 AJ, 14, 123/438; 105/406; 118/430; Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 172.

114 Gligorijević, Politička, pp. 147-148.

115 Ibid., p. 148.

116 Ibid., p. 149.

117 Popi, Formiranje, p. 237.

118 The police, which observed its work, deemed its main goal was secession of the Western Banat. (AJ, 14, 105/406; 118/430.)

119 Popi, Formiranje, pp. 337-338.

of the Minister of the Army that recruits from the Southern Banat would not be sent to serve in malaria-infested regions. With the fall of the Davidović government, these demands came to naught.

The RP decided to run with the PRP in the next elections, and to put up its candidates in the districts of Vršac, Alibunar and Northern Torontal. This solution was seen as being most in keeping with the Romanian national interests.<sup>120</sup> After some internal debate within the PRP, the agreement on cooperation, which contained the main Romanian demands, was signed on December 26, 1924. Although there was criticism on both sides, the government did make certain concessions (revision of the agrarian reform in some places, passports for Romanian students, changes in the local administration in certain places) and common campaign was executed, with frequent mentions of the common struggle in Austria-Hungary. At the same time, the RP feared the influence of the DP in some Romanian settlements.<sup>121</sup>

The elections of 1925 were held with unprecedented government terror – directed not only against the national minorities, but against all opposition forces.<sup>122</sup> Still the terror of the SRNAO and the Chetniks<sup>123</sup> was the strongest in the Vojvodina, where, in collusion with the authorities, they attacked the German Party, the Democrats, and the Union of Agriculturists, dispersing their rallies.<sup>124</sup> The most prominent victims among the national minorities were Dr Stefan Kraft and Dr Georg Grassl who were brutally beaten up in Stari Sivač, which led to a diplomatic mini-scandal in the Yugoslav-German relations.<sup>125</sup> As the instigator of the assault, the German diplomacy and press accused Svetozar Pribičević, known as an enemy of the minorities.<sup>126</sup>

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120 Ibid., p. 341; Idem, Rumuni, p. 66.

121 Popi, Formiranje, pp. 342-344; Idem, Rumuni, p. 67.

122 Bogumil Hrabak, Radikalska nasilja u Vojvodini u vezi s izborima 8. februara 1925, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 24, 1981; Idem, Džemijet, p. 236; SBNS, Vanredni saziv za 1925. godinu, knj. II, Beograd 1925, p. 52. Apart from the terror, surveillance of the minority parties increased. (AJ, 14, 118/430) The Times of London, found an exonerating circumstance on February 7, 1925: "Still, it must be remembered that the only election in Serbia proper which passed without bloodshed was that of 1912, that the great majority of the Croats had no political experience in the Hungarian days and that a population mainly composed of sturdy peasants who hold strong simple views on most subjects is naturally inclined to follow the Punjabi adage "A stout stick is the best argument."

123 The Germans and Hungarians could also become members of the SRNAO and the Chetniks if they declared themselves "Serbian Radicals". (Hrabak, Radikalska nasilja, p. 175; Branislav Gligorijević, Srpska nacionalna omladina (SRNAO). Prilog izučavanju nacionalističkih i terorističkih organizacija u staroj Jugoslaviji, Istorijski glasnik, 2-3, 1964, p. 12.) Obviously, political opportunism knew no bounds.

124 Gligorijević, Parlament, p. 191; Idem, Srpska nacionalistička omladina, p. 27. The national minorities were subject to the SRNAO terror even without the elections campaign. (AJ, 14, 118/430; PA, Abt. IIb, Deutschland in Jugoslawien, Politik 25, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Gligorijević, srpska nacionalistička omladina, pp. 6, 19-20.)

125 Avramovski, Britanci, I, p. 307; Janjetović, Die Konflikte, p. 138; Annabring, p. 36. The arrest of Ferhat Draga with a few of his collaborators on very old charges about which the authorities did nothing as long as the Cemiyet supported the government, can be interpreted as part of the pre-election terror. (Cf. Biographisches Lexikon, I, p. 426.)

126 PA, Abt. IIb, Politische Beziehungen Jugoslawiens zu Deutschland, Politik 2, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.

Apart from physical violence, there were also more subtle methods of pressure, such as threats to close down minority departments.<sup>127</sup>

The outcome of the 1925 elections was different for various national minorities, i.e. for their respective parties. The most important change on the political scene was the disappearance of the Cemiyet as an organized political force. It received only 14,998 votes and did not manage to obtain a single seat in the Parliament.<sup>128</sup> The Cemiyet was practically stymied as an organization already after the ban of the "Hak", and could participate in the elections campaign only conditionally speaking.<sup>129</sup> Zija's faction decided to run together with the PRP or independently (in some precincts), and Draga's with the DP or the PRP, depending on the precinct.<sup>130</sup> Thus this party paid the highest price for its defection from the cooperation with the PRP.<sup>131</sup> In the opinion of Branislav Gligorijević, it was not willing to fight for its demands, and compromises with the PRP (from which only the beys profited), compromised it with the voters.<sup>132</sup> Going over to the opposition came too late, and the pressure on the national minorities and adherents of the opposition did its part. The decision about common tickets with the DP and the Independent Radicals was difficult to realize, and the split of the leadership contributed to the defeat.<sup>133</sup> On the other hand, the Radicals managed to build up their own network in "Southern Serbia" into which they co-opted, through participation in the local government, a large number of Muslims from all classes,<sup>134</sup> so they no longer needed the support of the Cemiyet. Indeed, as soon as it grew too strong and started ogling with the opposition, it had to disappear.<sup>135</sup> National and social heterogeneity proved too great and too destructive.<sup>136</sup> Its voters were taken over mainly by

127 Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, p. 283.

128 Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 189. Ferhad Draga forecasted that the Cemiyet would have 16 MPs! (Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 174.)

129 Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 174. Attempts at starting new party organs, the Hak Yolu (The Way of Justice) and the Mucahede (Lawful Struggle) were also cut short by speedy bans. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 238.) The terror of the authorities, the Chetniks and the SRNAO was, together with economic threats and electoral skullduggery, certainly one of the main reasons for the Cemiyet's defeat. (SBNS Kraljevine SHS, vanredan saziv za 1925. godinu, knj. II, Beograd 1925, pp. 41, 46-51.)

130 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 235-243.

131 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 244-246, 271-272. The formal reason for disbanding the Cemiyet were connections with the kačaks – more or less already well known. (Bataković, *Kosovo*, p. 40; Sinan Hasani, *Kosovo – istine i zablude*, Zagreb 1986, p. 81; Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 175.) The leader of the Cemiyet, Ferhat bey Draga was arrested with a few other leaders and accused of serious crimes, although some Serbs tried hard to exonerate him. (Reč, April 11, 1925.) This fact, as well as his subsequent release, testify to intermingling of political connections across ethnic, religious and party lines, but also to non-functioning of the legal state.

132 The only demand the Cemiyet leaders were really serious about concerned their estates. Their actions concerning religious and educational matters were only token moves. (Hrabak, *Sreten Vukosavljević*, p. 22.)

133 Gligorijević, *Parlament*, pp. 189-190; Idem, *Političke, privredne i socijalne prilike*, p. 215; Jovanović, *Turci*, p. 139.

134 Krivokapić-Jović, pp. 165-173.

135 The party was never officially banned, but its leaders ceased to appear in public. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 274-275.)

136 *Ibid.*, pp. 277, 284-286. Hrabak deems that in the Cemiyet the national agenda ousted all other questions by mid-1924, including the agrarian one which had been dominant until then. (*Ibid.*, pp. 287, 291-297.)

the PRP.<sup>137</sup> The Hungarian Party also suffered a defeat – due to the pressure and disunity of the leadership which was torn between adherents of the cooperation with the DP, the PRP and of independent running.<sup>138</sup> The majority of Hungarian voters voted for Yugoslav parties – most for the DP (which had two Hungarian candidates, of which one, L. Pletikoszich was elected), and some for the PRP.<sup>139</sup> Jiuanu's ticket of the Romanian party did not get enough votes so he was not elected. At the same time a considerable number of Romanians in Alibunar district voted for the DP and the poor for the Republicans. In that precinct the Romanian candidate received more votes from the Serbs, than from the Romanians!<sup>140</sup> As for the SPP, a Slovak, Popovicki, was elected on the PRP ticket in the Novi Sad precinct.<sup>141</sup> The GP received more votes than ever, but only five MPs, because of changes in the electoral system.<sup>142</sup>

After the elections, the GP at first united with the Union of Agriculturists in the Parliamentary Club of Agriculturists,<sup>143</sup> but it could not stay in the opposition for long.<sup>144</sup> Because it needed support of a big ruling party, it implicitly offered cooperation to the PRP in October 1926, which, since its alliance with the CRPP was on the wane, accepted it, promising, as always, to rectify the minority complaints.<sup>145</sup> This cooperation continued until the next parliamentary elections in 1927.<sup>146</sup> The German Party submitted a memo to the Vukićević government in which it demanded: restitution of the confiscated property of the German associations; rectification of the damage caused by the agrarian reform; communal elections; proportional participation of the Germans in the state apparatus; ten to twelve MPs; and equality in social and economic matters.<sup>147</sup>

The flop at the elections of February 8, 1925, led to temporary passivization of the Hungarian Party, which lasted until mid-1926.<sup>148</sup> As for the Romanian Party, the fiasco at the elections caused derangement, and its one-time MP Jiuanu moved to Romania. The PRP used the occasion to put the pressure to bear upon the RP to integrate into the PRP, like many individual Romanians had already done. For these reasons the leadership of the RP decided to go into opposition and to run at the regional elections in alliance with the DP and the Socialist Party.<sup>149</sup> As for the parliamentary elections, the RP decided to run independently in 1927, championing freedom of religion, of schools and free use of the mother-tongue.<sup>150</sup>

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137 Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 190. On the PRP ticket 8 Turks and Albanians were elected. (AJ, 305, 8/17.) The PRP toyed for a time with the idea of forming a Muslim organization loyal to itself (the PRP) from Zia and his followers. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, pp. 234, 238.)

138 Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 191.

139 Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 173.

140 Popi, *Rumuni*, pp. 67-68; *Idem*, *Formiranje*, pp. 345-346.

141 Gligorijević, *Politička*, p. 150.

142 Plautz, p. 55.

143 PA, Abt. IIb, *Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien*, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3.

144 Like other minority parties, the GP was also under police surveillance. (AJ, 14, 109/413.)

145 Annabring, p. 38; Gligorijević, *Parlament*, 217-218.

146 Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 239.

147 Plautz, pp. 63-64.

148 Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 174.

149 Popi, *Formiranje*, p. 347; *Idem*, *Rumuni*, p. 67.

150 Popi, *Formiranje*, p. 349.

The Slovaks had no luck with the Radicals either: the PRP did not keep promises given during the pre-election time. Although the SPP insisted on its demands, especially on those concerning schools, it was unsuccessful. This led to passivity, and there was even talk of dissolution of the party. In 1925-1926 not a single party meeting took place, the party was losing influence for cooperating with the PRP and achieving nothing. Therefore the majority of the Slovaks turned to the opposition. The younger activists championed the reform of the party. The party congress in Petrovac on April 3, 1927 was supposed to bring about a U-turn. L. Mičatek proposed there that the SPP leave politics and turn to cultural matters. The young refused this, with the explanation there were other organizations in charge of culture. The third faction was in favor of continued political activity, but in alliance with some big Yugoslav party. It was decided to reorganize the party, and the new statute was adopted. The time until the next congress on July 17, 1927 was passed in reshuffling and recruiting new members. Until then, the reorganization was completed only in the Bačka, and only partly in Syrmium and the Banat. At the congress, it was decided to go to the elections with the PRP and with the demands from 1924. The Radicals offered only one vice-MP in the Novi Sad precinct. At the same time, the attempt of a group of Czech intellectuals around the magazine *Jugošlavšti Čechoslovaci* to revive the Czech party failed.<sup>151</sup>

The Hungarian Party returned to political life in the second half of 1926, announcing the wish to found the Vojvodina Hungarian Cultural Union and pursue the grievances of the fired railway men who had still not received their pensions. However, it couldn't build its political existence on confrontation, so that by the end of the year it offered the Radicals political cooperation for the regional elections, which the latter accepted. Instead of concessions, the HP got further sacking of Hungarian railway personnel, under the pretext they didn't speak the "state language" well enough. Nevertheless, despite disappointments, before the next parliamentary elections, the HP decided to run on common tickets with the Radicals, and although the majority of the Magyars didn't vote for the Hungarian Party, it scored its first success.<sup>152</sup> In the regional elections in 1927 the GP and HP ran with the Radicals, and in the German case the price was lifting the ban on the Kulturbund, religious instruction in the mother-tongue and 5-6 classes of German in primary school. It won 19 representatives.<sup>153</sup>

At the parliamentary elections on September 11, 1927, the SPP and GP were not exposed to government pressure because of the alliance with the PRP. Despite this, the SPP failed to secure a single seat.<sup>154</sup> The German Party got six MPs,<sup>155</sup> whereas the Hungarians got three – two with the Radicals (Imre Varady and Denes Sztreliczky) and one with the DP (Vince Kerepessy). Since it went to the polls without the support of some of the big Yugoslav parties, because of the depolitization of the demoralized Romanian population which abstained for greater part, and especially because of the internal party squabbles which escalated immediately before the elections, the Romanian Party gained no seats.<sup>156</sup> Apart from the mentioned

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151 Gligorijević, *Politička*, pp. 150-151.

152 Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, p. 320; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, pp. 174-180; Sajti, p. 69.

153 PA, Abt. IIb, *Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien*, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3; Sajti, p. 69.

154 Gligorijević explains this by the fact the PRP was already in the process of dissolution at that time. (Gligorijević, *Politička*, p. 151.)

155 Annabring, p. 38; Plautz, p. 55; Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 294.

156 Popi, *Formiranje*, pp. 351-354; Idem, *Rumuni*, pp. 69-72.



candidates of national minorities, several other members of minorities were elected on the tickets of Yugoslav parties in 1927: three Albanians for the PRP and one for the DP; a Turk for the DP and the PRP each; one Hungarian for the DP. This practice of putting minority candidates on the tickets of the big Yugoslav parties in order to attract the minority votes, existed from the very beginning. Due to the lack of Albanian and Turkish parties, it became a necessity in the South. After the royal dictatorship was imposed, it became the only institutionalized way for the members of the minorities to get into the Parliament.

In the period until the introduction of the royal dictatorship, the minority parties and their representatives continued to try to influence the state's minority policy. These attempts were sometimes made through speeches in the Parliament, but more often through personal contacts,<sup>157</sup> by sending delegations, by submitting memos etc. The complaints and demands remained more or less the same as in the previous years. The HP, which had no influence outside the Vojvodina,<sup>158</sup> was particularly persistent in complaining about the name analysis of pupils at enrollment into minority classes and about other school questions that were the most burning ones.<sup>159</sup> The SPP acted in the same way, but the government lent ear to its demands only at the end of 1927 – by the time the SPP scaled down its demands. This brought some educational concessions to the Czechs and Slovaks on January 28, 1928, which was the greatest achievement of the SPP. However, the concessions were anchored only in an order of the Ministry of Education that was to be in force “until the law on primary schools prescribed otherwise.”<sup>160</sup>

The German Party managed to ensure that the stipulation limiting the transfer of property rights on real estate within 50 km of the border is left out of the financial law for 1928/29. Their representatives also secured the original way of writing proper names (as opposed to phonetical in Serbo-Croat) in the registers.<sup>161</sup> As we have seen, especially the first was important for their voters. One of the more important moves of the GP was its draft bill on primary schools submitted in late 1928, which came too late to be discussed before the dictatorship was introduced.<sup>162</sup>

Although defeated at the parliamentary elections, the Romanian Party continued to function. Apart from a comparative success in the communal elections on November 6, 1927, it organized a conference in Vršac by the end of the year that dealt with: Romanian schools; the need for political consolidation and gathering all the Romanians in the RP; and about spreading the party in Northern Torontal, where its development had been neglected until then. The party dealt with these matters in the first months of the next year too. On March 20, 1928, the founding meeting for the

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157 Sajti, pp. 75, 78. However, the Budapest government which was giving subventions to the HP, demanded greater activity in the Parliament and withdrawal from the PRP parliamentary club at the first propitious moment. (Ibid., pp. 76, 78, 80.)

158 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 181. Croatian Peasants' Party made no secret of the fact it wanted to attract the Magyars too, or at least to dissuade them from voting for the PRP. The Budapest government, however, was against the HP combining with the Croatian opposition. (Sajti, pp. 65-66.)

159 Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 183-185.

160 Gligorijević, Politička, p. 154.

161 Plautz, pp. 64-65.

162 J.H., Kampfansage an die Minderheiten: der Volks- und Mittelschulgesetzentwurf, Nation und Staat, II, 3, 1928; Germania, November 30, 1928; Plautz, p. 77.

Northern Banat was held in Veliki Bečkerek. Setting-up of branches began, but it was soon hindered by squabbles which had to be resolved in courts, and which weakened the party. By the end of 1928 the RP initiated cooperation with other national minorities which had similar problems, which was greeted favorably by the Germans and Magyars – in principle – and condemned by some Yugoslav party newspapers.<sup>163</sup>

Apart from participating in the parliamentary elections, the minority parties also took part at the communal and regional ones. These were opportunities for some of their smaller demands to be met at the lower levels. Often it was easier to establish cooperation in the elections on the lower levels because the stakes in party haggling were not big questions that touched the basics of the state system or determined significantly the situation of national minorities. To be sure, the most successful were the Radicals who gradually started building up their alliance with the Muslims of the South from the local elections in 1920 onwards. It was eventually raised from the communal to the parliamentary level, with many Muslims on common or Radical tickets.<sup>164</sup> On the local level, alliance with the Muslims of the Southern parts was the cornerstone of the Radicals' activity there, although the Muslim elites were gradually becoming increasingly less Ottoman and increasingly more national, thus rendering the cooperation more difficult.<sup>165</sup> The Radicals strove to establish the alliance of the elites in the North too. Although the main minority demands were usually refused, there was not only party cooperation on the local level, but also integration of the members of the minorities into the PRP. The same was achieved, particularly in the North, by the Democratic Party.<sup>166</sup> In their penetration of minority settlements, the Radicals were often strong where the GP was strong too, whereas the DP and the Union of Agriculturists managed to gain a foothold in places with no Germans. In the Alibunar District, the PRP was dependant on the RP.<sup>167</sup> How successful the integration of members of the minorities was, is testified by the leadership of the local PRP branch in Pančevo, in which in mid-1926 (together with the Serbs), the Slovaks, Germans, Magyars and Romanians were represented. In mid-1920s the influence on the Hungarians and Germans was on the increase, which was mirrored in the number of candidates of these nationalities on various levels.<sup>168</sup> However, in some places (Ruma, Stara Pazova), there was an alliance of the Croats and Germans against the Serbs gathered in the PRP.<sup>169</sup> Although there were comparatively many German adherents of the CRPP (in Slavonia),<sup>170</sup> it was rather typical for the CRPP reproaching the Germans for their alleged closeness to the "Greater-Serbian" parties.<sup>171</sup>

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163 Popi, *Formiranje*, pp. 354-358; *Idem*, *Rumuni*, pp. 73-76.

164 Krivokapić-Jović, pp. 168-184.

165 *Ibid.*, p. 445.

166 *Ibid.*, pp. 310-311.

167 *Ibid.*, p. 316.

168 *AJ*, 14, 118/430; 120/433; 66, 56/138; Krivokapić-Jović, pp. 324-336, 340, 344-346. The less numerous and weaker Magyars in the Banat were particularly prone to cooperate. (*AJ*, 14, 77/228.)

169 Krivokapić-Jović, p. 353.

170 Leček, "Freies Heim", pp. 202, 214-217; *Idem*, *Folksdojčeri i Hrvatska (republikanska) seljačka stranka 1918-1941*, *VDG Jahrbuch/Godišnjak Njemačke narodnosne zajednice*, X, 2003, p. 153.

171 Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 722. Despite this, most of the German peasants in Bosnia voted for the CRPP. (*HWBGAD*, I, p. 500.)

Other parties tried to win over and to integrate members of the minorities. Depending on time and place they were successful – as a rule, when the minority parties and voters had been disappointed by the PRP. Thus, the Cemiyet cooperated with the PRP at the local elections in 1920.<sup>172</sup> The RP established cooperation with the DP and the Socialist Party. In that way, they managed to push through their candidate Dr Sava Butoarka, whereas one Romanian was elected on the DP ticket.<sup>173</sup> The HP also did well in those elections, thanks to the collaboration with the PRP.<sup>174</sup> In early 1923 the Democratic Party managed to attract some Hungarian intellectuals and burghers.<sup>175</sup> Most of the Magyars voted for the Yugoslav parties later on too, especially for the DP and the PRP, and not for the HP.<sup>176</sup> In the regional elections in 1927, the HP relying on the PRP, won 14 seats –which was quite a success, especially if previous discomfitures are taken into account. Furthermore, small school concessions were received in some places.<sup>177</sup> Smaller concessions were obtained also in the first communal elections in the Vojvodina the same year.<sup>178</sup> In the communal elections in the Vojvodina the GP did well, winning 511 seats in communal councils in 111 communes (most of them in the Vojvodina) and even the majority in 53 communes.<sup>179</sup> Although the local elections were marred by only minor irregularities,<sup>180</sup> unfortunately for the minorities, installing of the new communal authorities was sometimes slow, and sometimes the elected administrations were deposed on various pretexts.<sup>181</sup> However, even after these communal elections, most of the public notaries were Yugoslavs.<sup>182</sup>

Members of the national minorities obviously did not take part in the political life only through their minority parties. These were above all, an attempt of parts of intellectual (and partly economic) elites of the national minorities to articulate what they saw as primary national interests. The more pragmatic part of the politically active members of the national minorities sought an opportunity for political action (and to be sure, advantages it brought) within the framework of the Yugoslav parties,<sup>183</sup> for which, the party affiliation (especially on the local level) mattered more than the ethnic

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172 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 92.

173 Popi, Rumuni, p. 68; Idem, *Formiranje*, p. 347.

174 Sajti, p. 77.

175 Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 157.

176 *Ibid.*, p. 172.

177 *Ibid.*, p. 176.

178 *Ibid.*, p. 180. The authorities avoided calling the local elections in the Bačka, the Banat and Baranya for a long time, with the excuse national minorities would come to power, but the real reason was the wish of the PRP to retain local administration in its hands. (Hrabak, *Borba demokrata*, p. 53.) Nikola Pašić allegedly told Stjepan Radić several times, communal elections couldn't be held in the Vojvodina, because many communes would get German or Hungarian mayors. (SBNS *Kraljevine SHS, Redovan Saziv za 1927/28, knj. IV, Beograd 1928*, p. 221.) In Croatia communal elections took place regularly. (AJ, 14, 221/788.)

179 Plautz, p. 64; Nikolić, p. 191.

180 PA, Abt. IIb, *Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien*, Bd. 4.

181 SBNS *Kraljevine SHS, Redovan saziv za 1927/28, knj. IV*, pp. 239-244.

182 Rehak, p. 243; Nikolić, p. 191.

183 In the Northern parts of the country, the Yugoslav parties were joined primarily by the wealthier Volksdeutsche, whereas the voters of the German Party were mostly from the poorer strata. (Altgayer, p. 48; ASANU 14530-XIV 2.) The Muslims of "Southern Serbia" joined the PRP in pretty large numbers. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 91.)

one.<sup>184</sup> A large part of members of the minorities also voted for these Yugoslav parties.<sup>185</sup> The main reason was the belief that certain minority interests can better be served through them.<sup>186</sup> This held particularly true for parts of the country where minority parties were not active, or for diasporas. Thus, for instance, a lot of Germans in Slovenia voted for, or cooperated with the Slovenian People's Party,<sup>187</sup> and the majority of the members of the minorities in Croatia and Bosnia sympathized with the CRPP.<sup>188</sup> On the other hand, in the days of electoral campaigns the Yugoslav parties strove to win (also) the minority parties and voters by giving resounding promises, holding speeches in minority languages and even by publishing party journals in these languages.<sup>189</sup> In Southern parts, some PRP candidates went so far as to distribute rifles among the Albanians who were fond of weapons, in order to win them over.<sup>190</sup> To be sure, pressure<sup>191</sup> and irregularities abounded, and sometimes even bloodsheds occurred.<sup>192</sup> These were rather a common feature of the elections and their victims were not limited to members of the minorities.

If we were to sum up the role of members of the minorities in the political life of the first ten years of Yugoslavia's existence, we could say it rolled on a double track: through the minority parties and voting for them, and through the Yugoslav ones and voting for them. The Yugoslav parties usually considered the minority parties a necessary evil, whereas integration of members of the minorities into the parties of the "state people" was seen as a better solution.<sup>193</sup> Indeed, the integration took

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- 184 SBNS Kraljevine SHS, Redovan saziv za 1927/28, knj. IX, Beograd 1928, p. 304. Some members of the minorities were indeed indispensable at the local level – for instance Jožika Mayer, who was the pillar of the PRP in Novi Sad. (Kosta Milutinović, *Vojvodina i stvaranje Jugoslavije*. Koreferat na II kongresu jugoslovenskih istoričara u Zagrebu 24. novembra 1958, p. 212.)
- 185 SBNS Kraljevine SHS, Redovan saziv za 1927/28, knj. IX, p. 253.
- 186 This hope was by no means unfounded in many cases: Đorđo Krstić complained the Serbian MPs from Southern parts, in collusion with the Albanians, were preventing the agrarian reform and colonization in "Southern Serbia". (Krstić, pp. 50-52.)
- 187 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3.
- 188 Drljača, Marija Dombrovska, p. 147; Idem, *Kolonizacija*, p. 59. In Ruma the majority, German, population supported the CRPP until mid-1920s, and the GP since then. (Krivokapić-Jović, p. 353.) In Vinkovci, the PRP always used to win thanks to German support, but gradually increasing number of Germans started sympathizing with the CRPP. (*Ibid.*, p. 355.)
- 189 Popi, *Formiranje*, p. 350; Memić, p. 16; Leček, "Freies Heim"; Ismail Eren, *Turska štampa u Jugoslaviji (1866-1966)*, Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju, XIV-XV, 1964-1965, p. 369; Altgayer, p. 50. The practice of publishing party newspapers in minority languages would partly be continued during the 1930s. (AJ, 37, 73/457.)
- 190 Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 170.
- 191 A very special means of pressurizing minority candidates were exams in the "state language" – but only if they ran for the opposition! (SBNS KJ, II redovan saziv za 1936/37, knj. II, p. 710.)
- 192 Thus for instance a bloody clash between the Serbs and Germans happened in Pardanj (now: Međa), after the already violent elections. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3.)
- 193 The role of the PRP in the founding of the Cemiyet is still not sufficiently researched. It is not to be excluded that the local Radicals wanted to create it as their transmission organization among the Muslims.

place on quite a large scale.<sup>194</sup> The exact data are not available, but judging by the archival sources, as many members of the minorities were members of the Yugoslav parties as were members of their minority counterparts. Joining a Yugoslav party was for members of the minorities a channel of social promotion – although it was a “strictly controlled promotion”.<sup>195</sup> At the same time, the Yugoslav parties, vying in nationalism, accused each other of ties with members of the national minorities, whose members they wanted to see among their own ranks and whose votes they tried to attract with all means at their disposal during the election campaigns.<sup>196</sup> On the other hand, some minority parties (especially the Romanian and Hungarian ones) never got rid of the suspicion of irredentism, which, in the case of some of their members, was justified.<sup>197</sup> As for the ballots at the elections, it is certain that members of the minorities cast them more often than not for the Yugoslav parties<sup>198</sup> – which was (with no secret ballots, and often coupled with various kinds of pressure) certainly more a reflection of the situation, than of the political will. However, it is certain that the leaders of the minority parties (with the exception of the GP) compromised themselves with their co-nationals by mutual squabbles and egoism<sup>199</sup> or unprincipled collusion with the ruling circles. Some of these parties had too narrow a social base to attract all of their co-nationals,<sup>200</sup> especially the poorest.

The royal dictatorship of January 6, 1929 abolished all parties, including those of the minorities.<sup>201</sup> During the next two years and a half, there was no political life worthy of the name, and when its renewal began, it was under the circumstances drastically different from those of the parliamentarism of the 1920s. This held true especially for members of the national minorities who were particularly hit by prohibition of parties based on ethnic affiliation.<sup>202</sup> Despite this, the parties from the days before the dictatorship, or their parts, lived on. To a certain, although lesser, extent, this was true of the minority parties too. Political activity began through groups which had no formal party approval, but which were, as a rule, composed of

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194 AJ, 14, 104/402; 105/404; 120/433; 118/430; 164/596; ASANU 14530-XIV 2; IAP 12/312. In a document from mid-1930s it is said of the Muslims in Skopje: “With very few exceptions, the Muslims have always been with us, the Radicals. In that way they were executors of our state policy in these parts. (AJ, 37, 45/296.) In Subotica the majority of the DP members were Hungarians. (Hrabak, Autonomizam, p. 107.)

195 Krivokapić-Jović, p. 173.

196 SBNS Kraljevine SHS, Redovan saziv za 1921/22. godinu, knj. V, Beograd 1922, p. 108; Ibid., za 1928/29. godinu, Beograd 1928, p. 459; Ibid., za 1926/27, knj. II, Beograd 1927, p. 419; Hrabak, Autonomizam, 101.

197 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 252; Popi, Rumuni, p. 73.

198 Hrabak, Džemijet, p. 106; Sajti, p. 50; Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 161; Hadri, Kosovo, p. 67. J.V. Senz deems hardly one half of the Volksdeutsche voted for the GP, but if the Slovenes who voted for that party are considered, even that estimate seems exaggerated. (Cf. J.V. Senz, Politische, p. 315.)

199 Not even Dr Stefan Kraft was spared suspicion of economic irregularities at the expense of mostly poor Germans. (ASANU, 14530-XIV 2.)

200 This was true particularly of the Hungarian Party. (Sajti, pp. 183-184.)

201 The representatives of the new regime claimed in the beginning they would respect the rights of the national minorities, but they were evasive when they spoke about the political rights. (Berliner Tagblatt, January 17, 1929.)

202 Members of the national minorities complained about this on many occasions, but always in vain. (SBNS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1932/33, knj. III, Beograd 1933, p. 88.)

the leaders of the former parties. According to the model of integrating politicians from the times before the dictatorship into new ruling parties founded by the regime, some minority politicians were also included. Thereby, the participation of members of the minorities in the political life and their influence on it diminished further in comparison with the times before January 6, 1929.

For a few days after the dictatorship had been imposed, the minority parties were hoping they would escape disbanding, and the new powers-that-be encouraged such hopes in the beginning. However, they were soon disappointed.<sup>203</sup> Surveillance of the former politicians was very sharp in the beginning, so that they had withdrawn from public life. The leaders of the former Hungarian party withdrew from the political life during the first years of the dictatorship, and devoted themselves to working in cultural and artistic associations.<sup>204</sup> Similar was the case of other minority parties' leaders,<sup>205</sup> but since all minorities were chronically plagued by the lack of cadres for various organizations, party leaders always had something to do – either in cultural or economic organizations, or in the minority press.

The national minorities were considered particularly suspicious as disloyal, and they were put under particularly strict surveillance. It was forbidden to import political books and publications.<sup>206</sup> Under such circumstances, there was almost no leeway for legal political activity. One of the few were sections of the *Union of Associations for the League of Nations*.<sup>207</sup> The *Hungarian Association for the League of Nations* was founded on July 15, 1928, but it never received the official government approval.<sup>208</sup> The *German Association for the League of Nations and Understanding Among Peoples*, was founded on January 22, 1928, but unlike its Hungarian opposite number, after some difficulties it received the government approval on May 15, 1929. The leaders of the German Association were partly the leaders of the German Party, so that after the party had been disbanded, the Association became an informal Volksdeutsche political representation – a substitute for the GP.<sup>209</sup>

Until the second part of the 1930s, the political life of the national minorities was in hibernation, just like that of the rest of the population. District heads were sending reports from the Vojvodina about depoliticization of the national minorities which did nothing against the authorities, but were nevertheless not

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203 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4; Plautz, p. 65; Popi, Formiranje, p. 359; Idem, Rumuni, p. 75; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 26.

204 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 28, 82; Sajti, pp. 92-93, 96.

205 Annabring, p. 39.

206 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 27-28, 30, 32.

207 The Commission for the Minorities of the League of Nations' Secretariat, decided on founding such sections in the countries of the Little Entente. (Ibid., p. 33.)

208 Ibid., p. 34.

209 J.V. Senz, Politische, p. 317; Annabring, p. 55; Plautz, pp. 89-90. Already in 1927 there was an attempt at founding the Association for the League of Nations in Slovenia, but the authorities would not have it. Therefore, founding of such an Association for all Germans in the whole country was requested, which, overtaken by the introduction of the dictatorship, came into the position to be the ersatz for the GP. (PA, Abt. IIb, Deutschtum in Jugoslawien, Politik 25, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Die Gemeindewahlen in der südslawischen Wojwodschaft und die Deutschen, Nation und Staat, I, 1928, pp. 439-440.)

trusted. The local authorities supported nationalist organizations that kept the behavior of the minorities under surveillance. The first signs of activity were shown by the former leaders of the GP, who visited the Banus (Governor) of the Danube Province ("banovina") in August 1930 and requested the resumption of the activities of the Kulturbund (on the work of which great limitations were imposed in January 1929)<sup>210</sup> and rectification of irregularities in school policy.<sup>211</sup> This visit, combined with foreign-policy factors, yielded results, and on August 28, the Kulturbund was allowed to resume operation – under condition of modifying its statutes still further, which was eventually done by April of the next year.<sup>212</sup> On the other hand, the Banus and other officials refused to see a delegation of former Hungarian politicians. Even in the second half of the year, when it was desirable to include some representatives of the minorities into the political life, not the contacts with the former HS members, but with the Hungarians from the PRP and partly from the DP were sought.<sup>213</sup> In order to mobilize them, a suitable person was needed. It was found in the medical doctor from Subotica, Gábor Szántó, a former member of the HP and later of the PRP.<sup>214</sup> He came to adopting the idea of proving to the authorities the fidelity of the Magyars by a series of rallies at which carbon-copied resolutions of loyalty to the King and the Fatherland and about willingness to perform civic duties and to live in harmony with members of other nationalities were proclaimed. The authorities were suspicious of the Magyars, and the Magyars doubted the rallies would improve their position. The idea received support from the *Movement of Yugoslav Unity* which was started in Subotica by Fedor Nikić. Szántó tried to organize local branches of the movement in Hungarian villages, combined with signing of the loyalty declaration, but the action fizzled out due to the passivity of the Magyars. Despite Szántó's action, the general situation of the Hungarians deteriorated – including obstruction of activities of cultural associations, transfers and dismissal of teachers and denial of pensions for the dismissed railway men.<sup>215</sup> The situation of other minorities grew worse too – except for the Germans who got concessions in the field of cultural organizing and education, but, as we shall see, the reasons for this were of a foreign policy nature.<sup>216</sup>

As for the Romanians, the leading role in their political life was played by the former RP leaders.<sup>217</sup> This tallied with the pattern of other minorities, among

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210 Plautz, p. 39.

211 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 45.

212 Plautz, p. 39.

213 The claim of E. Sajti, the powers-that-be wanted to find "new political faces" can be accepted only conditionally: it was the unprominent ones who were desired. (Cf. Sajti, p. 93; Idem, *Changes in the Situation of the Hungarian Minority in Yugoslavia During the Period of Royal Dictatorship*, *Chronica*, 1, 2001, p. 131.)

214 Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 94; Idem, *Changes*, p. 131. Already on his entrance into the political arena, he was dismissed by the leading circles in Hungary and the leaders of the former HP as traitor and a man imposed on the Hungarian minority by the Yugoslav government. (Pester Lloyd, November 22, 1931; Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 95; Idem, *Changes*, pp. 133-134.) Among the former HP leaders only Ödön Nagy lent him his support – maybe for financial reasons. (Sajti, *Changes*, p. 133.)

215 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 45-49.

216 Plautz, p. 79.

217 Popi, Rumuni, p. 77.

which the protagonists of the political life – such as it was – were the leaders of the former parties. In Southern parts, just like in the Northern, the authorities favored people from the minorities who cooperated with the Yugoslav parties prior to 1929.<sup>218</sup> A considerable number of the Albanian leaders made a show of loyalty in public, but were spreading separatist ideas in secret. More widespread inclusion in the political life began only from mid-1930s without achieving its strategic goals. By then it was clear to the authorities that the state policy pursued until then only managed to disgruntle the Albanians (the Turks being increasingly less numerous due to emigration, and the remaining ones being peaceful). The integration of the Albanian (and Turkish) elite was only superficial. It seems the integration under the new conditions started only gradually, so that only one Muslim from “Southern Serbia” was elected to the Parliament in the first elections after the imposition of the dictatorship.<sup>219</sup> Nevertheless, the political movement among the Albanians could better be observed only from the mid-1930s, when the number of their representatives in the Parliament and the Senate increased somewhat.

Several political processes were going on in the northern parts during the first half of the 1930s, which were important for the two largest minorities in that part of the country. The first one has already been touched upon – the loyalty movement of Dr Szántó. It seems he got the idea for the loyalty rallies in March 1931. It spurred the former leaders of the HP to reactivate, and in mid-April Szántó and several ex-leaders of the HP visited the Banus of the Danube Province Matić who received them kindly, promising he would do everything to see that minority rights would be respected. However, just a few days later, his deputy denied the reception ever took place!<sup>220</sup>

Still, the authorities accepted the idea of Hungarian loyalty rallies taking place in spring 1931. As a rule, Szántó held carbon copied speeches in which he accused the Hungarian national minority itself of not having convinced the government of its loyalty. With the same breath, he praised the King and the dictatorship. Although a series of rallies was held in the course of two months, the authorities neither showed any reaction, nor did they relent in their attitude towards the Magyars.<sup>221</sup> It was only in the first half of June that the Minister of the Court indirectly acknowledged that the authorities had perceived what had been going on, and conveyed King's gratitude.<sup>222</sup> Deeming he had sufficiently prepared the terrain, Szántó proposed to found an independent political organization, the “Movement of Loyalism,” that would unite all Magyars in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, probably looking up

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218 Hadri, Kosovo, p. 67; Imami, pp. 270-272.

219 Statistika izbora narodnih poslanika za prvu jugoslovensku Narodnu skupštinu održanih 8. novembra 1931. godine, Beograd 1935, pp. 289-294.

220 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 61.

221 The leaders of the former HP tried to parry Szántó's action by a declaration of loyalty which they submitted to the Banus Matić together with Hungarian wishes, but he advised them to join Szántó's action, since two loyalist actions could not be tolerated. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5.) The pro-government Budapest daily Pester Lloyd wrote on May 29, 1931, people took part in Szántó's rallies only under coercion, and that the unconvincingly held speeches were censored first.

222 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 62-65. In the later phase of the rallies, Alexander's cabinet thanked for the expressions of devotion after each rally. (Ibid., p. 77.)



to the successful German cooperative organization, he proposed to organize the *Hungarian Economic Union* with the seat in Novi Sad. All Magyar economic organizations in the country were to join it. The Union would mediate in implementing government measures, and Szántó would be at the helm. Szántó's action enjoyed support of only some individuals from the government, and his interventions were only partly successful.<sup>223</sup> The greater part of the government remained mistrustful of the Hungarians,<sup>224</sup> surely being aware that the loyalty rallies were organized with government aid.<sup>225</sup> Furthermore, a considerable part of the Hungarian intelligentsia remained cool in the face of Szántó's action, or even opposed to it.<sup>226</sup>

The logical corollary to Szántó's activity was running on the government ticket in 1931. During the election campaign, and later on as an MP, Szántó continued to praise the regime, occasionally garnishing it with timid complaints, which brought him popularity neither among the Magyars in Yugoslavia (who went to the polls fewer than was the national average), nor in the political circles of Hungary.<sup>227</sup> The Germans agreed with the government on the candidates in six precincts,<sup>228</sup> but only Stefan Kraft<sup>229</sup> was actually elected because in other places Serbian candidates were also put on the government tickets.<sup>230</sup> As for the Slovaks, not being numerous enough to have a candidate of their own, their Advising Committee recommended that the voters select one of the Yugoslav candidates of their choice, the Slovak program being a Yugoslav one.<sup>231</sup>

After the elections of November 18, 1931, in mid-December the government MPs buckled down to founding the new ruling party under the name of the *Yugoslav Radical Peasants' Democracy* which would help implement the government policy. Szántó did not take part in the founding, but was made part of the enlarged

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223 Ibid., p. 71.

224 Ibid., pp. 65-69.

225 Their chief purpose, from the government's point of view was to supply the Yugoslav diplomacy with proofs for the world public opinion that the Hungarians in the country were happy, and therefore loyal, making it impossible for anyone to demand that the Magyar-inhabited parts be severed from Yugoslavia. (Ibid., pp. 67, 72.)

226 AJ, 38, 7/29.

227 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 79-80.

228 Deutsches Volksblatt, October 21, 1931. The Pester Lloyd, ill-disposed towards the Yugoslav authorities, but well informed, wrote the government had blackmailed the Volksdeutsche leaders with the approval of the private teachers' training college in Veliki Bečkerek, forcing them thus to run at the government ticket, so as to show the world public the Volksdeutsche supported the regime. (Pester Lloyd, November 14, 1931.) In an indirect way, this was confirmed by a report by von Janson of the German Embassy in Belgrade on September 23, 1931. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5.)

229 Kraft joined the regime creations the Yugoslav Radical Peasants' Democracy/ Yugoslav National Party later on, in which he was prominent for his inactivity. (ASANU, 14530/XIV 2.)

230 Annabring, p. 62; Die deutsche Wahlbeteiligung. Die Eröffnung der deutschen Lehrerbildungsanstalt, Nation und Staat, V, 2, 1931, p. 123; Die Wahlen, Nation und Staat, V, 1931, pp. 187-189. The Deutsches Volksblatt of Novi Sad accused the German voters of the precincts Odžaci and Bačaka Palanka, for the failure of the Volksdeutsche candidates Dr Hans Moser and Dr Georg Grassl. (Deutsches Volksblatt, November 11, 1931.)

231 Jugoslovenski dnevnik, November 3, 1931.

Provincial Committee. The new party considered the minority question to be a cultural one, and it called on members of the minorities to be loyal and participate actively in state and communal bodies, and in exchange they would receive the right to use their mother-tongues and to preserve their national identity.<sup>232</sup> As the MP of the ruling party in 1933 Szántó demanded (and even received some promises to that effect) that Hungarian landless be given some land, that in order to forestall floods and organize public works the bed of the Danube be regulated, so that some of the dismissed Hungarian railway men could be returned to work and that the matter of pensions for the fired officials might be relieved.<sup>233</sup> Moreover, he was active in founding of local committees of the YRPD. It seems he tried to win over the former leaders of the HP to cooperate, but they remained politically passive and active rather in cultural associations. They disagreed with his views on the situation of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia and they thought he was out only for his personal political ambitions.<sup>234</sup> He did not succeed in uniting his Association for the League of Nations with the older one headed first by Leon Deák and then by Imre Varady, whereas the leaders of the former Hungarian Party didn't want to lend him support in condemning the new wave of revisionism spreading from Hungary.<sup>235</sup>

While other minorities were mostly apathetic, within the German one changes started that would, although in the beginning they did not concern political life, eventually have fateful importance for the orientation and destiny of this minority. Since 1931, Nazi ideas started to penetrate the intellectual Volksdeutsche youth, many educated in Germany and Austria.<sup>236</sup> The first to start promoting it in public was a medical doctor from Pančevo, Jakob Awender, through his weekly *Pančevoer Post* (since 1934 *Volksruf*).<sup>237</sup> The struggle went on within the central German cultural organization, the Kulturbund, in the guise of the movement of the young "Renewers" (Erneuerungsbewegung) against the old Volksdeutsche leadership which was compromised by modest achievements and accumulation of offices, and it

232 Tagespost, December 16, 1931; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 85. The next government party, the Yugoslav National Party, never bothered to mention the minorities in its party programme, except at the very end, where it was said: "In the minority question the YNP will remain true to its principle of justice and equality of all good citizens of Yugoslavia and it will observe all international agreements in that respect." (AJ, 74, 11/22.)

233 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 89.

234 Ibid., p. 98.

235 Ibid., pp. 99-100.

236 At most German universities the Nazi influence prevailed already before the Nazis came to power. (Cf. George C. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology. Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*, New York 1964, pp. 268, 271; Richard Grunberger, *The 12-Year Reich. A social History of Nazi Germany 1933-1945*, New York 1972, pp. 335-337.) On the role of the Ethnic-German students educated at German, Austrian and Yugoslav universities, see: Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, pp. 703-704; Biber, *Nacizem*, pp. 44-53, 327-328; Altgayer, (Appendix), p. 7.)

237 About the Volksruf see: Branko Bešlin, *Vesnik tragedije. Nemačka štampa u Vojvodini (1933-1941.)*, Novi Sad, Sremski Karlovci 2001, pp. 52-61. In his memoirs, the later leader of the Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia, Dr Sepp Janko, described the "Renewal Movement" as foremostly concerned with social questions, which was at variance with his articles steeped in ideology of "Blood and Soil" he was publishing in the Volksruf. (Cf. Sepp Janko, *Weg und Ende der deutschen Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien*, Graz, Stuttgart 1982, pp. 27-26; Idem, *Reden und Aufsätze*, Groß Betschkerek 1944.)

ended only in 1938/39 with the victory of the young Nazis.<sup>238</sup> Except for a brief connection of the "Renewers" with the pro-fascist movement "Zbor" of Dimitrije Ljotić (February 1937-May 1938),<sup>239</sup> this conflict had a dimension that was more a world-view and generational one than a really political. Its outcome, due to the unification of all Volksdeutsche organizations under the auspices of the Kulturbund, Gleichschaltung (including political behavior) of almost the whole German national minority under the Kulturbund leadership (which turned into the "Folk-Group" at the end of the 1930s) and interference of agencies from the Reich, did in the actuality also develop a political character. The struggle of the "Renewers" although it was started neither within a political organization nor with overtly political goals, removed from the scene the old political elite of the Yugoslav Germans which couldn't keep pace with the young in pandering to National Socialism.

Simultaneously with the development of the "Renewal Movement", the "Young German Movement", headed by medical doctor Nikolaus Hasslinger, started developing among the Vojvodina Germans since August 1933.<sup>240</sup> It was leveled both against the pro-Nazi "Renewers" and the old leaders of the minority. Unlike the "Renewal Movement", it was much more openly political. Its avowed aims were loyalty to Yugoslavia, ties with the "state people", good relations between Yugoslavia and Germany, but also preservation of German nationality, opening of minority schools, and erasing social and religious differences among the Volksdeutsche.<sup>241</sup> The Yugoslav authorities and the press lent support to the movement which was seen as a counterbalance to the penetration of the Nazi ideas. The Young Germans movement merged into the ruling parties, one after the other: first into the Yugoslav National Party and then into the Yugoslav Radical Community. Although it gathered more adherents than Szántó, it was obvious it was an inspired movement controlled by the government.<sup>242</sup> For that reason it couldn't attract the German masses, and even less the young German intelligentsia. Its role, which was never too great anyway, started to wane after 1935 until it vanished completely after the "Renewers" victory within the Kulturbund.<sup>243</sup> The

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238 Annabring, pp. 67-71; Biber, Nacizem, pp. 45-89, 167-210. According to Altgayer's testimony, in some places the authorities were visibly forthcoming toward the "Renewers" – surely in order to disunite the Germans. (Altgayer, p. 90.)

239 This connection aroused great dissatisfaction of both the Prime Minister Stojadinović and the German ambassador von Heeren. (Biber, Nacizem, pp. 69-73; Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 729; Altgayer, p. 53.) Awender himself was rebuked for it and for the writing of his paper by the chief of the Central Press Bureau in May 1938, to whom he promised the "Renewers" would break up with the "Zbor" and join the Yugoslav Radical Community, the then ruling party. (AJ, 37, 73/457.) Already the next month Awender offered Stojadinović cooperation of the "Renewers" with the YRC. According to him, it was necessary because arrests, and fines caused dissatisfaction among the Volksdeutsche. (AJ, 37, 62/378.)

240 According to Altgayer, the real initiator and protector of the movement was the prominent politician Đaka Popović, whereas the organizer was Alexander Rupp, the District Chief. (Altgayer, p. 53.)

241 The whole programme in: Novosti, September 28, 1933.

242 Hasslinger's newspaper the Deutsche Press received government subventions, and the chief of the cabinet of the Minister of Social Policy and Health, Mirko Latas, even said of it, "it was our "Samouprava" in German." (AJ, 37, 45/296.)

243 Biber, Nacizem, pp. 63-67. As late as mid-1938 Hasslinger asked for an audience with the Prime Minister Stojadinović and the Marshal of Court, to talk with them about their further actions. (AJ, 74, 196/280; 37, 22/176.) This plainly shows his connections with

influence of the extreme right-wing "Borbaši" of Svetislav Hođera on some Germans was only transient.<sup>244</sup>

Representatives of other minorities joined the regime parties too, set up by the government. First the YRPD, which was renamed the Yugoslav National Party, and after 1935, the Yugoslav Radical Community. There is less data about it, especially for Southern parts of the country. In Croatia, the influence of the CPP (which dropped its republicanism) remained dominant, and in Slovenia that of the Slovenian People's Party.<sup>245</sup> As for national proportions in the communal administrations under the dictatorship, they deteriorated further still to the detriment of the national minorities, although in Hungarian villages resistance to the government arbitrariness was growing.<sup>246</sup>

Members of the minorities became more involved in politics after the assassination of King Alexander and the abandonment of the overt dictatorship.<sup>247</sup> The leaders of the Hungarian Party lent support to the government at the elections of 1935, but otherwise they did not get involved. As the only Hungarian candidate of the government, Szántó ran on the government ticket, for which the majority of the Magyars voted.<sup>248</sup> The United Opposition (UO) had one Hungarian candidate and one deputy, and the "Zbor" two.<sup>249</sup> The Romanian Party was reorganized as the Central Committee. It summoned representatives from all Romanian villages to a meeting at which they decided that all Romanians would vote for the government, and that Dr Alexandru Butoarca would be the Romanian candidate. The agreement was not observed by all at the elections (some Romanians voted for the UO), but Butoarca was nevertheless elected MP. As for the Germans, they also decided to run together with the government, and they managed to win two MPs.<sup>250</sup> Similar integration of certain representatives of the minorities (especially of the Albanians) took place in the South too. They won five MPs, more than other minorities.<sup>251</sup> Still, the Albanian

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the ruling circles. Both opposition movements fed on dissatisfaction, particularly of the younger Volksdeutsche, with national and social prospects the then Volksdeutsche leaders were not able to improve, and Stefan Kraft was their pet hate because of his numerous offices and his dictatorial nature. (ASANU 14530; 14530-XIV 2.)

244 It was somewhat stronger in Southern Bačka. (Altgayer, p. 52; AJ, 38, 7/27.) For a while part of the Slovaks sympathized with the "Borbaši". (AJ, 38, 7/27.)

245 The Germans of Kočevje regularly voted for the ruling party until 1929, reckoning they would achieve the fulfillment of their demands most easily in that way. (HWBGAD, III, p. 77.)

246 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 103.

247 Petranović, p. 211.

248 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 115-116, 121. According to the correspondent of the Central Press Bureau, Hungarian masses were not overly happy to be represented by a baptized Jew. (AJ, 38, 7/27.) According to another report, Hungarian masses were in favor of the government, and only intellectuals held oppositional sympathies. (Ibid.)

249 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 118-119. During the election campaign, the CPP went out of its way to win the Hungarian poor, wooing them, in the opinion of the authorities, with "separatist slogans". (AJ, 38, 7/27.)

250 Annabring, p. 63. Die Stellung des Kabinetts Jeftić. Die deutsche Volksgruppe in den Wahlen, Nation und Staat, VIII, 1935, p. 604.

251 Statistika izbora narodnih poslanika za Narodnu skupštinu Kraljevine Jugoslavije izvršenih 5. maja 1935. godine, Beograd 1938, pp. 258-261. The claim of Hakif Bajrami all Albanians were in opposition since 1934 does not make sense. (Bajrami, L'oppression, p.

politicians were traditionally more active on the spot, working the masses (though not always in the interest of the ruling party to which they formally belonged.)

The post-election government of Milan Stojadinović renounced open dictatorship, trying, among other things, to bring together former parties which de facto still existed – the YMO, Slovenian People's Party and parts of the PRP. Out of these heterogeneous elements the Yugoslav Radical Community was formed. Few representatives of the minorities took part in the founding<sup>252</sup> and some minority leaders joined later.<sup>253</sup> In some minority settlements, local branches of the YRC were set up, with all members belonging to national minorities.<sup>254</sup> The party as a whole did not remain immune to inner political, and also ethnic, strife.<sup>255</sup>

The leaders of the former minority parties and MPs complained about schools, and on several occasions they succeeded in obtaining certain concessions.<sup>256</sup> At that, it was obvious that in Northern Parts of the country the leaders of the former parties behaved as if their parties still existed, whereas the authorities tacitly agreed to regard them as the representatives of the minorities. They were submitting grievances, and representatives of the government, as in the previous years, gave only promises that would, at best, be only halfway kept.<sup>257</sup> On the other

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86.) However, it is more than likely that the majority of them were dissatisfied, but this didn't make itself manifest through an overt oppositional political attitude.

252 Szántó was one of the founders. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 124.)

253 Kraft was co-opted later on into the Main Committee. (Annabring, p. 64; *Bewegte innere Entwicklung. Neue außenpolitische Gesichtspunkte. Die deutsche Volksgruppe und die Regierungspartei, Nation und Staat*, IX, 7, 1936; *Belgrad im Mittelpunkt internationaler Besprechungen. Konstituierung der Regierungspartei, Nation und Staat*, IX, 9, 1936.)

254 Altgayer, p. 54.

255 Thus for instance, according to a report from 1935, the Pačevo Serbs were disgruntled that a German, Dr Alexander Preler was entrusted with the task of setting up the YRC in the Pačevo District, because he was not only of the wrong nationality, but a former member of the DP to boot. (AJ, 37, 13/88.) Nevertheless, he remained in office, discharging his party duties until 1938, when he was arbitrarily sacked to general dissatisfaction, by nephew of the Minister of Agriculture, Stanković. (AJ, 37, 12/80.) In Vršac, a desperate fight between two Serbs, Velimir Juga and Joca M. Georgijević raged in which the local Germans also took part. During it Georgijević accused Juga of facilitating the spread of Nazi propaganda among the Volksdeutsche. (AJ, 37, 54/351.) In a flier in German, Georgijević called on the Volksdeutsche to live in harmony with the Serbs and against the Nazi "Folk Community". (Ibid.) The Vršacer Gebirgsbote estimated on May 18, 1938, that the majority of the Germans were in favor of Juga, and the majority of the Serbs in favor of Georgijević. In September 1938 an anonymous letter complained about the Romanian Trajan Crișana, the secretary of the District Committee of the YRC in the Southern Banat, claiming he was a thief, gambler and philanderer, and that as such, he couldn't lead Serbian peasants, and that the intelligentsia would leave the party because of him. (AJ, 37, 62/378.) In Skopje, the party organisation was divided between the Muslims and the immigrant Christians on the one side and the local Christians on the other. (AJ, 37, 45/296.) The CPP was also not immune to ethnic strife. (Hrvatski državni arhiv (henceforth: HDA), grupa VI c, inv. br. 677.)

256 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 132-135. Still, how small their influence actually was, is best testified by the fact that Szántó had to plead with the Prime Minister Stojadinović to grant him an audience to talk "about some capital matters." (AJ, 37, 57/362.)

257 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 147-148, 158. Varady, Deák and Strelitzky asked on April 18, 1937 in a conversation with Milan Stojadinović that the founding of the Hungarian Party be

hand, some minority politicians, Hungarian ones most of all, were active on the side of the United Opposition, criticizing at the same time the situation of the Magyars.<sup>258</sup> Part of the Czechs in Croatia remained firmly attached to the CPP, whereas part of industrial workers of this nationality sympathized with the Socialists.<sup>259</sup> The CPP wanted also not only to have the Germans on its side, but to use them against Belgrade too, which nationally conscious Volksdeutsche resisted, convinced that their organizations could better prosper relying on the ruling circles.<sup>260</sup> In the Vojvodina, the alliance between the YRC and the Magyars and Germans proved successful at the communal elections of 1936 too.<sup>261</sup> In Slovenia most of the Germans voted for the Slovenian People's Party out of opportunism, and German industrial workers for the Socialist Party.<sup>262</sup>

An extraordinary phenomenon on the political scene in the Vojvodina was the autonomist movement. Due to the dissatisfaction with the economic and political situation in the Vojvodina, autonomist ideas existed already in the 1920s,<sup>263</sup> but the movement made its full mark only in 1932. It was headed by Duda Bošković, and it attracted heterogeneous elements from various parties. The movement insisted on the right of the people of the Vojvodina to decide their own fate and on the preservation of a distinct provincial identity. Some representatives of the national minorities joined it<sup>264</sup> but, despite participation at the elections, it remained outside of the mainstream of the Vojvodina and Yugoslav politics. It achieved its greatest success in the local elections of 1936, when it came to power in 23 communes in the Banat, 20 in Sirmium

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permitted again, but he refused. However, he promised improvements in education and culture – in return for Hungarian support at the parliamentary elections. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 97; Idem., *Changes*, p. 134; Biber, *Nacizem*, p. 190; *Unklare Lage der Regierung Stojadinović. Abordnung der deutschen Volksgruppe beim Ministerpräsidenten, Nation und Staat*, IX, 5, 1936, pp. 236-237.) The fulfillment of the demands of the minorities, when it came about at all, was very slow, whereas representatives of the authorities often had no time for representatives of the minorities. (AJ, 37, 52/328; 48/311.)

258 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 152.

259 Hanzl, Matušek, Orct, p. 48.

260 Arhiv Kulturbunda, Osijek (henceforth: AKB), I 1.1.1.; I 2.1.1.; I 2.1.2. The Germans started leaving the CPP especially since mid-1938 – influenced by the rise of the Reich (Anschluss), by the work of the Cultural and Humanitarian Association of the Germans in Slavonia (Kultur- und Wohlfahrtsvereinigung der Deutschen in Slawonien) and propaganda from Yugoslavia and abroad. However, considerable part remained loyal to the CPP. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 99/283.)

261 AJ, F. 398, f. 1; 37, 22/178; VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 2, d. 3; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 146. In his complaint about violence during the communal elections in 1936, the MP Dr. Kosta Popović claimed the majority of peaceful Germans of the Sombor District abstained because of the violence, whereas the Magyars voted for the YRC in exchange for concessions concerning activities of cultural associations and the analysis of names at enrollment of children in schools. (Ljubodrag Dimić, *Kulturna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918-1941*, III. Politika i stvaralaštvo, Beograd 1997, p. 86; SBNS KJ, I redovni saziv za 1935/36. godinu, II redovni saziv za 1936/37. godinu, knj. I, Beograd 1937, p. 354.)

262 Suppam, *Zur Lage*, p. 232. Nevertheless, at the communal elections in 1936 the Kočevje Germans ran, and won for greater part, together with the opposition. (Biber, *Kočevski Nemci*, pp. 35-36.)

263 Hrabak, *Borba*, pp. 56-57.

264 From the ranks of the minorities, the movement attracted mostly Magyars. (AJ, 38, 7/27.)

and 8 in the Bačka. After the Serbian-Croatian compromise in 1939, autonomist tendencies started to die down, and the nationalist ones flared up. The movement could exist as multi-party and multi-ethnic only if certain preconditions outside of the Vojvodina existed, and it did not represent a true integrative attempt across the party and ethnic lines.<sup>265</sup>

In the South the situation was somewhat different. The policy against the Albanians became more severe there since the mid-1930s. This increased the difficulty of integrating their political elite, which couldn't leave their co-nationals in the lurch in order not to lose influence. In other words, they had to sit on two chairs – supporting the government on the one hand, and working against it on the other.<sup>266</sup> It would be extremely difficult to reconstruct all their furtive actions due to the offishness of the Albanian society and because they went on far from public view, through personal contacts, often known to the authorities, who still lacked sufficient information. Furthermore, the YRC, which was everywhere a rather artificial, and therefore an inactive creation,<sup>267</sup> existed in the South almost exclusively on paper.<sup>268</sup> Intrigues, quarrels and recriminations, both between members of different nationalities and between rivaling members of the same nationality, were commonplace.<sup>269</sup>

Such were the conditions under which the Prime Minister Stojadinović decided to call the elections for December 1938. He promised equality to the Magyars and Germans at a big rally in Novi Sad on November 13, whereas his Minister of Education Dimitrije Magarašević promised schools in their mother-tongues.<sup>270</sup> On the other hand, Milan Stojadinović asked of the Banus of the Danube Province, Rajić, that the authorities pay attention how members of the minorities and the Jews voted.<sup>271</sup>

Negotiations with representatives of the Hungarian Party prior to the elections failed. The Magyars had asked for three MP candidates but the government offered just one, so the HP retreated into passivity. Government censorship prevented this from being made public. This attitude, however, was not universal, so that some (former) members lent their support to the YRC. As for Szántó, whose star was on the wane within the government circles,<sup>272</sup> he supported the candidature of Gelert Fodor,

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265 Petranović, pp. 294-295; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 138.

266 Hadri, p. 68.

267 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 152.

268 Thus for instance the Local Committee in Skopje didn't meet between November 1935 and November 1936. (AJ, 37, 15/96.) In the years after, it was no better: people usually joined for interest and were never active. According to a report from 1938, the fewest meetings were held in "South Serbia". (AJ, 37, 9/55.)

269 AJ, 37, 51/317.

270 Biber, Nacizem, pp. 190-191; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 167. On the eve of these elections, a correspondent of the Central Press Bureau suggested to solve minority questions "in accordance with a certain plan and some measures" because members of the minorities became more active and they expected that more of their wishes would be respected. By solving the minority questions they were to be attached to Belgrade on every occasion. (AJ, 38, 7/27.)

271 AJ, 37, 4/27.

272 In a document from 1938 it is claimed he enjoyed support only of the Jews (being himself a christened Jew). (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 2, d. 3.) On the eve of the elections, Stojadinović was willing to drop Szántó, on condition there would be no merger between the pro-Belgrade fraction headed by Deák and the pro-Zagreb one headed by Ivan Nagy. (Sajti, Changes, p. 136.)

the president of the Communal Committee of the YRC in Bačka Topola – hoping, and indeed demanding – the post of a senator for himself.<sup>273</sup> As usual, the government gave certain concessions and promises before the elections, and the (former) Hungarian Party did not prevent the Hungarians from voting.<sup>274</sup> The representatives of the infighting Volksdeutsche groups were forced to make truce in late October by a representative of the VoMi (Volksdeutsche Central Office), ordering them that all Germans should vote for the YRC, since this was in the interest of the Reich.<sup>275</sup> The Volksdeutsche representatives negotiated with Stojadinović on November 13, demanding four MPs and two deputies, but were promised only two MP candidatures and two deputies, as well as some school concessions.<sup>276</sup> To all appearances, this was hypocrisy on the part of the government, since the representatives of the Hungarian Party had previously been told that only one MP was foreseen for the Magyars and Germans respectively,<sup>277</sup> which would eventually come true after the elections. Obviously, despite a large number of minority members in its ranks and even in the leading posts on the district level,<sup>278</sup> the YRC wanted only a few minority candidates who would serve as multi-ethnic decoration and attract minority votes.<sup>279</sup> This was also shown by the fact the YRC itself invited the Romanian representative Butoarca to be the candidate on the government's ticket,<sup>280</sup> promising attention would be paid to Romanian demands. The Romanian Central Committee which virtually substituted for the Romanian Party, agreed to lend support to the government ticket, but announced also a number of complaints concerning education, permissions for the cultural association Astra and against the ordinance on the transfer of real-estate.<sup>281</sup> Butoarca was the Romanian candidate, but he failed because of the disappointment of part of the Romanian population, counter-propaganda of some Romanians, his political enemies, and also of some members of the YRC.<sup>282</sup>

In Southern parts, all kinds of combinations were made, and the candidates at the government tickets rivaled each other more often than was the case in the North.<sup>283</sup> The situation of the YRC in the Albanian-inhabited territories was made

273 AJ, 37, 13/88; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 169.

274 Dimić, Kulturna politike, III, p. 89; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 172.

275 Biber, Nacizem, pp. 188-189.

276 Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 47; Die Lage der deutschen Volksgruppe, Nation und Staat, XII, 2, 1938, p. 138; Biber, Nacizem, p. 190.

277 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 168.

278 AJ, 37, 13/87.

279 Thus the YRC ticket in the Danube province contained 7 members of minorities and 78 Yugoslavs. In the Vardar province, there were 7 Muslims and 85 "Serbs". (AJ, 37, 47/305; 48/311.)

280 According to claims of some of his political opponents, he was "ruining the YRC". (AJ, 37, 13/38.)

281 The Romanians were plagued by the same problem as other national minorities: disunity. They spent the time between the two elections chiefly in bickering, sometimes interrupted by brief truces. (Popi, Rumuni, pp. 78-84.)

282 Popi, Rumuni, p. 85. The Romanians, opponents of the YRC in the Alibunar District participated with such fervor in the election campaign that they burnt down the houses of their political adversaries. (AJ, 37, 4/30.)

283 AJ, 37, 5/34; 53/334. The Bulletin of the Section for the State Protection of the Ministry of the Interior accused Albanian candidates of using unallowed slogans during the election campaign. (VA, pop. 17, k. 76, f. 2, d. 28.)



more difficult by the more stringent policy towards that minority and by the convention with Turkey on emigration, concluded in summer 1938<sup>284</sup> which caused worries among the Albanian population and agitation on part of their politicians.<sup>285</sup> At the elections, there was shooting and a few dozen were killed.<sup>286</sup>

The outcome of the elections, at least concerning the representation of the minority candidates, was as the leaders of the YRC had hoped. Gelert Fodor was smoothly elected,<sup>287</sup> the Germans got only one MP at first (Franz Hamm),<sup>288</sup> but managed to obtain another seat (for Dr Josef Trischler) thanks to the pressure of the German ambassador.<sup>289</sup> In Apatin the Volksdeutsche mostly voted against their will for the baptized Jew Oton Gavrilović (previously Fisher!), because they were ordered to do so (and being put under pressure by the authorities).<sup>290</sup> The Germans in Kočevje also followed orders this time, although they ran with the opposition at the local elections two years before.<sup>291</sup> In Slavonia, where the assimilation was stronger and sympathies of the majority of the Germans for the CPP traditional, most of them voted for the CPP despite the directive, and only some for the YRC.<sup>292</sup> The policy of selective representation of members of the minorities was continued in "South Serbia" with six Muslims elected on the government ticket.<sup>293</sup> This, coupled with some

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284 Cf. Bajrami, Konventa; Avdić, *Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori*; VA, pop. 17, k. 92, f. 1, d. 6.

285 Ferhad bey Draga who was released after only two years in prison (of originally 100 to which he had been sentenced) (Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 108.), conducted propaganda against the YRC behind the scene before the communal elections in 1936. (AJ, 37, 22/167.) In 1938 he agitated against emigration to Turkey. (AJ, 37, 22/175.) In a memo from mid-1938 he demanded of minister Spaho an end to the agrarian reform, cultural rights for the Albanians and non-fulfillment of the convention on emigration of the Muslims to Turkey. Other MPs elected by the Albanians also agitated against the emigration of the Albanians. (AJ, 37, 22/175.)

286 For instance in the Vučitrn precinct, where the adherents of the YRC candidate Sherif Voca clashed with the gendarmes and Chetniks who supported the other YRC candidate, Miša Sretenović. (AJ, 37, 25/196; 53/344; 63 (pov.), 1939, F. 1, 1-150.)

287 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 172. However, it seems many Magyars in Bačka Topola didn't like him as too young and imature, although he enjoyed the support of the Banus Rajić. (AJ, 37, 52/328.)

288 This was breach of trust on part of the government which enraged the Volksdeutsche. (AJ, 37, 52/328.)

289 PA, VI A Bd. 18, 640/39.

290 Biber, *Nemci*, p. 192. According to Sima Rocić, former MP, the local Germans, but the Serbs too, were anti-Semitic, and were so disgruntled that the authorities had imposed Gavrilović on them, that Rocić feared bloodbath. (AJ, 37, 4/30.) On the day of the elections, the situation was verging on a clash, and the demonstrations of adherents of Gavrilović's opponent from the YRC ticket, Ludwig Keks, lasted in Apatin for two subsequent days. Some of the protesters were arrested and manhandled by the police. (AJ, 37, 4/30; 57/328.)

291 Biber, *Kočevski Nemci*, p. 36.

292 Geiger, *Nijemci u Đakovu*, p. 131. About the conflict between the nationally conscious and semi-assimilated Volksdeutsche in Slavonia see: Leček, *Folksdojčeri*, pp. 158-159.

293 *Biografski leksikon*. Narodno predstavništvo. Senat. Narodna skupština, Beograd 1939, *passim*. The government knew exactly which Albanian candidates it wanted in the Parliament. Thus the complaint of the president of the District Court in Gnjilan Stevan Despotović against the election of Ilijaš Agušević was refuted as political. (SBNS KJ, Vanredan saziv za 1939. godinu, knj. I, Beograd 1938 (sic!), p. 24.)

other phenomena to be discussed later on, testifies that the government still paid somewhat more attention to the minorities in southern parts – probably estimating that these, due to greater compactness, could cause more trouble – like that from the first half of the 1920s.<sup>294</sup> Milan Stojadinović's ticket received some 400,000 votes from the minorities (compared with some 170,000 votes of the adherents of the Slovenian People's Party and some 135,000 sympathizers of the YMO!).<sup>295</sup> Whereas the members of these two parties were given ministerial posts, power in "their" parts of the country, great influence on the state policy and more. In exchange, the national minorities had to make do with a few MPs whose (anyway rare) protests in the Parliament were the voice of "one crying in the wilderness." A few senatorial seats for representatives of the minorities were also a decorative measure of little use to the minorities.<sup>296</sup>

Until the Second World War the domestic policy revolved around first reaching, and then implementing the compromise between the leading Serbian and Croatian circles.<sup>297</sup> Under such conditions the minority question became increasingly dependant on the relations between Yugoslavia and their respective mother countries. This held true particularly for the three "large" minorities – the Germans, Magyars and Albanians. After the Anschluss Germany became Yugoslavia's neighbor whose interests Belgrade had increasingly kept in mind even before that.<sup>298</sup> Whereas the Yugoslav

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294 It was soon heard about some MPs that they had been working against the interests of the YRC – thoroughly in keeping with the traditional tactics of sitting on two chairs of Albanian politicians. (VA, pop. 17, k. 92, f. 1, d. 4.)

295 Dimić, *Istorija*, p. 181. The German ambassador von Heeren estimated the government got the (small) majority of the votes (54,09%) only thanks to the votes of members of the national minorities, the number of which he estimated at 330.000. He believed the Volksdeutsche alone had given cca. 120.000 votes. (Biber, *Nacizem*, p. 193.)

296 Imre Varady was appointed senator in February 1939, which met with the Magyars' approval. (Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 174; Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 101.) This meant the regime definitely gave up Szántó. In March 1940 the bishop of the German Evangelical Church Dr Philip Popp and Dr Georg Grassl (who had already been senator in the first half of the 1930s) were also appointed senators. (Plautz, p. 67.) In 1935 there were only three minority senators: Sefedin bey Mahmudbegović, Džafer Sulejmanović and Georg Grassl. (Č. M. Mitrinović, *Biografski leksikon*. Narodno predstavništvo, s.l. [1935]. Some rumors had it that Mahmudbegović was the leader of separatist propaganda. (VA, pop. 17, k. 95b, f. 4, d.3.) On the other hand, the Serbs of Peć deemed him just the right man for senator. (AJ, 37, 61/377.) Some claimed he had been a bloodthirsty tyrant and that his brothers had been in high posts in Albania, that he later on joined the DP which aided him financially and for which he was ostensibly working in secret also as a senator, and that he cooperated with federalists and Montenegrin separatists in the destruction of the YRC to which he formally belonged. (AJ, 37, 15/100.) In 1939 there were also only three minority senators: G.Grassl, I. Varady and Muhamed Zlatko. (Biografski leksikon.) The demand of the Romanians of the Alibunar District, most of whom were organized in the YRC, to have their own senator in the person of the bank manager and mayor of a commune N. Meda, failed. (AJ, 37, 13/88.) Apparently the government strove to appoint as senators the moderate and cooperative representatives of the national minorities, but it seems it did not succeed always in choosing the really loyal ones. Speculations of Ferhat bey Draga being appointed senator were sheer rumors.

297 Dimić, *Istorija*, pp. 182-197.

298 J.V. Senz writes Germany secured the rights of the Volksdeutsche – in order to rule them and the countries in which they lived. (J.V. Senz, *Politische*, p. 329.)

authorities previously used to persecute the Nazi excesses, after 1939 they became more tolerant and the outrages were increasingly controlled – at the directive from the Reich – by the leadership of the “German Folk Group” which reduced the number of the Volksdeutsche demonstrations.<sup>299</sup> The government was pursuing the policy of forthcoming in allowing the activities of the cultural associations, opening of minority classes and non-interference in the “internal” Volksdeutsche affairs. According to some press, there were even signs in autumn of 1940 that the Volksdeutsche would be granted some kind of autonomy in predominantly German places.<sup>300</sup> Part of the Slavonian Volksdeutsche, who had long been devoted to the CPP, started deserting it and joining the Kulturbund which became an umbrella political-economic-social organization of the Germans in Yugoslavia. In some cases this led to clashes with those Germans who remained loyal to the CPP at the communal elections in 1940.<sup>301</sup>

The situation of the Magyars also gradually improved, thanks to the improving relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary, on which Germany strongly insisted in 1940. In other words foreign factors, not the concessions in the inner-political haggling, were important.<sup>302</sup> This, however, doesn't mean there were no complaints like in the previous years,<sup>303</sup> but only that they were rectified more readily, thanks to reasons of foreign rather than domestic policy. The Yugoslav authorities strove to keep the Hungarian minority as their bargaining chip for negotiating with Budapest.<sup>304</sup> Some of the Hungarian leaders (Varady, Deák) tried to lead the Magyars over to the YRC camp, but others, headed by Ivan Nagy,<sup>305</sup> were dissatisfied at the slow

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299 Biber, *Nacizem*, pp. 199-200; Janjetović, *Die Konflikte*, p. 152. In mid-1940 the leadership of the “Folk Group” called on the Volksdeutsche not to make excesses, since it was difficult to intervene for the arrested. (*Deutsches Volksblatt*, June 7, 1940.) On July 1, 1940 the leader of the Kulturbund, Janko temporarily suspended the enrolment of new members. (VA, pop. 17, k. 527, f. 3, d. 45.)

300 *Il piccolo*, November 11, 1940; *Magyarország*, November 14, 1940; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 49; Annabring pp. 71-72. The German youth insisted particularly on appointment of German notaries. (AJ, 38, 7/27.) In December 1940 the *Deutsches Volksblatt* started the initiative that the Volksdeutsche be represented in the new town councils by at least one or two representatives. (*Deutsches Volksblatt*, December 4, 1940.) As for concessions in administration, according to the German correspondent Dr Berge, Vice-Premier Maček was against any kind of concessions. (AJ, 38, 122/267.)

301 Geiger, *Nijemci u Đakovu*, p. 129. Even under the changed circumstances, the Germans in Croatia were able to come to power in just six communes in the local elections, whereas in mixed communes they had to make agreements about power sharing. (*Deutsches Volksblatt*, May 28, 1940; *Der Angriff*, April 25, 1940.) Altgayer, whose forte is not precision, claims wrongly they gained power in five communes. (Altgayer (Appendix), p. 14.) Only five communes were also mentioned in a report by the First Army District Command of June 7, 1940. (VA, pop. 17, k. 527, f. 3, d. 45.)

302 Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 121; Mesaroš, *Mađari*, pp. 193, 199-205, 211, 223-226; Naplo, February 1, 1941. Right after the 1938 elections the Hungarian government started negotiating with its Yugoslav counterpart about the number of parliamentary seats for the Magyars. (Sajti, *Hungarians*, pp. 103-106; Idem, *Changes*, p. 140.)

303 SBNS KJ, *Vanredan saziv za 1939. knj.I*, pp. 695-698; *Deutsches Volksblatt*, March 21, 1940; *Pester Lloyd*, June 17, 1940; *Magyarország*, June 11, 1940; *Jutarnji list*, March 19, 1940.

304 Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 108; Idem, *Changes*, p. 142.

305 Nagy was a lawyer from Zagreb. He led the young Hungarians more inclined to cooperate with the Croatian opposition than with Belgrade. The Budapest government wanted

pace of improvements of the status of their national minority. They made connections with the CPP and increasingly turned to the right and toward irredentism.<sup>306</sup> The authorities strove to prevent the reconciliation of these two groups and they hindered the renewal of the HP (as well as of other minority parties), which remained an unfulfilled wish of the Hungarian political elite until the end of the inter-war Yugoslavia.<sup>307</sup> Other, smaller minorities in Northern parts, in the times of fateful changes in the country and Europe, were not visible on the political scene, but Prime Minister Cvetković promised vaguely to all a revamping of the whole country that would recompense the minorities for what they had missed thus far.<sup>308</sup> Based on this, some newspapers expected the government would soon issue a decree about the national minorities that would regulate their position similar to how it had been done in the conventions about the Volksdeutsche that Germany concluded with Hungary and Romania.<sup>309</sup> To be sure, nothing came of it, so the leadership of the German

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to unite the pro-Belgrade and the pro-Zagreb groups and to turn them against the government in the late 1930s. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 99; Idem, Changes, pp. 135-136.)

306 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184; VA, pop. 17, k. 32, f. 1, d. 16 and 28; k. 21, f. 3, d. 14; Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 205, 210, 217č Kasaš, O jednoj, p. 183. Soon after the Serbian-Croatian compromise, the CPP started promising improvement in the situation of the Magyars in the Province (Banovina) of Croatia and far-reaching political concessions. (Sajti, Hungarians, pp. 114-115; Idem, Changes, p. 147.)

307 AJ, 38, 7/27; VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 5; Sajti, Hungarians, pp. 99-100. The Vice-Premier and the leader of the CPP, Dr Vlatko Maček, told the newspaper Magyar Nemzet on December 24, 1939, that there were no obstacles to foundation of the Hungarian Party in Croatia. He repeated this on January 16, 1940. (AJ, 38, 240/387.) This never came to pass, which proves it was just political marketing. At the conference of the leaders of the former Hungarian Party in Senta in March 1940, it was decided to support the policy of the YRC. (Мир, March 7, 1940; Pester Lloyd, March 5, 1940; Magyarország, March 5, 1940.) A fortnight later in Novi Sad, the pro-Belgrade orientation was reaffirmed and adherents of Zagreb and extremists were condemned. (Reggeli Újság, March 15, 1940; Naplo, March 15, 1940.)

308 Neues Wiener Tagblatt, October 8, 1940.

309 Dnevnik, Утро, Запја, October 10, 1940. On occasion of the Second Vienna Award (about division of Transylvania) Germany made Hungary and Romania sign the „Agreement about the Folk Group”. (In fact it was important only for Hungary, since the Germans in Romania had already enjoyed far-reaching rights.) It granted the Volksdeutsche the following rights: the right to preserve their national characteristics and to manifest their National-Socialist world-view; the right to found organizations; the right to exercises freely all professions; proportional representation in the government and among civil servants; the right to schools and education of teachers-to-be; the right to use freely their mother-tongue in private and business matters and in public assemblies, as well as freedom of the press under the same conditions as the Magyars; Hungary committed itself to avoid assimilationist measures, especially the change of family names; freedom of cultural communication with Germany was granted, as well as the right of option for the Transylvanian Saxons. The organization of the German national minority, the Volksbund, was empowered to determine, based on personal statement, who was German and who wasn't. The Hungarian government managed to leave out of the agreement that the Folk Group was a legal person. Both parties interpreted this agreement in accordance with their respective interests later on, the Volksdeutsche (unfoundedly) claiming they had been recognized as a legal person. (Lóránt Tilkovszky, Zeitgeschichte der Deutschen in Ungarn seit 1919 mit einer Vorgeschichte, Budapest 1991, pp. 115-120; Idem, Ungarn und die deutsche „Volksgruppenpolitik“ 1938-1945,

"Folk Group" submitted a memo to the government on January 20, 1941, demanding that the "Folk Group" be recognized as a legal person with the right to independently decide on its cultural, economic and social matters, whereas the leadership of the "Folk Group" would represent all the Volksdeutsche before the authorities. Proportional representation of the Germans in the administration, judiciary and police was demanded, as well as the school autonomy.<sup>310</sup> To be sure, despite the increasing dependence on the Third Reich, such demands remained unacceptable to the Yugoslav government.

In the Southern parts of Yugoslavia, the Italian occupation of Albania caused a (very conditionally speaking) surge of pro-Yugoslav feelings among the Albanians.<sup>311</sup> However, since August 1939 the Italian-Albanian irredentist propaganda started spreading and influencing the political behavior of the Albanians. This propaganda was disseminated by various Albanian chieftains and Italian agents, but since it was done in secret, these processes were difficult to follow.<sup>312</sup> In any case, politics was conducted behind the scenes here more than ever, and the authorities, with their rigid and stringent repressive behavior, couldn't change the mood of the majority of the Albanians. Under the changed foreign political situation, the Albanians increasingly expected salvation from Italy and not from a political arrangement within Yugoslavia.<sup>313</sup>

Except for certain moments, participation of members of the national minorities in the political life of Yugoslavia on the national level was rather marginal. The strongest Yugoslav parties strove to gather members of the minorities as their voting army, usually giving very little in exchange. Breach of promises was the rule, and keeping of the given word was the exception. Members of the minorities were always disproportionably underrepresented. On lower levels, in district and communal assemblies – as long as they existed – the situation was somewhat better, but even there members of the minorities received less than their due. In the Parliament, the minority MPs could only expound (often in an inimical ambience) the complaints of the minorities in public,<sup>314</sup> but situations when they could actually do

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Budapest 1981, pp. 93-96; Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa, II, Bonn 1956, pp. 23E-25E, 73E-74E; Norbert Spannenberger, *Der Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn 1938-1945 unter Horthy und Hitler*, München 2002, pp. 214-222; Mathias Annabring, *Volksgeschichte der Deutschen in Ungarn*, Stuttgart 1954, pp. 105-110; Idem, *Volksgeschichte der Donauschwaben in Rumänien*, Neuhausen/F. bei Stuttgart 1956, p. 57.)

310 Josip Mirnić, *Nemci u Bačkoj u Drugom svetskom ratu*, Novi Sad 1974, pp. 72-73.

311 VA, pop. 17, k. 11, f. 4, d. 18; k. 7, f. 3, d. 19; Živko Avramovski, *Prilog pitanju italijansko-albanske iredentističke propagande na Kosovu i Metohiji u vreme Minhenske krize i okupacije Albanije*, Istorijski glasnik, 2-3, 1964, p. 138.

312 The perfidious leader of the separatist propaganda was Ferhat bey Draga. (Bajrami, *L'oppression*, p. 98.) On the other hand, former Serbian Radicals from Southern parts didn't have a bad opinion of him at all. (AJ, 37, 31/317.) About the inability of the Yugoslav authorities to find information who among the Albanian leaders was intriguing against Yugoslavia see: VA, pop. 17, k. 95b, f. 4, d. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; k. 7, f. 3, d. 45 and 48.

313 Hadri, p. 69; Bajrami, *L'oppression*, p. 95; VA, pop. 17, k. 70, f. 1, d. 54.

314 Sometimes the censorship curtailed even this possibility by shortening speeches of MPs before the publication of the minutes and in the press. (Cf.: *Das hin und her der jugoslawischen Minderheitenpolitik. Ernennung Dr. Grassls zum Senator, Nation und Staat*, V, 6, 1932, p. 413; *Die Budgetredender deutschen Parlamentsvertreter. Unerhörte*

something for their co-nationals in the Parliament were extremely rare. Representation among the officials, both state and communal, was even worse than in the assemblies on different levels.<sup>315</sup> Only representation among the communal elders made the situation somewhat better<sup>316</sup> - especially in Southern parts.<sup>317</sup> And yet, even in representation in communal government, there existed large differences depending on time and place.<sup>318</sup> Due to their territorial dispersion and/or the small number, but also due to the electoral system that was designed unfavorably for the minorities, members of the national minorities never managed to achieve the political importance they could have had. Cooperation between minority parties and their voters practically never occurred – except for a few joint rallies. The Albanians and Turks set out with a common political party, but ethnic strife and diverging political views led to its demise. The Czechs and Slovaks were too scattered and too few to cooperate. On the other hand, they did not perceive themselves as real national minorities, so it was far from them to build a common front with other minorities. Furthermore, ecclesiastical quarrel separated them from the Germans and bad memories of the historical Hungary from the Magyars. The Hungarians, and partly Romanians too, were too much under suspicion of irredentism to be attractive partners for other national minorities. Moreover, their parties were traditionally rent by internal discord, and the Romanians lacked stature, either by their number, economic power or political clout. The Germans didn't want cooperation with

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Verdächtigungen der deutschen Minderheit. Die Zensur, Nation und Staat, V, 7, 1932, p. 497; Die Lage der deutschen Volksgruppe, Nation und Staat, VII, 7, 1934, p. 450.) Sometimes the censorship was stricter with minority newspapers than with the Yugoslav ones, which could publish certain items that were erased from the minority press. In minority papers, even reports of the official agency, the "Avala" were bowdlerized. (Die innenpolitische Lage. Die Novelle zum Wahl- und Versammlungsgesetz. Die Frage der deutschen Bürgerschulen. Die Unterdrückung der Minderheitenpresse, Nation und Staat, V, 3, 1932, p. 179.)

- 315 SBNS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1932/33. godinu, knj. IV, Beograd 1933, p. 332. During our whole research we managed to find only one mention of a non-Yugoslav district chief - the German Alexander Rupp. (SBNS KJ, I redovan saziv za 1935/36, II redovan saziv za 1936/37. godinu, knj. I, Beograd 1937, p. 375.)
- 316 This despite the stipulation of the Law on Communes that foresaw that duties were to be performed in the official language alone, which gave a handy opportunity of interference and curtailing the participation of members of the minorities in the local government. (SBNS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1932/33, knj. III, pp. 89-90.)
- 317 AJ, 37, 56/360; 46/299; 55/358. The claim of Hakif Bajrami the Albanians were not represented in the local government (Bajrami, L'opression, p. 75.) is completely false. The truth is that they were sometimes underrepresented, especially in bigger towns, but it would be far from true to say they were not represented at all. According to a report by an acting chief of General Staff from 1937, in the territory of the Kosovo Division, 77 Yugoslav mayors and 1.249 council members, and 50 Albanian mayors and 1,825 council members were elected. (VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 3, d. 2.) On the other hand, some Albanians of extremely murky past came to communal offices in some places, thanks to corrupt Serbian officials. (VA, pop. 17, k. 95a, f. 8, d. 1; k. 95b, f. 4, d. 4; f. 7, d. 54.) The acting chief of the General Staff probably exaggerated when he said, in the document quoted above, all Albanian council members had been Albanian agents.
- 318 Thanks to party considerations, everything was possible, even that a Serbian mayor be deposed in favor of a German one. (SBNS KJ, I redovan saziv za 1935/36, II redovan saziv za 1936/37. godinu, knj. I, Beograd 1937, 352.)

the Magyars,<sup>319</sup> due to: memories of the past Magyarization policy; suspicions under which the Hungarian minority stood;<sup>320</sup> irredentist propaganda from Hungary that would misuse such cooperation;<sup>321</sup> disunity of the Hungarian leaders;<sup>322</sup> and finally, due to bad treatment of the Germans in Horthy's Hungary.<sup>323</sup> On the other hand, due to political calculations, the HP was not always willing to cooperate either.<sup>324</sup> Sometimes it blamed the lack of cooperation with the GP on the alleged Belgrade's favoring of the Germans.<sup>325</sup> Furthermore, cooperation between the minorities was also made difficult by huge regional differences that caused difficulty in the integration of the whole Yugoslav territory: what did a German burgher from Maribor have in common with an Albanian shepherd from Western Macedonia?!? And yet, the main reason why there never was real cooperation between minorities lies in the fact that the leading political personages of all minorities believed they could achieve more by cooperating with the ruling parties than through the arduous building of a common minority front, to which so many things stood in the way. This does not mean sporadic attempts at cooperation didn't occur, but their importance was marginal.<sup>326</sup> The national minorities, with their parties and politicians remained just a spice in the turbid Yugoslav political soup.

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319 One such attempt failed in 1938. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 2, d. 3.)

320 Höpfner, p. 342.

321 Stefan Kraft refused to cooperate with the Magyars fearing political damage for the Volksdeutsche. (Pester Lloyd, November 22, 1931.) In 1939 the situation was pretty much the same: the Germans didn't want to compromise themselves by collaborating with the Hungarians who suffered under constant suspicion of disloyalty. (AJ, 37, 58/371.)

322 The German ambassador to Belgrade Ulrich von Hassel wrote in 1931 the Hungarians lacked a firm organization and clear leadership – which was one of the preconditions for cooperation with the Volksdeutsche. Furthermore, in his opinion, the Hungarians didn't realize the difference of their position and that of the Volksdeutsche, and they had to stop seeing in the latter the "seceded Magyars". (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5.) These views held true for the greater part of the inter-war period. Thus Georg Grassl reproached the Hungarians for not having a unified leadership, and that they had attacked the GP "from the rear" by joining the Pašić-Pribičević "terrorist block. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5.) In 1937 a Volksdeutsche leader reproached the Hungarian leaders with inconsistency and sympathies for the opposition. (Magyarság, February 23, 1937.)

323 Loránt Tilkovszky Die Frage der politischen Zusammenarbeit der deutschen und ungarischen Minderheiten in Donaubecken, in den Staaten der Kleine Entante, in: Gerhard Seewann (ed.), Minderheitenfrage in Südosteuropa. Beiträge der internationalen Konferenz: The Minority Question in Historical Perspective 1900-1990. Inter University Center Dubrovnik 8-14 April 1991, München 1992, p. 403.

324 Vinaver, Mađarska i Jugoslavija 1918-1933, pp. 382, 384.

325 Sajti, Hungarians, p. 182.

326 VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 2, d. 3; AJ, 14, 110/414; Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933, p. 384; Popi, Rumuni, pp. 69, 75; Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 247; Nikolić, p. 190.





## Chapter Eight

# Education of National Minorities in Yugoslavia

Not by chance, the increasing of the importance of education overlapped with the increasing national consciousness with most European peoples. The school, becoming increasingly an instrument for education of subjects of an ever more national state, was allotted a growing role in shaping of their national consciousness. Therefore it is clear why the question of schools became and remained vital for most national minorities. It had similar importance also for national minorities in the Yugoslav territory – both before and after its foundation and both for the peoples who had been national minorities before the First World War, and for those who became minorities after 1912 or 1918. The relations between the Yugoslav peoples and the peoples who were national minorities in Yugoslavia were also reflected through the question of institutional education, being often the main bone of contention in their mutual relations. For this reason, this chapter will be devoted to this extremely important question.

The peoples who became national minorities in Yugoslavia, just like the Yugoslav peoples, developed, in terms of education and culture in general, under disparate conditions. However, their privileged, or at least more propitious position within the defunct empires, was not always mirrored in the field of education. Thus for instance, the Albanians, whom the Ottoman Empire tolerated much, were in the matters of school in worse position than the Serbs, who were otherwise in an incomparably worse general situation. The Swabians of the Vojvodina and Slavonia, although somewhat better off than their neighbors of other nationalities, had fewer schools than the more discriminated Serbs. Even the Hungarian poor, although nominally belonging to the ruling nationality, had often weaker educational opportunities than the underprivileged Serbs.

Let's have a look at what the educational situation of the peoples who became national minorities in Yugoslavia was, before its foundation. The most numerous national minority in southern parts (which would eventually become the largest in the whole country in 1931), was the Albanian one. It was at the same time culturally the most backward one – not only in Yugoslavia, but in the whole of South-Eastern Europe.<sup>1</sup> Albanian,<sup>2</sup> Serbian and other authors agree on this. Moreover, the most backward part of the Albanian people lived exactly in Yugoslavia.<sup>3</sup> The illiteracy rate

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1 Roux, p. 203. As late as 1927 in the annual report of the British Embassy, the Albanians were judged as the most backward part of the country's population, averse to any authority. (Avramovski, Britanci, I, p. 467.) It is, however unclear whether the British diplomats formed this opinion by themselves, or were influenced by their Yugoslav colleagues.

2 Pollo, Puto (eds.), p. 261.

3 Hadri, p. 81.

in Albania at the eve of the Second World War was estimated as 80%,<sup>4</sup> and in Yugoslavia some (probably a bit exaggerated) estimates went as high as 98%.<sup>5</sup> The Albanian language was undeveloped, without abstract and specialist terms, without a generally accepted alphabet and common literary standard – which would be accepted only in 1968.<sup>6</sup>

The reasons for this are to be found in the long Ottoman rule, which apart from its inherent bad sides, deliberately hindered the development of the Albanian education.<sup>7</sup> There was a short boom after the Young Turk Revolution when over 100 Albanian schools were opened, but it didn't last long: in 1910 as the Young Turks started pursuing the policy of national assimilation on the European model, Albanian schools and cultural associations were shut down and the authorities, strongly backed by Muslim clergy, started imposing the Arabic alphabet, which even became the only one permitted for school instruction in the Vilayet of Kosovo in 1910. This policy of closing down schools and cultural clubs was one of the reasons, albeit certainly not the main one, for Albanian rebellions in 1911 and 1912, during which, among other things, educational demands were made. The Turkish government had to relent before them, so reopening of Albanian schools began and it lasted until the outbreak of the First Balkan War.<sup>8</sup> And yet, after their victory in the First Balkan War, the Serbian authorities found mostly Turkish schools in Kosovo and Western Macedonia.<sup>9</sup> Apart from them, mektebs and madrasas were also quite numerous. These

- 4 Marmullaku, p. 39; Skendi (ed.), Albania, p. 58; Armin Hetzer even adduces 85%. (Armin Hetzer, *Geschichte des Buchhandels in Albanien. Prolegomena zur einer Literatursoziologie*, Berlin, Wien 1984, p. 125.)
- 5 Les Musulmans en Yugoslavie, Sarajevo s.a., p. 85. According to Marmullaku, the percentage in Yugoslavia was around 90%. (Marmullaku, p. 139.) The same, quoting Mita Miljković is claimed by Hadri. (Hadri, p. 81.) According to M. Mayer, 88,7% of the Turks and 97% of the Albanians in Yugoslavia were illiterate in 1921. (Martin Mayer, *Elementarbildung in Jugoslawien (1918-1941). Ein Beitrag zur gesellschaftlichen Modernisierung*, München 1995, p. 159.) Roux claims over 80%. (Roux, p. 207.) It should be kept in mind that all these are just estimates, and that there are several criteria for establishing the degree of literacy.
- 6 Roux, pp. 203-207; Stavro Skendi, *The History of the Albanian Alphabet: A Case of Complex Cultural and Political Developments*, Südost-Forschungen, XIX, 1960, pp. 269-283; Stjepan Antoljak, *Prilog historijatu borbe Albanaca za svoj alfabet*, Gjurmime albanologjike, 1, 1969; Hasan Kaleshi, *Le rôle de Chamseddin Sami Frachery dans la formation de deux langues littéraires: turc et albanais*, Balcanica 1, 1970, pp. 211-215; Pollo, Puto (eds.), p. 263. The Albanian literary language was standardized only in 1968, based on the Southern Tosca dialect, quite different from the vernacular of the Northern Gege who are the vast majority of the Albanians in Kosovo and Western Macedonia. The Albanians in Yugoslavia were quick to adopt the new literary standard, so as not to seem "primitive" or "bad Albanians". (B. Horvat, p. 178.)
- 7 The Ottoman authorities deemed that the Albanians, depending on their religious affiliation, belonged to one of the three millets: Muslim, Latin or Greek. The first non-religious Albanian school was founded in Korça in 1887. In Kosovo, the first similar school was opened in 1891, and the Young Turks shut down all such schools in 1910. (Roux, p. 210.)
- 8 Jašar Redžepagić, *Razvoj prosvete i školstva albanske narodnosti na teritoriji današnje Jugoslavije do 1918. godine*, Priština 1968, pp. 273-279, 291-294; Rahimi, pp. 75, 83, 85.
- 9 AJ, 38, 64/269.

were primitive primary and secondary religious schools, with rather uneducated staff<sup>10</sup> and unorganized instruction. Mektebs were to be found in all villages, and madrassas by mosques in all larger towns – there were as many as 73 of them, in “degenerated shape” in “Southern Serbia” and Montenegro.<sup>11</sup> Apart from these lay Turkish, and Islamic religious schools, there were several confessional schools for Albanian Catholics in Peć, Đakovica, Stubla, Zjuma, Zlokućani, Budisavac, Skopje and Uroševac (then: Ferizović), which Austria-Hungary supported.<sup>12</sup>

The most developed part of the education in the Southern parts of the future Yugoslavia, were Greek and Aromunian schools.<sup>13</sup> This concerned not their numbers, but their equipment and the quality of instruction.<sup>14</sup> There were 18 Aromunian primary schools in Macedonia in 1912, and a male and a female high-school in Bitolj.<sup>15</sup> Because of the pressure of Romania, which had supported these Aromunian schools (in Romanian!) since 1870s, Serbia had to unwillingly accept, through the exchange of notes on the occasion of signing the Bucharest peace treaty in 1913, the Aromunian school autonomy in Macedonia and the possibility for Romania to continue financing these schools. For their part, the Serbian educational authorities did their best to hinder their work by putting them under various limitations and supervising them more strictly than other schools, hoping they would gradually shut down – due to the small number of pupils and practical Aromunian spirit.<sup>16</sup> As for the Greek-friendly Aromuns (and they were 90% of the Aromuns!), they were not allowed to attend Greek schools<sup>17</sup> that were quite numerous, and which, due to the small number of the Greeks, catered mostly to the Aromuns.

The Serbian authorities shut down Turkish state schools too, opening state schools in Serbian instead. Preparatory classes were opened for Albanian and Turkish children to learn Serbian. Only the religious instruction was imparted in Turkish and Arabic, and a certain number of religious schools resumed operating too. The Roman-Catholic schools continued working 1913-1915, spreading Austro-Hungarian propaganda among the Roman-Catholic Albanians.<sup>18</sup> The aim of the educational policy was to develop, especially among the – Muslim and Christian – Slavic population, the feeling of belonging to one nationality and to one state.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, in the case of the Turks and Albanians, the main goal was to teach them the Serbian language and history.<sup>20</sup> Obviously, for religious and national reasons, the Muslims

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10 According to the Austro-Hungarian data from the First World War, there were even illiterate khojas for whom the occupying Habsburg authorities organized literacy courses. (Momčilo Isiđ, *Osnovno školstvo u Srbiji 1918-1941*, I, Beograd 2005, p. 35.)

11 Rebac, pp. 653-654.

12 Redžepagić, p. 280; Ljubodrag Dimić, *Prosvetna politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije na Kosovu i Metohiji 1918-1941 i istoriografija*, *Istorija 20. veka*, 1-2, 1990, p. 192.

13 According to the Serbian data, there were 178 Serbian, 290 Bulgarian, 47 Greek, 16 Aromunian, 167 Turkish and 10 other schools in Macedonia in 1911/12. According to these data, the Albanians had no schools. (Todorovski, p. 296.)

14 Hadži-Vasiljević, Bitolj, p. 44.

15 ASANU 14387/10009.

16 Todorovski, pp. 356-363; Boeckh, 355; Peyfuss, p. 121.

17 Boeckh, p. 353.

18 Dimić, *Prosvetna politika*, p. 192; Redžepagić, p. 283; Todorovski, pp. 366-371.

19 Todorovski, p. 368.

20 Todorovski, pp. 371, 373.

resisted attending Serbian schools.<sup>21</sup> It was only the peace treaty with Turkey on March 14, 1914, that guaranteed the right of the Muslim population to confessional schools – but only in Turkish. However, due to the First World War, it was never implemented.<sup>22</sup> It is conspicuous that the Serbian authorities made educational concessions only when the foreign policy reasons dictated it: in the case of the Aromuns – in order not to spoil relations with Romania which Bulgaria was trying to woo to its opposing camp: in the case of the Roman-Catholic Albanians – so as not to spoil further still the already bad relations with Austria-Hungary, but also with the Vatican with which negotiations about the concordat were in progress. The same was true of the religious instruction for the Muslims. And yet, although the population in whose favor concessions were made was not numerous,<sup>23</sup> they were made grudgingly, for political and not humanitarian or educational reasons.

Montenegro behaved in the similar manner in the territory it had conquered. Its authorities also strove to limit the work of Roman-Catholic schools, but because of Austria-Hungary, couldn't go too far in that.<sup>24</sup> During the First Balkan War, numerous mektebs which existed in the territory conquered by Montenegro, were shut down. After the end of the war, the Montenegrin authorities prevented attempts at their reopening. This measure was not aimed only against the Albanians, but also against the Slavic Muslims, for whom the authorities deemed they had behaved disloyally. Fifty-two Serbian schools were opened instead, attended also by some Muslims. There were cases in which allegedly the Albanian and Slavic Muslim leaders demanded opening of Serbian primary schools, but such requests should be taken with a grain of salt.<sup>25</sup> Just like in the Serbian territory, preparatory classes were opened for non-native speakers of Serbian, but the effects of the whole primary school system were less than modest, due to the lack of teachers, curriculum, money, school-buildings, but also due to the resistance and lack of language skills.<sup>26</sup>

The First World War and occupation of Serbia and Montenegro temporarily caused changes in the educational situation of the Southern parts of the future Yugoslavia. Whereas Bulgarian occupation was tough both on the Serbian, Albanian and Aromunian populations,<sup>27</sup> the Austro-Hungarian authorities tried in a number of ways to win over the Albanians.<sup>28</sup> Part of that policy was the opening of Albanian schools.<sup>29</sup> Their actual number remains unknown to this day. According to Mehemet

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21 Ibid., pp. 371-372, 374.

22 Serbia ratified the treaty, but it didn't implement it. Because of the war with Turkey, the treaty was repudiated in December 1914. (Ibid., p. pp. 402-403.)

23 The more numerous Muslim population, had no opportunity to enjoy the granted benefits from the peace treaty with Turkey.

24 Babić, *Politika*, pp. 207-208; Redžepagić, p. 281.

25 Babić, *Politika*, pp. 227-230. It can be presumed that these demands had been "inspired" by the Montenegrin authorities, which is proven by the reluctance of the Muslims to attend state schools. (Ibid., pp. 231-232.)

26 Babić, *Politika*, p. 233.

27 ASANU, 14387/10009; Pirraku, *Kulturno-prosvetni pokret*, p. 358.

28 Mitrović, *Albanci*, pp. 92-99.

29 Until the end of 1917 the Austro-Hungarian authorities opened 34 schools in the Southern Serbian territories (only 4 in Albanian). Furthermore, 30 mektebs were opened too. (Božica Mladenović, *Grad u austrougarskoj okupacionoj zoni u Srbiji od 1916. do 1918. godine*, Beograd 2001, p. 120.)

Pirraku, some 300 schools were opened during the Austro-Hungarian rule.<sup>30</sup> Jašar Redžepagić, utilizing certain sources, points out their actual number was some ten times lower,<sup>31</sup> whereas Ljubodrag Dimić proves with good arguments, that the information about 300 schools allegedly opened by the Austro-Hungarian authorities, is not founded on historical sources.<sup>32</sup> If the results of the investigation of the Yugoslav Ministry of Education after the war are taken into consideration, and difficulties (lack of teachers, buildings etc.) that (the not always objective) Redžepagić<sup>33</sup> points out, it is not very likely that the Austro-Hungarian authorities and their Albanian helpers could open so many as 300 schools – even if the very primitive mektebs with uneducated khojas were included. According to the petition of three Albanian priests to the League of Nations from 1930, the Serbian authorities closed 32 Albanian schools attended by 4,074 pupils.<sup>34</sup> According to the Albanian newspaper *Vulneti* of February 7, 1930, the Serbian authorities closed 26 schools in 23 places.<sup>35</sup> It would be impossible to determine exactly where the schools were located, but it is plain from both lists, that a small number of establishments with a small number of pupils was in question.<sup>36</sup> The Yugoslav government, in its remarks to the petition of the three Albanian priests of December 15, 1930, claimed they found no Albanian schools in their territory,<sup>37</sup> which wasn't completely true. However, if the development of education in the inter-war Albania is taken as a basis of comparison,<sup>38</sup> it is quite clear that the story of 300 Albanian schools opened during the occupation and then closed by the Serbian authorities, was most probably a myth.

As in many other things, the situation in education in the Northern parts of Yugoslavia was quite different from that in the Southern parts.<sup>39</sup> Unlike in the

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30 Pirraku, *Kulturno-prosvetni pokret*, p. 358. Part of the Western historiography took this number uncritically over. (Cf. Vickers, p. 92.)

31 Redžepagić, pp. 309-315.

32 Dimić, *Prosvetna politika*, p. 193; Idem, *Činjenice i interpretacije o svakodnevnom teroru*, in: *Odgovor an knjigu Noela Malkolma, Kosovo – kratka istorija*, Beograd 2000, p. 158.

33 Thus for instance, he arrogates as Albanian the cultural achievements of the 18th century Aromunian town of Moschopolis. (Redžepagić, pp. 91-97.) Pollo and Puto abuse in the similar way the fact that Moschopolis was in the vicinity of Korça, in the South of the present-day Albania. (Pollo, Puto, pp. 107-110.)

34 *AJ*, 305, 8/18.

35 The lists of places adduced in the newspaper and in the petition of the three priests do not overlap completely – not only due to different numbers.

36 It was literally admitted in the petition of the three priests: "The number of these schools and pupils wasn't large, but it should be noted that they had been opened spontaneously in places where an embryonic communal organization already existed, or in places or municipalities which, apart from the manifold tasks imposed by the state of war, had the possibility of maintaining an Albanian-language school." (*AJ*, 305, 8/18.)

37 *Ibid.*

38 Only 36.7% of children in Albania attended school in 1938; there were 18 high-schools with 5,677 pupils in all. Higher schools didn't exist at all. (Marmullaku, p. 39.)

39 As for the Vlachs in the North-East of Serbia proper, they never had schools in their own language, and allegedly never asked for them. (T.R. Georgievitch, *The Truth Concerning the Rumanes in Serbia*, Paris 1919, p. 32.) In that indirect way too, they were denied recognition as a national minority, and therefore we leave them out of this work.

Southern parts of the country, a much tighter school network was built there until 1918.<sup>40</sup> This, according to Martin Mayer, is what the survey of literacy and education looked like around 1900 in the territories which were incorporated into Yugoslavia in 1918:<sup>41</sup>

Province	%of illiterate	#of primary schools	#of secondary schools	1 school per capita
Slovenia	18.2	679	25	47,222
Cro./Slavonia	54.4	1,536	22	119,180
Dalmatia	72.2	457	7	88,786
Vojvodina	34.5	1,200	16	84,185
Bosnia/Herz.	87.8	487	11	175,618
Serbia	79.0	1,425	22	132,350
Maced./Kosovo	?	381	20	83,240
Montenegro	?	136	2	119,212

This (incomplete) table shows not only the great regional differences in literacy levels, but differences in the level of civilization also can be discerned, visible, among other things, in the lack of statistics. There were differences in the level of literacy among different constituent parts within the Habsburg Monarchy. Here is the literacy rate in percentages in Hungary, Croatia and Austria in 1880 and 1910:<sup>42</sup>

Country	1880	1910	% above 6 years in 1910
Hungary	36.4	58.2	68.7
Croatia	20.6	44.0	52.6
Austria	34.5	56.4	66.7

These differences between various parts of the Monarchy were hiding differences between its various peoples. This is how literacy rates looked like in percentages in Hungary:<sup>43</sup>

Ethnicity	1880	1910	% over 6 years in 1910
Hungarian	44.6	67.0	79.2
German	56.8	70.4	82.2
Slovak	32.9	58.0	69.7
Romanian	9.4	28.2	33.1
Ruthenian	7.3	22.7	27.9
Croatian	19.8	47.0	56.0
Serbian	19.8	40.4	48.0

40 In the Vojvodina on the eve of the First World War, that network was twice as developed as in Serbia proper, and four times more than in "Southern Serbia". (M. Mayer, p. 53.)

41 M. Mayer, p. 54.

42 Katus, *Die Magyaren*, p. 484.

43 Ibid.

This is how the illiteracy rate of members of different nationalities looked like in percentages in Croatia in 1900:<sup>44</sup>

People	men	women
Germans	26.7	35.4
Serbs & Croats	63.3	77.2
Hungarians	48.3	61.1
Czechs	22.2	33.3
Slovaks	58.5	65.2
Ruthenians	61.4	73.8
Slovenes	40.4	45.8

Such (i)literacy rates were the result of the number of schools, literacy of the immigrant members of the minorities in their old homeland, material and other factors. As for the Croatian authorities, which, according to the Croatian-Hungarian Compromise of 1868, were in charge of education,<sup>45</sup> they were not inclined to open schools for members of the minorities, and a considerable number of the originally minority schools was Croatized during the 1880s.<sup>46</sup> Thus, some 120,000 Germans had only some 20-odd schools, most of them in Syrmium.<sup>47</sup> In 1910 bilingual instruction was introduced in all schools for them, but due to the lack of German teachers, it was implemented only in larger places: in all others, it became completely Croatized.<sup>48</sup> The Czechs had no schools in Croatia until 1918.<sup>49</sup> On the other hand, a large number of so-called Julian schools for the immigrant Hungarians were opened by the Julian Society. They were attended also by the non-Magyars.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, there were also some 20

44 Valentin Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen in Syrmien, Slawonien und Bosnien. Geschichte einer deutschen Volksgruppe in Südost-Europa*, Stuttgart 1989, p. 130.

45 Ferdo Hauptmann, *Der kroatisch-ungarische Ausgleich von 1868*, in: *Der österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich von 1867. Seine Grundlagen und Auswirkungen*, München 1968, p. 44. Cf. also articles 48 and 49 of the Compromise. (*Ibid.*, p. 195.)

46 This was particularly true of German schools in predominantly Roman-Catholic communes. (Altgayer, p. 6.)

47 AIDGL, Nachlas Lichtenberger. In Đakovština, despite their numbers, they had no schools. (Geiger, *Nijemci u Đakovu*, p. 77.)

48 Josef Volkmar Senz, *Das Schulwesen der Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien*, München 1969, p. 20.

49 There were only a few Czech schools in the Yugoslav territory until 1918. They operated in the Vojvodina and one in Paraćin. (Hanzl, Matušek, Orct, p. 40.)

50 The data about these schools are contradictory. Stajić claims there were some 100 of them. (Stajić, *Mađarizacija*, p. 91.) Laszlo Szita mentions some 150 classes in 75 schools opened in Croatia between 1904 and 1918. (Szita, pp. 178-179.) The same number is adduced by Gujaš. Some of them were in Bosnia. (Gujaš, p. 91.) In a petition of Imre Prokopy and others to the League of Nations, 65 Julian schools with 115 teachers were mentioned. (*Pétition présentée à la Société des Nations au sujet de la destitution en masse des instituteurs de nationalité hongroise en Yougoslavie et de la loi yougoslave du 27 septembre 1929 sur les écoles normales d'instituteurs*, Paris 1930, p.6) A document from (probably) the first half of the 1920s mentions 17 village Julian schools, but it was probably a mistake. (AJ, 66, 63/165.) As for the Julian Society, it was founded in Budapest in 1904, by politicians, magnats and writers in order to protect the culture of the Hungarians abroad. It was named after Fra-Julian, considered a paragon of love for the

Hungarian schools founded by the nobility and several communal Hungarian schools.<sup>51</sup> Six railway primary schools were founded in the 1890s, 77% of the railway employees being Hungarian.<sup>52</sup> The real aim of these schools was as much the Magyarization of the non-Magyar pupils, as the preservation of the nationality of the Magyars.<sup>53</sup> They operated mostly in cities and towns, and they were rivaling the Julian schools which were scattered throughout villages and farms. Because of their aims, but also because of the generally strained relations between the Croats and Hungarians, these schools were a thorn in the side of the Croatian authorities, which did their utmost to hinder their work.<sup>54</sup>

However, the Hungarian education was most oversized in the Vojvodina, which belonged to Hungary proper. According to a Hungarian memo for the League of Nations, there were 645 Hungarian primary schools with 1,832 teachers in 1913/14. This is how they and their teachers were divided:<sup>55</sup>

Kind of school	# of schools	# of teachers
State	266	790
Communal	67	252
Catholic	224	639
Calvinist	26	57
Lutheran	25	44
Jewish	28	39
Private	9	11

On the other hand, the Serbs used to have 179 schools with 592 teachers, and other nationalities put together, had 79 primary schools and 802 teachers. If this is compared with the number of inhabitants, one can see that the Hungarians who comprised one quarter of the population had almost 2/3 of the schools, and almost half of all teachers. According to this document, the Hungarians had 227-day care centers and nurseries with 279 teachers and 148 nurses. Furthermore, there were 61 communal and 2 state artisan schools with 399 teachers as well as 7 communal, 2 cooperative and one commercial schools with 51 teachers in the same territory.<sup>56</sup> In order to get the complete picture, here are the primary-educational facilities that other nationalities possessed in the three counties the parts of which fell to Yugoslavia after 1918.

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Hungarian race. It enjoyed the support of the Hungarian government and large Hungarian landowners. (Gujaš, pp. 87-88.)

51 Ibid., p. 67.

52 Ibid., p. 72-74. Sajti claims there were 88 Julian and railway schools in Croatia and Bosnia. Twelve of them belonged to the railway. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 162.)

53 Thus in the railway schools in 1906/07, out of 943 children from the interior, 598 were non-Hungarians. (Gujaš, p. 83.)

54 Gujaš, p. 91.

55 Memorandum sur l'enseignement primaire de la minorité hongroise et la nouvelle loi du 5 décembre 1919 sur l'enseignement primaire en Yougoslavie, Budapest 1930, pp. 5-6. The same data in: Ammende (ed.), pp. 367-368.

56 Ibid., p. 6.



The Timis County: 168,000 Romanians had 128 primary schools; 70,000 Serbs had 44 primary schools; 3,000 Slovaks had one primary school; 165,000 Germans had 18 primary schools.

The County of Torontal: 200,000 Serbs had 74 primary schools; 87,000 Romanians had 40 primary schools; 16,000 Slovaks had 4 primary schools; 166,000 Germans had 13 primary schools.

The Bacs-Bodrog County: 145,000 Serbs had 66 primary schools; 30,000 Slovaks had 11 primary schools; 190,000 Germans had 18 primary schools.<sup>57</sup>

It is clear from this that the Serbs and Romanians had somewhat better educational possibilities on the primary level due to their ecclesiastic and educational autonomy. Unlike them, the Slovaks and Germans had no institutions that would protect their rights in the field of education, which, coupled with other factors, influenced the number of their primary schools. However, one should keep in mind that even in autonomous Serbian schools the Hungarian language, history, geography and civics were mandatory subjects taught in Hungarian.<sup>58</sup> This additionally diminished the number of classes for learning other subjects in mother-tongue.

However, for the Serbs and Romanians, the situation in secondary education was similar to that of other minorities. This is how according to another Hungarian petition to the League of Nations the Hungarian secondary education looked like in the same territory. There were 69 secondary schools: 4 state and 4 communal high-schools, one confessional high-school, one state six-year secondary school, one higher school for girls, three state higher commercial schools, one communal higher commercial school, one cooperative higher commercial school for boys, one private higher commercial school for girls, 20 higher state primary schools, 14 higher communal primary schools, 7 private higher primary schools, two communal higher primary schools, 5 confessional higher primary schools, two agricultural schools, one male and one female teachers training college.<sup>59</sup> If it is known that the much more numerous Serbs had just two high-schools and two teachers training colleges,<sup>60</sup> and other peoples not even that, it is clear how oversized the Hungarian secondary education was. It was the true reflection of the magyarizing policy the Hungarian government pursued in the last decades before the First World War.<sup>61</sup>

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57 I. Senz, pp. 212-213. Whereas the number of Serbian schools is similar to that from the Hungarian memo for the League of Nations, the total is higher for other nationalities – due to the schools in territories which didn't fall to Yugoslavia. This is particularly true of the Romanian schools.

58 Branislav Gligorijević, *O nastavi na jezicima narodnosti u Vojvodini 1919-1929*, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 5, 1972, p. 56.

59 Pétition présenté a la Société des Nations au sujet de l'enseignement secondaire hongrois en Yougoslavie, Geneve 1930, p. 5.

60 Apart from that, the Serbs had also three burgher-schools. (Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, p. 57.)

61 I. Dolmányos, *Kritik der Lex Apponyi*. (Die Schulgesetze vom Jahre 1907), in: *Nationale Frage in der Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie 1900-1918*, Budapest 1966; Dimitrije Kirilović, *Pomađarivanje u bivšoj Ugarskoj*, Novi Sad 1935; Idem, *Asimilacioni uspesi Mađara u Bačkoj, Banatu i Baranji*. *Prilog pitanju demađarizacije Vojvodine*, Novi Sad 1937. The disreputed Apponyi's school law foresaw that the instruction be in Hungarian alone from 7th to 9th grade, that if a minority school should adopt Hungarian as the language of instruction it couldn't reverse that decision, as well as that there would be 39 school hours for learning Hungarian, and 43 for learning the mother-tongue. This

From what was said above it is clear how great an advantage the Hungarian authorities wanted to create for the Hungarians, compared to other nationalities. However, the assimilationist effect of such a policy in minority regions was negligible,<sup>62</sup> whereas the Hungarian people as a whole, despite the high culture of the elite, remained on the average less educated than the masses of the national minorities.<sup>63</sup> What was worst for them, was that members of the Hungarian minorities in the successor states after the First World War had to pay for the assimilationist policy of the pre-war Hungarian powers-that-be.<sup>64</sup>

The educational situation of certain minorities was of course above all the result of the magyarizing policy of the Hungarian ruling circles, but also partly of the carelessness and the undeveloped national consciousness of members of some national minorities. This holds particularly true for the Ruthenians, whose intelligentsia was heavily magyarized, and whose two-grade confessional schools were handed over to the state in 1899: this relieved Ruthenian communes of the obligation to finance them, but the government's help was paid by Magyarization.<sup>65</sup> Similar was the case with most of the Swabian communes which gave their schools over to the state for economic reasons, allowing thus their Magyarization.<sup>66</sup> Considerable part of materialistically oriented Swabians wanted their children to learn the Hungarian language as well as possible, in order to facilitate their social climbing.<sup>67</sup> Unlike great part of the peasantry, they didn't think they needed any school, but they felt what they needed wasn't the school in their mother-tongue, but rather in the "state" language. Magyarized, and from the state increasingly dependant teachers, furthered this tendency.<sup>68</sup> Gradual awakening of the national consciousness during the First World War would start changing this attitude. However, this process, as we shall see, developed faster in the Vojvodina than in Slavonia due to the greater number and compactness of the Swabians, as well as the attitude of the authorities.

The situation of the German education in Slovenia was to a degree similar to that of the Hungarian one in the Vojvodina. It was also oversized, but gradually the Slovenes gained increasingly more opportunities for education in their mother-tongue. However, in this respect, there were differences between the crownlands, and indeed, between parts of the same crownland. The process of expanding Slovenian education went on slowly and arduously, and it hardly made sorties above the level of elementary education into the field of lower high-schools. The German education

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meant, that apart from learning Hungarian, there was not much time left for anything else. (I. Senz, p. 176.)

62 Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 726.

63 Jászi, *Magyariens Schuld*, p. 208. Jászi explains that by the fact the Hungarian intelligentsia consisted mainly of Jews and foreigners who had no contact to the people. Jončić's statement the Hungarians were the most developed and the most cultivated national minority is imprecise, and in the given context untrue. (Koča Jončić, *Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji*, Beograd 1962, p. 12.)

64 Dolmányos, p. 288.

65 Branislav Vranešević, *Rusini u borbi za nacionalni opstanak 1848-1890*, in: *Iz istorije vojvođanskih Rusina do 1941*, pp. 86, 91-92.

66 J.V.Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 27; AJ, F. 335, f. 80; SBNS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1932/33. godinu, knj. III, Beograd 1933, p. 66.

67 Freie Stimmen, March 30, 1933.

68 J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 27.

was ousted mostly in Crain, where, except for Kočevje, only several German primary schools remained, whereas it remained strongest in Carinthia, where, under the guise of the so-called "utraquist" (bilingual) schools instruction in German predominated. Just as the Südmark was helping funding of German schools and German pupils, the Slovene Association of SS. Cyril and Methodius, was helping found private Slovenian schools, with and without the right to issue certificates. Roughly put, for the education in the Slovenian territories, the following principle was valid: the higher the school, the more German instruction it imparted.<sup>69</sup> Thus the teachers training college in Ljubljana was in German and Slovene (but with more German), whereas those in Maribor and Celje, were all-German. All six-year high-schools, except for the one in Idrija which was German-Slovene, were in German. In Crain there were two German and four German-Slovenian high-schools. (The Slovenian being taught in lower, and German in upper grades; only since 1908 some subjects in upper grades were also taught in Slovenian.) In Styria, the Slovenes managed after protracted struggle, to obtain parallel Slovenian classes in high-schools in Celje<sup>70</sup> and Maribor,<sup>71</sup> but the high-school in Ptuj remained staunchly all-German.<sup>72</sup> In the German enclave of Kočevje until 1918, there were 33 primary schools, one four-grade burgher school, one nine-grade higher high-school and two day care centers. These German schools had their own school inspector.<sup>73</sup> The Deutscher Schulverein, a nationalist society for aiding German schools in the "endangered parts", built 11 primary schools in Kočevje and helped build 8 more.<sup>74</sup> Despite aid from without, the weak spot of the schools in Kočevje was that they were mostly one- or two-grade schools, whereas the number of pupils was declining due to the fall of the number of the inhabitants.<sup>75</sup>

The minority education in the Yugoslav territories of the Habsburg Monarchy until 1918 was the least developed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is understandable in view of the small number of members of the minorities, general undevelopment of the country, comparatively short time since the colonists had come, and hard pioneer way of life. There were 40-odd German schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina (8 of them at factories), a few Polish, 6 or 7 Hungarian and one Italian. Some of these schools were private, some communal and some confessional. Some were given over to the government later on in order to get rid of the expenditures. Some of the others also enjoyed government support, but since 1910 the Bosnian Diet was not willing to support purely minority schools – with a plausible excuse that the local

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69 A general survey see in: Ervin Dolenc, *Kulturni boj. Slovenska kulturna politika v Kraljevini SHS*, [Ljubljana 1996], pp. 29-30.

70 The government of Casimir Badeny fell over the matter of the parallel classes in the Celje high-school, showing how in nationality questions small causes can have momentous consequences. The next government, headed by Kilmansegg, smoothly assigned the money for the parallel Slovenian classes. (Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire*, p. 661; Taylor, pp. 211-212.)

71 The Slovenes managed to get parallel classes there already in 1888 with no opposition. The Germans deemed that town firmly German, so they had no fears Slovenian classes could endanger the supremacy of the German culture. (Taylor, p. 211.)

72 Gestrin, Melik, *Istorija Slovenaca*, pp. 209-211, 267-268.

73 Karner, p. 24; *Jubiläums-Festbuch*, p. 15.

74 500 let, p. 43.

75 Gottschee. *13 Jahre Gottscheer Gedenkstätte. 650 Gottscheer Volksgruppe*, [Graz] 1980, p. 64.

population also lacked a huge number of schools. Some schools, especially German and several Hungarian, received help from nationalist societies from Austria, Germany or Hungary.<sup>76</sup>

As can be seen from this short overview, education of individual peoples who became national minorities in 1912 or 1918 was very unequally developed. The degree of the development of education depended on the position in the ethnic pecking-order within a given empire, its educational policy, economic power, cultural level, the time and place of colonization, number of members of a minority, aid from mother countries, etc. In the following part of this chapter we shall see what changes in the field of education were brought about by the foundation of the Yugoslav state, what its minority school policy was and how it was implemented.

The millennial upheaval in autumn 1918 brought about not only the change of the political power, but also the change in the field of education. With the progress of the Serbian Army, Serbian power of some kind was reestablished in Western Macedonia, Kosovo and Metohija. Among other things, it bestirred itself to close down enemy schools. This hit in the first place the Bulgarian schools, but the Albanian ones opened by Austria-Hungary were not spared either.<sup>77</sup> This was in keeping both with the pre-war educational policy, and with the fact that the schools set up by the occupiers, were bearers of enemy spirit.

Apart from the Albanian schools, the Aromunian ones which had survived the Bulgarian occupation were shut down too.<sup>78</sup> Since Romania didn't help Serbia at the time of the Bulgarian attack, the Serbian government deemed itself no longer bound by the obligations of the Bucarest treaty and the notes exchanged on occasion of its signing,<sup>79</sup> so that the Aromuns definitively missed the opportunity to be recognized as a national minority.<sup>80</sup> However, most probably this wasn't done so much because of the Aromuns themselves (whos number was minimal anyway), but rather to prevent the Albanians and Turks, and particularly the Bulgarians and the pro-Bulgarian Macedonians from demanding separate schools<sup>81</sup> or even cultural autonomy.<sup>82</sup> This would be in stark contrast with the assimilationist plans of the Serbian elite, so it had to be prevented at all costs.<sup>83</sup> The Turkish primary schools were allowed to function until the 1919/20 schoolyear, when they were shut down – not without some resistance on the part of the Turks.<sup>84</sup>

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76 Kraljačić, *Kolonizacija*, pp. 122-123; Gujaš, p. 91; AIDGL, Nachlas Lichtenberger; Hoffmann, pp. 24-27; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, pp. 20-21; Drljača, *Kolonizacija*, 50; HWBGAD, I, p. 502.

77 Pirraku, *Kulturno-prosvetni*, p. 358.

78 Peyfuss, p. 121; Boeckh, p. 335.

79 AJ, F. 398, f. 1.

80 Already the Bulgarian occupiers had closed down most of the Aromunian schools and interned most of the Aromunian teachers and priests. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.)

81 Allegedly, the Aromuns never demanded the reopening of their schools after the First World war. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.)

82 ASANU, 14387/10009.

83 In the chapter dealing with legal documents concerning the minorities we have seen how the Delegation of Yugoslavia strove to exempt "Southern Serbia" at the Paris Peace conference from the minority protection, and how, this having failed, the Yugoslav authorities de facto behaved as if it hadn't.

84 AJ, 66, 105/315; 69, 53/86; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, pp. 127-128.

Similar processes of taking over power with almost simultaneous changes (or at least beginning of changes) in the school system took place also in other territories that would become part of Yugoslavia. The People's Administration in the Vojvodina decided on December 9, 1918, that the instruction was to be in the mother-tongue of the majority of the population.<sup>85</sup> However, this was not easy to implement. Teachers who would know the mother-tongue of pupils were lacking.<sup>86</sup> Part of the minority teachers, having been educated at Hungarian schools, wasn't able to impart instruction in their mother-tongue.<sup>87</sup> Part of the pupils couldn't speak their mother-tongue, but Hungarian. Also, there was resistance both on part of the teachers (especially Hungarian ones) and of part of the pupils and their parents.<sup>88</sup> In many cases, Hungarian teachers refused to swear the oath of allegiance to the new authorities, and Budapest encouraged them in this.<sup>89</sup> Part of the Hungarian teachers left their working places on their own free will, and part of them were punished by the Yugoslav authorities or transferred across the demarcation line, i.e., expelled.<sup>90</sup> Some Hungarian teachers were actively spreading propaganda against the new order, against opening of non-Hungarian schools,<sup>91</sup> or against learning Serbian,<sup>92</sup> whereas part of the non-Magyar teachers remained under their ideological influence, or even surveillance.<sup>93</sup> There were cases of Hungarian Roman-Catholic clergy agitating against the teachers who had sworn the oath of allegiance to the new state.<sup>94</sup> Part of Romanian teachers was interned together with other intellectuals, and considerable part left their places and moved across the demarcation line to the Romanian-held territory.<sup>95</sup> Part of them did that hoping for better career opportunities in the Romanian national state, and part of

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85 AV, 81, 305/1919; 53/1919; 575/1919; Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, p. 57.

86 Pančevačka gimnazija 1863/64-1963/64, Pančevo 1964, p. 27.

87 AV, 81, 561/1919.

88 Several pupils of the high-school in Novi Vrbas were incarcerated in the Petrovaradin Fortress because of the pro-Hungarian demonstrations in spring 1919. It is interesting, and in a way typical, that one of the later leaders of the German national minority, Franz Hamm, was among them. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 51/105; AV, 81, 1526/919.)

89 AV, 81, 1218/1919; 203/1919; 509/1919; 134/1920; 126/IV, 27429/930; Judin, p. 20; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, 58. Some were softened by suspension, so they eventually consented to swear the oath of allegiance to the state. (AV, 81, 305/1919.) In some cases the authorities were willing to accept only the statement of obedience instead of the oath. (AV, 81, 310/1919; 120/1920.) Some Hungarian teachers worked as late as February 1920, although they swore no oath, and the Ministry of Education ordered that they be made to do it by withholding their salaries. (AV, 81, 27/920.) Some Romanian teachers refused to swear the oath too. (AV, 81, 52/1919.) Some Hungarian teachers in Subotica first swore to be loyal, but then renounced their oath and started agitating against the new authorities. The mayor demanded them to be suspended, and if possible, interned. (AV, 81, 69/919.) It should be stressed that swearing the oath of allegiance was in keeping with the Article of Law XXVIII/1907 (the disreputed *Lex Apponyi*), then valid in the Vojvodina. (Sajti, *Hungarians*, p.148.)

90 AV, 81, 6403/1919; 463/1919; 2930/918; 48/1919; 13/1919; 9206/1919; 30/1919; 120/1920; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, pp. 64, 93.

91 AV, 81, 1103/1919; 9206/1919; 9589/1919; 145/1919.

92 AV, 81, 1718/1920.

93 AV, 81, 0397/20.

94 AV, 81, 1583/1919.

95 Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 49. After these measures, only 39 Romanian teachers remained in Yugoslavia. (*Ibid.*, p. 51.)

them because the communes in which they had been working paid them no salaries or rebelled against them.<sup>96</sup> Part of the Romanian teachers remained in the Yugoslav territory, but offered resistance to the measures of the new authorities.<sup>97</sup> The resistance on part of the non-Hungarian pupils and their parents was expressed in the wish to continue their education (if only temporarily) in Hungarian which they completely mastered, and not in their mother-tongue, the expert terminology of which was unknown to them.<sup>98</sup> There were also cases of Slavic children continuing to attend Hungarian schools out of inertia,<sup>99</sup> and some Bunjevci in Sombor were paying for private Hungarian lessons as late as 1920.<sup>100</sup>

Apart from firewood and other necessities,<sup>101</sup> the lack of schoolbooks was felt particularly keenly.<sup>102</sup> Old Hungarian textbooks could be only partly used, and then only after they have passed censorship.<sup>103</sup> There were no new schoolbooks because it was difficult to find qualified authors to prepare textbooks in various languages.<sup>104</sup> Among other things, their appearance was hindered by lack of money, and simple lack of paper.<sup>105</sup> Throughout 1919-1920 teachers' salaries came from

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96 AV, 81, 922/1919; 561/1919; 217/920.

97 AV, 81, 113/1919.

98 AV, 81, 988/1919; 8395/1919; 145/1919; Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 191. Demands for educating non-Hungarian children in Hungarian came as late as autumn 1922. Thus the Roman-Catholics of Veliki Bečkerek demanded in October 1922 reopening of the private school run by nuns in Hungarian, although the pupils would be predominantly Germans. (AJ, 74, 75/110.) To make allowances for the lack of language skills, the Ministry of Education temporarily permitted auxiliary use of Hungarian. (AV, 81, 145/1919.) A German course was organized in Pančevo in 1919 for 54 German girls unable to follow higher school instruction in that language. (AV, 81, 6445/1919.) There were German children speaking only Hungarian in the 1930s too. (AJ, F. 335, f. 89; Jugoslovenski dnevnik, July 4, 1930.) There were also demands from the pupils of the closed Hungarian schools to have private exams in Hungarian. (AV, 81, 1511/1919.)

99 AV, 81, 2517/919; 509/919.

100 AV, 81, 388/1920. This shows that the Hungarian influence remained strong, and maybe that the non-Magyars feared the return of the Hungarian power, so that they wanted to be prepared for anything that may come. The head of the Educational Department of the People's Administration Dr Milan Petrović forbade private Hungarian lessons for high-school students in autumn 1919. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 150.)

101 Some schools were devastated by the army. (AV, 81, 0397/20.)

102 AV, 81, 239/919; 9004/1919; Pančevačka gimnazija, p. 27.

103 AV, 81, 389/1920; 5262/919; 3867/1920. Censored Hungarian textbooks for secondary schools in dilapidating state were resold from generation to generation, and were used as late as 1940! (ASANU 14530 / XIV 2.) Importing new Hungarian schoolbooks from Hungary was forbidden. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 157.)

104 It took long to solve this problem. (AV, 81, 3478/919; 2463/919; 2421/919; 0397/20; 2468/1919; 7571/1920; J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, p. 45.) The first Hungarian primer in Yugoslavia was to be published in the monastery printing shop of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Sremski Karlovci. (AV, 81, 2077/919.) Later on, publication of schoolbooks was centralized, and the schoolbooks for members of the minorities were written by authors from the "state people". (AV, 126/IV, 54742/938; M. Mayer, p. 69; J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, p. 71.) Nevertheless, the lack of textbooks for the minorities wasn't rectified even in the 1930s. (AV, 126/IV, 1128/939; SB Senata KJ, Redovan saziv za 1933. godinu, knj. I, Beograd 1934, p. 212.)

105 AV, 81, 3478/919; 12786/1919.

Hungary, and they were usually several months in arrears. On the other hand, the school property meant for the maintenance of schools was taken away from them, facilitating their falling under the state control.<sup>106</sup>

In March 1919, the Department for the Bačka, the Banat and Baranya (BBB) was founded in the Ministry of Education that determined, based on the pupils' mother-tongue, the language of instruction in each school and determined how many classes of Serbian language, geography and history would be taught, as well as, how many non-Serbian classes each school would have.<sup>107</sup> The »Order about temporary organization of all day care centers, elementary, economic and apprentice schools« was passed the same month, that introduced respective mother-tongues as languages of instruction, whereas classes previously foreseen for learning Hungarian were now used for learning respective mother-tongues.<sup>108</sup> Serbian children were forbidden to attend Hungarian schools if there was a Serbian school in the place they lived in.<sup>109</sup> However, if there was no appropriate school nearby, Serbian children had to go to a Hungarian one if they wanted to continue their education in the first after-war years.<sup>110</sup>

The main tendency of the educational policy in the Vojvodina was the reduction of the oversized Hungarian school system. The main winners at that, were the Serbs and other Slavs, and partly Germans, whom the authorities wanted to win over and separate from the Magyars.<sup>111</sup> With the aid from the Czechoslovak government, the Slovaks founded a private high-school in Bački Petrovac which came under the auspices of the state in 1920.<sup>112</sup> With the help of the People's Administration, the Germans retrieved in 1918/19 several previously magyarized primary schools, and during 1919/20 and later, burgher schools in Apatin, Odžaci, Bačka Palanka, Bela Crkva etc.<sup>113</sup> A private German burgher school was founded in Pančevo, and the school board in Novi Vrbas decided in 1920 that the originally German Evangelic high-school there, that had been magyarized, should

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106 Sajti, Hungarians, pp. 148-149.

107 Gligorijević, O nastavi, p. 58; Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 187. Sometimes there were parallel school managements: an old Hungarian head-master for Hungarian classes, and a new Serbian one for new Serbian classes. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 149.)

108 Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 10; Gligorijević, O nastavi, p. 58.

109 AV, 81, 463/1919; 10569/1919.

110 Thus for instance, the Sombor high-school opened no upper grades in 1919/20, so the Serbian pupils had to enroll in Hungarian classes. They, however, demanded not to learn the Hungarian language, literature and history, but corresponding Serbian subjects. (AV, 81, 7958/1920.) Similar cases occurred as late as the 1930s. (AV, 126/IV, 24908/30; AJ, 66, 4/9; VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 12.)

111 AV, 81, 561/1919; Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 11. However, this pro-German tendency was not universally accepted by all in the educational apparatus. The school inspector from Vršac, Lj. Jovanović, for instance, suggested that the authorities support the Magyars against the local nationally conscious Germans. (AV, 81, 11064/1919.)

112 ASANU, 14530/XIV 2; Bednárík, p. 57; Siracki, Mesto, p. 50. In 1934/35 this school had 248 pupils, and instruction was bilingual (Slovak and Serbian). (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.) After having given permission for the foundation of this private high-school, the educational authorities didn't fall over themselves in their forthcoming toward the Slovaks, who complained already in September 1921 of everyday irregularities and disparagement and that hundreds of petitions and complaints went unanswered. (AJ, 69, 62/98.)

113 J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, p. 37.

reintroduce instruction in German, from September 1 of that year. During the same year, German was introduced as the language of instruction in the local burgher school for girls there. The Germans founded a private high-school in Žombolj in autumn 1919, whereas in Vršac, Pančevo and Novi Sad they managed to have parallel German classes opened in the local high-schools.<sup>114</sup> The Germans managed to found primary schools in Syrmium, Slavonia and Bosnia – one in each region.<sup>115</sup> In spring 1919, the Germans in Timisoara, then under Serbian control, decided to found one burgher and one secondary school, and the Ministry of Education was willing to be forthcoming in that respect.<sup>116</sup> Until schools were put under state control, the educational authorities sometimes tolerated private schools founded by the Magyars in order to offset the loss of the schools taken away from under their control.<sup>117</sup>

The Hungarian school system couldn't be completely dismantled in 1919 because the peace treaty wasn't signed, but preparations were made to that end.<sup>118</sup> In mid-1919, the Department for the BBB of the Ministry of Education, worked out the "Basic principles for liquidation of elementary, secondary, professional and burgher schools in the BBB", which foresaw mandatory learning of the Serbian language,<sup>119</sup> history and geography in all schools, showing thus the main tendency of the plan. One to two burgher schools were envisaged for the national minorities. Teachers training colleges for members of the minorities were not foreseen, just minority classes in such Serbian schools. Confessional schools could survive only as private, if they could finance themselves. In order to reduce the number of Hungarian schools, children of various nationalities were to attend schools in their respective languages,<sup>120</sup> or in Serbian, and with the Magyars, the effects of the Magyarization in the first generation were regarded as non-existing. The plan was to be put to practice gradually over five years, and at the expense of the Hungarian state which was to take care of laid off and pensioned teachers. These premises became to a great degree, the basis of the minority educational policy.<sup>121</sup> This also laid the foundations of the name analysis (i.e. analysis of ancestry) at enrolling children in schools, in order to prevent children of Slavic descent from enrolling into Hungarian or German classes, in the last resort, with the wish that the number of pupils in these classes

114 AV, 81, 1113/1919; Plautz, p. 67; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, pp. 38-39; HWBGAD, I, pp. 339-340. The foundation of the high-school in Žombolj and the parallel classes in Vršac, were helped also by the Germans from the Romanian territory. (Kausch, p. 64.)

115 In Brezik (Slavonia), Klenak (Syrmium) and Pošinci (Bosnia). (Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 37.)

116 AV, 81, 1578/1919.

117 Thus for instance, the "Free School" in Subotica was allowed to function (under state supervision) throughout the 1919/20 school-year. (AV, 81, 191/1919.) Such schools received financial aid from Hungary, but that couldn't save the Hungarian school system from dying out. (Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 152.)

118 AV, 81, 2546/1919; Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, p. 61. At first the authorities had to make certain concessions, such as exemption from celebrating Serbian holidays, the right to have exams in Hungarian or sending bilingual official letters. (AV, 81, 11031/1919.)

119 Due to lack of teachers, this wasn't always easy to implement. (J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 44.)

120 In practice this tenet was often disregarded. (AV, 126/IV, 26346/30; 33958/30.)

121 AJ, 66 (pov.), 51/105; Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, p. 61; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, pp. 188-189; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, pp. 11, 65, 69.



would fall below the minimum prescribed by the law, so that they could be closed down.<sup>122</sup> Complaints about the name analysis (which was several times temporarily abolished – at least on paper, and for some minorities) would become stock in trade of the minority politicians when talking about educational matters.<sup>123</sup>

As we have seen, in Croatia, which after the Croatian-Hungarian compromise of 1868 had autonomy in school matters, the most developed minority education was Hungarian. It was almost thoroughly dismantled after the 1918 upheaval. The Croatian authorities abolished Julian and railway schools, together with libraries founded alongside them.<sup>124</sup> Hungarian communes were offered the possibility of supporting their schools by themselves, but they had neither the will nor the resources for that.<sup>125</sup> Despite this, a small number of Hungarian schools survived the first wave of shutting down.<sup>126</sup> Not very numerous German schools were also closed down, although in Syrmium only temporarily.<sup>127</sup> In Bosnia-Herzegovina minority schools in villages mostly survived the revolution – partly because bilingual

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122 AJ, 14, 27/71; AV, 81, 553/920; 496/920; 359/920; 599/920; 43312/30; 39862/30; 126 IV, 30533/930; 11240/30; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 66; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, pp. 193, 195, 202; Sajti, *Hungarians*, 151; Macartney *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 419. Proposals were also aired that inspectors be assigned to every primary school to determine the pupils' nationality. (AV, 81, 381/920.) The name analysis was not practiced only in Yugoslavia, but in Romania and Czechoslovakia too. (Cf. Gower, p. 43; Kolar, pp. 113, 115, 117; *Pétition présentée à la Société des Nations au sujet de la destitution*, p. 6.)

123 ASANU, 14530/XIV 2; *Neue Verschlechterung der Lage der deutschen Minderheit. Gegen einer offiziöser Darstellung dieser Lage, Nation und Staat*, VI, 2, 1932, pp. 106, 108; SBNS KJ, *Redovan saziv za 1932/33. godinu*, knj. III, Beograd 1933, p. 161; Amende (ed.), pp. 345, 369; Plautz, p. 71; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 102; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, pp. 179, 189. Under the Davidović government, the name analysis was mitigated. In the second half of 1925 it was abolished (except for Slovenia) by Velja Vukičević. In November 1927 it was abolished again for a short time by minister Kosta Kimanudi. (Grentup, pp. 241-242; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, pp. 167, 182, 204; Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 786; Pržić, p. 237; *Nation und Staat*, I, 2, 1927, pp. 116-117.) Minister of Education, Božidar Maksimović, ordered on August 3, 1929, that pupils in the Vojvodina be enrolled according to their mother-tongue and nationality. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.) Another order to stop analyzing names was issued by the minister of education on November 23, 1936. It turned out soon, it remained only on paper, because already in February next year Hungarian representatives complained again. (Mesaroš, *Mađari*, pp. 136, 147.) They repeated their complaint to Prime Minister Stojadinović in late April. (Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 134.) It is interesting to note that in 1930 a school strike occurred in Kočevje after 150 German children were enrolled in Slovenian classes. It stopped only after some 100 pupils were transferred to German classes. (PA, Abt. IIb, *Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik* 6, *Jugoslawien*, Bd. 5.) Some Hungarian associations also organized resistance to the name analysis, calling on parents to demand that their children be enrolled according to the mother-tongue. (AJ, 66, 4/10.)

124 Szita, p. 179.

125 Gujaš, p. 96.

126 They were so few, so that the educational authorities deemed inopportune to publish special schoolbooks for them. In November 1919 they wanted simply to take over the Hungarian textbooks from the Vojvodina for them. (AV, 81, 12786/1919.) According to a survey from 1920/21, there were nine Hungarian schools in Croatia (7 of them confessional). Furthermore, there were 16 German and 3 Slovak schools. (AJ, 66, 7/25.)

127 Altgayer, p. 9.

educating had been introduced already in 1910. However, the number of minority schools, especially German ones in towns, decreased, partly because of the departure of the German labour force.<sup>128</sup>

Probably the most dramatic change in the field of education coupled with the change of government happened in Slovenia.<sup>129</sup> Already on November 16, 1918, the People's Government introduced Slovenian as the sole language of instruction; German instruction was foreseen only for classes with at least "40 real Germans".<sup>130</sup> In the next three years, this led to closing down or turning into Slovenian of: 11 two-grade, 5 three-grade, 12 four-grade and 23 five-grade German primary schools. Only in 14 communes, parallel German classes in Slovenian primary schools survived. Furthermore, in Lower Styria, 19 "utraquist" (bilingual) schools were turned into Slovenian, and 20 private German primary schools (partly with day care centers) in Styria and 14 in Carniola were shut down. Slovenian was introduced as the language of instruction also in burgher and high-schools in Maribor, Celje, Ptuj, Kočevje, as well as in the six-year high-schools in Maribor and Ljubljana and in the teachers' training college in Maribor. Only in Ljubljana a six-year German high-school survived a few more years. As for German teachers, they were fired, and most of them emigrated to Austria.<sup>131</sup> Like in the Vojvodina, name analysis was soon introduced in order to reduce the number of German pupils only to the "real Germans".<sup>132</sup> Simultaneously with the reduction of the number of German schools in Slovenia, the number of Hungarian schools in Prekomurje was also reduced, so that 72 Slovenian, 18 Hungarian and 3 German primary schools operated there in 1920/21, and a small Slovenian high-school since 1919.<sup>133</sup>

The common feature of all measures of the (still not centralized) authorities in the Yugoslav provinces in the field of minority education during the first few years after the foundation of Yugoslavia, was (sometimes a drastic) reduction of schools teaching in the minority languages. Apart from members of the respective nationalities, these schools were attended also by members of other nationalities, the Serbs,

128 Hoffmann, p. 27; HWBGAD, I, p. 502.

129 In a way, this was symbolized by common internment of the head of the educational section for Carniola, Kaltenecker, together with the chief of the Ljubljana police, his deputy, president of the provincial court and several other officials on October 29/30, 1918. (Pleterski, p. 366.)

130 Andrej Vovko, *Nemško manjšinsko šolstvo na Slovenskem v obdobju stare Jugoslavije*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XL, 3, 1986, p. 311; Wutte, Lobmeyr, p. 58; Penič, p. 388; HWBGAD, III, p. 330; Dolenc, p. 26.

131 Dolenc, pp. 30-33; Vovko, pp. 318-319; Penič, p. 388; Suppan, *Zur Lage*, p.179; Josef Perz, Fritz Högl, *Das Schulwesen des Gottscheer Landes*, in: *Jubiläums-Festbuch*, p. 132; Wutte, Lobmeyr, pp. 59-62. In Kočevje 17 primary schools were shut down, and 17 became just classes of Slovenian schools, with Slovenian teachers. (HWBGAD, III, p. 76.) In the same work, on p. 79 it is claimed, there had been 33 primary schools in Kočevje until 1918, which makes abolishing of 17 and survival of 17 as classes impossible. Doris Kraft speaks about 101 closed German schools in Slovenia. (Kraft, p. 134.) At that, she adds up quite arbitrarily schools and classes. About the situation until May 1921 cf. the memo of the Slovenian Germans in: PA, Abt. IIb, *Deutschtum in Jugoslawien*, Politik 25, Bd. 1.

132 Suppan, *Zur Lage*, p.180; Vovko, pp. 313, 317.

133 Slavič, pp. 125-126. There were 25 Hungarian classes with 1.422 pupils in Prekomurje in 1929. (Zorn, *Dve poročili*, p. 93.)

Croats and Slovenes included. This held true particularly for German schools in Slovenia and Hungarian ones in the Vojvodina and Slavonia. The new authorities used that as a pretext to shut down as many minority schools as possible. That it was just a subterfuge was testified by the fact that schools attended only by members of the minorities were also shut down – for instance Albanian or Aromunian schools in “Southern Serbia.” Abolishing large number of minority schools, refusing, and evading the obligations of the Convention on Protection of Minorities in the Southern parts and the quoted plan for the reduction of Hungarian schools in the BBB, were the general guidelines of the school policy towards the minorities in the next 20-odd years. This policy had already been ushered in by the behaviour of the Serbian and Montenegrin authorities in the field of education in the newly conquered territories after the Balkan Wars.

What were then, the goals of the educational policy of the Yugoslav state toward the national minorities? Were they different, and could they be separated from the general goals of the educational policy? Could there be an educational policy during the inter-war period at all, with so many changes of governments and ministers of education? This last question asked Ljubodrag Dimić too, after having analyzed the budget of the Ministry of Education in the 1920s.<sup>134</sup> He points out frequent changes of ministers without a vision,<sup>135</sup> for whom, just like for the MPs in the Parliament, education was just a (small) chip in their mutual political haggling and skirmishing.<sup>136</sup> On the whole, there was no educational policy that would pursue the goal of spreading literacy among the population, elevating its civilization standards and adjusting the working force to the needs of the economy.<sup>137</sup> Until mid-1930s there was no permanent curriculum, whereas temporary ones in use were incomplete and unclear.<sup>138</sup> Nevertheless, in one segment of the primary and secondary education a guiding idea and a constant feature running like a red thread survived all changes of cabinets, ministers, parties and regimes. It was the ideology of the national and state unity which schools crammed into the heads of generations of pupils.<sup>139</sup> Its aim was to overcome the ethnic, confessional, cultural and other divisions the past centuries had left behind as heritage to the Yugoslav peoples. To be sure, such ideology met with the resistance of the peoples whose national consciousness was already mature.

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134 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, I, p. 102.

135 41 cabinets with 24 ministers of education (each of them being in office 8 months on the average) were changed between 1918 and 1941. (M. Mayer, p. 69.)

136 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, I, p. 214.

137 M. Mayer, p. 202.

138 AJ, 66, 7/16; M. Mayer, p. 73.

139 AV, 126/IV, 44326/30; ASANU, XIV 2; AJ, 66, 57/146; 56/140; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, I, pp. 88, 118, 233, 250, 262-263, 276, 281; *Ibid.*, II, pp. 135, 138-140, 154, 224; M. Meyer, pp. 60, 140, 202; Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, p. 65. Provincial school inspector of the Danube province, Živojin S. Đorđević, wrote in 1932: “The instruction in national subjects [i.e. official language, history, geography and civics] is in the center of every elementary school, and therefore of ours too; in the case of the national minorities, this is particularly true.” (AJ, 66, 7/16.) Svetozar Pribičević formulated that more blatantly: according to him, such policy was in state interest, and “everyone living in this state had to bow to such national character [of the educational policy].” (SBNS Kraljevine SHS, Redovan saziv za 1926/27, III, p. 382.)

Such ideologized instruction was imposed on members of the national minorities too – in the official language or in their mother tongues. At the same time, ministers of education usually stressed that the goal of the government's educational policy wasn't assimilation, but removing of the bad consequences of the Magyarization and Germanization.<sup>140</sup> However, this was only partly true. As we shall presently see, the restrictive educational policy was only for the smaller part leveled against the consequences of the Magyarization and Germanization. It pursued, if not assimilation (that proved impossible in many cases, anyway), than weakening of the national consciousness of members of the national minorities and keeping them in ignorance of their mother-tongue (for which the government didn't care much). On the other hand, instruction in the "state language", history,<sup>141</sup> and geography didn't yield the desired results, although ¼ or even 1/3 of the classes was foreseen for the "national subjects".<sup>142</sup> By imposing roughly the instruction in "national subjects" the authorities achieved an effect that ran opposite of the foreseen, reducing the desire to learn the "state language" even with the members of the minorities who had felt it for practical reasons.<sup>143</sup> Obviously, the Yugoslav authorities learned nothing from the minority policy of the old Hungary.<sup>144</sup>

Constituent part of the educational policy is the educational legislature. There were 37 various laws and orders concerning education in force in the territory of Yugoslavia at its founding. There were several draft bills of educational laws in the 1920s, and all of them contained stipulations about the education in the languages of the national minorities.<sup>145</sup> As in many other fields, Yugoslav politicians were not able to come to an agreement and pass unified school laws for the whole

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140 ASANU, 14530 XIV 2; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, I, p. 233. Among themselves, some lower officials saw exactly the assimilation as the goal of the educational policy. (AV, 126/IV, 29044/30.)

141 Teaching Hungarian history was forbidden in the Vojvodina right after the upheaval. (AV, 81, 816/920; 235/1920.) Soon teaching of Hungarian cultural history was abolished too. (Sajti, *Hungarians*, XXX, p. 146; ASANU, 14530 XIV 2; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, I, p. 233. Among themselves, some lower officials saw exactly the assimilation as the goal of the educational policy. (AV, 126/IV, 29044/30.) On the other hand, the historical image of the national minorities as imposed on their youths in schools, was quite a bad one. (Cf. Zoran Janjetović, *National Minorities and Non-Slav Neighbors in Serbian Textbooks*, *Internationale Schulbuchforschung/International Textbook Research*, XXIII, 2, 2001.) The Czechs and Slovaks were granted the privilege of learning the "Czechoslovak" history at schools from January 1928. (Gligorijević, *Politička istupanja*, p. 154.)

142 AJ, 66 (o.n.) F 74; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, II, pp. 135, 138, 154. In order to prevent members of the national minorities from negligent learning of the "state language" and national subjects, it was proposed to set up special commissions which would supervise the learning process. Punishment for negligent learning or bad marks in two national subjects was to be repetition of the same grade. (Ibid., I, p. 263; AV, 126/IV, 32207/30.)

143 AV, 81, 1709/1919; 126/IV, 27429/930.

144 The naïve belief that learning "national subjects" was the right way to awake loyalty, or even facilitate assimilation, was shared by the educational authorities of Bulgaria, Romania and Albania too during the inter-war period. (Höpkern, p. 233; Kolar, p. 118.)

145 In mid-1923 the minister of foreign affairs proposed that the stipulations about the national minorities be left out of the draft of the bill on primary schools, so that the government wouldn't tie its hands in this matter. He championed the solution of the minority question through bilateral agreements. (AJ, 66 (pov.) 7/25.)

country.<sup>146</sup> The last draft of the primary school law before the imposition of the dictatorship, was submitted by the minister of education Milan Grol in October 1928. It contained the same stipulations concerning national minorities as the draft submitted the year before, and it awoke great dissatisfaction on the part of representatives of national minorities and their mother countries. The German Party submitted on December 20 their alternative draft of that portion of the law concerning minority education, but due to the imposition of the dictatorship it was never discussed.<sup>147</sup> The HP considered petitioning the League of Nations in November 1928 because of the draft bill, but it was dissolved before it could fulfill this intention.<sup>148</sup>

The laws on primary, secondary and burgher schools dealt little with education of national minorities. It was yet another proof of the policy of neglecting national minorities pursued by the ruling circles. The Law on Primary School, promulgated on December 9, 1929, stipulated in the article 44 that the instruction would be imparted in the "state language". For members of national minorities founding of parallel classes of at least 30 pupils was foreseen,<sup>149</sup> or of at least 25, in special cases and with the approval of the minister. Curricula were to be as in the Yugoslav classes. Instruction was to be in the mother-tongue of the pupils, whereas the "state language" was to be a mandatory subject.<sup>150</sup> If there were several minority classes in one school, they could have a common head-master. The Yugoslavs had to attend Yugoslav classes if they were available, and members of minorities either Yugoslav classes or those of their own nationality, but in no case classes of another national minority. All teachers became state employees, and private schools were abolished – except for those opened under international agreements. The last mentioned stipulation was mitigated in article 164 that enabled the then existing schools to survive if they accommodated with the stipulations of this law.<sup>151</sup> The law provided also for

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146 Gligorijević, O nastavi, p. 77-79.

147 AJ, 80, 29/149; Der Minderheitenschulgesetzentwurf des deutschen Abgeordnetenklubs, Nation und Staat, II, 4, 1929, pp. 275-280; Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 719; Gligorijević, O nastavi, pp. 79-80; Plautz, pp. 76-77. The proposal of the GP foresaw separate minority schools in mother-tongue of the pupils with minority teachers. The "state language" would be taught from the third grade up, six classes a week. A special minority section would be opened in the Ministry of Education. Minorities would have to be given the right to found, fund and supervise private schools. In places with no state of private minority school, private lessons for up to ten pupils would have to be allowed. The Ministry of Education would have to take care of the textbooks for minority schools. (Plautz, pp. 77-78.)

148 Sajti, Hungarians, p. 127.

149 That limitation existed ever since the upheaval of 1918 (AV, 81, 670/1920.), and, being fixed by the law, it remained in force, except for the Banat Romanians after 1933, until the end of the inter-war period. (AV, 126/IV, 27609/940.) To tell the truth, the limitation was not always observed, so that in some cases classes with less than 30, or indeed less than 25 pupils, operated. (AV, 126/IV, 23676/31; 2121/931.)

150 Although the law granted the right to instruction in the mother-tongue, police pressure was sometimes put to bear on those parents who demanded what the law guaranteed them. (AV, 126/IV, 50220/30.)

151 The same held true for day care centers. In the Danube Province considerable number of day care centers were brought in accordance with legal requirements. (AV, 126/IV, 22685/931.)

the preparatory classes for members of national minorities, but they were not mandatory.<sup>152</sup> Laws on secondary schools (August 31, 1931) and on teachers training colleges (September 27, 1929) contained no stipulations about instruction in the languages of national minorities or about a possibility for opening private schools of these kinds, whereas the Law on Burgher Schools of December 5, 1931, explicitly foresaw immediate closure of the state minority burgher schools, and gradual closure of the private ones. At that, it was openly stated this was done because members of minorities "in the more cultured parts of our country" were more capable than the Yugoslavs who were being "ousted in all sectors of the economy". Members of minorities were to be educated in the "state-building spirit" through education in the "state language" in burgher schools.<sup>153</sup>

The school laws partly made legal the already existing practice, and partly made possible further reduction of the minority education.<sup>154</sup> This held true particularly for burgher schools that were initially seen as a convenient educational blind alley for members of minorities. Since attendance of these schools made further education impossible and since they, as practical schools, enjoyed considerable popularity in the former Habsburg territories, instruction of Serbian and respective minority languages with four classes a week each was introduced in them in 1920/21. In that way, the authorities wanted to discourage members of minorities from attending secondary schools or from studying at universities.<sup>155</sup> As for secondary schools and teachers training colleges, the authorities used the fact the Convention on Protection of Minorities didn't oblige them to grant these schools to members of minorities, so that they were not mentioned in the laws. In that way the government staved off any kind of obligation in that matter, without tying its hands for eventual concessions in the future. In that respect, the school laws from late 1920s and early 1930s remained in the tradition of the minority school policy pursued until then.

Let's see with what means the ruling circles tried to execute such educational policy. As we have seen, the means for that were partly tried already before the First World War. The creation of a multi-ethnic state made the situation more difficult, particularly since part of national minorities in the Northern parts of the country had very developed educational institutions. They were oversized to a large

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152 J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, pp. 88-89; Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, pp. 80-81. The Law on Primary Schools was the direct cause for the petition of Imre Prokopy to the League of Nations (Dimić, *Kulturna politike*, III, pp. 77-78.), and it also caused dissatisfaction in German diplomatic circles which were very preoccupied with the minority question in those years. (PA, Abt. IIb, *Unterrichtswesen*, Polirik 17, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.)

153 Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, p. 82. However, minority classes in burgher schools were reopened at the order of the minister of education in February 1932 (Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 82.), only to be closed again during the 1932/33 school-year. (J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 104.) This, as well as, some other examples to be adduced further, testifies that the Yugoslav governments didn't take laws too seriously and that chief factors at decision-making were potential political gains.

154 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 50.

155 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, II, p. 163. Nevertheless, in accordance with the general tendency of reduction of minority classes in all kinds of schools, the number of minority classes at burgher schools was gradually also diminished. Thus in the Danube Province in 1929/30 there were 15 and in 1930/31 only 5 Hungarian classes. At the same time, 12 new Yugoslav classes were opened. (ASANU, 14530 – II 7/20.)

extent, so the new authorities started reducing them. That trend was continued, especially toward the Germans in Slovenia, throughout the inter-war period. Thus, according to some German authors, only five parallel German classes in primary school remained in Kočevje by 1929.<sup>156</sup> However, this seems a bit exaggerated, since other authors adduce 25 classes for 1932,<sup>157</sup> and 16 for 1940/41,<sup>158</sup> although this testifies that the fall of the number of German classes was continuous.<sup>159</sup>

In the Vojvodina, putting schools under state control which had started already in autumn 1918 was continued just two days after the peace treaty with Hungary had been signed in Trianon, on June 6, 1920, when they were declared state institutions.<sup>160</sup> This meant, the state took over to pay the teachers (making them thus dependant of the government), whereas the communes were left to take care of school buildings and their material needs. On August 20, 1920 the Serbian law on primary schools of 1904 and the law on secondary schools of 1912 were extended to the Vojvodina.<sup>161</sup> On July 13, 1920, the Department of Education in Novi Sad made a new curriculum for secondary and professional school, which envisaged instruction only in Serbian. All schools would be either Serbian or shut down. Only in some places parallel minority classes could survive. The decision of the School Board of Novi Vrbas about turning the local Hungarian high school into a German one was approved; in Bela Crkva Hungarian classes were shut down and Serbian ones opened; the Hungarian high school in Senta survived, but was brought under state control and the first and second grade in Serbian were opened; in Subotica Hungarian classes were temporarily retained; the eight-grade high school that the Germans had founded in Žombolj survived, but was reduced to a four-grade school; the Slovak private high school in Bački Petrovac was brought under state control, and 3<sup>rd</sup> and

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156 Schemtisch, p. 23. It is not to be ruled out, that in this case only the town of Kočevje is meant, for which Vovko adduces only six parallel German classes in 1930/31. For the whole of Slovenia he adduces 54 classes with 1.841 pupils. (Vovko, p. 316.)

157 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 700. In 1928 there were 27 German classes in Kočevje. (Idem, Zur Lage, p. 203.)

158 Gottschee, 13 Jahre, p. 71. According to the authors of this publication, there were 51 classes in that year, with 903 and 1.521 German children. (Ibid.)

159 Vovko adduces 18 German classes in 14 schools with 700 pupils in 1940/41. (Vovko, pp. 316-317.)

160 Gligorijević, O nastavi, p. 61; J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, p. 50. It is not known if proclamation of this measure was made on purpose immediately after the official, internationally recognized separation of the Vojvodina from Hungary and its unification with Yugoslavia, but it is certain that that move was planned in advance. The only minority with schools officially represented in the Parliament, the Slovaks, submitted through their MP Štefanke, a complaint of the Bačka Evangelical Seniorat of August 24, 1920, in which it was demanded that Slovak schools remain under the control of the Slovak Evangelical Church. The authorities never deigned to answer this petition. (J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, p. 55.)

161 Ammende (ed.), p. 368; Gligorijević, O nastavi, p. 61; Isić, p. 42. The goal was to put almost the whole school system under state control and to make it impossible for private schools to awake national consciousness of minorities. (ASANU, XIV 2.) The state schools used the buildings of communal and confessional school until March 1928, partly paying rent. (Vereš (ed.), p. 89.) On March 16, 1928 the minister of education Milan Grol ordered to register them as state property, what was effectively a confiscation. (J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, p. 77.)

4<sup>th</sup> grade were opened. Hungarian state burgher schools in Kula, Odžaci and Topola were closed down, and those in Kovin, Novi Sad, Palanka, Turski Bečej, Novi Bečej and Titel were merged with Serbian secondary or burgher schools.

Instead of minority secondary, professional and burgher schools, parallel minority classes in Hungarian were opened in Sombor, Novi Sad and Pančevo, and in German in Vršac. The possibility of opening few more in other places was left open, provided there were at least 20 pupils in upper, and at least 30 in lower grades. As for teachers members of national minorities, they could be employed if they were qualified and if they spoke Serbian – to learn it they were given two years.<sup>162</sup> All Serbian and Montenegrin textbooks were approved for use, whereas those from the Vojvodina needed the approval of the Main Educational Council. The textbooks for minorities were to be written according to the same curriculum as the Serbian ones, and they needed the approval of the Ministry of Education.<sup>163</sup> On October 1, all minority burgher schools were shut down in places where a Serbian counterpart existed, and in them parallel minority classes were opened if there were at least 30 pupils. It was precisely determined which burgher schools could survive and where. On September 20 it was ordered that Serbian and minority schools follow the same curriculum. The Serbian language was to be taught from the third grade onwards, until the conditions were met for it to be taught from the first grade up.<sup>164</sup> What is striking, is that despite the larger benevolence toward the Swabians, as compared to the Hungarians, after the reduction of secondary and burgher schools, more of these schools for the Magyars than for the Germans survived. Furthermore, schools or parallel classes for Slavic minorities were not mentioned, except the six-grade high school in Bački Petrovac. Apparently, it was not that easy for the educational authorities to slash the oversized Hungarian schools and to open new ones, or classes for members of other minorities. Most likely, the lack of cadres, and of good will were at play. Besides, it was easier to move in the rut and to retain at least some of the Hungarian schools, i.e. classes.

Interesting was the fate of the six-year high school the Germans had opened in Žombolj. It enjoyed no public status right to the end of the 1919/20 school-year,<sup>165</sup> when its further operation forbidden by a wired order of the Ministry of education containing no explanation. The delegation of the commune went to Belgrade to complain, to be informed that only state schools could operate. The delegation invoked the existence of the Serbian school autonomy in Austria-Hungary,<sup>166</sup> but was told that Serbian confessional schools were also put under state auspices.<sup>167</sup> The Swabian delegation then proposed that the school survive, even as a state-run one. The

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162 The head-master of the high school in Vršac, Marčetić, suggested just one year in March 1920. (AV, 81, 385/1919.)

163 There were very few minority schoolbooks during the inter-war period. (Cf. Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 379.)

164 Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, pp. 61-64.

165 AV, 81, 8014/920.

166 It was adduced as a model already in a memo that representatives of the German minority submitted to the then Prime Minister Protić in January 1919. (J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 34.) The German representatives kept adducing the example of the Serbian ecclesiastical and educational autonomy as their declared aim.

167 This was correct from the formal point of view. However, with the creation of Yugoslavia they had lost their reason for being.



Ministry of Education accepted this, but only if the eight-grade German high school became just the division of the four-grade Serbian high school that would be opened; the commune of Žombolj would have to board and lodge 20 Serbian war orphans who would attend the school. Having no alternative, the Germans accepted.<sup>168</sup> Obviously, it was pressure to “strengthen the Serbiandom” on the Romanian border. This can be concluded from several other cases where schools were to strengthen the Yugoslav character and the population in “nationally endangered”, usually border areas.<sup>169</sup>

Similar fate to that of the high school in Žombolj, had the one in Novi Vrbas, which became an eighth-grade division of the four-grade Serbian high school in Srbobran.<sup>170</sup> On July 14, 1921 minister of education Pribičević ordered closure of the first grades of the minority's secondary and burgher schools, with the subterfuge, that they were not mentioned in the Constitution. The intercession of the Kulturbund managed to prevent this, but in the years that followed Hungarian and German classes in these schools were shut down.<sup>171</sup> In 1922, at the instigation of the Serbian head-master, the German high school in Vršac was closed down.<sup>172</sup> However, parallel lower classes for the Swabians were opened in the Novi Sad and Pačevo high schools in 1921/22.<sup>173</sup> After Žombolj was ceded to Romania in 1923, the pupils and the teachers of the local high school were transferred to Vršac, where the German upper classes were reopened.<sup>174</sup> However, they were shut down, together with the German upper classes in the high schools in Novi Sad, Pančevo and Novi Vrbas in February 1925.<sup>175</sup> It is not improbable that this was the government's revenge that the

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168 Plautz writes about the obligation to take 20 Serbian pupils. (Plautz, p. 69.) The same is affirmed by Kausch (p. 69) and in the HWBGAD, I, p. 283. Senz speaks about 40 orphans. (J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 58.)

169 The Prime Minister appealed with the minister of the interior on October 25, 1928, to improve the high school in Debar, so as to prevent the Albanian youth from going to schools to Albania. (AJ, 66, 57/145.) It was shut down nevertheless, so that a delegation of the local inhabitants asked in late August 1932 that it be reopened – for national reasons. (AJ, 74, 56/140.) The school inspector Lj. Jovanović championed having a Serbian head-master and a Czech teacher in ethnically mixed Središte on the Romanian border. (AV, 81, 2310/919.) Slovenian national organizations from Kočevje demanded in 1937 reopening of the 5th and 6th grades of the local high school in order to lift the depressed national spirit of the local Slovenes. (AJ, 37, 47/305.) Similar ideas were championed by the chief of the Department of Education of the Vardar Province in 1933 in regard to the Albanians, for whom schools were to be built in order to parry the schools that Albania was building with Italian help along the border. (AJ, 66 (o.n.), F. 88.)

170 J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 59; HWBGAD, I, 340.

171 AJ, Zbirka Ljube Davidovića, 323/76; Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, p. 68; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 60.

172 PA, Abt. IIb, *Unterrichtswesen, Politik* 17, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1. The same head-master, Marčetić, had accused the local Germans of being Pan-Germans, already two years before. (AV, 81, 421/1920.) The official excuse for closing the school was that the pupils were leaving it without adequate knowledge of the “state language”. (Margan (ed.), p. 384.)

173 J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 59; HWBGAD, I, 340.

174 The Germans in the Vojvodina had 561 classes with 26.091 pupils in 193 schools in 1923/24, which was significantly more than in 1917/18. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 717.)

175 J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 60; Margan (ed.), p. 382; Scherer, p. 30.

German Party joined the opposition,<sup>176</sup> although this measure certainly tallied nicely with the general tendency to reduce the minority education. This can also be discerned from the fact that in the Vršac high school, the parallel classes of the 4<sup>th</sup>, and then the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> grades were gradually abolished between 1926 and 1929. Contemporary authors explained this by insufficient knowledge of Serbian the German pupils had acquired in the lower grades, which allegedly prevented them from following the instruction in the upper grades which was in Serbian. According to these authors, it was necessary to enable the Germans to learn the “state language”, because “not only would it be necessary for them in their future life, but they would in that way best come to love this beautiful land of ours, they would come better to know and make contacts with their Serbian fellow-pupils, which would last them also when they have grown up.”<sup>177</sup>

The fate of the Hungarian secondary and vocational schools was similar: in March 1923, by a decree of the Ministry of Education, it was decided that Hungarian secondary schools could remain only in Senta, Veliki Bečkerek and Subotica. The Jews, who were often the main agents of Hungarian language and culture in the Vojvodina, were forbidden from enrolling in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> grade, because it was desired to channel the Jewish youth into Serbian schools.<sup>178</sup>

As for primary schools, they operated in the language of the pupils: for members of minorities separate classes were opened if there were 60 pupils, i.e. 55 in two classes, or 45 in three or more. The Serbian language, history and geography were mandatory subjects in minority classes too. The generally restrictive tendency was only partly mitigated in the attitude toward members of some Slavic minorities. Thus the Ruthenians managed to have the Ruthenian primary schools opened in some Ruthenian places, or places with larger number of Ruthenians (Kucura, Stari Vrbas, Đurđevo, Ruski Krstur, Mikloševci, Petrovci.) This was more easily achieved in the Bačka than in Syrmium. Although Ruthenian schools existed in some places, Ruthenian parents who wanted their children to continue their education, preferred to send them to primary schools in the “state language”. There were some 70 such Ruthenians who attended secondary schools and universities during the inter-war period.<sup>179</sup> There were 43 Slovak classes in Yugoslavia in the early 1930s, in former Slovak confessional primary schools which had been turned into state ones, as well as the already mentioned high school in Bački Petrovac.<sup>180</sup> The Czechs in Croatia were also granted a larger number of schools in their mother-tongue for the first

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176 Cf. the previous chapter.

177 Margan (ed.), p. 385.

178 Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, p. 69. Until the end of the first World War the Jews were mostly educated in Hungarian, and partly in German schools. (AV, 81, 2158/919.) Since July 1928 they were again allowed to attend Hungarian and German schools. (AJ, 305, 9/19.) The facilities for education of members of the national minorities in their mother-tongues in 1929 existed only in the Slovak high school in Bački Petrovac, Hungarian parallel classes in Subotica and Senta (1st to 8th grade) and in Veliki Bečkerek, whereas the Germans had only an eight-grade high school in Novi Vrbas. (ASANU, 14530/XIV 2.)

179 Biljnja, pp. 52-54; Risto Jeremić, *Bački Rusi* (Rušnjaci, Rusini), Novi Sad 1928, p. 9.

180 The upper grades in the Slovak high school were abolished in 1932, but due to the uproar in the Czechoslovak public, they were soon reopened. (Jugoslovenski dnevnik, August 9, 1932.)

time.<sup>181</sup> As for the Poles and Ruthenians in Bosnia, they remained practically without schools, subject to quiet assimilation.<sup>182</sup>

The order of the minister of education Svetozar Pribićević of June 18, 1925, that primary schools were to be in the "state language" and that for members of minorities, if they numbered more than 30, parallel classes from the 1<sup>st</sup> through 4<sup>th</sup> grade could be opened, served further "nationalization" of education. Instruction in minority classes was to be in the mother-tongue of the pupils, with the exception of the "national subjects." If there were less than 30 pupils in one class, and more than 30 in the whole school, several classes could be combined, on condition that the total number didn't surpass 50. If there were not enough pupils of a given national minority, the class would be shut down.<sup>183</sup> As we have seen, these principles had been mostly introduced right after the upheaval, and they mainly remained in force throughout the inter-war period. Soon after this decree, followed the name analysis that had to reduce the number of minority classes.<sup>184</sup> It too,

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181 In 1931 there were 7 private Czech schools supported by the Czechoslovak government, as well as 8 parallel Czech state schools. (AJ, 66, 7/16; Lenard, narodne manjine, p. 733; Gligorijević, Politička istupanja, p. 155.) Apart from that, there were supplementary courses for Czech children from Croatian schools. (Lenard, Narodne manjine, p. 733.) The teachers of these schools came from Czechoslovakia at first, but later on there were increasingly more Czechs from Yugoslavia among them. Between 1927 and 1930 the Czechs also had a two-years agricultural school which worked at first in Veliki Zdenci, and then in Daruvar. (EJ, 3, p. 265; Lenard, Narodne manjine, p. 733.) Czech schools were visited by representatives of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Education, and their Yugoslav opposite numbers were lending them a helping hand in that. (AV, 126/IV, 18525/31.) In the late 1930s, however, the situation changed: several Czech classes were shut down, and several teaching posts remained vacant. (AJ, 66, 71/186.) Some explained this by the fact the Czechs didn't support the government, but the gradual cooling of relations with Czechoslovakia which accompanied Yugoslavia's rapprochement with Germany, probably also played a part.

182 Burda, p. 188; Drljača, Marija Dombrovska, p. 142. After the Yugoslav-Polish agreement in May 1933, the Poles were permitted to hold 22 village courses. (Ibid., p. 146.) Drljača mentions teachers and priests from Poland too, but it seems these were just exceptions. (Drljača, Kolonizacija, p. 55.) On the other hand, Lenard claims, the Poles never asked for instruction in their mother-tongue. (Lenard, Narodne manjine u SHS, p. 731.) Bosnian Ruthenians demanded of the authorities schools in their mother-tongue, but they were granted nothing except promises and permissions for several literacy courses. (Strehaljuk, p. 82.)

183 Gligorijević, O nastavi, p. 70.

184 Ibid. Several orders and instructions which modified it were issued, but they didn't change its meaning and its goal. Thus in 1922 it was ordered that father's nationality would be decisive at enrolment, whereas in most cases the educational authorities were to decide. In such cases, forthcoming was to be shown to non-Hungarian mothers trying to save their children from Magyarization. In 1925 it was ordered that children whose parents spoke even a little bit of the "state language" attend classes in that language or preparatory classes. In early August 1929 the Ministry of Education ordered that the Germans, Hungarians and Romanians be enrolled according to their mother-tongue and nationality, whereas pupils of Yugoslav nationality were to be enrolled into Yugoslav classes. It was forbidden that pupils of one national minority attend classes of another. (Gligorijević, O nastavi, p. 71.) Clearly this measure was aimed at the Hungarians whose schools enjoyed greatest prestige from before 1918, but it affected members of all

despite occasional abolishing and less vigorous implementation, remained a constant feature of the Yugoslav educational policy towards national minorities.

In that context, there was another constant feature of the Yugoslav educational policy towards minorities. It was limitation or even prevention of the Yugoslav citizens of minority origin to attend secondary schools or universities in their mother countries, with which the relations usually weren't good.<sup>185</sup> The Yugoslav authorities feared, and not without reason too, minority students would be infected with separatist, irredentist, revisionist and other nationalist ideas in their mother countries, which would be harmful for the Yugoslav state and national unity.<sup>186</sup> In that respect members of minorities were visibly discriminated against,

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minorities. (AV, 126/IV, 18503/931.) The proof that other nationalities were treated no better is the order from 1930 that children from mixed Romanian-Serbian marriages be enrolled into classes in the "state language". (AV, 126/IV, 8864/30.)

- 185 AJ, 66 (pov.), 60/159; 51/105; 66, 57/145; HWBGAD, I, p. 284; Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 197, 204, 210-211; Popi, Rumuni, pp. 98, 117-118; Wutte, Lobmeyr, p. 62; Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, pp. 69-70, 93-94, 112, 123-124; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 421. According to an estimate of the Yugoslav authorities there were some 1.500 students from Yugoslavia in Budapest, only 100-odd of them with valid documents. (AJ, 14, 159/555; 144/501.) Between 1927 and 1931 87 students went to study in Hungary legally, and 39 were refused permission. (Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 70.) For the 1927/1930 period Mesaroš adduces 81 (mostly Hungarians) who were granted permission and 59 who weren't. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 373.) According to Suppan, there were 284 German students in Yugoslavia, with approximately the same number studying in Germany and Austria, where some of them had ties with Pan-German circles. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 724.) According to the information of the military intelligence service, some 1.000 Albanians from Yugoslavia were at schools in Albania in 1937. (Dimić, Prosvetna politika, III, p. 124.) The authorities frowned at this already in the 1920s. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 57/145.) As for the Romanian students, in the government circles the opinion prevailed it wasn't that dangerous to let them study in Romania, since most of them never came back from there. In the mid-1920s, some 200 Yugoslav citizens were studying in Romania – most of them without permission of the Yugoslav authorities. (Popi, Rumuni, pp. 117-121.) Separatist tendencies were ascribed to the Association of the Romanian Students in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. (Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 112.) In 1931 a group of theology students in Caransebeş founded the Ring of the Romanian Orthodox Theologians from the Yugoslav Banat. (Popi, Rumuni, pp. 117-121.) (This society too testifies to the make-up of the Romanian intelligentsia in Yugoslavia.)

- 186 This fear had solid grounds in the information the Yugoslav authorities had about the number, dispersion and activities of organizations adverse to Yugoslavia's integrity. Thus for instance, the number (some 10.000!) and omnipresence of irredentist organizations in Hungary was a well known fact. (C.A. Macartney, October Fifteenth. A History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945, I, Edinburgh 1957, pp. 29-34.) Among them, the Yugoslav authorities were particularly worried by the student almost para-military organization Karhatalom of which almost all students in Hungary were members, which not only indoctrinated them ideologically, but at certain junctures took over rather concrete security tasks – such as at the attempt of return of the ex-king Charles. Furthermore, the irredentist students' oath at Hungarian universities, their intelligence activities etc. awoke mistrust of the Yugoslav government. (AJ, 14, 124/444; 98/385; 99/386; 217/771; 96/383; 159/555; 211/756; 129/468; 130/469; 164/596; 120/432; 135/479; 66 (pov.), 60/157; 60/159.) In order to combat this mistrust, the Hungarian authorities cautioned the returning students to be restrained. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 151.) The majority of students from Yugoslavia went

as compared to the Yugoslavs who were free to study wherever they chose.<sup>187</sup> Gradually increasing number of members of national minorities (especially the Germans and Magyars) enrolled in Yugoslav universities,<sup>188</sup> where their student associations existed, which were not always politically impeccable in the eyes of the authorities.<sup>189</sup>

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to Hungarian universities illegally. As for German and Austrian universities, they were steeped in nationalism already before the First World War, whereas during the inter-war period the Nazis managed to gain the predominant influence on students in both countries rather quickly. We have seen that the "Renewers" brought their ideas from there to Yugoslavia. The universities in Germany were made to toe the line in 1933, so that studying at them became potentially even more nefarious to Yugoslav interests, as the authorities noticed the Volksdeutsche students were spreading "Hitlerism" in their homeland over holidays. (AJ, 14, 27/71; Zbirka Cincar-Markovića, fas. II; 66 (pov.), 70/183; 38, 48/106; Grunberger, pp. 335-341; Mosse, pp. 193, 254, 268, 271.) Although a friendly and allied country, Romania had a very strong nationalist intelligentsia among which refugees from Yugoslavia (the Romanians from the Banat, Vlachs from Serbia and Aromuns from Macedonia) were often among the most vehement. The Yugoslav authorities feared studying at Romanian universities and staying in such environment could also inspire the young Romanians from Yugoslavia with nationalist ideas. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/185.) Although it had no universities, Albania opened several boarding secondary schools alongside the border with Yugoslavia to which it enticed pupils from across the frontier. The Albanians from Yugoslavia were raised in irredentist spirit in them. (AJ, 66, 7/17; 57/145; 22/51; 72/187.) Some of them continued their education in higher Albanian schools, or, thanks to grants, went to study in Italy which was rather unfriendly towards Yugoslavia. Many schooled in Albania remained there, permeating its institutions with irredentist and anti-Yugoslav spirit. (AJ, 66, 7/17; 66 (pov.) 57/145.) The banus of the Vardar Province complained in 1936 that permissions to attend schools in Turkey were being given too lightly, this being at variance with state interests, because the students and pupils allegedly imbibed enemy propaganda there. (AJ, 66, 79/221.)

187 To be sure, members of minorities could much more easily obtain permission to study in countries which were not their mother-countries.

188 The proportion of minority students at the Belgrade University 1929-1941 lagged behind their share in the total population: the Hungarians were 1.06%, Germans 1.68% and others 1.23% of the students. (Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 360.) The number of German students at Yugoslav universities increased only from 371 to 382 between 1931/32 and 1937/38. The reason was that, despite the obstacles, greater part of the Volksdeutsche still studied in Germany and Austria. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 703.)

189 Already in 1922 the Ukrainian Student Society of some 20 members, separated from the Academic Society "Domagoj". (Biljnja, Rusini, p. 55.) Germans students of the Zagreb University founded in 1925 the Association of German Students (Vereinigung deutscher Hochschüler) which had a house of its own. In Belgrade the Volksdeutsche students had the association Suevia which started as an alimentary community, only to obtain its own house with social rooms, kitchen and lodging for 30 students in 1933. (J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, pp. 110-111.) These associations were transmitters of Nazi ideas in the late 1930s. (VA, pop. 17, k. 95b, f. 6, 9, 19; Hrvatski državni arhiv (henceforth: HDA) grupa XI, kut. 28, inv. br. 2881, SB, ODZ, 5793/1939.) Apart from them, there were several other German students' associations in smaller places. (HWBGAD, I, 284, 341.) On the make-up of the Volksdeutsche students in Yugoslavia in the 1930s, cf.: Kosier, pp. 141-142. It should be stressed that considerable part of the Volksdeutsche students received scholarships from the leadership of the Kulturbund, that, in principle, had to be

What was the situation of one of the two key links within the framework of such a minority educational policy, namely of minority teachers? It followed to the largest degree the development of minority education. At the time Yugoslavia had been founded, the Hungarian education in the historical Hungary and the German one in Slovenia were oversized. Accordingly, there was a discrepancy in the number of Hungarian teachers (among whom there were many magyarized Germans and others) in the Vojvodina and German ones in Slovenia on the one hand, and the number of minority or Yugoslav teachers on the other. This disparity started changing fast through the large exodus – willing and coercive – of German and Hungarian teachers. The Romanian national minority, which had had satisfactory number of teachers in Romanian schools,<sup>190</sup> also suffered losses in the process,<sup>191</sup> which it managed to partly offset only in the second half of the 1930s. As for other nationalities in the Northern parts of the country, they (including the Yugoslav ones) all suffered from lack of the teaching staff. This shortage was gradually alleviated during the inter-war period, but it was never completely rectified: lack of teaching personnel existed throughout Yugoslavia and it couldn't be removed for financial reasons.<sup>192</sup> It was coupled with lack of minority teachers<sup>193</sup> that was only partly due to lack of money with the ministry of education.

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paid back. (AJ, 38, 403/554.) As for the Hungarians, between 1931/32 and 1939/40, on average 349 students of Yugoslav citizenship and Magyar mother-tongue studied on Yugoslav universities annually. (Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 81.) It can be surmised with certainty that some Jews were also among them. The Hungarian students of the Belgrade University founded in June 1933 the Cultural and Literal Association Bolyai Farkas that developed a lively activity, remaining in correct relations with the authorities. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 380.) On the other hand, part of the Hungarian students in Zagreb, united since February 1932 in the Cultural Association of Hungarian Students in Zagreb (Zagrebi Magyar Egyetemi Hallgatól Kultúregesület), made connections with extreme Croatian nationalists, the Frankovci in the second half of the 1930s. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 374.) Sajti reckons some 500 Hungarians graduated from Yugoslav universities 1918-1941. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 154.) Marmullaku's claim the Albanians couldn't attend schools above the primary one, is not correct. (Marmullaku, p. 141.) On the eve of the Second World War, between 70 and 80 Albanians were studying at the Belgrade University. They were united in the Association Kosovo. However, it seems very few Albanians actually graduated from Yugoslav universities during the inter-war period. (Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 132.) There was also the association of Albanian students Besa at the Belgrade University in the late 1930s which was in contact with the Albanian Embassy and which spread irredentist propaganda. (Avramovski, Prilog, pp. 136-137.) The Italian propaganda also managed to win some Albanians, students of the Belgrade University in the second half of the 1930s. (Milutin Folić, Akcija studenata Kosova za prava albanskog naroda u periodu 1937-1941, Kosovo, 8, 1970, p. 53.)

190 AV, 81, 217/920. There were 105 Romanian teachers in the territory of the Yugoslav Banat before the First World War. (Popi, Rumuni, p. 93.)

191 After the exodus and expulsion of some Romanian teachers, only 32 of them remained in Yugoslavia. (Popi, Formiranje, p. 317; Idem, Rumuni, pp. 49, 93.) Only 30 out of 90 teachers in Romanian classes spoke Romanian in October 1926. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 57/146.) The Foreign Ministry pleaded with the Ministry of Education in October 1926 and March 1927 to open a Romanian class in some of the Vojvodina teachers training colleges in order to overcome lack of Romanian teachers. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 57/146.)

192 M. Mayer, pp. 107-110.

193 AV, 126/IV, 20048/931; Ammende (ed.), pp. 344, 347; Lenard, Narodne manjine, p. 733. Officially, 143 Yugoslav, 43 Hungarian, 33 German 11 Slovak and 5 Romanian teachers

The other main reason was the wish of the educational authorities to keep the number of minority teachers low. To that end, enrolment of minority candidates into teachers training colleges was made difficult,<sup>194</sup> whereas permissions to found minority teachers colleges or minority classes in Yugoslav ones, were granted only with difficulty and usually under pressure of foreign policy factors.<sup>195</sup> As we have seen, the Yugoslav authorities wanted to raise members of the national minorities in the spirit of national and state unity and to impose on them learning of the "state language", deeming in that way even if they didn't cause assimilation of the national minorities, they would develop their love for Yugoslavia.<sup>196</sup> They believed this could be better achieved if instruction for minorities was imparted by teachers of Yugoslav nationalities.<sup>197</sup> The second best solution was employing young minority teachers who were educated in Yugoslav teachers training colleges.<sup>198</sup>

Since there were not enough Yugoslav teachers for minority classes on the one hand, and since many minority teachers remained in the state territory (especially in the Vojvodina) even after the exodus, on the other, the latter had to be retained in service. Furthermore, massive firing of minority teachers would be difficult to bring in accordance with the obligations from the Convention on Protection of Minorities and would give the country bad name in European public opinion.

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lacked in the Danube Province in 1931. (AV, 126 IV, 1676/931.) However, this doesn't mean this reflected the true educational needs: the list referred only to the number of vacant working places. In its remarks to the petition to the League of Nations of the three émigré Albanian priests from 1930, the Yugoslav government adduced total lack of Albanian teachers as reason why there were no Albanian classes. (AJ, 305, 8/18.)

194 J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, pp. 64-65; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 204. Among the students of the Vršac teachers training college in 1930, there were 264 Yugoslavs, 5 Czechoslovaks, 46 Germans, 7 Hungarians, 8 Romanians and 6 others. (AV, 126/IV, 44326/30.) In the Novi Sad teachers training college, there were 204 Yugoslavs, 14 Czechoslovaks, 13 Germans and 6 Hungarians in October 1930. (AV, 126/IV, 44362/30.)

195 Unlike other minorities, the Czechoslovak Union was permitted in 1928 to hold teachers courses in order to at least partly alleviate lack of teachers. (Lenard, *Narodne manjine*, 733; *Narodna jednota*, May 23, 1931.) These teachers (mostly Yugoslavs and Russians!) were to remain in service until adequate replacements were found (AV, 126/IV, 4156/931.), although some of them hadn't even finished high school. (AV, 126/IV, 4156/31.) Furthermore, 20 Slovak and 7 Czech teachers from Yugoslavia attended a course in Czechoslovakia. (*Narodna jednota*, May 21, 1932.)

196 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, II, p. 50. Just how absurd this notion is, was noticed by one of the initiators, and later one of the first critics of Hungarian nationalism, count Istvan Szechenyi who picturesquely said that the moving of the tongue was not the same as heartbeat. In 1930 the Serbian language curriculum for Hungarian classes was only slightly less extensive than that for Serbian classes. (AV, 126/IV, 27323/30.)

197 AJ, 66 (pov.), 57/146; Gligorijević, *O nastavi*, p. 73; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 198. However, some Yugoslav teachers were not equal to the task they had been given, so they came under influence of the minority environment in which they worked. (AJ, 66, 99/283; AV, 126/IV, 13581/931.)

198 AV, 126/IV, 20048/931; Gligorijević, *Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija*, 99. After considerable part of the pre-war minority teachers had been sacked or retired, most of minority teachers received favourable marks from their supervisors. German teachers (who were even better educated than their Yugoslav opposite numbers) received the best marks, whereas the Romanian ones were given the worst. (AJ, 66 (s.n.) F. 7; F. 75; F. 73; 14, 27/71.)

Therefore the Yugoslav authorities vacillated, torn between the desire to reduce the number of minority teachers and the need to keep at least the minimum of them, necessary both for minority classes and the statistics.<sup>199</sup> The means with which the undesired were to be removed were exams in the “state language”, because the authorities were guided by the idea that knowledge of the language was a kind of statement of loyalty.<sup>200</sup> In 1922 programmes and rules for such exams for secondary school teachers were made. The exams yielded poor results, so they had to be repeated in 1926, and finally in 1928, after which 85 Hungarian teachers lost their jobs.<sup>201</sup> It would, however be fair to say that the authorities showed an unexpected leniency by tolerating throughout the years a considerable number of minority teachers who hadn’t learnt the “state language”.<sup>202</sup> Above all these were older teachers who in their old age had neither the will nor the capability to learn the new official language, so that the number of minority teachers who spoke no “state language”

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- 199 In March 1927 the Foreign Ministry interceded with the minister of education to open one parallel Hungarian class at one of the Serbian teachers training colleges, so that the question of the new generation of Hungarian teachers wouldn’t come before the League of Nations. The Ministry of Education answered this wouldn’t be in the state interest, and that it would be preferable to capacitate Serbian teachers to work in minority classes. (Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 206-207.)
- 200 One month (sic!) Serbian language courses for minority teachers were organized in Subotica in October 1919. (AV, 81, 6016/1919.) A head of section in the Ministry of Education stated in mid-1934 that those minority teachers who spoke the “state language” had success in their work with children, unlike those who didn’t speak it. (AJ, 66, 7/25.) It is not to be excluded that he, like many school inspectors, wasn’t able to control instruction in minority languages and that he checked only knowledge of the “national subjects”. He accused teachers alongside the Northern border of secretly working for Hungary.
- 201 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 719; G. Nikolić, p. 213. According to some information from the Ministry of Education from 1929, 165 German and Hungarian teachers were discharged because they didn’t speak the “state language”. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4.) According to others, 114 Hungarian, 43 German and 6 Romanian teachers were dismissed. (Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933, p. 403.) Some representatives of the Hungarian minority complained to the League of Nations about this. (Pétition présenté à la Société des Nations au sujet de la destitution, p. 6; Gligorijević, O nastavi, pp. 73-74.) In its reply to the complaint, the Yugoslav government stated not a single teacher was sacked in 1928 because he didn’t speak the official language, and that those who had been fired earlier, could be readmitted into service if they learn the “state language” in the meantime. (ASANU, 14530-II 6/15.) Teachers had to take exams in official languages in other countries too. So for instance, German exams were organized for the teachers of the Burgenland Croats in Burgenland in 1923/24. (Bela Schreiner, Das Schicksal der Burgenländischen Kroaten durch 450 Jahre/Sudbina Gradišćanskih Hrvata kroz 450 ljet, Eisenstadt s.a., p. 49.)
- 202 These were often transferred for punishment to “Southern Serbia” to learn Serbian (sic!). (Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 719.) In its reply to the Hungarian petition to the League of Nations, the Yugoslav Ministry of Education denied this, saying “such a thing couldn’t be justified either by the needs of the service, or from the pedagogical point of view.” (ASANU, 14530-II 6/15.) However, cases of transfer into purely Slavic parts did occur. (AV, 126/IV, 13574/931.) Nevertheless, Sajti claims the Yugoslav educational authorities treated old Hungarian and German teachers more humanely than the Romanian ones. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 146.)



remained high even after 1929.<sup>203</sup> It is not to be excluded that some of them considered it beneath them to learn it. Apart from the language exams, from early April 1929 the revision of qualifications of all secondary school teachers who had graduated in Hungary and other revisionist countries started.<sup>204</sup> This was in keeping with the tougher policy toward minority teachers after the imposition of the dictatorship and was, among other things, reflected in the retirement of 114 Hungarian, 93 German and 6 Romanian teachers after the Law on Primary Schools had been passed.<sup>205</sup> In early June of the same year, some 500 Albanian religious teachers who used to teach in Turkish, were also sacked, because of incapability, as officially explained.<sup>206</sup>

Together with the exodus, difficulties at enrollment into teachers training colleges, but also small interest of members of national minorities to be educated in a language that wasn't their native one for a poorly paid teaching profession,<sup>207</sup> lack of minority teachers in parallel minority classes was aggravated by unemployment of part of educated minority teachers, as well as by the fact that the Ministry of Education often posted minority teachers in Yugoslav classes, whereas Yugoslav teachers who spoke no or only little language of their pupils, were often employed in minority classes.<sup>208</sup> Representatives of national minorities kept complaining about such phenomena throughout the inter-war period.<sup>209</sup>

However the above-described problems concerned primarily the Northern, economically and culturally more developed parts of the Kingdom. In the South, the

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203 AJ, 66, 4/11; 66 (pov.), 57/146; 16/41. Similar examples occurred in the following years too. (AV, 126/IV, 23117/30; 42346/30; 2201/31; 1128/939.) On the other hand the Ministry of Education demanded of the teachers of the "national subjects" and headmasters of schools with minority classes to "understand at least to a certain extent respective minority languages." (AJ, 66 (pov.), 57/146.)

204 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, I, p. 254.

205 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, pp. 50-51. According to other data, 108 Hungarian teachers were fired in autumn 1929. (Ammende (ed.), p. 370.) The fact that no Albanians and Turks were among them seems to imply that under 53 Albanian and 26 Turkish teachers mentioned in the official publication *Yugoslavie d'aujourd'hui* (p. 85.) Serbian teachers working in classes attended by members of these two minorities should be understood, since it is hard to believe that the teachers from these two minorities would have had so superior a knowledge of the »state language« as compared to their colleagues from the Northern parts of the country.

206 Avramovski, *Britanci*, I, p. 604.

207 J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 39; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 197.

208 AV, 126/IV, 24806/931; 13574/931; 17001/931; 5369/31; 5368/31; 9069/30; 22708/940; SBNS Kraljevine SHS, *Redovan saziv 1926/27*, III, pp. 377-378; *Ibid.* za 1931/32, knj. III, Beograd 1932, p. 221; SB Senata KJ za 1933, I, pp. 211-212; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 204; *Idem*, *Mađari*, pp. 375-376; Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, pp. 708, 719; HWBGAD, III, p. 76. Margan excuses this solely by lack of minority teachers. (Margan (ed.), pp. 383-384.) In Kočevje this was indeed the reason, although the authorities in Ljubljana must have been glad that it was so. (Grothe, pp. 180-182.) In a school in Ruma in 1931 there were 17 German and 9 Serbian classes but all teachers were Yugoslavs. (AV, 126/IV, 14278/931.) In the German school in that town there were 10 German and 5 Yugoslav teachers. (AV, 126/IV, 10001/31.) Furthermore, there was uneconomic employment of Yugoslav teachers who spoke some minority language (usually Hungarian). (ASANU, II/9/15.)

209 According to Hungarian data, there were 1.832 Hungarian teachers in the Yugoslav territory in 1914, 650 in 1923, and just 250 in 1940. (Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 153.)

situation was different, concerning development of the school network, number of teachers<sup>210</sup> and unwillingness of the population to send children to school.<sup>211</sup> On the other hand, the goals of the educational policy were the same there too. Indeed, since significant part of the educational effort of the state in “Southern Serbia” was aimed at assimilation of the Macedonians, the authorities could hope for greater success in the long run, than was the case in territories predominantly inhabited by ethnically thoroughly alien population.

As for the Albanian and Turkish population, educational policy towards them comparatively quickly changed from assimilation to conscious and deliberate benighting.<sup>212</sup> The reason was the realistic estimate the Albanians couldn’t be assimilated, but it was desired to make at least good Yugoslav patriots out of their youth.<sup>213</sup> This policy was typical of the 1920s; in the 1930s, greater stress was put on ousting the Albanians, and within the framework of such a policy, school was just an additional means of pressure which had to spur them to emigrate.<sup>214</sup>

Just like in party politics, the ruling circles wanted to strengthen their positions and those of the young state in the South in educational policy too, through the elite that had influence on Muslim masses. Whereas an “alliance of the elites” (the old Muslim and the new Christian ones) was the goal in the field of pure politics, in the educational policy, the goal was to educate the new spiritual elite – well educated but raised in the Yugoslav spirit and loyal to the regime. This was the more necessary, since 73 private madrasas in the Southern parts not only held instruction in a language that wasn’t that of the state,<sup>215</sup> but their teachers (muftis) were illiterate in the “state language”, and to boot, of “limited school knowledge according to modern needs”, and their instruction wasn’t in keeping with the state interests.<sup>216</sup> In order to educate the loyal Muslim elite, the Great Madrasa of King Alexander I, was founded in Skopje in 1925. It was conceived as a kind of a classical high school for Muslims, where, apart from religious, secular subjects would be taught too.<sup>217</sup> A school thus conceived met with the resistance on part of the conservative Muslim intelligentsia, but also of part of Albanian politicians.<sup>218</sup> They agitated saying the school wasn’t

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210 There were 195 Muslim teachers in the Vardar Province in 1935/36, this being 6.42% of the teaching staff. (ASANU, 14530-II 7/5.)

211 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, II, p. 114; *Ibid.*, III, p. 120.

212 AJ, (o.n.), F. 88; Pirraku, *Kulturno-prosvetni pokret*, pp. 358, 360; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, pp. 122-123; Vickers, p. 103. It is less than unlikely that the idea of solving educational question through a reciprocal agreement with Albania was seriously meant – keeping in mind the overall policy of the Yugoslav state toward the Albanian minority within its borders, and towards the Slavic minorities in Albania. (On the idea of reciprocity cf.: Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 252.)

213 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 110.

214 AJ, 37, 51/315; VA, pop. 17, k. 69, f. 4, d. 2.

215 The assertion of the three émigré Albanian Roman-Catholic priests in their petition to the League of Nations from 1930, that khojas imparted religious instruction for the Albanians in Serbian wasn’t true. (AJ, 305, 8/18.)

216 AJ, 63, 137/x 1923; Rebac, p. 659; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 131; Idem, *Činjenice*, p. 160. Due to their low pedagogical level, it was decided in 1927 to abolish 68 of them, whereas others were reformed in accordance with modern spirit. (Jovanović, *Turci*, pp. 143-144.)

217 AJ, 63, 137/x 123.

218 Dogo, *Kosovo*, p. 293.

Islamic enough, and that Bosnian teachers, who formed part of the staff, would "Serbianize" the pupils.<sup>219</sup> The instruction, apart from religious subjects taught in Turkish and Arabic, was in Serbian, the learning of which was one of the main goals of the school. However, the language barrier was one of the main reasons that throughout the time the madrasa operated, Albanian and Turkish pupils were a minority.<sup>220</sup> This was also the reason that the majority of the drop-outs came from these two nationalities. In that way, Slavic Muslims profited more by the Great Madrasa than members of the national minorities (which also corresponded with the government's intentions). What certainly didn't correspond with the intentions of the founders of the school and the educational authorities was the fact the Great Madrasa became a hotbed of communism instead of the bulwark of loyalism, so that it didn't fulfill its basic mission: the new Muslim elite loyal to the government wasn't created, although several important intellectuals came out of its ranks.<sup>221</sup>

Some of the major problems of the education of the Muslims from "Southern Serbia" - both Slavic and non-Slavic - made themselves manifest in the Great Madrasa. One of the hindrances for their education was religious suspicion: the Muslims were reluctant to go to state schools, because they perceived the state as Christian, and they considered secular school as a threat to their faith. They were particularly reluctant to send female children to school.<sup>222</sup> The language barrier played its part with the Albanians and Turks. Furthermore, conservatism of the majority of peasants, especially of the culturally backward ones, wasn't conducive to education of their progeny.<sup>223</sup> Muslims were 11.2% of the population of "Southern Serbia" in 1931, but their children formed just 5.1% of the pupils. (The percentage of Orthodox pupils corresponded to their share in the total population, and that of the Roman-Catholics even surpassed it.)<sup>224</sup> On the other hand, almost all Muslim children from

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219 AJ, 69, 9/21. This was in accordance with the general aversion of the Southern Muslims towards their better educated Bosnian brethren. (Rebac, p. 659.)

220 The Albanians were 34.6% and the Turks 5.2% of the pupils. (Memić, p. 42.)

221 Jašar Redžepagić, *Velika mederesa u Skoplju 1925-1941*, Zbornik za historiju školstva i prosvjete, 4, 1968; Memić, *Velika medresa*; Idem, *Učenici Velike medrese u revoluciji*, Novopazarski zbornik, VI, 1982; Pirraku, *Kulturno-prosvetni pokret*, pp. 361-362.

222 Until mid-1930s Muslim girls were not taken to schools, and Serbian girls also avoided school in high degree. (AJ, 66, 100/296; 14, 177/653; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, I, pp. 76, 86, 88, 120; Jovanović, *Turci*, p. 144.)

223 M. Mayer, pp. 191-192; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, II, p. 92; AJ, 66, 100/296. This phenomenon could be discerned also among peasants of Serbian nationality. (Isić, pp. 302-330.) The authorities punished that offence only mildly. It is interesting to note that attendance was worse in the Sandžak than in Kosovo and Metohija. (Ibid., p. 324.)

224 M. Mayer, p. 196. Dimić claims it was estimated the Albanians were 7-8% of all pupils in the Vardar Province and 29% of the population. (Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, 129; Idem, *Prosvetna politika*, p. 193.) In 1924/25 there were 246 classes in Southern parts, attended by 14.415 Muslim pupils. In 1927/28 there were 7.423 Muslim boys and 232 girls in state schools in the South. (Dimić, *Prosvetna politika*, p. 193.) According to the remarks of the Yugoslav government which answered the petition to the League of Nations by three emigré Albanian priests, there were 1.401 primary schools in "Southern Serbia" in 1930. Out of that 261 schools with 545 classes were attended by the Albanians. (AJ, 305, 8/18.) According to Roux, 25.000 Serbian and 12.000 Albanian children were attending schools in 1940/41, i.e. 75% of the Serbian children went to school, and 10% of the Albanian ones. (Roux, p. 208.) On the other hand, there were 536 primary

their fifth year of age up, attended siban mektebs that were a kind of religious courses attended by numerous children of different ages. The authorities mostly tolerated these institutions, but sometimes they were shut down.<sup>225</sup> It is interesting to note that they experienced a veritable boom in the years of the dictatorship 1931-1934. By tolerating mektebs, the state wanted to atone for a lack of Muslim schools, and for the Albanian population to acquire the basic education in the mother-tongue, denied by the state.<sup>226</sup> For its part, the state educational policy which strove to unify the population, imposing often alien, mostly Serbian traditions,<sup>227</sup> and in a language that a great part of the minority population, especially in the South, didn't understand, neither could achieve the set objectives,<sup>228</sup> nor could it contribute to raising the cultural level of the population, not to mention capacitating it for work in a more modern economy.<sup>229</sup> School inspectors were primarily interested in the headway in

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schools (out of that 470 were one-grade schools) in Albania in 1926/27, with 803 teachers and 26.612 pupils. (Schmidt-Neke, p. 150.) It means the number of schools for the Albanians was somewhat more than twice lower in Yugoslavia than in Albania, but the number of pupils was three to four times lower. There were 626 primary schools and day care centers with 51.251 pupils and 1.195 teachers in 1937. This means every 18th Albanian went to school or day care center. (Ibid., p. 263.) Somewhat larger numbers feature in a report of the Yugoslav Interior Ministry from May 1938. (AJ, 66, 108/344.) These impressive figures, however, don't tell us how many children actually went to school, how long and how frequently and in which parts of Albania. (It should be supposed that, like in many other things, regional differences were great in this respect too, and that attendance was better in the more civilized Southern part, than in the Northern mountains.) However, the fact that 90% of the population in Albania were illiterate, proves the impressive results were mainly achieved in the field of statistics. (Schmidt-Neke, p. 272.)

- 225 Roux, p. 207. The MP Husejin Mašić complained in the Parliament in 1922 that many mektebs in the Southern parts were closed down because their premises were confiscated for state primary schools or government agencies. Because of that, allegedly 1.000 Muslim children remained without instruction, since the then existing mektebs could accommodate only 400 children. (SBNS Kraljevine SHS, Redovan saziv za 1921/22. godinu, knj. V, Beograd 1922, pp. 754-755.)
- 226 Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, pp. 129-130; Idem, Prosvetna politika, p. 194. However, the Muslims of "Southern Serbia" were not particularly enamored with school and admonishing of the Islamic Religious Community to that effect didn't manage to alleviate their aversion. (AJ, 14, 177/653; Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 120; Idem, Prosvetna politika, p. 151.) According to a report of the Main General Staff, the Albanians gladly attended religious schools, but avoided the state ones. (AJ, 66, 7/17.) In the petition of the three Albanian emigré priests from 1931 it is claimed the Albanians attended schools on the Yugoslav average (although the kind of schools – confessional or state – was not specified), and objective reasons that the attendance wasn't better are adduced. (AJ, 305, 9/18.) However, it is the fact that in the early 1930s 6 illegal private religious Muslim schools existed, and in the village of Trnovce near Bujanovac, a primary school in Albanian also operated. (AJ, 66 (o.n.), F. 87.)
- 227 Minority classes worked according to Serbian curricula. (J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, p. 72.)
- 228 According to a report from February 1938, Albanian émigrés and khojas managed to supplant Yugoslav teachers. (VA, pop. 17, k. 90, f. 1, d. 4.)
- 229 Martin Mayer noticed that although 90% of the schools in 1925/26 were in villages, their curricula were tailored for town needs. (M.Mayer, p. 124.)

learning of the "national subjects",<sup>230</sup> which testifies that the education of members of minorities was even more unsatisfactory than was that of members of the majority peoples.<sup>231</sup>

The first influence of the introduction of the dictatorship on minority education was restrictive. The school legislation was unified, but due to principal prohibition of private schools, it left little room for minority education, self-initiative and educational self-help on part of members of minorities.<sup>232</sup> At the same time, it only strengthened the wish of certain national minorities to achieve cultural and educational autonomy. This idea wasn't new: it was espoused practically from the foundation of Yugoslavia particularly by the Germans, who took the Serbian ecclesiastical and educational autonomy in the historical Hungary as the model.<sup>233</sup> Their representatives expounded the idea on many occasions in the Parliament, in talks with representatives of the government, at international conferences and in Yugoslav and foreign press.<sup>234</sup> Basically, the idea was also acceptable for other minorities,<sup>235</sup> and it also had many adherents in the circles of minority representatives in Europe.<sup>236</sup> We have seen that the Czechs managed to make use of the goodwill of the state to open several private schools with the aid of their mother country. However, what the Czechs, were allowed to do, other minorities weren't. The educational authorities strove, by strict adhering to the rules, to make more difficult, and if possible, to prevent the activities even of those few surviving private minority schools. The Slovaks

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230 AJ, 66, 7/16; 14, 27/71; SBNS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1932/33, III, p. 162; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, 73; HWBGAD, I, p. 340. It was only in 1940 that the effort was made in the Danube Province to find school inspectors with knowledge of minority languages. (AV, 126/IV, 22708/940.)

231 For poor educational results parents were also responsible, since they used their children for work instead of sending them to school. This happened both in the more developed parts of the country and in the Southern ones. (AV, 81, 0397/20.) It is interesting that attendance in the Danube Province was the worst in its part comprising Northern Serbia. (ASANU, 1953-II 7/19.) Particularly averse to schools were the Muslims, although this started to change in the 1930s, especially in the case of secondary schools and universities. (VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 1, d. 16.)

232 The impossibility of opening private schools was most consequently obeyed in the case of national minorities. They for their part, tried to circumvent it in a number of ways. So, apart from the already mentioned mektebs, several clandestine Hungarian schools were operating in the Vojvodina in 1930, under the guise of instruction during the school holidays. (AJ, 14, 227/819.)

233 Plautz, pp. 70, 72, 76; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 34. A concrete plan for German school autonomy from May 1919 see in: Michael Kausch, *Schicksalswende im Leben des Banater deutschen Volkes. Das Ringen um Rückeroberung der völkischen Gesinnung und der nationalen Güter*, Temeschburg 1939, p. 69.

234 ASANU, 14530/XIV 2; AJ, 80, 29/149; PA Abt. IIb Nationalitätenfrage, *Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien*, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2 and 3; SBNS Kraljevine SHS, Redovan saziv za 1926/27, knj. III, Beograd 1927, pp. 376-377; SBNS KJ, II redovan saziv za 1936/37. godinu, knj. II, Beograd 1937, p. 761; Morocutti, p. 81; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 17; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, pp. 81-82.

235 Hungarian representatives aired similar demands. (Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 73.) The expert for international law on minorities, Dr. Fedor Nikić even considered the Hungarians the main champions of that concept. (Fedor Nikić, *Manjinske i privatne škole i naša prosvetna politika*, Letopis Matice srpske, knj. 320, sv. 3, 1929, p. 404.)

236 J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, pp. 65-66.

tried in vain to retain control of their confessional schools. As for the Magyars, having lost their numerous communal, confessional, private and state schools, they strove to improve their education within the narrow boundaries prescribed by the state. In the last resort, they too were in favor of cultural autonomy. But being more under pressure than the Germans and, disunited and weak at the same time, they realistically didn't push the matter to the front burner, although they were not renouncing the idea either. For members of the Albanian minority, the school was never a first class question. Although the members of the Cemiyet demanded religious and educational autonomy already at their founding congress,<sup>237</sup> and raised the question on several occasions later on, it was more of a political marketing:<sup>238</sup> Albanian masses for their part, didn't show much interest in the development of Albanian education.<sup>239</sup> For them, the questions of agrarian reform, of the *kaçaks*, of arming or disarming or of emigration to Turkey were more important. Furthermore, since the Cemiyet was to all intents suppressed, there was no organization that would articulate such demands.<sup>240</sup> The Turks had a certain number of schools until they were abolished on August 23, 1920,<sup>241</sup> and the number of Turkish population gradually decreased. Those who remained in the country made their peace with the regime such as it was (including its educational policy), without showing much initiative in any field.<sup>242</sup>

It may be said that the main direction of the development of minority education in the inter-war Yugoslavia was determined in the first half of the 1920s. Until the mid-1920s most of the schools were brought under state control and a large number of minority schools or classes were terminated. This trend was most

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237 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 81. Members of the Cemiyet usually championed Muslim religious schools in Turkish until 1924. Only in 1924 did they ask for Albanian schools too.

238 AJ, 66, 22/51; Hrabak, JMO, p. 157; Idem, *Džemijet*, pp. 90, 135, 206, 229, 289, 306; Jovanović, *Turci*, p. 147; Pirraku, *Kulturno-prosvetni pokret*, p. 363. One MP of the Cemiyet even proposed during the drafting of the Constitution, that the supreme law should guarantee the right of the Turks and Albanians to education in their mother-tongue. (Hrabak, JMO, p. 160.)

239 In the remarks of the Yugoslav government to the Petition to the League of Nations by the three émigré Albanian priests, it is said the Albanians never asked for schools in their mother-tongue. (AJ, 305, 8/18.) The same is claimed in the report of the administration of the Vardar Province from 1930. However, a little further in the same report, it is said the Albanians demanded Albanian teachers several times. (AJ, 38, 64/169.) The same was claimed by the Yugoslav vice-consul in Albania in 1924. (AJ, 66, 57/145.) The chief of the Education Department of the Vardar Province wrote in 1933 that it seemed the Albanians held school in higher esteem than did the Christians, and that they gladly educated their children. (AJ, 66 (o.n.), F. 88.) This shows that the Albanians were not completely disinterested in schools, but they had lower priority for them than for the minorities in the Northern parts of the country. This can be concluded from public speeches and political talks of representatives of various minorities with government officials.

240 The claim of Sinan Hasani that the Albanians became outlaws en masse because they were deprived of education in their mother-tongue, is absurd. (Hasani, p. 73.)

241 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 128. Certainly it was not by chance that the order to close down these schools was signed by the then minister of education Svetozar Pribićević.

242 The Yugoslav authorities construed this lack of any initiative as loyalty. (Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, II, p. 110.)

vigorously continued in Slovenia, following the numerical decrease of the German minority in that province. However, in other parts of the country, certain changes in the field of education of certain minorities occurred. This was true above all of the German and Romanian minorities, and only to a small degree of the Hungarian one. In the case of the Volksdeutsche, it was an indirect influence of the gradual change in the orientation of the country's foreign policy. In the case of the Romanians, the perceptible improvement came about as a result of the most direct influence of foreign factors, whereas a moderate and inconsequent improvement of the educational situation of the Magyars was the result of a combination of factors of domestic and foreign policy.

Although negotiations with Romania on regulation of minority education on both sides of the border had been going on already in the 1920s, the first minority (the numerically insignificant Italians excluded) which experienced a (mild) improvement of its educational (and coupled with it of its overall) situation, were the Germans. However, even for them the improvement came neither quickly and easily, nor was it equally felt in all parts of the country where they lived.<sup>243</sup>

The great economic depression taught the king and the government that in the field of economic aid, nothing was to be expected from the traditional political friends France and Czechoslovakia. Because of that, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, a gradual turning toward Germany began, which would culminate some ten years later, under quite changed foreign political circumstances, by accession of Yugoslavia to the Tripartite Pact. As one of the factors which, in the opinion of the German diplomacy, hindered any rapprochement, was the position of the German minority in Yugoslavia.<sup>244</sup> In order to remove this hurdle, that was enlarged by very unfavorable reception with which the Yugoslav Law on Primary Schools met in Germany, the Yugoslav government decided to grant the Volksdeutsche certain concessions in the field of education.<sup>245</sup> Thus the minister of education Boža Marinković signed a decree on September 1, 1930 which enabled the Germans to enroll their children into schools based on the parents' statement and the language spoken in the family. Enrolment was to be made through parity commissions composed of parents and representatives of the educational authorities, and the moot cases would be solved by the minister of education. Under this decree the Volksdeutsche were exempted from article 45 (paragraph III) of the Law on Primary Schools, which enabled them to start learning the "state language" only from the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade onward, and not from the 1<sup>st</sup>. Furthermore, German teachers were allowed to organize literacy courses and to teach the "state language" under government supervision. It was allowed that the language of instruction in the first two grades of the higher primary

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243 In the field of education it was hardly felt at all in Slovenia.

244 PA, Abt. IIb Politische Beziehungen Jugoslawien und Deutschland, Politik 2, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3. Since 1929, the year when Germany particularly started championing the interests of the Volksdeutsche in Europe, the question of the German minority would become one of the main ones in the relations with Yugoslavia during the next few years. (Höpfner, pp. 157, 319.)

245 ASANU, II9/15; Das Schicksal, p. 26E; Höpfner, p. 320. Among other things, by giving school concessions the Yugoslav government wanted to forestall the Volksdeutsche petition to the League of Nations. (Höpfner, p. 322.) As a herald of concessions and a gesture of goodwill in the field of education, reinstallment of certain number of dismissed German teachers could be interpreted. (AJ, 66, 2/5)

school be German,<sup>246</sup> private day care centers were permitted, and preparatory classes foreseen by article 5 of the Law on Primary Schools, were no longer mandatory for the Germans.<sup>247</sup> In the last part of this decree, foundation of a private German teachers training college was permitted.<sup>248</sup>

It was typical that the Volksdeutsche learned of this decree from foreign press:<sup>249</sup> the Yugoslav authorities had great fear of precedent in minority policy, i.e. that concessions given to one minority would be demanded also by others.<sup>250</sup> To be sure, this fear wasn't groundless. As for the decree on German education, it remained no secret for members of other national minorities, and indeed they asked on several occasions for what the Germans had been granted.<sup>251</sup> Since the decree was promulgated, the development of the German education accelerated somewhat, but it never went smoothly.<sup>252</sup> The greatest and most direct improvement was felt in the

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246 The "national subjects" were in the "state language" (AV, 126/IV, 10695/31; 12979/31.), although several exceptions also occurred (such as in Nemačka Crnja in 1931). (AV, 126/IV, 25075/31.)

247 AV, 126/IV, 23427/931.

248 AJ, F. 398, f. 1; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, pp. 26-27; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, pp. 95, 218; Pržić, pp. 237-238; Vovko, pp. 314-315.

249 J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 95. The leading German newspaper in Yugoslavia, the *Deutsches Volksblatt*, published the decree only on January 23, 1931. (*Pester Lloyd*, February 14, 1931.)

250 This reason was adduced by the foreign minister Marinković, to the German ambassadors Köster in November 1929 and to von Heeren on May 28, 1930. (Höpfner, p. 320; PA, Abt. IIb, *Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik* 6, *Jugoslawien*, Bd. 5.) The argument that the Hungarians and other minorities, and indeed the Germans in Croatia and Slovenia couldn't be granted the same as the Germans in the Vojvodina, was championed as late as 1939 by the chief of the Educational Department of the administration of the Danube Province, Milan Petrović: "Every concession given to the local Germans in those parts would be interpreted by national extremists among the Croats and Slovenes, as an attack on Croatian and Slovenian interests." (AJ, 14, 27/71.)

251 AV, 126/IV, 13414/939; AJ, 14, 27/71; *Deutsches Volksblatt*, July 9, 1931; Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 191. Czech and Slovak teachers demanded on a conference in Novi Sad in early March 1932, "German privileges" for the Czechs and Slovaks, expressing dissatisfaction that the Germans were given more than the Slavs "whom one should trust more because of the blood and heart." (AJ, 66, 7/16.) The Czechs and Slovaks aired the same demands already in mid-1931. (AJ, 66, 6/13.) There were also cases of Hungarians enrolling into German classes – doubtless with the wish to learn German, which as it seemed, again offered large opportunities for business and employment. (AV, 126/IV, 17860/931.) However, the authorities tried to prevent this. (AV, 126/IV, 17197/31; 9779/31.)

252 Thus for instance a decree of April 3, 1933 reintroduced learning of the "state language" from the 1st grade, but it was withdrawn on August 25, 1934 because of the protests of the Volksdeutsche representatives. (Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 29.) In 1933 instruction in the "state language" was introduced from the 1st grade, but it was abolished in September of the same year. For a while the decree on the way of enrolment of the Volksdeutsche children was suspended. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 788.) On January 23, 1931 a German day care center in Novi Sad was shut down, and several others which failed to accommodate to the law were also threatened with closure. (AV, 126/IV, 2916/31; 25978/931.) The press in Germany and Austria protested at slow and inconsequent realization of the school concessions. (*Kreuz-Zeitung*, December 25, 1930; *Freie Stimmen*, December 23, 1930; *Berliner Tagblatt*, October 1, 1930.) Among other things, analysis of names at enrolment of pupils occurred here and there too. (SB Senata



Vojvodina where a number of parallel German classes was opened already in 1930/31 and where the educational authorities did their best to find the necessary teachers who spoke German.<sup>253</sup> Stronger resistance to opening of German classes occurred particularly in Slovenia and Croatia.<sup>254</sup> Whereas the Slovenian educational authorities managed to hold on to their restrictive school policy until the Second World War,<sup>255</sup> considerable part of the Germans in Croatia started to awake nationally, demanding opening of German classes.<sup>256</sup> For this reason, the largest number of new classes was opened in Slavonia and Syrmium, although the process was coupled with resistance on part of Croatian and croatized teachers and priests, pressure of the local authorities, and even conflicts within communes.<sup>257</sup>

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KJ, Redovan saziv za 1933, I, p. 211; PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5; Neue Verschlechterung, Deutsche Zeitung, Julz 3, 1932.) Complaints about obstruction on part of the lower civil servants and about lack of language skills on part of teachers continued. (SB Senata KJ, Redovan saziv za 1937/38. godinu, knj. I, Beograd 1938, p. 190.)

- 253 AV, 126/IV, 3105/31; 10909/31; 17001/31; 10113/31; 2511/31; 2512/31; 2513/31; 2519/31; 2520/31; 2523/31; 2789/31; 3505/31; 3869/31; 9560/31; 5221/31; 5150/31; 13914/31; 13913/31; 12980/31; 22565/931; 46471/930; 44407/30; 45762/930; 3964/931; 15194/931; 15461/931; 3841/31; 3105/31. It is not clear if the comparatively high number of German head-masters (six in the district of Bačka Palanka) mentioned in a document from 1931, was connected with the school concessions the Volksdeutsche had been granted. (AV, 126/IV, 17860/31.) The same goes for the intention to remove those teachers who spoke no German from German classes. (AV, 126/IV, 9594/31.) On the other hand, closing down of German classes occurred as late as 1940, even in the Vojvodina. (AV, 126/IV, 50011/940; 34177/938; 47107/938; 29392/938; 72807/938; 14278/931.)
- 254 Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, pp. 27-28, 34; Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors, p. 416; J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, p. 91; Suppan, Zur Lage, pp. 206-207; Frei Stimmen, May 28, 1931; Tagespost, May 25, 1931; Deutsche Zeitung, February 5, 1931; Tagespost, February 11, 1931; Berliner Tagblatt, February 13, 1931; Hamburger Nachrichten, March 1, 1931; Koroška domovina, May 1, 1931. The improvement in education was felt only slightly in Bosnia too. (AIDGL, HA 1327.)
- 255 Despite the improvements in the Vojvodina and in Slavonia and despite the increasingly closer ties with the German Reich during the second half of the 1930s, the number of German classes continued to decrease in Slovenia. (Vovko, pp. 316, 320.) According to the Slovenian data on February 1, 1938, the Germans in Slovenia had 30 parallel classes (22 in Kočevje) with 1.238 pupils, whereas 894 German pupils had no instruction in their mother-tongue. (Suppan, Zur Lage, p. 233.) Already by October 1939 only 24 German classes with 926 pupils were left. (ASANU, 14530-II9.) Not even the pro-German Prime Minister Dr. Milan Stojadinović wanted to oppose his Slovenian interior minister Dr. Anton Korošec in this matter. (Ibid., pp. 222-223; HWBGAD, III, pp. 77, 80.) Due to continuous oppressive policy in Slovenia, part of the German parents lost confidence in German classes, i.e. they feared their children would not learn enough Slovenian in them. (Deutsche Zeitung, June 26, 1932.)
- 256 According to the senator Rožič, 58 German classes were opened in places where they hadn't existed previously in Croatia in 1931 alone. (Biber, Nacizem, p. 88; Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 34.) Immediately after the Law on Primary schools was passed, 97 demands for German classes were submitted in Slavonia and Croatia. The authorities answered by procrastination and name analysis. (J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, p. 89.)
- 257 ASANU, 14530-II/10; J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, p. 91; Geiger, Nijemci u Đakovu, p. 77; Mariborer Zeitung, March 12, 1932.

The greatest gain for the German national minority was the permission to set up a private teachers training college. Its founder was to be the German School Foundation (*Deutsche Schulstiftung*), to the founding of which the authorities acceded already on May 15, 1929.<sup>258</sup> The Foundation was started in late June 1931<sup>259</sup> after several months of money-raising action which the *Volksdeutsche* press followed from day to day and furthered. Over 3 million dinars were collected.<sup>260</sup> The main goal of the Foundation was establishing and maintaining of the German private teachers training college, which started operating on October 11, 1931 in Veliki Bečkerek, in the building of the cloister of sisters of Notre Dame. After two years of work, the college was transferred to Novi Vrbas.<sup>261</sup> In early October of the same year the approval for a private German burgher school in the same town was obtained.<sup>262</sup> These were the important achievements of the German national minority which other minorities looked at with envy.<sup>263</sup> In the second half of the 1930s the German private teachers training college became, in the eyes of Serbian observers, the hot-bed of Nazi propaganda.<sup>264</sup> Despite this, it continued operating until the end of the inter-war Yugoslavia. The German educational system continued to develop in the following years, although resistance on part of the local authorities was often considerable. Obstacles were occasionally made by the Ministry of Education too, but the rise of the Third Reich, the increasing dependence of Yugoslavia on it, and finally the fall of the main Yugoslav ally, France, in 1940, enabled the development of German education, which although it fell short of the (ever growing) *Volksdeutsche* desires, surpassed by far anything other minorities had. Thus, the Yugoslav Germans were allowed in autumn of 1940 to found private high schools in Novi Vrbas, Apatin,

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258 J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 92.

259 The approval of the founding charter was granted only on September 26, 1933, which proves the Yugoslav authorities were not too keen on fulfilling the concessions they had granted. According to the charter the founders of the Foundation were the League of the Germans for the League of Nations and Understanding Among Peoples, the *Kulturbund* and the Central Agricultural Savings-Bank from Novi Sad. (J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 98.)

260 *Die Wache*, August 19, 1931; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 97. The Foundation received a permanent yearly subsidy from the Yugoslav government, which was an open secret galling the Serbian population (*AJ*, 14, 27/71.), as well as regular donations from Germany. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, 729.)

261 Milan Petrović, the chief of the Educational Department of the Danube Province in 1939 deemed it good from the point of view of the state interests, that the German teachers training college was in the Protestant Novi Vrbas, the large majority of the *Volksdeutsche* being Roman-Catholic. (*AJ*, 14, 27/71.)

262 The school received permission to start operating on August 29, 1931. (J.V. Senz, *das Schulwesen*, pp. 99-100.) It worked under government supervision and the authorities determined, among other things, the time-table and the textbooks. (*AV*, 126/IV, 44066/38; 9302/38.)

263 What members of other minorities probably didn't know, was that the statutes of the private German teachers training college were definitely approved only in August 1940, as well as that the authorities limited the number of eligible candidates. (J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 100.)

264 The German parallel classes at the six-year high school and at the private German burgher school in the same town were seen in the same light. (*AJ*, 66, 101/297; 108/341; *ASANU-XIV/2*; Biber, Nemci, 86.)

Belgrade and Zagreb, as well as, a private agricultural school.<sup>265</sup> These concessions,<sup>266</sup> coupled with those in the fields of foreign relations and economy, were a kind of appeasement à la yougoslave. It is plain that other minorities which had no such powerful mother country, couldn't even dream of anything like it.

Another minority whose educational situation improved during the 1930s was the Romanian. It had to thank the assiduity of the Romanian diplomacy, which ever since the early 1920s insisted on a bilateral convention that would solve the question of minority (Serbian and Romanian) primary schools in the divided Banat.<sup>267</sup> Thus Yugoslavia consented to sign a supplementary agreement on alliance on June 7, 1921 in which it agreed to solve that matter by a convention. Several rounds of negotiations followed throughout the 1920s, but they failed to yield a result. The final agreement was reached, it seemed, in Bled on July 17, 1927. According to it, the minorities would have state schools in their respective mother-tongues, except for the "national subjects" which would be taught in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> grade. Minority chairs would be opened at the teachers training colleges in Vršac and Timisoira and studying abroad would be possible too. The textbooks for minority schools would be approved by the respective ministers of education. Autonomous School Councils would be elected for five years in each country. 20 pupils of a given nationality would be needed for a minority class. However, this convention never struck root, although the Yugoslav officials claimed all its stipulations were observed in Yugoslavia except for the one concerning the School Council, whereas none at all in Romania, the execution had only started unwillingly, when it was conveniently interrupted by the imposition of the dictatorship on January 6, 1929.<sup>268</sup> The opposition in Yugoslavia attacked the Bled agreement as clericalization of instruction (because Romanian priests and teachers were granted supervision over schools) and favoring of the Romanians.<sup>269</sup> The Serbian orthodox bishopric of Timisoira was also dissatisfied, deeming the convention endangered the right of the local Serbs to confessional schools.<sup>270</sup>

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265 Biber, Nacizem, pp. 84-85, 203, 224-225; Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 49; Senz, Das Schulwesen, pp. 123-124; AV, 126/IV, 50054/940. The German incomplete six-year high school in Apatin into the 1st grade of which 124 pupils were enrolled, became in September 1940 two classrooms of the local burgher school. (AV, 126/IV, 4921/940; 51419/940; 51832/940.)

266 There were also smaller concessions in the field of education, such as opening of a state-run day care center as a training class for the private German teachers training college. (AV, 126/IV, 67129/940.) In the late 1930s, and early 1940s, several private German day care centers were opened. (AV, 126/IV, 12595/940; 30219/38.) A private German day care center still operated in Odžaci in 1938, although it had been prohibited from working already in 1932! (AV, 126/IV, 41552/38; 48737/32.)

267 Gligorijević, Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija, p. 80; Pržić, p. 151; Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 92.

268 AJ, F. 398, f. 1; 66 (pov.), 57/142; Rehak, Manjine, pp. 203-207; Gligorijević, Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija, pp. 79-86; Popi, Rumuni, pp. 94-100; Pržić, pp. 151-154; Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, pp. 95-100. It seems certain number of teachers from Romania had started to work in the Yugoslav part of the Banat before the imposition of the dictatorship. (Pétition présenté a la Société des Nations au sujet de la destitution, p. 10.)

269 Very vehement in his attacks on the agreement was the old enemy of national minorities, Svetozar Pribičević, the leader of the Independent Democratic Party. (SBNS Kraljevine SHS, Redovan saziv za 1927/28. godinu, knji. I, Beograd 1928, p. 301; Popi, Rumuni, p. 99; Idem, Jugoslovensko-rumunski odnosi, p. 77.)

270 Gligorijević, Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija, p. 85.

New negotiations ensued in which Yugoslavia demanded dropping the Main School Council and the Romanian school inspector, to which Romania wasn't willing to accede. Yugoslavia also demanded that the minimal number of pupils be raised to 30, and that the optional Romanian instruction at the teachers training college in Vršac be abolished. The disagreement led to cooling of the Yugoslav-Romanian relations and attacks of the Romanian press on the allied country. Foreign ministers of the Little Entente agreed in late 1932 that a solution for the problem of minority schools in the Banat should be found as soon as possible. The final agreement was reached on March 10, 1933 when the convention on minority schools was signed, that was ratified by both parties and to a larger or smaller extent executed too.<sup>271</sup>

The agreement contained the following stipulations: schools would be state-run in the mother-tongue of the pupils; the "state language" would be learned from the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade with 6 classes a week and history and geography with 3 classes – in the "state language"; religious instruction would be in the mother-tongue of the pupils; the minimal number of necessary pupils for opening a school would be 20; the two governments would do their best to employ a sufficient number of teachers of minority nationalities, and until enough locals for those jobs were available, teachers from the neighboring country could be used - they would have to pass an exam in "national subjects" after three years and a practical exam a year later;<sup>272</sup> salaries would be provided by the state and ethnically mixed communes were to build and maintain school buildings; where no minority school existed, at least 30 minority pupils could attend the school in the "state language", and where there were less than 30, they had to attend school in the "state language"; in order to educate the necessary number of minority teachers, special professors at the Vršac and Timisoira teachers training colleges were to be appointed to teach in Romanian and Serbian respectively, the mother-tongue, religious instruction, didactics, methodics, church singing and practical exercises; these professors could temporarily be brought from the mother country; the students of the teachers training colleges learning to become minority teachers, would belong to the respective minorities, but they would have to have the knowledge of the "state language" and to that end optional chairs would be opened at the Vršac and Timișoara teachers training colleges respectively; the textbooks would be local, but with the approval of the Ministries of Education, those from mother countries could be used too; if there were a Serbian and a Romanian school in the same place, their budgets and administrations would be separated; members of the two minorities would have representatives in the district School Council; finally, it was made possible for the Romanians in the Yugoslav Banat to found private schools and day care centers. Thereby they were granted a privilege which in a way surpassed even those of the Germans who had to ask a special permission for every private school they wanted to open. The main difference in comparison with the Bled agreement was that the Main School Council was dropped,<sup>273</sup>

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271 Schmidt-Rösler, Rumänien, pp. 427-435.

272 This stipulation was one of those to which the Yugoslav government was most averse during the negotiations. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/185; ASANU, 14387/9936.) Despite this the number of teachers from Romania was 60 in 1938. (Die Kulturrechte des Rumänentums im jugoslawischen Banat, Nation und Staat, XIII, 1, 1939, p. 34.)

273 Gligorijević, Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija, p. 87; Rehak, Manjine, pp. 208-211; Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, pp. 101-103; Arpad Török, Die rumänisch-jugoslawische

because for the Yugoslav authorities it had a smack of real minority school autonomy that they were reluctant to grant. This was especially important since throughout the negotiations, like in the case of German privileges, the Yugoslav government feared the precedent other minorities could invoke.<sup>274</sup>

Yugoslavia procrastinated with the fulfillment of the convention until January 1935, with the excuse it waited to see if Romania would fulfill it. For its part, the Romanian diplomacy kept pressing the allied country to start putting the convention into practice. The true execution started in Yugoslavia only in March 1935 when Romanian classes were turned into independent schools. The Romanian embassy wasn't satisfied with the speed the Romanian teachers, head-masters and school councils were being appointed. Slow implementation continued in the following years too.<sup>275</sup> There was mistrust towards Romanian head-masters and teachers, so that head-masters were not given confidential official letters, whereas teachers were kept under surveillance and subject to a special exam in "national subjects" in April 1936. The Yugoslav authorities strove to employ in the first place Yugoslav citizens (the Romanians and non-Romanians) over which it had a more complete control, and it tried particularly hard to avoid having teachers from Romania in purely Romanian villages.<sup>276</sup> Some of these "contractual" teachers were accused of spreading irredentist ideas and propaganda against the Yugoslav state,<sup>277</sup> whereas district chiefs noticed a more lively cultural work and national homogenization in the places in which these teachers served.<sup>278</sup>

Although Yugoslavia signed and ratified the school convention with Romania only under pressure and although it was fulfilling it only grudgingly,<sup>279</sup> the convention nevertheless helped improve education of the Romanian national minority in the Banat. First of all, the number of teachers, which had dangerously declined after the First World War, increased. At the same time, Romanian classes were turned into schools – something other minorities couldn't boast of<sup>280</sup> – and their number increased too.<sup>281</sup> Here and there textbooks from Romania were in use (without permission).<sup>282</sup> Although the Romanian government subsequently asked for

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Minderheitenkonvention und die Minderheitenschutzverträge, *Nation und Staat*, VII, 3, 1933, pp. 151-155.

274 ASANU, 14387/10012; 14387/9938; 14387/8981; *AJ*, 66 (pov.), 71/185.

275 Gligorijević, *Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija*, pp. 94-98; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, pp. 105-106; Schmidt-Rösler, pp. 436-437.

276 AV, 126/IV, 1128/939; Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 111; Gligorijević, *Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija*, pp. 98-99.

277 Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 112.

278 AV, 126/IV, 1128/939; Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 112; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 110.

279 Thus for instance, there was procrastination when it came to opening of separate Romanian schools and Romanian teachers complained about persecution on part of Serbian head-masters. In 1936/37 there were complaints about school inspectors who refused to give the Romanian head-masters decrees of their appointment. (AV, 126/IV, 9085/941; Popi, *Rumuni*, pp. 105, 107.)

280 The example of the Yugoslav-Romanian convention, spurred representatives of the Volksdeutsche, senators Grassla and evangelical bishop Popp, to ask in January 1936 the same school concessions for the Germans that were granted the Romanians. (Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, pp. 44-45; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, pp. 103-104, 106.)

281 Gligorijević, *Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija*, p. 100.

282 AV, 126-IV, 1128/939.

some other improvements in favor of the Romanian minority, they were refused by its Yugoslav counterpart.<sup>283</sup> Still, thanks to the school conventions, at the Vršac State Teachers Training College, education of the future Romanian teachers started in 1935/36, and a Romanian class with 45 pupils at the lower high school in that town was opened in 1934.<sup>284</sup>

The road of the Hungarian minority to certain improvements in the field of education was much thornier than that of the Germans and Romanians and it never achieved such results as those two minorities. Since German and Romanian privileges were granted not because of the goodwill or understanding of the Yugoslav authorities, but rather due to the influence of the mother countries, it is clear that the Hungarians, with whose mother country the relations oscillated between very cool and very strained, couldn't count on an improvement under the influence of foreign policy. Indeed, their bad situation was conditioned as much by the bad policy of the historical Hungary toward national minorities, as by bad relations between Yugoslavia and the Trianon Hungary which made no attempt to hide its revisionist intentions.<sup>285</sup> For these reasons, in their struggle to improve their educational situation, the Hungarians suffered mostly blows and setbacks. We have seen that a large number of Hungarian teachers was dismissed or pensioned in the first half of the 1920s and that a large number of schools was shut down or turned into schools in other languages with parallel Hungarian classes here and there. Such tendency typical not only of the Magyars was continued in the second half of the 1920s. Even before the Law on Secondary Schools, upper Hungarian classes at high schools in Senta and Srbobran were shut down.<sup>286</sup> Sacking and pensioning of the Hungarian teachers who didn't speak the "state language" sufficiently well, was also continued.<sup>287</sup> Temporary improvements which occurred occasionally, were part of the elections tactics of the ruling parties. They were local and often of short duration.<sup>288</sup> The main, albeit not great, breakthrough in the field of Hungarian education was made, just like in the German case, in Slavonia during the 1930s, where until 1929-30 not a single Hungarian school or class existed.<sup>289</sup> The first parallel Hungarian classes in Syrmium were opened only in 1938.<sup>290</sup> At the end of 1940 few classes in some Slavonian places were opened as a token of forthcoming on part of the Province of Croatia.<sup>291</sup> To be sure, the Hungarian minority couldn't be appeased by this, and it demanded in the

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283 The Romanian government demanded that the 5th and 6th grades have instruction in Romanian, that the "national subject" be taught in Romanian and that a Romanian school inspector be appointed. (Gligorijević, *Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija*, p. 101; Popi, Rumuni, p. 108.)

284 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 111. Until the Second World War, 40 Romanians attended the teachers training college and 334 the lower high school. (*Ibid.*)

285 Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 237; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 77. On Hungarian revisionist policy cf. Hoensch, pp. 118-120, 132-137, 139-144.

286 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 52.

287 *Ibid.*, p. 89.

288 AV, 126/IV, 34177/938; Mesaroš, *Mađari*, pp. 117, 136, 147, 167, 172.

289 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 52.

290 *Ibid.*, p. 159.

291 *Ibid.*, p. 217. The Province of Croatia (Banovina Hrvatska) made some concessions to the Magyars, probably in order to wean them from the traditional pro-Belgrade orientation of the majority of the Vojvodina Hungarian leaders.

late 1930s more Hungarian classes, instruction in Hungarian language and literature for Hungarian pupils at high schools, possibility to study in Hungary etc.<sup>292</sup> As a small asset in the development of their education, the Hungarians could score the work of the parallel Hungarian classes at the Belgrade teachers training college. They worked in 1933-1935 with 15-odd pupils. For their maintenance in the boarding house voluntary grants had to be collected, so that the Hungarian press in Yugoslavia and MP Szanto were busy with this task. Instruction was only partly in Hungarian, and in September 1935 the Ministry of education stopped enrolment into the 1<sup>st</sup> grade with the explanation there was a surplus of Hungarian teachers within the teacher cadre.<sup>293</sup> During 1937 there was an improvement in the Hungarian education,<sup>294</sup> and before the elections in 1938 the Magyars were granted certain smaller concessions again,<sup>295</sup> but on the whole, the Hungarian minority achieved far less in improving its educational situation than the Germans and Romanians,<sup>296</sup> because the Yugoslav authorities stuck to their rigid and restrictive school policy wherever they could.<sup>297</sup>

Finally, in order to get the whole picture, and the possibility of comparison and drawing conclusions, a glance should be cast at the situation of the education of the smallest recognized minority in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which was, strictly juridically speaking, a minority only partly: the Italians in Dalmatia. Although the Yugoslav authorities first closed down Italian schools opened during the Italian occupation of part of the Yugoslav coast,<sup>298</sup> the Italians were not only granted large rights in the field of education by the Convention for General Understanding of 1923

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292 AJ, Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, fas. II.

293 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184; Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 376-377. The explanation was cynical if one keeps in mind the needs of the parallel Hungarian classes, but it was thoroughly in keeping with the policy of shutting down teachers training colleges and reducing the number of teacher candidates pursued in the 1930s due to lack of funds in the Ministry of education. (M.Mayer, p. 108.) Para-state Hungarian irredentist organization TESZEK (Társadalmi Egyesületek Szövetségének Központja – Center for Alliance of Volunteer Associations, founded in 1921) financed maintenance of the students' boarding house in Belgrade. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 153.)

294 Vuk Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941*, Beograd 1976, p. 287; Sajti, *Changes*, p. 134.

295 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, 89. Not without difficulties, Hungarian classes at the Belgrade teachers training college were reopened, which had been promised already in April of the previous year. (Sajti, *Changes*, p. 134; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 167; AJ, Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, fas. II.)

296 In late November 1940, at the time of the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement, the chief of the Educational Department of the Danube Province proposed to open three classes in Hungarian instead of the classes in the "state language" for the magyarized Slovaks in Kupusina, as demanded by 192 local inhabitants. (AV, 126/IV, 64558/940.)

297 AV, 126/IV, 55301/938. On the occasion of the visit to Budapest of the Yugoslav foreign minister Aleksandar Cincar-Marković on February 27, 1940, his opposite number Teleki handed him a diplomatic note in which opening of Hungarian schools in 64 villages was demanded. Furthermore, it contained names of 54 places where they existed only formally, or where it was needed to supplement them by Hungarian classes. The note also contained the names of Hungarian teachers in "Southern Serbia", as well as of Yugoslav teachers working in Hungarian classes without the knowledge of Hungarian. (Sajti, *Changes*, p. 148.)

298 AJ, 66, 1/1.

and its interpretation of the same year,<sup>299</sup> but they fully turned them into practice. The Convention made possible opening of Italian schools with Italian curricula and textbooks, with teachers of Italian citizenship, so that members of the Italian minority and optants, aided by Italian nationalist organizations *Lega culturale* and *Unione italiana* opened 8<sup>300</sup> primary schools which had 429 pupils and 33 teachers in early 1930s. Moreover, there were 4 day-care centers with 6 nurses and 120 children. These schools and day-care centers operated unmolested even when they overstepped the permitted limits,<sup>301</sup> although the Yugoslav authorities strove to allow only the optants to attend them, and not the Italians Yugoslav citizens (i.e. de jure members of the minority).<sup>302</sup> Together with some of these schools, day-care centers, libraries and other associations were operating.<sup>303</sup> Moreover, the Italian authorities were granting scholarships for studying in Italy, and the Yugoslav ones strove to prevent that.<sup>304</sup> Although the number of Italian schools and pupils wasn't big, and consequently the breach in the minority-unfriendly educational policy neither, it showed just how much a numerically insignificant minority could get with the help of a powerful mother country. In other words, the Italian schools, granted in order to appease the powerful and dangerous neighbor, just like the Czech private schools which were opened as a concession to an allied power, were the best proof of lack of principle in the Yugoslav minority policy, which was hiding behind principles and legal stipulations only when minority rights were to be denied – most often, in the field of education. When the “state interest” demanded, laws could be modified or circumvented by ministerial decrees.

On the whole, the Yugoslav state strove to put all education, including that of the minorities, under its control and to utilize it for raising young generations in the spirit of national and state unity. In the process, the goals were hardly modified when education of national minorities was in question. Ideological subject-matter prevailed over that of general or professional education. This was particularly striking in the school policy toward national minorities. If they couldn't be assimilated, as a rule, as restrictive a school policy as possible was applied: both when it came to the number of classes and teachers and when it came to the kind of instruction pupils received.<sup>305</sup> They were to be raised in the spirit of loyalty and their national consciousness was to be weakened through neglect of quality and

299 Pržić, pp. 144-145.

300 La Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui, p. 89. Rubić adduces 7 (Rubić, p. 13.), whereas a document from January 1934 mentions 5. (AJ, 66, 1/1.)

301 The schools were in Hvar, Krk, Split, Šibenik, Trogir, Korčula and Dubrovnik. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1; Rubić, pp. 13-14; Pržić, pp. 145-146; Rehak, Manjine, pp. 188-189; Jaquin, p. 161.)

302 AJ, 66, 56/134; ASANU, 14387/8783.

303 Rad italijanske Kulturne lige u Dalmaciji, Narodna odbrana, 7, February 17, 1935.

304 AJ, 66 (pov.), 60/158.

305 During the 1931/32 school-year 60.000 children attended school in a language that wasn't their mother-tongue. In “Southern Serbia” the percentage of such children in early 1930s, was 15, according to M. Mayer (M. Mayer, pp. 138-139.), but that percentage was actually higher, since the Macedonians also hadn't instruction in their mother-tongue. According to Mesaroš, due to the name analysis, over one half of the Hungarian children had no instruction in their mother-tongue in the 1920s. (Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 235.) In Croatia, where practically no Hungarian schools existed, the situation was even worse.



quantity of instruction in mother-tongue. Exceptions were made grudgingly, and usually for reasons of foreign policy or short-term pre-election calculations. The poor development of the educational institutions, but also more modest cultural needs of the local population in the Southern part of the country, made the minority educational policy there in some aspects more restrictive, but in others more tolerant than in the more developed North of the country.

Let's see in the end what the situation of the minority education looked like when seen through the statistical data from the middle of the inter-war period (1929 and 1931) when the bulk of the reductions had already been done, and in the end of the period (1939), before the policy of concessions had reached its peak - to be sure, taking the school statistics with a grain of salt too. This is how the numbers of primary schools which operated only in one minority language looked like in 1929, according to official statistics: 50 German, 91 Hungarian, 4 Romanian, 6 Slovak, 5 Ruthenian, 7 Italian, 3 Czech. Apart from this, many schools had instruction both in the "state language" and in one of the respective minority languages: 133 German, 95 Hungarian, 26 Romanian, 16 Slovak, 3 Ruthenian, 98 Turkish, 3 Czech. There were also schools in which the instruction was imparted, apart from the "state language", also in two or even three minority languages: 11 in German, Hungarian and Serbian, 5 in German, Slovak and Serbian.

As for secondary schools, one worked in Slovak, and it was the only purely minority high school then. In the "state language" and in German 13 secondary schools operated, and in the "state language" and in Hungarian 10.<sup>306</sup> As we have seen, various modalities of instruction in minority languages were possible. The quoted statistics don't distinguish between the lower and upper grades of primary and secondary school and the number of minority classes can't be discerned from it - just the number of schools in which they existed. Similar imprecision is displayed in some other published statistics,<sup>307</sup> probably not by chance.

Here are the data for the 1935/36 school year adduced in the official publication of the Central Press Bureau:<sup>308</sup>

<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>day care</b>	<b>primary school</b>	<b>higher primary school</b>	<b># of pupils</b>	<b># of teachers</b>
Germans	36	607	118	39,927	769
Magyars	33	452	—	26,605	446
Czechoslovaks	1	119	11	7,471	122
Romanians	3	83	—	4,878	100
Ruthenians	—	23	—	1,455	23
Total	73	1,284	129	80,336	1,460

306 Jubilarni zbornik života i rada SHS, p. 740.

307 For instance: Nikola S. Tujković, Statistika škola pod Ministarstvom prosvete na dan 15. maja 1932. godine, Beograd 1933.

308 La Yougoslavi e par les chiffres, Belgrade 1937, p. 143.

This survey doesn't show everything of importance for minority instruction: neither the number of classes, nor the nationality of teachers, i.e. their language skills, the number of members of minorities in classes in the "state language", nor the ratio between the minority class/pupils/teachers and Yugoslav ones. The light on this last question is partly shed by another statistics made as an answer to a Hungarian petition to the League of Nations in 1931.<sup>309</sup>

Nationality	# of classes	% of classes	# of teachers	% of teachers	% of people
Yugoslavs	1,683	58.03	1,724	61.5	37.88
Hungarians	536	18	364	13	27.95
Germans	564	18.6	508	18.4	23.10
Slovaks	121	4.1	123	4.3	4.37
Ruthenians	18	0.6	27	0.96	0.83

Unfortunately, this table concerns only the Bačka, the Banat and Baranya. The results for the whole country would certainly be different, and certainly even less favorable for members of national minorities. It can be discerned from the table that the inequality in regard to the number of educational institutions and teachers that existed until 1918 in favor of the Hungarians, by 1931 tipped in favor of members of the "state-building people", mainly the Serbs. It can be seen that all national minorities, with the exception of the Slovaks, and partly of the Ruthenians, had fewer classes and teachers than was their due according to their share in the total population. However, like in the previous case, it is not clear here how many minority teachers actually worked in classes with pupils of their nationality, i.e., how many Yugoslav teachers worked in minority classes and what their language skills were. It's typical, but understandable, that data about Albanian and Turkish teachers are to be found much less frequently, and even then, it is the question what they meant: teachers of these two nationalities, or teachers in classes with children of those two nationalities.<sup>310</sup>

Finally, here is how the statistical survey of the minority education in the Northern parts of the country looked like in early November 1939, according to nationalities.<sup>311</sup>

309 AJ, 38, 402/553. Our table summarizes two tables from the document. Just how slippery ground the statistics is, is best shown by another statistics of the number of classes, pupils etc, in the Bačka, the Banat and Baranya from 1931 in which partly different data feature. (AV, 126/IV, 34286/930.)

310 La Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui adduces 53 Albanian and 26 Turkish teachers and 79 Albanian classes with 11.240 pupils. (La Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui, p. 85.) the same publication adduces 92 Turkish classes of primary schools, with 7.739 pupils and 89 teachers. (Ibid., p. 87.) The same unclear data concerning the teachers appears in this case too, although it is not clear if, the 26 already mentioned Albanian teachers are also accounted for in the 98 Turkish ones. This, coupled with constant change of the numbers of classes and pupils, is the best proof how uncertain the statistics are.

311 AJ, 66 (pov.), 7/25.

### Germans

Province	# of schools	# of classes	# of pupils	# of teachers	# of German teachers
Drava	21	25	1057	21	31
Croatia	4; 39 yu, d 1 yu, cs	67	3,123	64	29
Vrbas	7 yu, d	11	733	10	9
Drina	1; 1 yu, d	5	237	5	5
Danube	18;104 yu,d, 29,d,h.;1 yu,d.ro;3 yu.d.cs;3 yu.d.h.ro;3 d.h.	594 18 day care	31,263 (2,080 in day care)	576 + 121 relig. Teachers (+18 nurses)	632
Belgrade	5 yu, d	45(2day care)	1,808 (231 in day care)	38 (2 nurses)	25
Teachers college	1	5	142	7	—

(Explanation: yu – Yugoslav; d – German; h – Hungarian;  
cs – Czechoslovak; ro – Romanian; r – Ruthenian.)

### Hungarians

Province	#of schools	#of classes	# of pupils	#of teachers	# of Hungarian teachers
Drava	4 yu, h	4	104	4	1
Croatia	1 yu, h	2	84	2	7
Danube	28;101 yu, h 29 yu, d, h; 3 yu, cs, h, ro; 3 yu, d, h, cs; 1 yu, h, cs; 3 h, d	439	27,079	417	375
Belgrade	1 yu, h	2	110	2	2

### Czechoslovaks

Prov- ince	#of schools	#of clas- ses	# of pu- pils	#of teach- ers	#of Czech- osl. teachers
Croatia	3; 14 yu, cs	30	1,309	33	36
Vrbas	1 yu, cs	1	22	1	1
Danube	2; 17 yu, cs 3 yu, d, cs; 3 yu, d, h, cs	106	5,997	100	132
Morava	1 yu, cs	1	18	1	5
Bel- grade	1 yu, cs	4	123	6	4

### Ruthenians

Prov- ince	# of schools	# of clas- ses	#of pu- pils	#of teach- ers	#of Ruthenian teachers
Danube	2 yu, r	22	1,376	22	35
Yugosla- via	3 yu, r	23	1,411	23	36

### Romanians

Prov- ince	#of schools	#of clas- ses	#of pu- pils	#of teach- ers	#of Roma- nian teachers
Danube	23;9 yu, ro 1yu, ro, h, d 1 ro, d	81	4,363	78	110

It can be seen from these tables that minority teachers were unequally dispersed. The number of Ruthenian teachers by far surpassed the number of Ruthenian classes, and similar was the case of Romanian teachers and classes, as well as of Hungarian in Croatia. On the other hand, teachers were lacking in the Vojvodina. To be sure, just like in the previous tables, it is impossible to discern the distribution of minority teachers in minority classes from this table too. It can be partly observed on the local level in the reports of the local educational authorities. These reports, depending on place, to a larger or smaller extent confirm complaints of the minority leaders about the lack of teachers of minority nationalities for minority classes.<sup>312</sup> However, if taken with a grain of salt and interpreted in the right way, these statistics numerically illustrate quite well what has been discussed in this chapter.

312 Some examples see in: AV, 126/IV, 29010/939; 10661/941; 9073/930; 33816/930; 10661931; 81/657.

## Chapter Nine

# Minority Press and Publishing

Apart from schools, the press is one of the major factors in the life of national minorities which helps them survive as separate communities. It not only cherishes the mother tongue (which is often neglected at schools and public institutions), but it also informs members of a minority about events and processes within the minority; it serves as a mouthpiece for expressing opinions on matters of importance for a national minority and often serves as a medium for presenting wishes, complaints, demands etc. to the majority people or to the international public. It often ties together the scattered members of a minority, thus creating the feeling of community.

The minority press in the inter-war Yugoslavia fulfilled all these functions too. Like the press of the majority peoples it expressed different opinions within certain national minorities and it championed the interests of members of the minorities in public. It was typical that certain journals served as hubs for the politically and ideologically like-minded, which was very important at the times when it wasn't always possible to organize political parties. The degree of freedom of the minority press corresponded with the general freedom of the press in the country, but at the same time it was also conditioned by the situation of a particular national minority. This meant the minority press was always under strict surveillance of the censorship, although this held true for the press of the majority peoples too. On the other hand, since the mother countries of the national minorities were Yugoslavia's neighbors or at least not far away, members of the minorities had a chance to broaden their informational horizon in their mother-tongues through the press that was legally (or often illegally) imported.

Furthermore, the minority press, just like the foreign press in the languages of the national minorities (particularly Hungarian and German) had numerous readers among representatives of the majority peoples, influencing them too. The powers-that-be kept this in mind when they decided which newspapers, articles or books could get permission for distribution.

Like in many other things, there were huge differences concerning the press – both between various parts of the country and between minorities.<sup>1</sup> The oldest journals in the languages of the peoples which became national minorities in Yugoslavia, appeared in Slovenia – in German as early as the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>2</sup> The oldest German journal in the Slovenian territory which survived until the foundation of Yugoslavia was the *Laibacher Zeitung*, founded in 1778, which having lived through many changes, survived as the official journal between 1821 and 1918.<sup>3</sup> Among the more important German papers were the *Marburger Zeitung* (est.

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1 There was also a difference how strict the censorship was in various centers.

2 Amon, p. 1329.

3 Amon, p. 1330; Tanja Žigon, *Nemško časopisje na Slovenskem*, Ljubljana 2001, pp. 32-33.

1870) and the Cillier Zeitung (est. 1876). Both of them championed the Greater-German program of Linz, but they were also advancing democratic and social demands.<sup>4</sup> The Cillier Zeitung was called the Deutsche Wacht since 1883, showing also in that way its national tendency.<sup>5</sup> Apart from them, the upheaval of 1918 was survived by the Gottscheer Bote (1904-1919) which was banned in Yugoslavia only on June 1, 1919. However, it continued publication on July 1 of the same year under the name the Gottscheer Zeitung (until 1937).<sup>6</sup>

Another leading people in the Habsburg Monarchy, the Magyars, couldn't boast such a long tradition of publishing newspapers as the Germans, or the Serbs for that matter: Hungarian journals in the Vojvodina territory appeared several decades after the Serbian ones – only on the eve of the revolution of 1848. A stronger development of the Hungarian press started only from 1860s, and particularly since 1890s.<sup>7</sup> Until 1914 more than 127 Hungarian journals and newspapers were published there. However, most of the local Hungarians, being poor, didn't read the political press, whereas the well-off read mostly big Budapest newspapers.<sup>8</sup> Although some Magyar newspapers which had been started already in Austria-Hungary survived the upheaval of 1918 (e.g. the *Torontal*, est. 1872,<sup>9</sup> the *Napló*, est. 1898,<sup>10</sup> or the *Tiszavidék*<sup>11</sup>), the great boom of the Hungarian press in the Vojvodina began only after the foundation of Yugoslavia.

As for the Vojvodina Swabians, they had a very well developed provincial press ever since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, so that every larger place had some newspaper. In the territory of the Banat, the Bačka, Baranya and Croatia (in its historical boundaries),<sup>12</sup> there were over 300 German journals and newspapers until 1914,<sup>13</sup> but very few of them survived the First World War.<sup>14</sup> Even those which did, remained

4 Amon, p. 1332; Žigon, p. 65. About the Linz program cf. Pulzer, pp. 151-152.

5 The Cillier Zeitung wasn't aimed against the Slovenes in the beginning, but since early 1880s it became a German nationalist mouthpiece. (Cvirn, *Nemci v Celju*, pp. 8, 25-27.)

6 Amon, p. 1332; Žigon, p. 59.

7 Laslo Rehak, *Štampa u Vojvodini*, in: *Vojvodina 1944-1945*, Novi Sad 1954, p. 351.

8 Rehak, *Štampa*, pp. 351-352.

9 The paper was renamed in *Hiradó* in March 1930. (Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 367.) The opinions of the interested Yugoslav state agencies concerning its loyalty diverged a great deal. (AJ, 14, 77/288.) The correspondent of the Central Press Bureau, Triva Militar deemed in 1933 that the paper was poorly edited, in a Hungarian spirit, and that it was kept alive only in order to have a Hungarian daily in Veliki Bečkerek. (Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 371.)

10 The paper started under the name of *Bácskai Napló*. After having been banned for a while in 1919, it resumed publication as *Bácsmegyei Napló*, and since March 25 1929 as *Napló*. (Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 219; Idem, *Mađari*, p. 369.)

11 This paper appeared until the end of the First World War as *Óbecsei Újság*. (Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 369.)

12 That is in the territory of the pertinent counties, which was larger than that of the present day Vojvodina and Slavonia.

13 Most of these journals were in German, but since 1860s in a Hungarian spirit. (HWBGAD, I, p. 260.) Typically, the German press developed slower in the Bačka than in the Banat. (Ibid., I, p. 331.)

14 Branko Bešlin, *Vesnik tragedije. Nemačka štampa u Vojvodini 1933-1941*, godine, Novi Sad, Sremski Karlovci 2001, pp. 17-20. Ten German newspapers were published in Southern Hungary, 8 of which had a national tendency. Three newspapers were published in the future Yugoslav territory. (I. Senz, p. 269.)

journals of local importance. The oldest among those which continued publication in Yugoslavia was the *Werschatzer Gebirgsbote*, established in 1857.<sup>15</sup> However, it also remained a small local paper, and it was only with the *Deutsches Volksblatt* that the *Volksdeutsche* gained a paper that would reach beyond the boundaries of local communities and be read in almost all the territories (in some places more, in others less) inhabited by the German minority. The Magyars in Croatia before the First World War had the *Szlávonijai Magyar Újság*, and the Germans, since 1905, the *Deutsches Volksblatt für Syrmien* (since 1913 just the *Deutsches Volksblatt*),<sup>16</sup> in which some are prone to see the forerunner of the post-war *Deutsches Volksblatt*.<sup>17</sup> The Slovaks in Croatia had only the short-lived (1911-1914) *Domácnost a škola* before the First World War,<sup>18</sup> whereas the Poles in Bosnia remained on a low literacy level and almost without any reading matter – both before and after 1918.<sup>19</sup>

In the Southern parts of the country, it was the journals in Turkish that had the longest tradition. They started appearing from 1860s on – mostly as official gazettes of the vilayets, sometimes partly in Serbian. Such Turkish-Serbian journals were published in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Austro-Hungarian rule too.<sup>20</sup> However, it wouldn't be correct to say that the press in Turkish had a great tradition or a large readership: widespread poverty and even more widespread illiteracy prevented the press from becoming a mass phenomenon, and the use of the press remained confined to a narrow circle of civil servants and part of upper classes. Furthermore, until 1908 the Ministry of Interior had the monopoly on casting letters, so that there were just two printing-houses in the Yugoslav territory under the Ottoman rule – in Mostar (est. 1876) and Bitola (est. 1904).<sup>21</sup>

As for Albanian journals, thanks to the higher cultural level and freer working conditions, most of them were published for a long time in the Diaspora.<sup>22</sup> It was only after the Young Turk revolution that some Albanian journals appeared in the Albanian-inhabited territories, including those that would become part of Yugoslavia. These journals were meant to awaken the national consciousness, and for that reason they were sometimes published in Albanian and Turkish – the latter being the language in which the majority of the literate Albanians was capable of reading.<sup>23</sup>

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15 Bešlin, *Vesnik*, p. 18.

16 Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen in Syrmien, Slawonien und Kroatien*, pp. 113, 118.

17 To be sure, there were also other German-language papers in Croatia before the First World War, but they were not German-oriented. One of those was for instance *Die Drau* from Osijek which was published since 1870s. It survived the war, but in the first half of the 1920s, although it was in Serbian possession, it was edited by Jews. It had a print-run of some 1,200 copies and it was read mainly by the Jews and Croatian federalists. (PA, Abt. IIb, *Pressewesen*, PO 12, *Jugoslaviwn*, Bd. 1.) It died out in the second half of the 1920s, but in 1932 another paper of the same name was started. (*Jutarnji list*, June 26, 1932.)

18 Krajčović, *Slovaci u političkom razvitku*, p. 202.

19 Drljača, M. *Dombrovska*, p. 146.

20 Eren, pp. 359-366; Hasan Kaleshi, Jürgen Kornrumpf, *Das Wilajet Prizren. Beitrag zur Geschichte der türkischen Staatsreform auf dem Balkan im 19. Jahrhundert*, *Südost-Forschungen*, XXVI, 1967, p. 230.

21 Eren, p. 359.

22 Skendi, *Albanian National Awakening*, *passim*.

23 Kaleshi, Kornrumpf, p. 234; Eren, p. 368; *Istorija makedonskog naroda*, II. *Od početka XX veka do kraja Prvog svetskog rata*, Beograd 1970, p. 319. Such journals were *Üsküp* – *Shkupi* in Skopje, *Ittihad-Milli* – *Bashkim Kombit* and *Drita* in Bitola.

After the Albanian language congress in Bitola in 1908, the number of Albanian journals in Albanian increased. Now they were not only published in Skopje and Bitola, but they started appearing also in Elbasan, Constantinople and Thessalonica.<sup>24</sup> However, the policy of the Young Turk regime wasn't propitious for further development of the Albanian press, and because of the widespread illiteracy, lack of roads, tribal, religious and other divisions, the Albanian society remained mainly pre-literate in which the news were transmitted and ideas exchanged almost exclusively by word of mouth.

Creation of Yugoslavia meant also the beginning of a new period of development of the press of the peoples that became national minorities. They found themselves in a state that publicly professed principles of liberal democracy, but which in practice resorted to the policy of limiting freedom of expression and censorship.<sup>25</sup> This was plain to see already in the first days of the interim state administration in autumn 1918, when the People's Administration in the former Hungarian territories introduced severe censorship that was made even stricter in early 1919.<sup>26</sup> Several Hungarian papers were suppressed,<sup>27</sup> and import from the Hungarian-controlled territory prohibited.<sup>28</sup> The desire was to limit the influence of the Hungarian and German press and in view of that, a Serbian news agency was to be founded.<sup>29</sup> Still, the new regime couldn't completely eliminate undesirable influences coming from the other side of the demarcation line, because control slackened over time.<sup>30</sup> Censorship continued operating throughout the inter-war period, and in view of the minority journals and the press from the mother countries of the national minorities, the busiest was the censorship at the State Prosecutor's Office in Novi Sad.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the Yugoslav authorities were not averse to other ways of influencing the press, such as donations,<sup>32</sup>

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- 24 Eren, p. 368. The first Albanian journal in the Vilayet of Kosovo was the *Shkupi*, which was started in Skopje in 1911. (Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 63.)
- 25 A short survey of the censorship in inter-war Yugoslavia see in: Bešlin, *Vesnik*, pp. 72-74.
- 26 The reason for tightening censorship was probably the fact that Hungarian and Romanian newspapers were brought into the territory under control of the People's Administration. (AJ, 14, 143/497.)
- 27 Thus the *Bácsmegyei Napló* was banned for two weeks. (Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 219.)
- 28 Kecić, *Revolucionarni radnički pokret*, pp. 127, 130-131, 147. Not only were some journals suppressed, but their editors arrested. (AJ, 69, 7./14.)
- 29 Judin, pp. 19-20; Kecić, *Vojvodina u vreme stvaranja*, p. 149; Krkljuš, p. 149. Throughout the inter-war period the Yugoslav authorities couldn't obviate the influence of the Hungarian and German press, read by many Yugoslavs too. (AJ, 14, 110/414; Popović, *Banat, Bačka Baranja*, p. 17; *Novosti*, January 3, 1926) The reason for broader reading public of some Hungarian newspapers, was partly their better access to information, sometimes better than that of some Belgrade newspapers. (This held particularly true of the *Bácsmegyei Napló*.) (AJ, 66, 56/141.) Similar was the make-up of the readers in some parts of Slovenia, where some German newspapers (e.g. *Mariborer Zeitung*) had more readers among the Slovenes than among the Germans. (VA, pop. 17, k. 26, f. 2, d. 12.)
- 30 Throughout the inter-war period the Yugoslav authorities never managed to solve this problem, and the undesirable publications found ways of penetrating the country in certain numbers time and again.
- 31 AJ, 63 (pov.) 1939, f. 2. Some of the lists of the forbidden journals, or their numbers really impress with their length. (AJ, 14, 106/409; 213/764.)
- 32 AJ, 37, 45/296; Bešlin, *Vesnik*, pp. 81-82.



personal talks with editors in order to convince them to change their editorial policy,<sup>33</sup> or instructions to the whole press how it should write about certain topics.<sup>34</sup> The toughest measure was suppressing of certain numbers, then of whole journals,<sup>35</sup> and even the arresting of journalists was not a rarity.<sup>36</sup> Similar measures were usually part and parcel of the government offensive against a party or a minority as a whole.<sup>37</sup> The same procedure was applied to the foreign press, only at times it was even tougher: there were periods when importation of all press from certain countries was forbidden. The only mitigating circumstance for the readers was that foreign newspaper firms and their distributors in Yugoslavia managed to find loopholes and to break the embargo by smuggling.

Because of such conditions of publication, the minority press, just like the press of the "state people", had limited freedom of expression. It tried to broaden it by using ciphered language, which was perceived and understood by the censors who were often not able to intervene because the formal reasons were lacking.<sup>38</sup> The alleviating circumstance for the press of the national minorities was that, apart from

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- 33 AJ, 63 (pov.) 1934, f. 16; 1939, f. 2; 37, 73/457. These talks sometimes took the form of real intimidation. (Ein Notschrei der deutschen Minderheit in Slowenien (S.H.S.). Wie aus dem Deutschen Haus in Cilli ein „Celjski dom“ gemacht wurde!, s.l. s.a., p. 8.) Threats were not just empty words: sometimes, especially in the first half of the 1920s, terrorist attacks by the nationalist organizations such as the ORJUNA and the SRNAO were also applied as an argument. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2.)
- 34 This was typical of time before the beginning and during the Second World War, when the whole press in Yugoslavia was ordered not to write unfavorably about Germany (on occasion of the Anschluss) and then (at the beginning of the war) to write strictly in the spirit of neutrality. (Bešlin, Vesnik, pp. 92-93; Aprilski rat 1941. Zbornik dokumenata, I, Beograd 1969, pp. 26-27.) The Volksdeutsche newspapers circumvented this order to the highest degree, transmitting mainly news from German sources, thus de facto spreading German propaganda. (AJ, 38, 93/225; Bešlin, Vesnik, pp. 94-96.)
- 35 The most famous case of this kind was suppression of the Hak, the newspaper of the Cemi-yet, as well as of Hak Yolu and Mucahede, the journals with which the party tried to substitute it. (Eren, p. 375.) Moreover, after the imposition of the dictatorship, several journals were suppressed, the mouthpiece of the Hungarian Party, the Hirlap, among them. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4.)
- 36 Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 221-222, 243. Certainly the greatest kick-up was triggered off by the arrest of journalist Hilde Isolde Reiter in 1930 – not so much because of the arrest itself, but more because of the torture at the hands of the police. Of no small importance was the fact that she was German, so that the case caused vehement protests of the powerful German press. (PA, Rassenfrage, Fremdvölker, Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien; AJ, 38, 47-105; Empörende Methoden der südslawischen Polizei. Der Skandal um die Verhaftung des ehemaligen deutschen Abgeordneten Dr. Neuenr und der Schriftstellerin Hilde Reiter, Nation und Staat, III, 10-11, 1930, pp. 695-701.)
- 37 Claims of some minority MPs that the censorship was tougher on the minority press than on the Yugoslav, corroborated with just few examples (SBNS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1932/33, I, p. 23), has as yet to be proved. Up to now, there are no indications that would imply such a thing. (Cf. Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 57.)
- 38 This was typical of Hungarian newspapers. Such complaints were aired against the Bácsmegyei Napló in January 1922, and in May of the same year against the Vajdaság (AJ, 14, 85/366), against the Délbácska in October 1927 (AJ, 63 (pov.) 1927, f. 3.), Szombori Újság in 1929 (AJ, 14, 85/336.) and Napló in 1935. (AJ, 63 (pov.) 1939, f. 2.)

foreign policy, it dealt with matters that interested minorities such as education, participation of the minorities in the agrarian reform, (permitted) cultural activities of minority associations or with general questions (such as economy) about which it was possible to express different opinions more freely. Political leaders of the minorities deliberately avoided interfering with big political questions of the state's constitution or relations between the Yugoslav peoples, and the minority press (partly edited, or at least influenced by them) followed that line, contenting itself with formal statements of loyalty to the King and the State.<sup>39</sup> This attitude was the consequence of the realistic estimate that members of the minorities couldn't influence the big political matters, and that their interference with them could bring only harm. At the same time, it was a silent protest against the state in which they lived and conscious self-isolation. For their part, the authorities reproached them with disinterest for Yugoslavia's national-political and cultural problems.<sup>40</sup>

Among the minority journals during the inter-war period, the most successful, in the opinion of the Yugoslav authorities, were the Hungarian ones, although they were subject to constant suspicion, and although they fought each other for readers, i.e. to increase circulation.<sup>41</sup> According to an observation, the Magyars read predominantly newspapers and journals, unlike the Germans who preferred reading books for learning and fun.<sup>42</sup> However, despite this, in mid-1920s the Vojvodina was flooded by cheap books from Hungary for the intelligentsia and the people, and the targeted readers were not only the Hungarians.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, since 1921 the publication of books in Hungarian started in Yugoslavia too.<sup>44</sup> Just like books, the Hungarian newspapers were not meant only for the Magyar audience, which partly helped them survive in the market.

This is how the survey of the most important Hungarian newspapers in the Vojvodina looked in the early 1930s:<sup>45</sup>

Place	Title	Kind	Frequency	Circulation
<b>Subotica</b>	Napló	politic./info.	Daily	22,000
<b>Subotica</b>	Az Újság	politic./info.	Daily	5,000
<b>Sombor</b>	Új Hírek	politic./info.	Daily	7,500
<b>V. Bečkerek</b>	Hiradó	politic./info.	Daily	2,000
<b>Novi Sad</b>	Reggeli Újság	politic./info.	Daily	7,000
<b>Subotica</b>	A Munka	agricultural	Weekly	2,000
<b>Senta</b>	Szentai Újság	politic./info.	3 / week	500
<b>Senta</b>	Szentai Friss Újság	politic./info.	3 / week	500

39 Bešlin, Vesnik, pp. 31, 68-69.

40 AJ, 63 (pov.) 1927, f. 3; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 371; Bešlin, Vesnik, pp. 76-77.

41 VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 2, d. 3; Popović, Banat, Bačka i Baranja, p. 16; Novosti, February 3, 1926.

42 AJ, F. 398, f. 1. If this observation was true, it could be explained by the fact newspapers are cheaper than books, which tallied with the weaker purchasing power of the Hungarians as compared to that of the Volksdeutsche, and with the greater interest in politics of the former.

43 AJ, 14, 110/414.

44 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 213.

45 AJ, 63, 47/145.

Place	Title	Kind	Frequency	Circulation
<b>Bačka Topola</b>	B. Topola es Vidék	politic./info.	Weekly	300
<b>Stari Bečej</b>	Tiszavidék	politic./info.	Weekly	1,200
<b>Stari Bečej</b>	Stari Becseji Járás	politic./info.	Weekly	800
<b>Stara Kanjiža</b>	Potisje Tiszavidék	politic./info.	Weekly	500
<b>Stara Kanjiža</b>	A Siv Újság	politic./info.	Weekly	1,200
<b>Temerin</b>	Temerini Újság	politic./info.	Weekly	500
<b>Subotica</b>	Hirnök	politic./info.	2 / week	?
<b>Novi Sad</b>	Katolikus Tudosito	religious	occasionally	2,500
<b>Pančevo</b>	Reformatus	politic./info.	Daily	?
<b>V. Bečkerek</b>	Hiradó	politic./info.	Daily	?

In a survey of the Hungarian press in the Vojvodina that Mesaroš found, partly different journals were adduced, whereas a different print-run was quoted for the most prominent and most read. Thus for instance it is said that the *Új Hírek* had the circulation of 3,500, *Tiszavidék* only 800, and the *Reggeli Újság* only between 4,000 and 5,000.<sup>46</sup>

The paper with the widest readership in both lists was the liberal *Napló*. It was founded in 1899, and it went through several name changes. It was put under sequester in 1918, but managed to extricate itself, allegedly thanks to the financial aid from Hungary.<sup>47</sup> Typical for it, apart from the largest circulation among the Hungarian papers in Yugoslavia, was the fact that it was read in all parts of the country where the Magyars lived.<sup>48</sup> In other words, it managed to overcome the narrow local boundaries to which the large majority of Hungarian (and other minority) journals was confined. The *Napló* was owned by the joint-stock company "Minerva", and the majority shareholder was Ferenc Fenyves with his family. He, as most of the employees, was a Jew,<sup>49</sup> which was typical of a considerable part of the Hungarian press in the historical Hungary.<sup>50</sup> For that reason the correspondent of the Central Press Bureau deemed the paper supported Jewish-Hungarian industry in the Vojvodina. Its attitude toward the authorities was "ostensibly loyal".<sup>51</sup> According to some rumors, the *Napló* was a great adversary of Horthy in the early 1920s, but was then "bought", so that it wrote loyally toward the Hungarian regime for some time.<sup>52</sup> Hungarian refugees, Karolyi's adherents, influenced its writing for a while.<sup>53</sup> In mid-1920s it was accused of receiving subsidies from the Press Bureau of the Hungarian

46 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, pp. 367-371.

47 AJ, F. 335, f. 18; Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 219. The paper had financial support of the Hungarian government since 1921, although it became critical of the regime in Hungary since the late 1920s. (Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 155.) It received permanent donations from the TESZEK, i.e. in the last resort, from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. (Sajti, *Hungarians*, pp. 41, 155.)

48 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 369.

49 Remarks about the *Napló* as a Jewish paper are often to be found in the Yugoslav government documents. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 2, d. 19; AJ, 63 (pov.), 1939, f. 2.)

50 Jászi noticed that the Jewish press in pre-war Hungary was the most jingoist. (Jászi, *The Dissolution*, p. 174.)

51 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 370.

52 AJ, 14, 122/436; 85/336.

53 Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 155.

government,<sup>54</sup> but in 1933 the correspondent of the Central Press Bureau reported the paper was writing against the Hungarian authorities.<sup>55</sup> At that time its circulation dwindled due to the competition of other Hungarian dailies. Further decrease in circulation occurred in the late 1930s because of the Jewish boycott – according to a report, the Jews believed the Roman-Catholic clergy took over editing of the paper.<sup>56</sup> The Attorney General in Novi Sad wanted to ban the paper in 1935 above all because it was widely read among the Yugoslavs, especially the Bunjevci, whereas the tenor of its writing was extremely critical of the then state policy in all fields.<sup>57</sup>

Until 1929 the great adversary of the *Napló* was the *Hir* of Subotica, the journal of the Hungarian Party.<sup>58</sup> It was published from early 1921 to September 1929, when it was suppressed.<sup>59</sup> Not without reason, because of its extremely nationalist writing, the authorities considered it irredentist, and even the paper of the “Awakening Magyars”, and on several occasions it happened that the greater part of the editorial board was in jail.<sup>60</sup> Because of its way of reporting, this paper stood under suspicion of having been directly in the service of Hungarian propaganda, and the Yugoslav authorities suspected, with reason, that it was receiving money from Hungary.<sup>61</sup> The paper was also targeted by the nationalist and terrorist organization ORJUNA in August 1922, which destroyed its offices with bombs, and its printing shop the next year.<sup>62</sup> There was talk about the merger of the *Bacsmegyei Napló* and *Hir*, which was beset by financial difficulties in 1926,<sup>63</sup> but nothing came of it; apparently it was just a canard.

The third important Hungarian daily was the *Hiradó*, the continuation of the *Torontal* which had been established in 1872. The paper was a mouthpiece of the Hungarian Party in the 1920s, but since the dictatorship had been imposed, it turned to local economic and social questions.<sup>64</sup> It was also accused of receiving financial aid from Hungary and of spreading irredentist propaganda.<sup>65</sup> According to a report by *Triva Militar* from 1933, the paper was kept alive artificially in order to spread the Hungarian propaganda and so that *Veliki Bečkerek* would have a Hungarian daily.<sup>66</sup> It was close to the circle of Imre Varady.<sup>67</sup>

The fourth Hungarian daily of longer standing was the *Reggeli Újság*. The paper was started in Novi Sad in 1920 as *Délbácska*, and it was financed by a joint-stock

54 AJ, 14, 111/415. This is claimed by Rehak too. (Rehak, *Štampa*, p. 355.) Because of writing which was deemed “unpatriotic” by Serbian nationalist circles, *Napló*’s premises were demolished in 1926. (AJ, 14, 77/275.)

55 Mesaorš, *Mađari*, p. 370.

56 VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 2, d. 19.

57 AJ, 63 (pov.), 1939, f. 2.

58 Mesaorš, *Položaj*, pp. 157, 160.

59 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4.

60 AJ, 14, 85/336; 122/436; 105/406; Mesaorš, *Položaj*, pp. 221-222. The same was the case with the scandal-sheet *Az Ucca*.

61 AJ, 14, 125/451; 122/436; 111/415; 124/440.

62 M. Đorđević, p. 33; Branislav Gligorijević, *Organizacija jugoslovenskih nacionalista, Istorijski XX veka*, 5, 1963, p. 336; Mesaorš, *Položaj*, pp. 157, 221.

63 AJ, 14, 122/436.

64 Mesaorš, *Mađari*, p. 367.

65 This was claimed in February 1939. (VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 36, d. 4 and 6.)

66 Mesaorš, *Mađari*, p. 371.

67 Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 155.

company of prominent Magyars, mostly members of the Hungarian Party, who remained true to its line even after the imposition of the dictatorship. Furthermore, this paper too received subsidies from Hungary.<sup>68</sup> Its editors considered themselves the "true Magyars", whereas they regarded other Hungarian dailies as "Jewish". The paper wrote in an outspoken "Christian" (i.e. Anti-Semitic) national spirit,<sup>69</sup> so that it suffered several attacks by nationalist organizations and in January 1922, its entire editorial board ended up in prison.<sup>70</sup> Due to the even stronger pressure during the dictatorship, since 1934 it turned to cultural matters which became its hallmark.<sup>71</sup>

A special phenomenon among the Hungarian journals was the *Új Hírek* from Sombor (which started as the *Friss Újság*, but was suppressed by the Ministry of the Interior). It was particular not only for its writing, but also by the fact that it was printed in the printing house of Sava Mladen, and also by the fact that one its chief editors was a Serb, Mihajlo Markov. Despite the participation of these two Serbs in the publication of the paper, it was close to one of the leaders of the Hungarian minority, Dr Leo Deák, and its contents was, in the eyes of the authorities, politically as incorrect as that of most Hungarian newspapers.<sup>72</sup>

Among the professional Hungarian journals, *A Munka* from Subotica, for agriculturists deserves mention. It was mostly read in Northern Bačka.<sup>73</sup> As can be seen from the previous table, most of the Hungarian journals were politically informative. The same can be concluded from the already mentioned survey published by Mesaroš. This reflects the overriding interest of the Hungarian population (or at least of the pathat read the newspapers) for political matters. Most of the journals had smaller circulation, but their problems with the law were not smaller than those of the big newspapers.<sup>74</sup>

Nevertheless, apart from informative-political papers, several cultural and literary journals appeared during the inter-war period too. Most of them were of short duration, and the only one to achieve real prominence was the literary journal *Kalangye*, published between 1932 and 1941. Until the death of Kornel Szenteleki in 1933, and for three years more, it stood under the influence of this Hungarian writer who died prematurely. From 1936 the editing was taken over by Károly Szirmai, who raised the quality of the journal, but narrowed the circle of the contributors.<sup>75</sup> A left-ist literary magazine the *Híd* was published since 1934 which, among other things, developed literary cooperation with other peoples of Yugoslavia.<sup>76</sup>

The development of Hungarian journalism in Yugoslavia during the inter-war period, with its hub in the Vojvodina,<sup>77</sup> surpassed its development before 1918.

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68 Ibid.; Rehak, *Štampa*, p. 355.

69 AJ, 63 (pov.), 1927, f. 3; Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 47.

70 Mesaroš, *Položaj*, p. 243.

71 Ibid., p. 220; Idem, *Mađari*, p. 367; AJ, 66, 71/184.

72 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 368; AJ, 74, 191/266.

73 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 368; AJ, 74, 191/266.

74 AJ, 14, 85/336.

75 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 378; Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 157.

76 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, pp. 257-258; Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 157.

77 Several Hungarian journals appeared also in other parts of the country inhabited by the Magyars. The *Muravidek*, with the print-run of 800 and *Nepújság* with the print-run of 600 were published in the Prekmurje during the 1920s. (Zorn, *Dve poročili*, p. 93.) The *Szábatság* appeared in Murska Sobota in 1923, but it didn't last long. (AJ, 14, 85/336.)

The unfavorable conditions under which the Hungarians of these territories found themselves after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire, paradoxically only at first sight, contributed to the development of the Hungarian press. Cut off from the mother country and facing new existential problems, the Hungarian minority had to develop its journalism: import from Hungary was strictly controlled, and the press in the mother country could only partly satisfy the interest of members of the Hungarian minority for events in their local communities. Thus a strong local press was called for, which (within the narrow limits set by the censorship) served as a safety valve for venting minority dissatisfaction, and as a kind of compensation for deprivation in other fields such as schools, cultural and artistic associations, or free political organization. For that reason the official Yugoslav representatives didn't have to embellish the data about the Hungarian press for the European bodies, as they did in other matters, such as education.<sup>78</sup>

The German press was not lagging behind the Hungarian one in print-run and the number of journals, and it even surpassed it in versatility. On the one hand, this mirrored a smaller interest in pure politics on the part of the German (especially Swabian) population, and its larger interest in various practical matters, and on the other, it was the reflection of diversity of German associations, many of which had their own magazines. What was typical of the German press, was its polycentrism, i.e. dispersion of the major journals throughout the whole Volksdeutsche-inhabited territory, as opposed to the Magyar journals, of which the most important ones were published in the main Hungarian territory in Yugoslavia, in the Vojvodina.<sup>79</sup> What became obvious from the mid 1930s in most of the German papers was the ideological strait-jacketing under Nazi influence, resisted only by the few, mostly Catholic, journals.

As we have seen, three German newspapers survived the upheaval of 1918. In the Kočevje the *Gottscheer Zeitung* succeeded the *Gottscheer Bote*, which remained the provincial biweekly of the Kočevje ethnic enclave throughout the inter-war period.<sup>80</sup> The

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The Magyar Újság was published in Osijek in the early 1920s, the formal editor of which was an ex-gendarmerie captain Milan P. Aleksandrović, and the real one Dr Kardas, a refugee from the Hungarian part of Baranya. (AJ, 14, 69/235.) An interesting phenomenon in the Prekmurje was also a Hungarian-friendly journal *Mörška krajina* which was published by an innkeeper Štefan Kühar, in two languages: in Hungarian and in the Slovenian dialect of the Prekmurje in Hungarian spelling. He claimed, the Slovenes in the Prekmurje were not Slovenes but Vends unable to understand Slovene. (AJ, 14, 66/216.) All these journals had small print-run and local importance.

78 It seems the number of "some 25" Hungarian journals adduced in a propaganda paper was too low. (AJ, 38, 93/225.) The number of 57 journals mentioned in a document from February 1939 is probably closer to the truth. (AJ, Zbirka Aleksandra Cincar-Markovića, fas. II.) At the end of 1940 the authorities informed journalists that the Hungarian minority had 40-odd journals: 4 dailies, 19 weeklies, 4 biweeklies, 7 monthlies etc. (AJ, 38, 93/225.)

79 The exception was the oppositional *A Nép* of Iván Nagy, which was published in Zagreb because of the ties with the Croatian Peasants' Party and more lenient censorship. (Rehak, Štampa, p. 356.)

80 Žigon, p. 59; Simonič, p. 129. According to some unproven but probable information, the paper received financial aid from the Kočevje emigrants in the USA. (Zorn, Dve poročili, p. 90.) Conservative at first, like most of the Volksdeutsche journals in the 1930s it became the mouthpiece of the Nazi propaganda, which caused prohibition of

Cillier Zeitung was published under that name until February 1929, when it changed the title to the Deutsche Zeitung, so as not to have to use the Slovenian form of the town's name, Celje.<sup>81</sup> This very measure symbolizes the national fighting spirit typical of this paper almost from its start. Just like before the First World War, it was the combative mouthpiece of the ever more endangered Germans of Lower Styria in their struggle against the Slovenes and the Yugoslav state,<sup>82</sup> for which it was often banned.<sup>83</sup> It was published twice a week, and formally belonged to the MP Fraz Schauer, member of the German Party.<sup>84</sup> The paper received subsidies from large German industrialists, but nevertheless it struggled with financial difficulties,<sup>85</sup> and finally died out in 1937.<sup>86</sup> This was in keeping with the numerical and social weakening of the Germans in Slovenia, which was mirrored also in the decrease in the number of German journals.<sup>87</sup> The Deutsche Nachrichten appeared as a Nazi propaganda weekly for the Volksdeutsche in Slovenia in late 1938 in Zagreb – due to more lenient censorship there. It was published until 1941.<sup>88</sup>

The history of the Marburger (Mariborer) Zeitung was somewhat different. It was also a very nationally leaning paper that survived the break-up of Austria-Hungary. After the First World War it was “nationalized” and came to be owned by the concern Slovenska banka (Slovenian Bank) and then by the concern Mariborska tiskarna (The Maribor Printing-House), becoming to all intents, a Slovenian paper in the German language with a large number of Slovenian readers.<sup>89</sup> Another change ensued in the 1930s, when this paper too started sailing under the Nazi colors.<sup>90</sup> During the time between 1919 and 1936 the socialist Volksstimme was published in German, also in Maribor. It died out as German socialists turned national-socialists.<sup>91</sup>

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its importation in Austria. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 26.) Its writing became overtly Nazi since 1939. (Biber, Nacizem, p. 271.)

81 Žigon, pp. 66-67.

82 In a radio-address on March 16, 1933 Hitler himself praised the paper for its merits for the German cause. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 26.) The staff of the Deutsche Zeitung was very proud of this. (Novosti, April 2, 1933.)

83 AJ, 14, 86/343.

84 Ibid.

85 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3. The Hamburger Nachrichten wrote on March 12, 1924 that the printing-shop of the Cillier Zeitung was “primitive” – which also testifies to the lack of money. The reason the paper was discontinued were financial difficulties. (Der Auslandsdeutsche, XX, 7, 1937, p. 370.)

86 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 918.

87 Žigon, p. 77.

88 Biber, Nacizem, p. 271; Franjo Baš, Kulturbund v Celju, p. 216.

89 AJ, F. 398, f. 1. In the first half of the 1920s, the Marburger Zeitung was even engaged in a struggle with the Cillier Zeitung. However, the German consulate in Zagreb deemed its writing became acceptable from the German point of view again in 1926. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3.)

90 Žigon, pp. 69-70; HWBGAD, III, p. 481. Already in early 1934 the Banus of the Drava Province complained the paper opened its pages for the propaganda of the Austrian Nazis. (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1934, f. 16.) The military authorities feared its nefarious influence on both Germans and Slovenes, and suggested its quiet liquidation, like that of the Deutsche Zeitung. (VA, pop. 17, k. 26, f. 2, d. 12.)

91 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 918; HWBGAD, III, p. 481; Žigon, p. 71; Altgayer, p. 48. The Ministry of the Interior deemed in February 1926, the Volkssrimme should be granted free railway transportation, since it was better if the German adherents of that option

Apart from these journals read in Slovenia, there was, as we have seen, a developed press in the Vojvodina too. It became more national only in Yugoslavia. The trailblazer in that direction, and the leading Volksdeutsche paper in the inter-war Yugoslavia was the Deutsches Volksblatt (DVB) of Novi Sad. It came into being on the initiative of prominent Germans in 1919 when the Deutsches Volksblatt für Syrmien was transferred from Ruma to Novi Sad. In order to secure regular publication and to prevent irregularities, the Printing and Publishing Joint-Stock Company (Druckerei- und Verlags-Aktiengesellschaft – DVAG) was established on September 29, 1919, with the main task of publishing the DVB and opening a German book-shop in Novi Sad. Through the Slovenian Germans Oskar Plautz and Franz Perz, who had connections with the Cilli industrialists, the Westen brothers, each of them holding 4000 shares, a firm connection with the Germans in Slovenia was established,<sup>92</sup> so that the DVB never was a regional Swabian paper. The first number appeared on October 25, 1919.<sup>93</sup>

The DVAG came to be the strongest newspaper and publishing house in the Vojvodina in the 1930s.<sup>94</sup> The road to that achievement was not an easy one, and it was successfully tread partly thanks to aid from Germany.<sup>95</sup> The main publication of the DVAG, the DVB, was published in 10,000 to 12,000 copies, and it was read in all German-inhabited areas<sup>96</sup> - although, to be sure, mostly in the Vojvodina. Its writing, as a rule, was moderate, and almost always within the confines of the law.<sup>97</sup> Its

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remain so, "instead of joining the purely German orientation which could not be the friend of this state." (AJ, 14, 86/343.) However, this does not mean the paper wasn't subject to occasional banns, just like any other. (AJ, 63 (pov.) 1931, f. 10.)

92 Plautz, pp. 18-26; Altgayer, p. 46; Bešlin, Vesnik, p. 24.

93 HWBGAD, I, p. 341; Bešlin, Vesnik, p. 22.

94 Bešlin, Vesnik, p. 25. Because of the good printing technique and solid quality, the state agencies, including the Army, used its services. (Ibid.)

95 The DVB asked for financial aid to buy a second-hand printing press in October 1922, in order to become independent and to cut costs. The Ambassador Keller supported the petition. The paper and its printing-shop received help from Germany in 1924-1927. (PA, Abt. IIB, Pressewesen, Politik 12, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Höpfner, pp. 318-319.) Thanks to the VoMi which bought stocks from the Westen brothers and turned them over to the Kulturbund, this central Volksdeutsche organization became the formal owner of the firm in late 1939. (Bešlin, Vesnik, p. 69.) It is not known how big the financial aid the DVB and other German papers received from Germany was. According to Rehak, who adduces no sources, it was significant and larger than in the 1920s. (Rehak, Štampa, p. 356.) The opinion of financial aid from abroad was shared also by the correspondent of the central Press Bureau, Triva Militar. (Bešlin, Vesnik, p. 77.) However, if one takes into account the lack of foreign currency in the Third Reich, the main directions of its imperialist penetration and ways of financing it, one should rather suppose the financial help from Germany wasn't big. (Cf. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933-1938, Frankfurt/M, Berlin 1968, pp. 672-673.) Altgayer testified the Volksdeutsche organizations received financial help only in exceptional cases. (Altgayer, p. 67.) It is known for certain only that the editor of the DVB Dr. Oskar Brreitzwitzer received 6.000 dinars from the German Transportation Bureau in Belgrade in March 1940 as an aid to the paper (AJ, 14, 27/71.) – which wasn't such a big sum.

96 The paper was distributed in 800 places. (Biber, Nacizem, p. 41.) It was also read in the scattered German villages in Bosnia. (Hoffmann, p. 58; H. Maier, p. 49.)

97 Despite this, it also had to suffer a few banns. (PA, Abt. IIB, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4.)



attitude towards the authorities was marked by "political correctness", and it didn't meddle with internal political squabbles.<sup>98</sup> Even in the second half of the 1930s, as it fell under the influence of National-Socialism<sup>99</sup> and although it took over considerable part of its material from German news-agencies and newspapers, its tone and style still remained moderate in comparison with the organs of the "Renewers". As for the language, the DVB was meticulous about it, since the Swabians spoke vernacular at home, and often had no chance to learn the literary language at school. Because it was well-informed, had numerous contributors and good articles, the paper managed to isolate the majority of the Volksdeutsche from non-German informational influences. To be sure, this made it easier to reorient the German minority according to the trends in Germany and the needs of the Reich's foreign policy in the second half of the 1930s.<sup>100</sup> Just how influential the DVB was, is proven by the fact the senator Daka Popović started the (then only) Serbian daily in the Vojvodina, the *Dan*, the main *raison d'être* of which was to criticize the writing of the DVB and the policy of the Kulturbund! However, it had a print-run of some 2,000 to 3,000 copies – like some smaller German weeklies.<sup>101</sup>

A kind of peasants' version of the DVB was started in 1931. The new daily came into being thanks to the merger of three papers, and had the same title as the Celje daily – the *Deutsche Zeitung*, but with the subtitle "Organ for the German Peasantry of Yugoslavia" (*Organ für das deutsche Landvolk Jugoslawiens*). It came out every day except Mondays, in 3,500 to 4,500 copies, and it was meant primarily for the less demanding village readers.<sup>102</sup>

One of the roles of the press is to serve as a means of articulating diverging opinions. With the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche, unlike with the Magyars, that was not the case in the 1920s.<sup>103</sup> When the heterodox opinions surfaced among members of the German minority, they were inspired by Nazi ideas which the students brought from German and Austrian universities. They found their first mouthpiece in the magazine *Pančevoer Post* which was started in 1932. Two years later, it was renamed the *Volksruf*. It was a weekly, published in 5,000 copies, and it was the most widely-read Volksdeutsche paper after the DVB. In it the young "Renewers" publicized their ideas which were mostly carbon copies of the spiritual trends in the Reich, adjusted for consumption in Yugoslavia.<sup>104</sup> It was through the *Volksruf* that the "Renewers" started their

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98 Nevertheless, the paper stepped on the ORJUNA's toes in August 1922 by allegedly writing against the state and France. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2; Georgijević, *Organizacija*, p. 336; M. Đorđević, *Organizacija*, p. 33.) The offices of the DVB were damaged in a blast in March of the next year too. (M. Đorđević, *Organizacija*, p. 38; Plautz, p. 18.)

99 According to the British diplomatic reports, the paper received subsidies from Germany at that time. (Živko Avramovski, *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, II, Beograd, Zagreb [1986], p. 440.)

100 Bešlin, *Vesnik*, pp. 25-50.

101 *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 79. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the *Dan* had to drop its permanent anti-Kulturbund section. (AJ, 38, 170/317.)

102 HWBGAD, I, p. 341; Bešlin, *Vesnik*, p. 31.

103 In fact, unison existed until Hitler's accession. (Bešlin, *Vesnik*, pp. 68-69.)

104 In a letter to the minister of justice and others, the interior minister said of the *Pančevoer Post*: "Reading the above-mentioned newspaper, one gets the impression one reads a newspaper published in Germany." (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1933, f. 14.)

crusade against the old leadership of the Kulturbund and other minority organizations, and to be sure, against the DVB, that was controlled by the old Volksdeutsche leaders. Unlike the DVB which always kept a high level, the Volksruf, as the "Renewers" in general, often used rude insults, disqualifications, demagoguery, and even completely nonsensical accusations.

Since the DVAG remained in the hands of the old leaders, the "Renewers" had to wage their ideological campaign through new Nazi-oriented journals which they themselves started: the monthly Volk und Bewegung (1936), the weekly Deutsche Bauernzeitung (1936) meant for peasantry, the humorist weekly Die Wespe (1937), the calendar Volk und Arbeit (1938), the youth magazine Schaffende Jugend (1939) and the weekly Die Heimat. All these journals were edited by the same people, and all of them, except for Die Heimat and Die Wespe were published in Pančevo, which was the center of the "Renewal" Movement.<sup>105</sup> An increasing number of the "Renewers" journals appeared over time, which struggled against local papers supporting the old leadership of the Kulturbund. A reflection of divisions within the German minority was also the short-lived (1938-1939) weekly the Deutsche Volksbote für Jugoslawien, which espoused the interests of Stefan Kraft in his conflict with the ex-MP Dr Hans Moser (supported by the DVB).<sup>106</sup> Among the *de facto* "Renewers" journals one should list also the Slawonische Volksbote from Osijek which started on September 6, 1936. In the beginning it was moderate, becoming increasingly radical over time, mirroring thus the national awakening of the Slavonian Germans.<sup>107</sup> Since the Slavonian Germans did not know Gothic script, due to lack of German schools, it was printed in Latin characters.<sup>108</sup>

However, Nazi ideas were not particular only to the "Renewers" papers. Gradually they infiltrated the journals under control of the leaders of the Kulturbund and smaller "independent" papers. In the case of the Kulturbund leadership and its journals, it was the habit of following the trends in the mother country on the one hand, and, on the other, the concrete need to remain, through flirting with National-Socialism (and above all, with Anti-Semitism which had a strong home-grown tradition), on good terms with the ruling factors in the Reich from whom material and moral aid for improving the situation of the German national minority was expected, just like in the 1920s.<sup>109</sup>

Among the newspapers that opposed the penetration of Nazi ideas, as did the old leadership of the Kulturbund, the Deutsche Volkszeitung of Veliki Bečkerek, started on August 20, 1933, deserves mention. It was the mouthpiece of the Young German Movement of Dr Hasslinger, and it was, just like the movement itself, directly government-funded. On March 18, 1934, it changed the title into the Jungdeutsche, and in the autumn of that year, already rather compromised as the regime paper, it moved to Novi Sad. In May 1935 it was renamed again to Die Presse, but by then the Young German Movement had lost its influence. The paper vegetated until the end of 1938, when its survival under the completely changed circumstances both in Europe and Yugoslavia, and within the German national minority no longer made any sense.<sup>110</sup>

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105 Bešlin, Vesnik, pp. 50-61; Biber, nacizem, p. 271.

106 AJ, 38, 93/225; Bešlin, Vesnik, pp. 61-62.

107 Biber, nacizem, pp. 68, 270.

108 AKB, II, 1.1.4.

109 Cf. Janjetović, Vajmarska republika, pp. 140-155.

110 Bešlin, Vesnik, pp. 80-83.

The Young-Germans' paper struggled more against the influential old leadership of the Kulturbund, than against the opposing Nazi "Renewers". The strongest resistance against the penetration of Nazi ideas was offered by several Roman-Catholic papers, headed by *Die Donau* from Apatin.<sup>111</sup> This weekly, published in 1,000 copies, was started in mid-1935,<sup>112</sup> but it was only at the beginning of the following year, when the Apatin priest Adam Berenz became editor, that it started opposing Nazi ideas from the Roman-Catholic, Hungarian-nostalgic point of view. Whereas *Die Donau* spared the DVB and vice versa, it waged war to the last against the *Volksruf*, the main mouthpiece of the "Renewers", the war that, due to the situation which was increasingly changing in favor of the Nazis, it couldn't win.<sup>113</sup> Apart from *Die Donau*, *Der Jugendfreund* and *der Familienfreund* (firstly from Crvenka and then from Novi Vrbas) also opposed Nazism from the Roman-Catholic positions.<sup>114</sup> The first appeared as a feuilleton, and then from 1936, as an independent youth journal, first in Belgrade and then in Odžaci, in 4,000 copies.<sup>115</sup> The latter was published since 1927 as a biweekly in 1,000 to 2,500 copies.<sup>116</sup> Even though it couldn't prevent the spread of National-Socialism, the German Roman-Catholic press grew stronger through conflict with it.<sup>117</sup> As for the Protestant *Volksdeutsche* religious journals (*Grüß Gott*, since 1934 *Kirche und Volk*), they accepted national-socialism without much hesitation, trying to convince their readers there was no opposition between Germanism and Christianity.<sup>118</sup>

Apart from the above-mentioned journals, which to a great extent dealt with politics, there was a number of local informative, entertaining, educational and professional journals (such as the *Müller-Zeitung*, *Der jugoslawische Imker*, *Der jugoslawische Tischler*). Whereas the political-informative papers were of local significance, emulating the tone and the direction of the big papers, others catered to various tastes and needs for instruction, information and fun, mirroring thus the differentiated interests of a community on the high level of civilization.<sup>119</sup>

Apart from the above-mentioned journals, some papers of the Kulturbund enjoyed wider circulation. In the first place it was the weekly *Bilder Woche* that was started in early 1937 and that, with its appearance and topics, didn't lag behind its European models. Furthermore, there were professional magazines: the pedagogical *Unsere Schule* (1928-1932) and *Schwäbischer Volkserzieher* (from 1938), the

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111 Idem, *Nemačka katolička štampa u Vojvodini i njen spor sa nacionalsocijalistima 1935-1941. godine*, Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske, XXIV, 59-60, 1999, pp. 107-122.

112 According to Altgayer, it was financed by countesses Chotek. (Altgayer, p. 54.)

113 Bešlin, *Vesnik*, pp. 151-159. The articles from *Die Donau* were re-published in: Michael Merkl (ed.), *Weitblick eines Donauschwaben*, Dieterskirch 1968.

114 Merkl (ed.), pp. 22-26; Josef Haltmayer, *Die katholische Donauschwaben in der Batschka*, in: *Die katholische Donauschwaben in den Nachfolgestaaten 1918-1945. Im Zeichen des Nationalismus*, Freilassing 1972, pp. 245, 266.

115 Bešlin, *Vesnik*, p. 164. Although the print-run of 4.000 is quite good, Merkle, quoting memoirs of the parson Koloman Muillion, adduces 8.000. Obviously it is the case of exaggeration on part of people who wanted to give too great importance to their resistance to National-Socialism. (Merkle (ed.), p. 22.)

116 Bešlin, *Vesnik*, p. 163.

117 Bešlin, *Nemačka katolička štampa*, p. 111.

118 Idem, *Vesnik*, pp. 169-174.

119 Ibid., pp. 182-235.

ethnographical-demographical Volkswart (1932-1935) and Volk und Heimat (since 1938), the peasant-cooperative Landwirt (since 1933, renamed into the Landpost in 1940), the social-cooperative Woge Blatt etc.<sup>120</sup> A brown ideological thread went more or less through these journals too, but despite this, many of them were on a quite high professional level, often publishing articles and studies of considerable value. If several journals published in Slavonia are added to these (above all the "Renewers" Slawonischer Volksbote, Die Slawonische Presse (since 1937) and the ecclesiastical Christliche Zeitung,<sup>121</sup> all from Osijek) one gets a picture of a developed journalism rich both in the number of journals,<sup>122</sup> and in their versatility. Whereas the censorship and deliberate self-isolation led to choking of the plurality of opinions in the 1920s, clashes of opinions developed in the 1930s, the battlefield of which was often exactly the press. They ended up in the Nazi victory so that at the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia almost all Volksdeutsche journals ideologically stood on the side of the Reich.<sup>123</sup>

No other national minority, neither in the Northern nor in the Southern parts of the country could boast of nearly so rich a press as the Hungarian and the German one. The reasons were numerous: small numbers, weak intelligentsia, poverty, illiteracy, dispersion, disunity, aversion of the authorities or several of them combined.

Among the remaining minorities in the Northern part of the country, the largest number of journals appeared in Romanian. However, in their case there was neither such a great continuity nor so large print-runs, or diversity or influence such as with the Magyars and Germans. The first Romanian paper in the territory of Yugoslavia, the Opinca, appeared even before the state was founded – in Vršac on November 24, 1918. It organized elections for the Grand National Assembly in Alba Iulia, but it wasn't of long duration.<sup>124</sup> The next Romanian paper to come out was the weekly Graiul Românesc, which was started in March 1923 as the journal of the Romanian Party. Its owner and editor was at first the MP Jianu, and from 1925 it was edited by Joan Erina. The paper died out when Jianu emigrated to Romania in 1925.<sup>125</sup> The party got a journal anew in August 1927 under the title Nadejdea. It was published in 2,000 to 4,000 copies. The paper was well informed of the events in the country and abroad, but soon internal party squabbles started to be discussed

120 Ibid., pp. 102-134; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 107.

121 The paper was published continuously from 1919 to 1941 in 800 copies. (Bešlin, *Vesnik*, p. 150.)

122 Just like in the case of the Hungarian press, the number of 26 German journals in the 1930s mentioned in official propaganda writings is too low. (AJ, 38, 93/225; F. 335, f. 80.) 26 German journals were mentioned also in Fedor Nikić's *Jugoslovenski dnevnik* on July 4, 1930.

123 Despite the unison of the greatest part of the Volksdeutsche press, some sources doubted the efficiency of the propaganda it spread. Thus a report from Vršac from 1938 claims all provincial German papers were Nazi, although the Nazis were a small minority among the Volksdeutsche. (AJ, 37, 54/351.) In the annual report for 1940 of the Apatin district chief it is said: "Their [Nazi] propaganda, large in quantity, is pretty clumsy and by its hysterical way of writing often provokes ironic remarks by the Germans themselves." (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 7, d. 23.)

124 Popi, Rumuni, p. 40.

125 Ibid., p. 146; Idem, *Formiranje*, p. 333.

in it, in rather foul language.<sup>126</sup> In the same year, the *Lumina* appeared in Pančevo as a propaganda sheet of the industrialist Petru Balnojan-Marișescu from Banatsko Novo Selo.<sup>127</sup> For a short while in 1935 the *Ziarul nostru* was published, edited by the textbook author Savu Nicolaevici who criticized the policy of the Romanian leaders.<sup>128</sup> Thanks to the internal Romanian quarrels, another Romanian weekly was started in April 1936 – the *Foaia popurului român*. It soon came into conflict with the *Nadejdea* and the people from the Central Committee around Butoarca, which prevented it from devoting more space to education, culture and religion as announced in the beginning.<sup>129</sup> Moreover, several other very short-lived journals appeared, which were discontinued due to the lack of subscribers. The Romanian peasant population, which was not very numerous anyway, hadn't a sufficiently strong reading public to support several local papers, especially if one takes into account the fact that some of the Romanians in the Yugoslav Banat read the papers imported from Romania.

The Ruthenians had even greater obstacles than the Romanians. First of all, they had no codified literary language before 1918 with which to publish a press.<sup>130</sup> This one being overcome, others that hindered better development of their journalism remained. Even less numerous than the Romanians, and with even smaller intelligentsia, they managed to establish only two journals during the inter-war period. The first one was the *Ruske novine*, established in 1922 by the Ruthenian People's Association "Prosvita". It was, just like the association under strong clerical influence. Apart from the journal, the association also published calendars.<sup>131</sup> Part of the Ruthenian intelligentsia, particularly from Kucura, wasn't happy with the predominance of the clergy. This anti-clerical part of the Ruthenian intellectuals founded the Cultural-Educational Alliance of the Yugoslav Ruthenians in Novi Vrbas in 1933, with the *Zarja* as its journal. The otherwise Pan-Slav and leftist Alliance, changed its name in the Cultural-National Alliance of the Yugoslav Ruthenians, and its journal into the *Ruska zarja* in 1936. The two Ruthenian journals started a brotherly ideological struggle which mirrored the ideological split among the Ruthenians in Yugoslavia.<sup>132</sup>

The Czechs and Slovaks in the inter-war Yugoslavia, despite the number that was almost two times higher than that of the Romanians in the Banat, couldn't boast of a rich press. The reason was to be found in their dispersion – especially of the Czechs in Croatia, as well as in the large assimilation of the intelligentsia: of the Czech into the Croat and the Slovak into the Magyar. The Czechs founded a joint-stock company in Zagreb after the First World War, that started the journal *Československe listy* which was well edited but went under already in 1921 due to

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126 Popi, Rumuni, pp. 70-71.

127 Ibid., pp. 70, 146; Idem, *Formiranje*, p. 350.

128 Popi, *Formiranje*; Idem, Rumuni, p. 146.

129 AJ, 38, 109/247; Popi, Rumuni, p. 146.

130 Not being able to understand the Northern Ukrainian dialects and the Ukrainian literary language, they raised their vernacular to the level of the literary standard. (Jeremić, p. 6; Lenard, *Slovenske narodne manjine*, p. 855; Nikola Gaćeša, *Rusini između dva svetska rata*, in: Idem, *Radovi*, p. 350.) The *Prosvita* published the grammar, primer and catechism, folk poems and religious books. (Biljnja, Rusini, p. 61.)

131 Gaćeša, Rusini, p. 350; Biljnja, Rusini, p. 60; Kostelnik, p. 576.

132 Gaćeša, Rusini, p. 353; Biljnja, Rusini, pp. 85-86, 90; Idem, *Prilog*, pp. 184-187.

political bickering. The Hlas, which was started shortly after that, fizzled out after just a few numbers, and it was only the Jugoslavski Čehoslovaci from Daruvar that caught on. As for the Slovaks, they established the Narodna jednota in Bački Petrovac in 1919,<sup>133</sup> whereas the Zornička was published for children.<sup>134</sup> Furthermore, the Slovak Evangelical Church published the Evanjelički hlasnik,<sup>135</sup> and the literary tri-monthly Naš život was published from 1933 to 1941 by the Literary Committee of the Matica Slovenska in Yugoslavia.<sup>136</sup>

Let's see what the number of journals according to the language in the main minority region in the Northern part of the country, the Vojvodina looked like, according to Triva Militar:<sup>137</sup>

Year	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
<b>Daily</b>									
Serb.	4	2	2	1	3	1	1	1	1
Hung.	5	6	6	5	5	4	4	4	4
Germ.	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
<b>Weekly</b>									
Serb.	40	34	42	42	46	29	32	35	-
Hung.	14	12	12	13	19	13	15	15	-
Germ.	12	14	17	16	23	21	25	24	-
Others	3	2	2	3	2	2	5	6	-
<b>Biweekly</b>									
Serb.	10	11	9	8	8	8	7	7	-
Hung.	6	5	5	5	6	5	5	3	-
Germ.	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	-
<b>Monthly</b>									
Serb.	19	12	15	16	14	18	22	29	-
Hung.	9	8	4	3	5	5	6	7	-
Germ.	6	4	5	5	5	5	9	6	-
<b>Others</b>	2	2	3	3	4	4	2	3	-

133 The leading idea of the founder of the journal, Jan Čajak, was to direct the Slovaks against "the kikes and Magyarones" who stirred the masses against the intelligentsia and the Serbs. (AV, 81, 201/920.) The paper was permitted, but that the authorities had no soft spot for the "Slavic brothers" either, was proven in August 1932, when a number of the Narodna jednota was banned because of its writing about the reduction of the high school in Bački Petrovac. (Rabotnicke noviny (Bratislava), August 6, 1932.)

134 Lenard, Narodne manjine, p. 732. The Jugoslavski Čehoslovaci had a monthly feullton Naš rolnik. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.)

135 AJ, F. 398, f. 1.

136 Bednárík, p. 57. A similar magazine started a few years before, died out. (Velkov (Prague), February 16, 1933.)

137 Bešlin, Vesnik, p. 75.

Year	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
<b>Occasional</b>									
Serb.	4	5	14	11	22	12	14	16	-
Hung.	2	2	3	3	1	1	1	2	-
Germ.	3	5	6	4	4	6	7	6	
Others	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
<b>Total</b>									
Serb.	80	67	88	81	98	73	82	94	-
Hung.	37	33	31	31	37	30	34	34	30
Germ.	27	30	35	30	39	39	48	43	40
Others	5	5	6	6	7	7	7	12	-
<b>Total</b>	149	135	160	148	181	149	172	185	-

Despite several dozens of journals published in the “Southern Serbia” during the inter-war period,<sup>138</sup> the amount of minority press there was much scantier than in the Northern parts of the country. Thus the Albanian minority, e.g., had no press at all, which was admitted by the Yugoslav authorities.<sup>139</sup> And yet, although it may seem paradoxical, almost all journals published in the “Southern Serbia” during the 1920s were printed in the printing house of an Albanian, Rista Kirijaš.<sup>140</sup> As for the minority press, to all intents, it was confined to the journals in Turkish. The most important one was certainly the *Hak*, the paper of the *Cemyiet* which was published between February 23, 1920 and December 11, 1924. It championed the rights of the Southern Muslims and the political line of the party.<sup>141</sup> For these reasons the paper and the people who edited it found no grace in the government's sight.<sup>142</sup> Unfortunately, most of its copies didn't survive, which makes a more elaborate analysis impossible.<sup>143</sup> Since May 1923 it was published as a daily (except Wednesdays), and certain numbers had two pages in Serbian too. It was banned within the framework of the general government pressure on the *Cemyiet*.<sup>144</sup> For a short while, it was replaced by the *Hak Yolu*, the formal owner of which was a prominent Radical politician Nastas N. Petrović,<sup>145</sup> which casts an interesting light on inter-ethnic and inter-confessional intermingling of political elites in the South of the country. After it had been suppressed, it was replaced by the, also short-lived, *Mücadele*, also owned by Nastas N. Petrović.<sup>146</sup> Apart from these *Cemyiet* papers, 14 issues of the *Rehber* were published in Turkish in 1920; it had a subtitle “Independent Turkish journal which served the interests of the Muslims”,<sup>147</sup> but it was in fact the journal of the Democratic Party.

138 V. Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 344.

139 *Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui*, p. 86.

140 Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 346.

141 Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 169.

142 Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 345.

143 Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 155; *Idem*, *Džemijet*, p. 8.

144 Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 174; *Idem*, *Džemijet*, p. 234; Eren, p. 375; Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 345.

145 Eren, p. 375.

146 *Ibid.*, p. 378; Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 238.

147 Eren, p. 380; Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 82.

Apart from these journals meant for all Southern Muslims, neither the Turkish, nor the Albanian national minorities had their own journals. This was mostly due to the general poverty and wide-spread illiteracy.<sup>148</sup> On the other hand, the authorities had no interest in the development of the minority press, and especially not for these two minorities.<sup>149</sup>

Apart from the real minority journals, there were journals of Yugoslav parties for national minorities. Thus the CRPP published the *Freies Heim* from October 1923 to January 1925 in German;<sup>150</sup> the same party started a paper in Hungarian, the *Bacska*, in Sombor in September 1926;<sup>151</sup> the Democratic Party started its paper in Turkish, the *Rehber*, in mid-January 1920,<sup>152</sup> and before the elections of 1927 it published the *Demokratul* in Romanian;<sup>153</sup> PRP published the *Sanda-yi Millet* in Turkish from June 1927 to January 1929.<sup>154</sup> During the same period, the Democratic Party published the *Isik*, also in Turkish,<sup>155</sup> whereas the Yugoslav Socialist Workers' Party published 12 issues of the *Sosyalist Fecri* in 1920.<sup>156</sup> This practice was continued in the 1930s when it seems, the most diligent in this field was the Pan-Slav, and at the same time German-friendly movement "Zbor" of Dimitrije Ljotić which published in turn from mid-1936 to the beginning of 1938, the *Erwache*, *Sturm* and *Angriff* for members of the German minority, all of which were duly banned. Also for the Germans, the *Deutsche Beobachter* of the Vojvodina Movement was published from 1935 until the end of 1938.<sup>157</sup> The adherents of Svetislav Hođera (the "Borbaši") published the weekly *Kampf* for their German followers.<sup>158</sup>

The choice of press in minority languages was enriched almost throughout the inter-war period by journals imported from abroad – in the first place from the countries that had minorities in Yugoslavia. The import should be understood in the broadest sense, i.e. as legal and illegal. The latter never stopped, although the authorities did their best to prevent it.<sup>159</sup> As for the legal import, it depended

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148 Pollo, Puto (eds.), pp. 261-263. The fact only two newspapers were published in Albania at the eve of the Italian occupation, testifies to how great a role was played by these two objective factors. (Fisher, p. 49.)

149 Only exceptionally did they deviate from this principle – as in 1936 when they published a brochure in Albanian in Sarajevo, leveled against the Albanian nationalist organization *Bashkimi Kombëtar*. (AJ, 37, 22/175.)

150 Leček, o.c.

151 AJ, 14, 85/336.

152 Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 82.

153 Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 70.

154 Eren, p. 384.

155 *Ibid.*, p. 375.

156 *Ibid.*, p. 384; Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 300.

157 Bešlin, *Vesnik*, 90.

158 Altgayer, p. 52.

159 As we have seen, the authorities in the Vojvodina had introduced censorship and prohibited importation of the press from the Hungarian and Romanian territory already in late 1918. In late 1938 the military authorities complained that Albanian and Turkish press was being smuggled into the Southern parts of the country and distributed among members of the Albanian and Turkish minorities. (VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 1, d. 16.) there were indications that Albanian books were smuggled and that the main center for their distribution was the Albanian consulate in Skopje. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 72/187.) Allegedly



on the country, paper and the time.<sup>160</sup> The censorship offices kept updating the lists of prohibited and (again) permitted journals.<sup>161</sup> That was the way to isolate the readers in Yugoslavia from undesirable influences, but also to compel certain newspapers to write more propitiously of the situation in Yugoslavia.<sup>162</sup> Since most of the countries from which the press was imported weren't overly-friendly disposed towards Yugoslavia, and indeed not all the press in friendly countries (e.g. Romania)<sup>163</sup> was friendly, such measures were understandable.<sup>164</sup> This held true particularly for the Hungarian press, the larger part of which wrote inimically of Yugoslavia.<sup>165</sup> Sometimes foreign press published secret government decrees that it obtained in a spurious way, which was, to be sure, extremely dangerous from the government's point of view – especially since foreign press wasn't read only by members of the minorities.<sup>166</sup> However, the government measures were not implemented too strictly so that the interested importers managed to find ways to supply their readers.<sup>167</sup> As for the permitted journals, readers could subscribe for them, just like for the Yugoslav ones.<sup>168</sup>

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there was a clandestine Albanian association Agimi for distribution of Albanian books in the 1920s. (Pirraku, Kulturno prosvetni pokret, p. 359.)

- 160 Importation of the Hungarian press was completely forbidden in 1925. (AJ, 14, 219/781; 85/335.)
- 161 Some of the lists of the prohibited newspapers see in: AJ, 14, 91/372; 85/335; 86/342. On a list of prohibited papers (probably from 1921) there are 19 Hungarian, 33 Austrian, 3 Romanian, 2 Bulgarian and 1 Czechoslovak journal. (AJ, 14, 91/372.)
- 162 This was achieved with some Austrian papers in mid-1920s, which agreed to write more moderately about Yugoslavia in order to safeguard their material interests. (AJ, 14, 85/335.) However, this measure couldn't influence all Austrian newspapers so that many remained forbidden in Yugoslavia. (Wutte, Lobmeyr, p. 43.) The Mariborski večernik complained on September 30, 1933, that the Maribor Germans awaited in pubs in the evening the arrival of German and Austrian newspapers in order to find in them things that slipped through Yugoslav censorship.
- 163 AJ, 38, 52/120; 14, 87/346; Aprilski rat, pp. 43-46.
- 164 The authorities were particularly afraid of Hungarian press and books, imported and local, which allegedly flooded the Vojvodina in the 1920s. For that reason, according to the great county chief of Subotica, importation from Hungary should have been forbidden, because it would only strengthen spiritual ties between the Magyars from both sides of the border and their desire for unification into a single nation-state. (AJ, 14, 85/333; 110/414.) Some ten years later, the situation was no better and importation from Hungary was small. (Budapesti Hirlap, March 24, 1934; Dušan Bajagić, Mađarska štampa o ubistvu kralja Aleksandra I Karađorđevića (B.A. paper, Mscr.), Beograd 2000, p. 45.)
- 165 AJ, 14, 85/333; Bajagić, pp. 35-44.
- 166 AJ, 14, 126/457; 63 (pov.) 1931, f. 10.
- 167 AJ, 38, 22/177; 63 (pov.) 1931, f. 10. The Attorney General in Ljubljana complained in February 1934 the Maribor Germans could read almost the entire German press. (AJ, 63 (pov.) 1934, f. 16.)
- 168 Popi, Rumuni, pp. 146-147. One could subscribe to 50-odd German and Austrian papers through the DVAG in 1934, whereas agencies Avala and Putnik which were also in that business, complained of the DVAG's competition. (Bešlin, Vesnik, p. 38.) How well organized the distribution of German and Austrian newspapers had been, was testified by the fact that they reached even the scattered German villages in Bosnia. (Hoffmann, p. 58; H. Maier, p. 45.) Hungarian press was imported from Hungary by the firm Kurir from

Let us take a glance at the literary production of the national minorities in Yugoslavia between the two world wars. It was much scantier than the press. This is understandable in view that book publishing takes longer and that the potential readership is much more limited than that of the press. For these reasons, for the reading-friendly minorities (especially those in the North of the country) it was easier and less complicated to import books than to print them.<sup>169</sup> Nevertheless, some books had to be published in the country – primers, readers and similar textbooks.<sup>170</sup> This was typical of numerically small minorities (the Romanians, Ruthenians), which hardly published any other works.<sup>171</sup> Apart from certain number of schoolbooks (which remained insufficient), several collections of poems and stories and other reading matter were published. Furthermore, Hungarian writers gathered around several (usually short-lived) journals.<sup>172</sup> Typical for the Germans in the 1930s, apart from (also insufficient number of) textbooks and calendars, was the publication of historical and ethnological surveys and so-called “homeland books” on the occasion of anniversaries of various German settlements.<sup>173</sup> This was part of the deliberate policy of national awakening led by the Volksdeutsche, and especially Swabian, intellectual elite. The editorial board of the *Narodna jednota* began publishing a series of books on the Slovaks and Czechs too in early 1930s,<sup>174</sup> which was in the same vein. The Czechs and Slovaks published also the *People’s Calendar*, which could be found in “every house”.<sup>175</sup> Throughout the inter-war period Hungarian and German books were imported in considerable numbers, which enhanced the reading opportunities not only of the minority population, although the choice was not always to the authorities’ liking.<sup>176</sup> There were several German book-shops, and in September 1940 a Hungarian one was opened in Novi Sad. It received subsidized books from Hungary which it sold at moderate prices.<sup>177</sup> As for Albanian books, it was prohibited to import them and smuggling, which did occur, was severely punished.<sup>178</sup>

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Subotica in mid-1920s. (AJ, 14, 85/333.) However, it is doubtful if that was possible in all parts of the country, e.g. with the press from Albania in the Southern parts, as claimed by the official propaganda. (Yugoslavie d’aujourd’hui, p. 86.) Nevertheless, it is certain that Albanian journals were smuggled and distributed among the Muslims of “Southern Serbia”, especially in towns. The same was true of Turkish journals in old orthography. (VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 1, d. 16.) Oversights happened when issuing permits for importation, so that some outspokenly anti-Yugoslav papers could be distributed legally. (AJ, 14, 85/333.)

169 AJ, F. 398, f. 1.

170 Popi, Rumuni, p. 147; Gaćeša, Rusini, p. 350.

171 Popi, Rumuni, p. 131; Jeremić, p. 11.

172 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 378-379.

173 Anton Scherer, *Donauschwäbische Bibliographie 1935-1955*, München 1968; Simonič, p. 129.

174 Obzor, July 12, 1932.

175 Obzor, November 19, 1933.

176 AJ, F. 398, f. 1. Packages of Nazi propaganda literature became increasingly frequent in the 1930s. The post sent them back or destroyed them, at which the German Embassy protested, especially since part of the titles destroyed in that way could be found on the free market in other places. (AJ, Zbirka Cincar-Markovića, fasc. II; 37, 22/177.)

177 VA, pop. 17, k. 528, f. 2, d. 10.

178 Hadri, Kosovo, p. 82. Indeed, the number of books published in Albania between the two world wars was extremely modest. (According to the official statistics 400 titles between 1912 and 1939.) (Hetzner, pp. 123-124.)

It can be concluded that in the field of the press, as in many others, the aim of the authorities was to weaken the national minorities and to shape them ideologically in accordance with the wishes of the ruling circles.<sup>179</sup> Minority journals were to be kept under control even more than the rest of the press, whereas the importation of foreign journals was to be selective – especially since the press in minority languages (local and imported) wasn't read only by members of the minorities. Despite this, some minorities which had the necessary tradition and means (the Magyars and Germans especially), managed to develop quite a strong press published in large number of copies, characterized by large variety of themes (albeit not always of ideological approaches). In the Southern parts, the minority press never managed to develop nearly so well, due to poverty, illiteracy, lack of tradition and also, greater government pressure. However, the fact remains that the minority population there, still living predominantly in a pre-literate society, felt the lack of the press much less acutely than was the case in the Northern parts.

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179 The correspondent of the Central Press Bureau, Triva Militar, wrote in his study about the minority press in 1935: "According to this situation, tasks and duties, both of our official circles and social classes are called for in order to suppress the minority press in these parts. We have a double duty at that task: on the one hand, we must strive unconditionally to develop and further our national press in this territory, and on the other, to force a constant decrease in number of minority papers." (Bešlin, Vesnik, p. 78.)



## Chapter Ten

# Cultural and Educational Associations and Organizations of the National Minorities

The bourgeois society as created in the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> century brought about more massive association of people for various purposes than ever. Cultural-educational societies were very numerous in the process. This was quite understandable in a century that set high store by science, progress and moral and esthetic betterment of the individual. In ethnically mixed areas these associations had also special tasks, which became increasingly important as nationalism grew, which was often detrimental to culture.<sup>1</sup> All this was continued into the 20<sup>th</sup> century: national cultural and educational associations and organizations continued playing an important role in the society, and especially in minority communities where they often tried to be the mainstay of national life, not only in the field of education and culture.

According to the official data of the Yugoslav authorities, there were some 700 minority cultural, educational, entertainment and humanitarian societies in the kingdom. Out of that 415 were German, 190 Hungarian, 25 Italian, 48 Romanian etc.<sup>2</sup> To be sure, these were only the permitted associations. Although the possibility can't be ruled out that the total was somewhat inflated, the number is quite remarkable nevertheless. The quoted data indicate also the territorial dispersal of the associations: almost all of them (with the exception of the Italian ones) were to be found in the Northern parts of the country. If one keeps in mind that Ruthenian, Slovak and Czech associations were not mentioned, it is clear that for minorities from the Southern parts of the country very few or no items remained.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, one should keep in mind that even if the numbers are true, they are also deceitful. Many societies, due to chicanery on part of the authorities or apathy of the members, didn't work, or evinced only minimal activity. On the other hand, there were associations that were active, although they were not approved or were even clandestine.<sup>4</sup> The

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1 As a relevant example for our topic see a survey of Hungarian and German associations in Southern Hungary at the turn of the century, in: I. Senz, pp. 36, 60-65. About the rivalry between German and Slovenian cultural societies in Celje cf: HWBGAD, II, p. 57.

2 AJ, 38, 93/225.

3 In its remarks for the Secretary General of the League of Nations at the petition of the three refugee Albanian priests in 1930, the Yugoslav government stated literally; "Aucune ville ou village habité par les Albanais n'a jamais possédé d'association culturelle ou musicale." (AJ, 305, 8/18.) Most probably this was not far from the truth. Ali Hadri mentions only a few public libraries, bands and theatre troupes in all Kosovo in the late 1930s. (Hadri, Kosovo, p. 82.) This goes to show that the local Serbian population (indigenous and immigrant) couldn't boast of rich cultural life either.

4 Malcolm mentions clubs, youth associations and humanitarian organizations which were engaged, more or less secretly, in cultural and educational work. (Malcolm, Kosovo, p.

objective of this chapter will not be to deal with all the mentioned associations and organizations; we shall confine ourselves to mention the main direction of their work, the kinds of associations particular to a minority, as well as, the conditions under which they worked. More attention will be paid to the main cultural-educational organizations which aspired not only to centralize the whole cultural life of respective minorities, but sometimes developed other activities (social, economic and even political), striving to embrace the whole national minorities from which they had sprang up.

Great regional differences in civilization were already mentioned on several places in this work, and they have to be kept in mind also when one speaks about cultural and educational associations and organizations. Better economic and cultural development of the Northern parts of Yugoslavia which had belonged to Austria-Hungary until 1918, produced an incomparably better development of cultural-educational societies<sup>5</sup> and organizations, as compared to the former Ottoman territories. Whereas in the latter, cultural association (usually unseparated from the political ones and called clubs) started developing only after 1908,<sup>6</sup> and then only for a while; in the former Habsburg territories, there were associations that could boast of a history longer than 200 years in 1918.<sup>7</sup>

However, it turned out the new authorities were awed not at all by the antiquity of some cultural institutions. In the territory of Slovenia, almost all German associations, cultural and others, were given short shrift and either shut down or "nationalized."<sup>8</sup> The

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272.) This is not to be ruled out, although the accessible archival sources mention just a few Albanian associations – mostly sports clubs. Pirraku speaks of secret clubs and associations which had libraries with, to be sure, "progressive" Yugoslav, Albanian and foreign literature, as well as the society Agimi for distribution of Albanian books. (Pirraku, *Kulturno prosvetni pokret*, p. 359.) Spreading books and literacy among the Albanians was done by the society Drita in the 1930s. (Ibid., p. 369.) Mustafa Memić mentions that the pupils of the Great Madrasa of King Alexander in Skopje, mostly the Turks and Albanians, founded the cultural association *Jard'm* in May 1938, which was under the influence of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. (Memić, *Velika medresa*, pp. 68-69.)

5 In Ljubljana alone there were over 30 different German associations. (HWBGAD, III, p. 329.)

6 Albanian cultural-educational societies started appearing sporadically from early 1880s, but because of the resistance of the Ottoman authorities, as a rule in Diaspora. (Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening*, passim; Polo, Puto (eds.), pp. 154-155, 161-163.)

7 Thus for instance, the Philharmonic Society of Ljubljana was founded in 1702. (Lenz, p. 65.) The *Männergesangsverein* of Maribor was founded in 1846, and the second of the three German choirs, the *Liedertafel* in 1865. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.)

8 Dolenc, pp. 47, 55, 57; Morocutti, pp. 39-41. This hit particularly the local branches of the *Schulverein*, the *Südmark* and other associations whose centers remained abroad. Their property was sequestered and then sold. It was done in accordance with the Law on Abolishing Germanizing Associations. (Hartmann, p. 236; Lenz, p. 47.) Only in Kočevje these two associations had 22 branches each. (*Jubiläums-Festbuch*, p. 15.) Otterstädt adduces 20 branches of the *Schulverein* and 22 of the *Südmark*. (Otterstädt, *Gottschée. Verlorene Heimat*, p. 38.) The Slovenian memorial book of the 500th anniversary of the Kočevje describes the events in autumn 1918 thus: "The new state authorities quenched quickly all their schemes [i.e. of proclaiming Kočevje's independence], disbanded almost all their societies, achieving thus that the situation was stabilized and normalized." (emphasized by this author) (500 let, p. 42.) The Germans from Slovenia complained in a memo for the Yugoslav government and political parties that

property of many was confiscated.<sup>9</sup> Theaters in Maribor, Celje and Ptuj passed into Slovenian hands by 1923.<sup>10</sup> The situation in other parts of the former Habsburg Monarchy was similar. The activities of minority societies were halted also by large drain of the intelligentsia that had led them before the war, and it took several years before these associations obtained the necessary permits, filled the gaps in personnel and started working again. This held true especially for the Hungarian and Romanian associations in the former Hungarian territories and the German societies in Slovenia, since these minorities were considered irredentist in those areas.<sup>11</sup>

However, the picture was not universally bleak: it depended on the territory and the national minority in question. Soon after the First World War, foundation of cultural-educational organizations of the minorities which had been oppressed or neglected in the Habsburg Monarchy ensued. Thus the Ruthenians founded their cultural association the Ruthenian People's Educational Society "Prosvita" (= Education) in Novi Sad on August 2, 1919, as a branch of the Association of the same name from Lavov.<sup>12</sup> The society soon opened affiliations in all places with a considerable number of the Ruthenians, and, among other things, it was busy opening saving-banks, establishing amateur troupes, organizing performances, founding cooperatives, artisan societies etc.<sup>13</sup> It was typical of it, as indeed of other minority organizations set up with primarily cultural-educational goals, that it dealt with economic and social matters too. The reasons were to be found in the small number of intellectuals on the one hand, and in the desire to create all-embracing national organizations, on the other. In Zagreb 1922, the Ruthenian section of the (Croat) Academic Society Domagoj separated from it under the name The Ukrainian Students' Society. In 1922 in the same town, the Ukrainian Union of Education was founded, which gathered students and older "white" (i.e. anti-communist) Ukrainian emigrants.<sup>14</sup> In order to spread the work of the Prosvita among the youth, the Union of Ruthenian-

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some 200 German associations of various kinds were disbanded. (PA, Abt. IIb, Deutschtum in Jugoslawien, Politik 25, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.)

- 9 Lenz, p. 65; Franz Hriber, *Das Vereinswesen in Gottschee*, in: *Jubiläums -Festbuch*, pp. 217-219; Otterstadt, *Gottschee. Verlorene Heimat*, p. 8. Ein Notschrei, p. 8.) The greatest kick-up was started over confiscation of the German House (Deutsches Haus) in Celje. The case passed courts of several levels in Yugoslavia and reached the Council of the League of Nations, so that in early 1930s Yugoslavia agreed to pay 500,000 dinars to the School Foundation of the Germans in Yugoslavia as indemnification for confiscation of the German House. (Cf. Ein Notschrei; PA, Abt. IIb, Deutschtum in Jugoslawien, Politik 25, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5; Dolenc, pp. 60-61.)
- 10 Dolenc, pp. 15, 47. The authorities shut down the German theater in Ljubljana after Slovenian demonstrations, although it was mainly attended by the Slovenes. (Ibid., p. 45.) Negotiations with the owners ensued, and it was eventually nationalized.
- 11 German associations in Slovenia were mostly singing societies. (Zorn, *Dve poročili*, passim.)
- 12 Biljnja, Rusini, pp. 23, 59; Gačič, Rusini, p. 349. Kostelnik wrongly adduces the year 1920. (Cf. Kostelnik, *Klasno*, p. 574.) According to Lenard, the Prosvita was established after the model of the organization of the same name in Lavov, not as its affiliation. (Lenard, *Slovenske manjine*, p. 855.)
- 13 Biljnja, Rusini, p. 45.
- 14 Ibid., p. 55.

Ukrainian Pupils was founded in 1927, but it evinced no great activity, except for some performances in villages during summer holidays.<sup>15</sup>

The Slovaks also made use of the epochal change of the historical situation, establishing in July 1919 their national festival, during which they would gather throughout the inter-war period to discuss cultural needs, to have folk festival, exhibitions, lectures and sport competitions.<sup>16</sup> At the first festival in 1919, apart from social, economic and cultural questions, political ones were discussed too. In the years that followed, politics was dropped.<sup>17</sup> As for the Czechs, they couldn't boast of a large number of societies until 1918,<sup>18</sup> and the Croatian authorities were not very forthcoming after the war either (for instance when the Czechs in Bjelovar tried to found their association).<sup>19</sup> There were almost no contacts between the Czechs and Slovaks in the Yugoslav territory until 1918.<sup>20</sup> Together with the Czechs, the Slovaks from 36 educational societies, founded the Czechoslovak Union (*Čehoslovenski svaz*) in Osijek in 1921 – as a non-political national organization that was to help organize the Czechs and Slovaks and to represent them before the governments in Belgrade and in Prague.<sup>21</sup> The Union had not only cultural, but also economic and organizatorial tasks,<sup>22</sup> but it achieved certain successes also in the field of culture. Thus it founded the *Matica školska* as its sub-committee, and in 1928 it established itinerant libraries (more than 50 of them). Despite the fact that its seat was transferred from Belgrade to Zagreb, the majority of the Czechs considered it pro-Belgrade oriented, whereas they were mostly leaning toward the Croatian (Republican) Peasants' Party.<sup>23</sup> Until early 1930s the Union managed to attract some 7,000 members in 66 affiliations.<sup>24</sup>

The main form of organizing cultural activity among the Czechs were brass-bands, which existed in almost every place inhabited by them, and which played at festivities, amateur theater performances and (what was typical of the Czechs), performances of puppet theaters, of which they had 16 in 1937.<sup>25</sup>

In terms of cultural associations, the Poles were in an even worse position than the Czechs at the time Yugoslavia was founded. As in other cultural fields,

15 Ibid., pp. 55-57; Gaćeša, Rusini, p. 351.

16 Obzor, August 6, 1932. The festival was founded on the model of the one in the Slovak cultural center in Turčianski Sv. Martin in Slovakia. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.)

17 Obzor, July 31, 1929.

18 The following associations existed: *Česká beseda* in Zagreb (est. 1874), *Lumir* in Belgrade (est. 1885), as well as *Česká beseda* in Dubrovnik (est. 1889), *Daruvar* and *Prekopakra* (est. 1907). (EJ, 3, p. 264.) The *Česká beseda* in Zagreb was prohibited during the First World War, and after it, together with the *Čehoslovenská obe*, it founded a private school in 1922. The *beseda* in Daruvar continued a vivid activity also after the war, establishing a school in 1922, a day care center in 1927, and an economic school, a reading room and a library later on. (EJ, 2, Zagreb 1956.)

19 Its statutes were approved only in July 1921 after the intercession of the Czechoslovak consulate in Zagreb. (Lenard, *Narodne manjine*, p. 733.)

20 Wolf, p. 116.

21 The Union was joined by the then existing organizations of *Česka beseda*. (Gligorijević, *Politička istupanja*, p. 145; *Jugoslavski Čehoslovaci*, May 25, 1932.)

22 Gligorijević, *Politička istupanja*, p. 145.

23 Hanzl, *Matuše*, Orct, pp. 32-33; Lenard, *Narodne manjine*, p. 733.

24 *Narodni politika* (Prague), January 21, 1931.

25 Hanzl, *Matuše*, Orct, pp. 36-38.



(education, press) their situation didn't improve in the domain of cultural association after entering the Yugoslav state due to their small numbers and dispersion. There were two societies, "Polish Hearths", in Belgrade and Zagreb, in autumn 1938, and there were plans of founding one in Sarajevo too.<sup>26</sup> This means that in the main Polish settlements in Bosnia there was no cultural work of any significance.

As for the Vojvodina Swabians, they had a considerable number of cultural-artistic societies (mainly male choirs),<sup>27</sup> and they utilized connections of their leaders and cultural climate that was propitious for them, to establish an umbrella national cultural association – the Swabian-German Cultural Union (Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund).<sup>28</sup> Before the permission was granted, some changes had to be introduced into its program (the possibility of founding private schools was dropped, as well as the possibility of enrolling juridical persons or foreigners.)<sup>29</sup> The foundation was eventually realized in Novi Sad on June 20, 1920, and the statutes envisaged that the organization would have national, cultural and economic goals.<sup>30</sup> The organization came into being on the model of the cultural organization of the Sudeten-Germans (Deutscher Kulturverband, est. 1919), and the rules were mostly copied from the Serbian Cultural Society "Prosvjeta", which was active in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the First World War.<sup>31</sup> The writing of a German school program was set as the first task,<sup>32</sup> showing thus at the very beginning the aspiration of the German elite for cultural autonomy.

At the same time, the Kulturbund had the most turbulent history and the greatest importance among the cultural-educational organizations of the national minorities. Numerous Volksdeutsche economic, humanitarian and other organizations, which gathered individuals or associations, evolved from it over time. From the beginning the Kulturbund strove to be more than its name suggested – not only a cultural, but a general national organization.<sup>33</sup> For that reason it was not by chance that the

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26 AJ, 38, 93/225. The Union of Poles in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was founded in Zagreb in 1938 which encouraged cultural activities too. (Drljača, Marija Dombrovska, p. 148.)

27 The oldest was the one in Bela Crkva, founded in 1854. The rest of them were founded in the second half of the 19th century and in the first years of the 20th. (Plautz, p. 7.)

28 Thanks to their connections in political circles, the Volksdeutsche leaders managed to be received by the ruling politicians of the day, Protić, Davidović and Drašković, and even Pašić later on. None of these was against founding of a German cultural organization in principle, but at first they deemed it not oportune for fear that Hungarian irredentism would spread within it, or that the Magyars would demand to establish a similar organization. (Altgayer, p. 13.) The fear turned out to be justified: until the end of the inter-war period the Kulturbund remained the desired ideal of Hungarian minority leaders.

29 Altgayer, p. 13.

30 Annabring, *Volksgeschichte der Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien*, p. 40. The member of the Union's Committee of the Kulturbund, Dr. Georg Grassl, summarized it thus: "Under culture one shouldn't understand only the spiritual, but also the material and above all, the moral one." (Plautz, p. 30.)

31 Plautz, p. 26; J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 51; Idem, *Politische Aktivitäten*, p. 300. This was no coincidence: one of the founders, Dr. Georg Grassl was the head of the Educational Department of the Provincial Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina before the First World War. (J.V. Senz, *Das Schulwesen*, p. 52.)

32 Plautz, p. 34.

33 In the beginning this seemed rather difficult, especially since larger part of the Roman-Catholic clergy was not nationally conscious or mistrusted the Kulturbund as a

fateful struggle between the old minority leadership and the young, pro-Nazi “Renewers” was waged within it and around it. It ended with the victory of the latter, and turning of the Kulturbund into the “Folk Group”, organizationally, if not ideologically too, straitjacketed according to the taste and the needs of the German Reich. Because of its universality, the Kulturbund became the model for other national minorities in the Northern parts of the country, most of which tried to achieve something similar,<sup>34</sup> but, due to many factors, not nearly so successfully.

The renewal of Romanian cultural societies and their activities proceeded even slower than that of the Ruthenian, Czechs and Slovak cultural associations. Romanian cultural societies were founded or renewed in larger numbers only from 1923 on.<sup>35</sup> At the founding congress of the Romanian Party in February 1923, the Romanian Cultural Association was also founded, with the task to unify and encourage the work of Romanian cultural societies and to obtain permission for their rules.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, its goal was to establish economic and financial institutions, agricultural, commercial and industrial associations, undertake steps to increase the popular welfare, to grant scholarships, found and maintain schools, professional courses, establish and further libraries, to build and maintain cultural centers, reading rooms etc., organize lectures, choral, musical and theatrical performances, publish and distribute books, magazines, pictures, musical books, found and further musical, singing, sports, female, theatrical societies and to improve social security.<sup>37</sup> This program rightly presupposed the connection between the material well-being and cultural progress, but it overlooked the fact that both the financial means and the cadres were lacking to implement it. The Yugoslav authorities spared the founders the disappointment that would ensue from unfulfillment of such an ambitious program, by not granting approval to the association’s statutes – with the excuses,

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Protestant and Anti-Catholic organization. (Bešlin, *Nemačka katolička štampa*, p. 110; HWBGAD, I, 283; Anthony Komjathy, Rebecca Stockwell, *German Minorities and the Third Reich. Ethnic Germans of East Central Europe Between the Wars*, New York, London 1980, p. 127; Grentrup, pp. 93-94; Haltmayer, p. 240.) The claim almost whole leadership of the Kulturbund was Protestant (Peter Menzel, *The German Minority in Inter-War Yugoslavia*, *Nationalities Papers*, XXI, 2, 1993, p. 134.) has to be checked out.

34 The Hungarians showed this most overtly. Such desires were supported by Budapest. (Sajti, *Hungarians*, p. 69.) The journal of the Yugoslav Hungarians, the *Kalangye* wrote in October 1935 that the Magyar minority wanted to organize an educational institution like the Kulturbund. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184.) *Pesti Hirlap* also deemed on May 10, 1940, there would be no successful Hungarian cultural life if it wasn’t centralized, like in the Kulturbund. When the Hungarian Cultural Community was allowed to organize in the Province of Croatia in March 1940, the authorities believed it would be similar to the Kulturbund. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 6.) Following the example of the Kulturbund, Hungarian cultural associations introduced taxation of their members in summer 1940. (VA, pop. 17, k. 528, f. 1, d. 46.) When the Hungarian Cultural Union was finally approved, Magyar leaders deemed the Hungarians finally became equal in rights with the Germans (who were in a more favorable position throughout the decades because of the Kulturbund that was the model for the Hungarian Cultural Union.) (AJ, 74, 9/17.)

35 Popi, Rumuni, p. 127.

36 Ibid., pp. 55, 127.

37 Ibid., p. 128.

no statutes would be permitted before the Law on Associations was passed.<sup>38</sup> A year later, the Romanian Party threatened the government that it would end cooperation with it if the statutes of the Association were not approved, but this didn't help either. Although it couldn't take off due to the government's obstruction, the association gave impetus to the development of other cultural-educational societies through the cultural activities of which the Romanian political leaders strove to foist irredentist propaganda too.<sup>39</sup> Despite chicanery on part of the authorities, Romanian cultural and artistic societies were renewed in 1923-1924, with the aid from Romania in books, magazines, etc. from individuals, organizations and the authorities playing great part in the process.<sup>40</sup>

The main form of Romanian cultural organization remained (mostly church) choirs (which cultivated folk songs too) and brass-bands.<sup>41</sup> In 1931 they were united into the Association of Romanian choirs and brass-bands, with 35 choirs and 14 brass-bands.<sup>42</sup> Educational work through lectures and similar performances lagged far behind the musical life, and the only other form of cultural activity (the press excluded) were religious circles and some 35 popular libraries.<sup>43</sup> Romanian cultural life in Yugoslavia remained on the level of provincial minority cultural activity. Not very numerous intelligentsia, but also the peasantry, living under modest material conditions, under strict government surveillance, couldn't aspire to grand cultural achievements. Moreover, the disunity within the Romanian elite made it impossible to unite forces, as we shall see later on.

Due to its favored position, the Hungarian national minority, i.e., its elite, had been used to richer cultural life than the intellectual elite and masses of all other nationalities. Therefore the Hungarian minority felt particularly keen the limitations imposed on it by the new minority status and the ill-will of the authorities,<sup>44</sup> which for their part, saw in the activities of Hungarian cultural-artistic societies and in Hungarian culture in general, a dangerous lodestone, which not only attracted the Magyars to the state idea of St. Steven, but influenced members of other peoples too. Therefore it is no wonder that the authorities put so many hindrances in the way of activities of Hungarian cultural societies. In every performance of Hungarian cultural-artistic societies the authorities saw hidden irredentism,<sup>45</sup> excusing with it their restrictive policy

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38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., p. 129.

40 Ibid., p. 130.

41 There were 29 Romanian singing and 16 musical societies in the Yugoslav Banat in 1929. (Lenard, *Narodne manjiene*, p. 739.)

42 Popi, Rumuni, p. 141.

43 Ibid., p.p. 129-131. There are also other data (probably from the early 1930s): 8 musical associations, 22 singing associations and 4 reading rooms. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.) This only goes to show how unreliable statistics are if not accompanied by other information.

44 According to Dušan Popović, the Germans found stronger guarantee of their survival in the strengthening of their material resources, whereas the Hungarians, without neglecting the material basis, (join this to the previous line) saw that guarantee above all in cultural and educational work, in building up their own "Yugoslav-Hungarian culture". (Popović, *Banat, Bačka i Baranja*, p. 37.)

45 Thus for instance, the police authorities in Kikinda reported in mid-March 1922 that there had been no Hungarian propaganda in that town until then, but than it appeared in the form of the Hungarian Cultural Society. (AJ, 14, 105/404.) Similar suspicion of

of issuing permissions for statutes of Magyar cultural societies<sup>46</sup> and their performances.<sup>47</sup> The restrictive government policy was certainly the reason that the majority of Hungarian associations were of local or professional importance, albeit permeated with a common Hungarian spirit.<sup>48</sup>

Whereas the cultural activities of Romanian societies revolved mainly around choirs and brass-bands, the main forms with the Magyars were amateur theater and cultivation of folklore.<sup>49</sup> Dilettante theater troupes (drama sections) existed in numerous Hungarian cultural, but also other (artisans etc.) associations. They were a substitute for the lacking professional theater, constantly demanded by Hungarian leaders and stubbornly refused by the Yugoslav authorities.<sup>50</sup> Sombor became

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Hungarian cultural association survived until the end of the inter-war period. (VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 22, d. 2.)

- 46 It would be difficult to say how big the total number of Hungarian cultural societies operating during the inter-war years was because different figures feature in Yugoslav documents. Thus, e.g. an undated document mentions some 190 Hungarian associations (not only cultural-educational) (AJ, 38, 93/225.) and another one, probably penned by Ilija Pržić, some 170 (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.); a document from 1925 speaks about 68 purely Hungarian societies and 21 German-Hungarian ones (AJ, 305, 8/18.); in the reply of January 1931 to the petition to the League of Nation by Imre Prokokpy from May 1930 about Hungarian associations, the Yugoslav government adduced the Hungarians had 31 reading rooms, 15 musical and singing societies, 7 cultural and 83 other associations (AJ, 305, 8/18.); another document from mid-October 1937 speaks about at least 114 Hungarian associations – mostly cultural (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.), whereas another from February 1939 adduces in all 153 Magyar associations (AJ, Zbirka A. Cincar-Marковиća, fas. II.); another document from the end of 1940 mentions 120 cultural and educational societies, without those in the territory of the Province of Croatia (AJ, 38, 93/225.). Since all these documents were propagandistic in nature, one can doubt the figures, or at least, one can doubt that all these societies actually worked. Great differences between certain data probably indicate different classifications. The Magyarország wrote on December 29, 1937, there were between 350 and 400 Hungarian societies, but these figures seem exaggerated. (An undated list of Hungarian societies that we have found, lists 298 various associations. (AJ, 63, 47/145)) What part of the Hungarian association was cultural, can be discerned from a list of Magyar societies from 1929 which adduces 189 societies, 64 out of them cultural. (Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 80.) That would imply that approximately one third of the associations were cultural.
- 47 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184; 14, 159/555; 110/414; Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 223. According to the petition by Imre Prokokpy to the League of Nations from May 1930, the Serbian authorities closed down several prominent Hungarian cultural societies after the First World War. (AJ, 305, 8/18; 66 (pov.), 71/184.)
- 48 AJ, F. 398, f. 1.
- 49 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184.
- 50 SBNS KJ, Vanredni saziv za 1931/32. godinu, knj. III, Beograd 1932, p. 217; Kasaš, O jednoj predstavi, p. 195; Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 228-229. How keen on possessing a theatre the Magyars were, is testified by the fact that in their propaganda literature for the world public, they complained of the lack of a professional theatre, as of infringing on one of the important minority rights. (Cf. The Hungarian Minorities in Succession States, p. 109.) Rumors spread among the Yugoslav authorities in November 1935 that the Hungarians intended to set up a center for theatre that would review scripts of plays before staging them. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184.) How much the Yugoslav authorities shrank from Hungarian theater as the best means of spreading the Hungarian national spirit, is

the center of the amateur scene, where the Buffs of the Amateur Scene (Mu pártolók köre) and People's Ring (Népkör) were active in early 1920s.<sup>51</sup> Local authorities kept making difficulties for amateur theater, but also other, cultural-artistic societies by denying approval to their statutes, by strict censorship of plays, by banning of associations and by a number of other underhanded measures.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, demonstrations of Serbian nationalists against performance of Hungarian plays sometimes also occurred.<sup>53</sup> Despite this, Hungarian amateur troupes developed almost in all towns and larger villages by the end of 1930s and, in the words of a Serbian observer, their performances had the form of "magnificent popular manifestations,"<sup>54</sup> whereas cultural societies were also engaged in humanitarian work.<sup>55</sup> Together with amateur theater, cultivation of the folklore also played a significant role in the cultural life of the Hungarians.<sup>56</sup> Apart from that, other societies were also active within the limits of the possible: reading rooms, educational associations which held lectures etc.<sup>57</sup>

Among the larger Hungarian cultural societies, the Banat Magyar Cultural Society from Veliki Bečkerek deserves mention. It was founded already before the First World War, and after a certain delay, resumed its activities after the First World War. Its statutes were approved in 1922 and it managed to broaden its activities by opening a number of branches in the surrounding villages. The powers-that-be didn't want it to spread further and to become all-encompassing, so that it was prohibited for a while,<sup>58</sup> and after that it was allowed to resume operating, but its work was confined to Veliki Bečkerek.<sup>59</sup>

Apart from this, there were choral societies in most of the places inhabited by the Hungarians (too) already before the First World War. They continued working after 1918 without greater disturbances on part of the government. In the beginning, their major problem was the drain of the cadres – at first of civil servants who had been expelled or who had emigrated, and later on of artisans and workers who moved about in the search of work. This contributed to the reduction of social differences, because the need of merging popular singing societies with the "genteel" ones occurred in many places.<sup>60</sup> The largest performances of Hungarian singing

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shown by the fact that as late as 1940 they were not willing to permit visits of some Budapest theatres in areas inhabited by the Magyars. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184.)

51 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 224.

52 Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 225-226. One of these measures was the tax on cultural performances, which was illegal. (Ibid., p. 231.) An undated military document recommended not to allow establishing of purely Hungarian cultural societies. (VA, pop. 17, k. 76, f. 9, d. 32.)

53 Such excesses occurred in Subotica and Sombor in 1934. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184.)

54 This was the opinion of Marko Maletin, the manager of the Theatre of the Danube Province. (ASANU, 14530-II 12/2.)

55 Reggeli Újság, January 30, 1941.

56 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 232.

57 Ibid., pp. 232-233.

58 The society was accused of operating without the approved statutes and that it engaged in political activity. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184.)

59 Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 224-226. A report from April 1934 depicts the work of the association as much more modest. (AJ, 66 (pov.) 71/184.) At the beginning of its work after the war, there were many Germans in it, at which the Kulturbund intensively frowned. (AJ, 14, 124/444; 96/383.)

60 Mesaroš, Položaj, pp. 233-234.

societies were organized on the occasions of anniversaries of certain choirs, and the Union of Magyar Singing Societies was founded in March 1928.<sup>61</sup>

The difficulties which other cultural minority associations passed through, were experienced by the German ones too. Their situation was particularly difficult in Slovenia where many of them had to start from scratch – to be reestablished or to acquire property again. The possibility of foreign aid was significantly reduced in the process by abolition of local branches of the *Südmark* and the *Schulverein* and by confiscation of their property. Founding of affiliations of the *Kulturbund* was efficiently prevented for a long time.<sup>62</sup> Firemen societies proved to be one of the most durable bulwarks of German culture, because in Slovenia they didn't fulfill only their basic duty, but served as village brass-bands too.<sup>63</sup> A few singing societies survived or were re-founded too, and they managed to continue working in an atmosphere of administrative, but also physical, pressure.<sup>64</sup> They were tolerated by the authorities as a necessary evil and seen as a provocation by Slovenian nationalists.<sup>65</sup>

Together with a number of local choirs, reading rooms and other institutions, there was also the *Kulturbund* featuring as the main German cultural organization which tried to include as many places, people and associations as possible as would join it by becoming its branches. This is how its development appeared, as seen through the establishment of local affiliations: 67 in 1921, 108 in 1922, 111 in 1923, 128 in 1924, 29 in 1927, 51 in 1928, 64 in 1929, 13 in 1931, 82 in 1932.<sup>66</sup> The figures are bouncing because the *Kulturbund* was banned twice: officially in 1924, and practically in 1929, when its work was to all intents prevented after the royal dictatorship had been imposed. The first prohibition ensued in April 1924 because the German Party joined the opposition.<sup>67</sup> It was suspended in October of the same year, but local authorities sabotaged it almost everywhere, so that legal resumption of work was possible only in a few places.<sup>68</sup> The official permission to continue work was granted in January 1927, and for the second time only in late August 1930.<sup>69</sup> The second pardon should be seen within the framework of measures for

61 Ibid., pp. 231, 234.

62 This was the case in Slovenia. (Grentrup, p. 329.)

63 The Slovenes managed to "nationalize" them only after 15 years of Yugoslavia's existence. (Slovenec, November 25, 1933.)

64 HWBGAD, III, p. 81. On occasion of the anniversary of the male singing society in Ptuj on May 20, 1923, the MP of the German Party Franz Schauer was wounded by a stone thrown by Slovenian nationalists. (Plautz, p. 18.) A bomb attack in Ptuj prevented the performance of the German choir for the New Year's Eve 1924. (PA, Abt. IIb, Deutschland in Jugoslawien, Politik 25, Juglawien, Bd. 1.)

65 Thus for instance, the German orchestra wanted to give a concert at the same evening, on April 6, 1940, when the "Sokol" evening was foreseen too. The authorities put off the concert for April 13. (AJ, 37, 22/177.)

66 Biber, Nacizem, p. 35. Plautz adduces only 123 branches for the period until April 1924: 109 in the Bačka and in the Banat, 13 in Syrmium and 1 in Slovenia (in the Kočevje). (Plautz, p. 35.)

67 Ibid.; J.V. Senz, Politische Aktivitäten, p. 312; Annabring, Volksgeschichte der Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien, p. 41. Some branches continued operating despite the prohibition. (AJ, 14, 27/71; Altgayer, p. 15.)

68 Many branches worked illegally, i.e. without permission. (AJ, 14, 118/430.) However, that couldn't be an appropriate substitute for legal activities.

69 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 722; Biber, Nacizem, p. 34; Plautz, pp. 35-39.

rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Germany, which provided the Volksdeutsche with the school decrees too that alleviated their educational situation. The prohibitions of the Kulturbund, coupled with confiscation of its property, awoke insecurity among the German population and repelled it from the organization, i.e. made its renewal more difficult.<sup>70</sup>

Until the early 1930s the Kulturbund was engaged in all sorts of cultural activities: lectures, organizing musical and folklore festivals, championing German language classes, exchange of stamps, telling children fairy-tales, etc.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, it started developing social work, as well as economic activities, for which special organizations were established that evolved from the Kulturbund – to be discussed in the next chapter. For their part, some representatives of the authorities accused it of meddling in politics,<sup>72</sup> and sometimes searches of offices and even arrests occurred.<sup>73</sup>

For all these reasons, the success of the Kulturbund was only partial. At the times of its greatest upswing at the eve of the prohibition of 1924, it managed to embrace only a small part of the Volksdeutsche.<sup>74</sup> Furthermore, until its abolition in 1924 the territory in which it operated was perceptibly smaller than the territory in which the Volksdeutsche settlements were scattered: Slovenia, Slavonia, as well as the dispersed German villages in Bosnia, were included in the Kulturbund organization only after 1927.<sup>75</sup> In Slovenia the tough regime prevented the organization,<sup>76</sup> whereas in Slavonia, apart from the ill-will of the authorities, a role was played by the dormant national consciousness of the local Swabians, which was even less developed than with their brethren in the Vojvodina.<sup>77</sup> For these reasons, the leaders of the Kulturbund confined their action realistically to the Bačka, the Banat and Eastern Syrmium. Like the cultural-educational societies of other minorities, this organization also enjoyed some assistance from the mother country. Despite its considerable importance for national

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70 Scherer, *Die Donauschwaben*, p. 15. There were 95 affiliations with 12,000 members in late 1933. (Mirnić, p. 33.)

71 HWBGAD, I, p. 284.

72 AJ, 14, 135/479; 144/502; 105/405. Maybe this was true for some branches. On the other hand, the lower authorities sometimes mixed the Kulturbund and the German Party (which was probably due to personal overlapping too). (Cf. AJ, 14, 109/413.)

73 In Pančevo one of the leaders of the local affiliation and the vice-chairman of the district court, Dr. Simon Bartmann was arrested, because he was thorn in the flesh of part of the Serbs because of his post at the court. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.) The Kulturbund wasn't allowed in Croatia in early 1920s, because the authorities insisted that the statues be approved individually for each local branch, although they had already been approved for the whole country. (Ibid.; Plautz, p. 35.)

74 After just one year of work, Georg Grassl stated at the first annual congress that the organization had 30.000 members. (Mirnić, p. 30.) Plautz adduces 30.000 "if family members are counted too." (Plautz, p. 35.) Such reckoning doesn't make sense and is obviously demagogical. If reduced to realistic size, the number of members in 1924 wouldn't surpass 10.000, i.e. cca. 2% of the Yugoslav Germans.

75 Mirnić, p. 30.

76 A branch of the Kulturbund was founded in the town of Kočevje in 1929, but it was inactive. (Otterstädt, Gottschee. *Verlorene Heimat*, p. 43.)

77 With some of the Volksdeutsche there a linguistic barrier existed, since some of them no longer spoke German. (Beer, p. 78; AKB, Osijek II 1.1.4.)

awakening of the Swabians during the 1920s, the Kulturbund remained an organization of a minority among the Yugoslav Germans in that period. It would achieve the real importance for the whole national minority only gradually during the 1930s, but establishment of certain sub-associations already in the 1920s laid the foundations for all-embracing inclusion of the German population.<sup>78</sup>

The royal dictatorship of 1929 didn't only hit the political life of the national minorities, but the work of their cultural-educational associations and organizations as well. The first consequence was further limitation of cultural life because of the bans on the societies and performances.<sup>79</sup> Many associations had to revamp their statutes in accordance with the demands of the new regime, and insertion of the clause that a society would work in the "state language", or at least that the greater part of its performances had to be in that language were often one of the conditions for approving the statutes.<sup>80</sup> To be sure, such demands met with the resistance of representatives of the minorities and of their mother countries.

Since it is impossible to sit on bayonets for long, the dictatorship was of short duration – both in the purely political sphere and in the field of cultural activity of minority associations. It may be said that attempts were made at unifying cultural (and national in general) activities of certain minorities. The sole exception in this were the Ruthenians who experienced division of forces along to the ideological lines, and partly the Germans, whose striving for unity had to undergo long and fierce ideological and generational struggles first.

The first step in the direction of greater concentration was done by the Germans. They were spurred to do it by greater forthcoming by the authorities that allowed the establishment of the private German teachers' training college. This led to the establishment of the School Foundation that was already mentioned.<sup>81</sup> The Foundation<sup>82</sup> was important because it managed, through the press and live agitation, to spur a large number of the Volksdeutsche to educational activity. By starting a wide action, the leaders of the Foundation (mostly the experienced minority leaders headed by Kraft) managed to awaken the community feeling among the increasingly broader circles of the German minority.<sup>83</sup> In parallel with the approval of the

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78 Thus the Association of the German Graduate Students (Landesverband deutscher Akademiker), and the Association of Singers (Sängerbund) in 1928. (Plautz, p. 43; Mirnić, p. 30.)

79 Ammende (ed.), p. 351.

80 PA, Abt. IIb, nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4 and 5; ASANU 14530-XIV 2; Kasaš, O jednoj predstavi, p. 188; Ammende (ed.), pp. 351, 371; Zorn, Dve poročili, p. 93; Sajti, Hungarians, p. 133. The same was claimed by Imre Prokopy in his complaint to the League of Nations from May 1930. (AJ, 305, 8/18.)

81 Plautz, pp. 78-79.

82 The Foundation was officially established in Novi Sad on June 29, 1931, in the presence of representatives of 73 communes. According to Plautz, all communes in which the Germans lived without exception, participated in money-raising. (Plautz, p. 80; J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, pp. 97-98; Mirnić, p. 34.) For the founding charter cf.: J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, pp. 221-227; Deutsches Volksblatt, June 30, 1931.

83 Although the money-raising action was very successful, the local authorities made difficulties in some communes. (Deutscher Volksfreund, June 11, 1931; Deutsches Volksblatt, June 26, 1931.) The money-raising action was not organized only among the Swabians, but among the Germans in Slovenia too (Deutsche Zeitung (Celje), February 8, 1931.), and the success was particularly noteworthy if one takes into account the



foundation of the private teacher training college and educational improvements, the Kulturbund was also officially approved again – for the whole of Yugoslavia – although the statutes had to be revamped once more before the final approval on April 14, 1931<sup>84</sup> – although many local authorities refused to acknowledge this. The Union of German Popular Libraries (Verband deutscher Volksbüchereien) was founded in 1931 too, with the aim to unify, promote and direct the work of the Volks-deutsche libraries and to help readers find good books.<sup>85</sup> The Union comprised 171 libraries by April 1940.<sup>86</sup>

The next to make progress in unifying cultural work were the Slovaks who founded the Matica Slovenska in Bački Petrovac in 1932, on the model of the institution of the same name in Turčanski Sv. Martin.<sup>87</sup> Although some Czechs reproached them that this was a breach of the Czechoslovak unity,<sup>88</sup> the Slovak organizers refuted that by adducing as a counter-argument the presence of several officials of the Czechoslovak Union at the meeting.<sup>89</sup> The Matica Slovenska had several committees for various fields: literary-artistic, educational, historical, ethnological, economic, theatrical and museum.<sup>90</sup> After four years of work, this organization had around 1,000 members and branches in almost all the more important Slovak-inhabited places, and it published the journal *Naš život*.<sup>91</sup> The annual assemblies of the Matica took place each year within the framework of the traditional Slovak festivities.<sup>92</sup> Despite all this, the efforts of the Matica Slovenska to save the Slovaks from assimilation are judged by some authors as too weak, unsystematic and too late.<sup>93</sup>

The Ruthenians were split into two main cultural organizations, instead of unification of cultural forces. Since the Prosvita had been under the influence of the

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proverbial thrift, and even niggardliness of the Swabians when it came to spending on culture. (Cf. Rüdiger, o.c.; Komjathy, Stockwell, p. 127; Grentrup, p. 25; VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 24; AJ, 66 (pov.), 70/183; Deutsches Volksblatt, November 25, 1931.) Over one million dinars was collected. (Die Woche (Odžaci), July 19, 1931.) Apart from the subsidies from the Yugoslav government, throughout its existence the Foundation received financial aid from Germany too. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 720.) In the early 1940s the Foundation became the maintainer of other private German schools, and in February 1940 a five-year plan for the development of private German education was made. (J.V. Senz, Das Schulwesen, pp. 120-121.)

84 Plautz, p. 39.

85 Deutsches Volksblatt, November 13, 1931.

86 Tätigkeitsbericht der Bundesleitung des Schwäbisch-deutschen Kulturbundes, Novi Sad 1940, p. 19.

87 Bednárík, pp. 57-58; Narodna jednota, June 22, 1932. The original idea was to found just a branch of the Matica Slovenska from Turčanski Sv. Martin, but it was dropped for practical reasons. (Obzor, August 6, 1932.) The statutes were made on the model of the Matica Slovenska from Turčanski Sv. Martin and partly of the Matica srpska. (Politika, August 16, 1932.)

88 Jugoslavski Čehoslovaci, August 4, 1932.

89 Slovenský deník, August 12, 1932.

90 Bednárík, p. 58; Česke slovo, August 6, 1932.

91 AJ, F. 398, f. 1.

92 AJ, 38, 7/29.

93 Kropilak, Siracki, p. 121.

conservative Uniate clergy,<sup>94</sup> its activities didn't meet with the approval of some of the left-wing Ruthenian intelligentsia from the start. It was mainly concentrated in Kucura and it made itself heard already at the founding assembly of the Prosvita. However, it took 14 years before, strengthened by young generations, it founded the Cultural-Educational Union of the Yugoslav Ruthenians (CEUYR) in Novi Vrbas in 1933. Part of the founders were active members of trade unions and even of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The association championed Pan-Slavism, religious tolerance and cooperation with the Yugoslavs.<sup>95</sup> Despite such a broad platform, the association didn't manage to attract a larger number of adherents than the Prosvita,<sup>96</sup> which was leaning increasingly to the right since 1933.<sup>97</sup> The Union had its journal, the *Zarja*, which presented leftist and communist ideas in an artistic form and waged war against the conservative *Ruske novine* of the Prosvita, which accused the CEUYR of being an Orthodox organization (because part of its members converted to the Serbian Orthodox Church).<sup>98</sup> The CEUYR was often attacked by the Uniate clergy in sermons.<sup>99</sup> The CEUYR was renamed the Cultural-National Union of the Yugoslav Ruthenians, and the *Zarja* into the *Ruska Zarja*.<sup>100</sup> In that way, with the Ruthenians more than with any other nationality (with the exception of the Germans) it was plain that culture was the continuation of politics by other means.<sup>101</sup>

This was partly to be seen in the case of the Romanians and their common cultural-educational organization, the *Astra* too.<sup>102</sup> It came to being as an attempt to overcome political and personal divisions, as well as to give the cultural work of the Romanians in the Yugoslav Banat the common direction.<sup>103</sup> The foundations of the

94 Biljnja, Rusini, p. 79.

95 Ibid., pp. 83-90; Gaćeša, Rusini, pp. 351-352.

96 Although leftist authors were not willing to admit this after the Second World War, it is quite clear if one compares the places in which the CEUYR managed to set up its branches with those in which affiliations of the Prosvita existed. (Biljnja, Rusini, pp. 23-24.) Gaćeša states the CEUYR wasn't particularly active. (Gaćeša, Rusini, p. 353.) It is not clear from the literature if the cultural-educational society *Prosvijeta* in Prnjavor, Bosnia, was a branch of the Prosvita or an independent society. (Strehaljuk, p. 83.) In any case, the main cultural work of the Ukrainians in Bosnia was done in choirs and bands which almost every village had. (Ibid., p. 84.)

97 Biljnja, Rusini, p. 58; Gaćeša, Rusini, p. 352.

98 Biljnja, Rusini, 86.

99 Vladimir Biljnja, *Uticao KPJ na Kulturno-prosvetni savez jugoslovenskih Rusina*, *Zbornik za istoriju Matice srpske*, 5, 1972, p. 182.

100 Biljnja, Rusini, p. 90; Gaćeša, Rusini, p. 353. The change of the name probably indicates the need to ogle with the Ruthenian nationalism in order to win support from the Ruthenian masses which had been under the influence of the conservative Uniate clergy.

101 Differently put, the same was said by Vlado Kostelnik. (Cf. Kostelnik, *Klasno i nacionalno*, p. 575.)

102 The name was taken over from the national educational organization founded in Sibiu in 1861, the members of which were both Romanians from the Habsburg Monarchy and from the Regat (i.e. Romania). The *ASTRA* developed a lively activity spiritually preparing in a way for the unification of the Romanians. (Oțetea (ed.), p. 319.)

103 A document of the Yugoslav authorities ascribes the initiative to the "renegade" Atanasije Popovici, a Vlach from Eastern Serbia who had emigrated to Romania, and who became the inspector of the Romanian schools in the Yugoslav part of the Banat after the signing of the Yugoslav-Romanian school convention. According to that document, he visited all Romanian villages in the Western Banat and prepared the establishment

Astra were laid in Vladimirovac near Pančevo on March 16, 1936 at a great assembly attended also by the Romanian ambassador.<sup>104</sup> Clergymen were almost the only to be elected into the Action Committee. The goals of the society set down in the statute were the following: furthering Romanian culture by printing publications, by founding cultural clubs, popular libraries, reading rooms, musical and singing societies, choirs, brass-bands, museums and collections, granting rewards and aid for science, arts and industry, by organizing exhibition and public lectures, by founding funds for aiding schools and clubs, by furthering sports and helping organizations supporting economic and cultural progress. The association was open for joining to all cultural-artistic societies accepting these goals.<sup>105</sup> Like the program of the Cultural Association from 1923 this one was also designed too ambitiously, and it too coupled cultural with economic goals. The formal founding took place on December 10, 1936. At first, the interest was great, and the clergy played the leading role. Territorially, the Astra was divided into six sections. However, discord appeared soon and the Nadejdea turned against the Astra.<sup>106</sup> The association gradually took over ever more diversified tasks, although the cultural ones remained the major ones. The goal was that some day the Astra would take all Romanian matters into its hands,<sup>107</sup> emulating in that way the Nazi Volksgruppe-model.<sup>108</sup> The Central Committee of the Astra decided in May 1937 that all existing societies were to join the Astra. However, the work wasn't particularly active.<sup>109</sup> The squabbles that encumbered the organization's activity from the very beginning, were overcome only in November 1937, so that a larger number of branches was founded only in early 1938.<sup>110</sup> A big meeting was held in Vršac on May 22, 1938, demonstrating unity and self-confidence, but it wasn't followed by much work. The parliamentary elections in autumn of that year pushed cultural activities to the back burner.<sup>111</sup> Despite the aid in books from Romania and despite having included a large number of associations, the Astra soon experienced a slump in verve and prestige, and eventually couldn't fulfill the ambitious tasks that the founders had intended for it to accomplish.<sup>112</sup>

The second-largest national minority in the North of the country, the Magyars, had difficulties in uniting cultural forces. In its way stood, as with other minorities, subjective shortcomings - epitomized also in disunity and rivalry among the

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of the Astra. However, his plans were spoiled by the disunity of the Romanian intellectuals and priests. (AJ, 38, 109/247.) Furthermore, there were many skeptics who believed the action was organized for personal gain. (AJ, 38, 109/247.)

104 This was disliked by some Yugoslav officials as a precedent. (AJ, 38, 109/247.) In fact, this wasn't the first time the ambassador of a mother country attended such a minority meeting: the Czechoslovak ambassador was present when the Matica Slovenska was founded. (Politika, August 16, 1932.)

105 Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, pp. 115-116; Popi, p. 135.

106 Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 136. The Astra's journal became the *Foaia poporului Român*.

107 AJ, 38, 109/247; Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 137.

108 This was no chance: similar ideas were gaining popularity and the young Romanians around the Astra were leaning increasingly to the right, accepting the ideas of the Iron Guard of marshal Antonescu in the late 1930s. (Perunika D. Petrović, *Rumunska nacionalna manjina u Jugoslaviji od 1945. do 1963*. (B.A. paper, Mscr.), Beograd 1992, p. 4.

109 Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 137; AJ, 66, 71/185.

110 *Ibid.*, p. 138. 38 affiliations were founded until March 1938.

111 *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.

112 *Ibid.*, p. 141.

Hungarian leaders – but even more than in the case of other minorities, the unwillingness of the authorities to allow such unification.<sup>113</sup> The dictatorship was one of the factors hindering an all-embracing cultural-educational organization, but on the other hand, it spurred the cultural life of the national minorities inasmuch as it prevented political activities and turned the Hungarian intellectual elite to work within local cultural-artistic societies.<sup>114</sup> Like other cultural associations, the Hungarian ones had to submit the streamlined statutes for renewed approval, with the authorities being most suspicious towards Roman-Catholic societies. However, the heaviest blow was the ban of the Népkör in Subotica, that was particularly pesky to the authorities as a potential irredentist hub.<sup>115</sup> On the other hand, the Cultural Society of the Magyars in the Banat of Veliki Bečkerek extended its influence almost to the whole of the Yugoslav Banat. The year 1930 passed almost without a single ban, and even some new associations were founded.<sup>116</sup>

This situation didn't last long. Already in 1932 there were complaints,<sup>117</sup> and in 1934 bans became increasingly more frequent: the Hungarian Reading Room (Magyar olvasókor) that had succeeded the Népkör in 1932 and that had 1,600 members,<sup>118</sup> was abolished in April, and the Hungarian Cultural Association of Veliki Bečkerek was banned in July, with the explanation that it had started expanding its activities into places with very few Hungarians and that it had political ambitions.<sup>119</sup> At the same time, there were increasingly more indications that the Hungarian ambassador was interfering with the cultural life of the Magyars in Yugoslavia.<sup>120</sup>

The situation of Hungarian cultural societies improved somewhat under the government of Milan Stojadinović which issued working approvals more easily,<sup>121</sup>

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113 Demands for creation of a unified Hungarian cultural organization became more frequent in the late 1930s and early 1940s as Yugoslavia's foreign political situation deteriorated, and that of Hungary improved. The leaders of the Hungarian minority used the rapprochement between the two countries to set forth demands for a unified cultural organization. (Kasaš, *O jednoj predstavi*, pp. 184, 194.)

114 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 44.

115 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184; Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 53-55. The Népkör which had a tradition dating to the times before the First World War, developed its activity not only in Subotica, but also in the surrounding villages in which its visiting theatrical section was serious competition to the Serbian Popular Theater of Subotica.

116 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 55.

117 SBNS KJ, Vanredni saziv, 1931/32, III, p. 217. The Magyarország wrote on November 8, of the same year about the founding of several cultural societies and the improvement of the cultural life of the Magyars in Yugoslavia.

118 There were the Bunjevci and Jews among them. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184.)

119 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184.

120 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 105-106. At that time the authorities judged the leaders as bad, accusing them they refused to express their loyalty and that they hadn't voted at the elections of 1931.

121 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184; Magyarország, October 23, 1937; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941*, p. 244; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 86; Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 158, 380. In November 1936 the work of the cultural society from Veliki Bečkerek was allowed again. (Napló, November 24, 1936.) Among the newly approved societies in 1938 there were several Hungarian-Serbian ones. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 158.) The Magyarország wrote on December 29, 1937 that under the Stojadinović government almost all

and even some cultural societies, the statutes of which hadn't been approved, also developed a lively activity.<sup>122</sup> In some cases of delayed approvals of the statutes of cultural-artistic societies, the Hungarian ambassador also intervened.<sup>123</sup>

The changes on the European political scene that influenced the Yugoslav foreign, but also domestic policy too, influenced also the relations between the state and the national minorities. In late March 1939, one of the leaders of the Hungarian minority, Senator Imre Varady, had a talk with the minister of agriculture who was also in charge of the minorities, Nikola Bešlić, about the Hungarian cultural union for the whole of Yugoslavia on which the Hungarian minority leaders had insisted already for a long time, but which the authorities refused to permit.<sup>124</sup> Lacking this formal unification of the cultural forces, the Hungarians made do with the organization of the so-called "pearly bunches" – village performances of dances, songs and plays organized on the model of similar manifestations in Hungary which contributed to the building up of spiritual unity of the Hungarians from both sides of the border.<sup>125</sup> In January 1940, with aid in money and actors from Hungary, the age-old craving of the Yugoslav Hungarians for a professional theater came true: it was founded – in Belgrade!<sup>126</sup>

The first success in the organizational unification was achieved in April 1940 when the Banus of Croatia, Šubašić, approved the statutes of the Hungarian Cultural Community, founded on February 3, 1940. This was the fruit of the cooperation between Ivan Nagy and Maček and his CPP<sup>127</sup> which always had many suave words for members of the minorities when it had been in the opposition. Although its representatives in the government in the mid-1920s showed almost as little understanding for the minorities as their Serbian or Slovenian counterparts, the authorities of the newly established Province of Croatia wanted to win over members of the minorities through some concessions. In keeping with the practice in the inter-war Yugoslavia, it turned out that implementation of the concessions was not without difficulties.<sup>128</sup> The Hungarians were encouraged by the beginning of work of the Hungarian Cultural Community in the Province of Croatia, and Senator Varady visited Minister Bešlić in the hope a similar association would be approved for the whole of Yugoslavia.<sup>129</sup>

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Hungarian societies except for the political ones, were reopened, but that many did nothing more.

122 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 148.

123 Ibid., p. 149.

124 Ibid., p. 180. Mesaroš supposes they talked also about the wishes from the memo of the Hungarian Cultural Union which contained classical minority demands, more appropriate for a political party than for a cultural association. This only goes to show that with the loss of political parties, minority cultural societies had taken over their functions too. This phenomenon was not typical of the Magyars alone.

125 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184; Új Magyarország, January 11, 1938; Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 86. The Yugoslav authorities strove to prevent mutual visits of Hungarian cultural societies from Yugoslavia and Hungary.

126 Obviously, like in the case of the teachers' training college, the authorities didn't want it to be opened in a predominantly Hungarian place – in order to reduce its influence on the Hungarians, and because of better control. (Sajti, Changes, p. 150; Idem, Hungarians, p. 119.)

127 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 209; Sajti, Changes, p. 149.

128 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 217.

129 VA, pop. 17, k. 32, f. 1, d. 28.

In the political situation in which Yugoslavia's position was weakened further still after German victories in the West, and with the Reich's pressure for a Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement, the government had to cave in and issue an approval for the creation of the Hungarian Cultural Union for the whole of Yugoslavia. It was founded on November 24, 1940. Mostly the people who had led the Hungarian party came to the helm. (Among them, the honorary chairman Santa and several other members of the leadership were already overt irredentists, and some of them would even become war criminals during the Second World War.)<sup>130</sup> All this, together with some portions of the statutes, indicated the founders didn't intend to establish only a cultural organization, but had political goals in mind too.<sup>131</sup> The leadership of the Union adopted the Horthy-style slang about discipline, national and Christian (i.e. Anti-Semitic) ideal, and it was willing to engage more in politics than in culture if the reestablishment of the Hungarian Party wouldn't be permitted.<sup>132</sup>

The Hungarian masses were filled with a national zeal already before the foundation of the Hungarian Cultural Union<sup>133</sup> (due to revisionist successes of Hungary), so that the founding of local branches proceeded apace, although the authorities of the Danube Province approved the statutes only on February 6, 1941. Many existing societies joined the Union in a body, so that already in March of the same year it had branches in 109 places, and the leaders had the objective of inscribing 100,000 Hungarians by the end of 1941.<sup>134</sup> Thus, at the time of the collapse of the first Yugoslavia the Hungarian minority was on the road to total organization as the German one.<sup>135</sup>

In the remaining part of this chapter we shall deal briefly with ideological clashes within and around the Kulturbund which led to the victory of the young Nazis in it and in the bringing of the Kulturbund and all Volksdeutsche minority organizations under the control of the Reich. The process (which started in an organization which, to be sure, had ambitions of uniting all the Volksdeutsche, but which encompassed only a comparatively small number of members of the German national minority until the late 1930s),<sup>136</sup> was of great importance, not only for that minority,

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130 Kasaš, Mađari, *passim*.

131 Sajti, Hungarians, p. 119; Idem, *Changes*, pp. 149, 151; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 213. To some representatives of the authorities it was clear from the start that the Union didn't have only cultural, but also political goals. (AJ, 74, 9/17.) Indeed, the Union soon stepped on the path on irredentism (Kasaš, *O jednoj predstavi*, p. 201.), and it aspired to encompass all spheres of life. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 120.)

132 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 219.

133 Sajti, Hungarians, p. 121.

134 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 220-223. The Hungarian press claimed that number had already been reached by March 25, 1941. (Ibid., p. 226.)

135 The aim of the leaders of the Hungarian Cultural Union was to unite all Magyars in it. (AJ, 74, 9/17.) The *Napló* wrote on February 20, 1940 that the Hungarians in Yugoslavia had missed much during the previous 20 because they had lacked a common cultural organization. In its efforts the Hungarian Cultural Union came into conflict with its one-time model, the Kulturbund, with which the "struggle for the souls" of the Magyarized or semi-Magyarized Germans flared up, especially in ethnically mixed villages. (AJ, 38, 7/27.)

136 Until 1938 the Kulturbund couldn't unite more than 10% of the Volksdeutsche. (Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 50.) According to its own data, it had 12.000 members in 1933. (Mirnić, p.33.) An estimate from the same year said the Kulturbund didn't include more than 6% of the Volksdeutsche. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 70/183.) Furthermore, during the first

but also for other minorities, and even for the country as a whole. The importance of that process lay in the fact it was going on within the second largest national minority (according to the 1931 census), backed furthermore by the increasingly powerful mother country. The Germans in Yugoslavia served as a model in many ways to other minorities, and sometimes even to the majority peoples, so that many phenomena and processes among them were reflected in desires, expectations and strivings of other national minorities, and, together with other factors, influenced the general minority policy of the Yugoslav state.

We have seen that the first heralds of Nazi ideas among the Yugoslav Germans had been the Volksdeutsche students returning from studies in Germany and Austria. Even before Hitler's accession they started criticizing the old leaders of the German minority organizations, demanding an end to the accumulation of political, economic and cultural offices in few hands.<sup>137</sup> It was the understandable desire of young intellectuals for jobs in keeping with their education, which they couldn't fulfill in state or communal service that was hardly accessible to members of the minorities, to say the least.<sup>138</sup> According to Altgayer, in the beginning it was not the matter of ideological differences, but a struggle for posts.<sup>139</sup>

The Nazi youths, who took on the name of the "Renewers" from the Nazis in Romania, put forward their demands publicly for the first time at the main assembly of the Kulturbund on December 3, 1934, at which they received over one third of the votes. In order to fend off this menace, the Union's leadership (Bundesleitung) expelled the leader of the Renewers Dr. Jakob Awender and a few of his Myrmidons in mid-January 1935. The Renewers enjoyed the strongest support from the youths organized in the Kulturbund's youth groups.<sup>140</sup> They didn't enjoy the support of the German diplomacy which always favored a more moderate and more cautious approach,<sup>141</sup> but they did have the support of the Nazi party and other Nazi or Nazified organizations in Germany – especially of the Popular Union for the Germans Abroad (Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland – VDA)<sup>142</sup>

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years of the dictatorship, many of the surviving branches didn't evince great activity. (Komjathy, Stockwell, p. 130.)

137 Biber, Nacizem, p. 43.

138 According to an undated document, initially the "Renewers" managed to win over only the poor and "losers with communist leanings". (ASANU 14530/XIV 2)

139 Biber, Nacizem, p. 43. Josip Mirnić doesn't share this opinion. He believes the conflict started as an ideological one, and that it was only later that different conceptions of tactics, strategy and organization of the Kulturbund occurred, and that eventually the struggle became also a clash of generations and the struggle for power. (Mirnić, p. 36.) The later leader of the Kulturbund and of the whole German national minority, Janko, claimed in his memoirs the Kulturbund had been the organization of only the rich Germans, and that the "Renewers" wanted to make of it an organization for all Volksdeutsche. (Janko, Weg, pp. 22-24.)

140 PA, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5; Mirnić, p. 37.

141 PA, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5; Akiko Shimizu, Die deutsche Okkupation des serbischen Banats 1941-1944 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien, Münster 2003, p. 42.

142 Biber, Nacizem, pp. 44-50, 60-62; Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 729; Shimizu, p. 52. Such attitude of the organizations and agencies from Germany was typical also concerning other German national minorities throughout Europe. (Cf. Hans von Rimscha, Gleichschaltung der deutschen Volksgruppe durch das Dritte Reich, Historische Zeitschrift,

which earlier helped the Kulturbund a great deal with books, magazines scholarships etc.<sup>143</sup> In order to put an end to the activities of the youth, the Union's leadership reorganized the Kulturbund in late October 1935, sharpening the discipline, disbanding the youth groups and expelling the youth leader Jakob Lichtenberger. The Kulturbund branches from Slovenia demanded extraordinary elections in the organization the following month.<sup>144</sup> The "Renewers" being done away with, the annual assembly of the Kulturbund on December 21-22, 1935, adopted the reorganization of the Union and approved the right of the Union's directors to disband local, district and regional organizations.<sup>145</sup>

The disbanding of the local branch in Osijek on December 11, 1935, led to the founding of the Renewers' Cultural and Humanitarian Association of the Germans (Kultur- und Wohlfahrtsvereinigung der Deutschen - KWVD),<sup>146</sup> which became the awakener of the national consciousness of the nationally dormant Slavonian Volksdeutsche.<sup>147</sup> It had to fight not only apathy or even resistance of the Croatized Germans, but also the rival groups of the Kulturbund that existed in some places.<sup>148</sup> The leader of the KWVD became Branimir Altgayer, the expelled leader of the Osijek branch of the Kulturbund. Parts of the ruling YRC lent their support to the KWVD in order to weaken the Kulturbund, and even more to weaken the CPP, for which a considerable part of the Germans in Slavonia voted.<sup>149</sup> Taking into consideration all the difficulties, the new

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182, 1956; MacAlister Brown, Germany's Mobilization of the German Fifth Column in Eastern Europe, *Journal of Central European Affairs*, XIX, 2, 1959; Valdis O. Lumans, *Himmler's Auxiliaries. The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe 1933-1945*, London 1993; Hans-Adolf Jakobsen (ed.), *Hans Steinacher, Bundesleiter des VDA 1933-1937. Erinnerungen und Dokumente*, Boppard am Rhein 1970; Idem, *Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik*; E. Ritter, *Das Deutsche Ausland-Institut in Stuttgart 1912-1945*, Wiesbaden 1976.) The VDA helped the Kulturbund financially (directly and indirectly) and in books, so that it had a means of pressurizing it. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 905; Biber, *Nacizem*, p. 61.) The VDA aided the "Renewers" against the Union's leadership. (Biber, *Nacizem*, p. 60.)

143 Altgayer, pp. 66-67; Komjathy, *Stockwell*, p. 130. After the expulsion of the "Renewers" the financial aid from the VDA was discontinued. (J.V. Senz, *Politische Aktivitäten*, p. 325.) According to Jakob Lichtenberger, the financial aid of the VDA to the leadership of the Kulturbund was significant, but he doesn't say precisely at what time he meant. (Cf. his writing *Gedankensplitter über die Beziehungen des Südostdeutschtums zu Deutschland von der Ansiedlung bis 1945*, in: *AIDGL, Nachlas Lichtenberger*.)

144 Biber, *Nacizem*, pp. 54-55.

145 Annabring, pp. 67-71; Altgayer, pp. 23-24; Biber, *Nacizem*, p. 56. The Union's Direction made ample use of this right: cca. 180 branches were disbanded, 18 in the first wave. (Mirnić, p. 38.) The Kulturbund affiliations were disbanded also by the state authorities for their own reasons. Several branches were disbanded in the Vojvodina. (Biber, *Nacizem*, pp. 56-58; Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 728.) Within the framework of removing potential hubs of resistance, organizational independence of some sub-unions (graduates, libraries, singers) was abolished. (Mirnić, p. 38.)

146 Altgayer, p. 26; Biber, *Nacizem*, p. 67.

147 There were many Germans in Croatian cultural and other societies in Slavonia both before and after the First World War. (Cf. Zlatko Virč, *Vinkovački Nijemci u hrvatskim društvima*, *VDG Jahrbuch-Godišnjak Njemačke narodnosne zajednice*, Osijek 2002.)

148 The young adherents of the Kulturbund in Velimirovac reviled Hitler in their street war against the KWVD, saying he would be their swine-herd. (AKB, *Osijek II*, 1.1. K (KWVD).

149 Biber, *Nacizem*, pp. 67-68.



organization was fairly successful, so that it had 86 branches by mid-1938. With the help from the Bačka and the Banat, the KWVD managed comparatively quickly to awaken the national consciousness of the Germans in Eastern Slavonia who had been Croatized to a large extent. The authorities were aware it was not only a cultural or humanitarian association, but an organization with plainly political and ideological goals, so they kept an eye on it, even though the KWVD distanced itself from the ties Awender's adherents established with the "Zbor"- Movement of Dimitrije Ljotić.<sup>150</sup>

The struggle between the Union's Directors and the Renewers (the details of which we cannot relate here) lasted unremittingly until 1938 when a "reconciliation" was achieved, that was, to all intents, the withdrawal of the majority of the old leaders (who had also split in the meantime). It came about under the direct influence from the Reich and tallied with its increasingly radical domestic and foreign policy.<sup>151</sup> In the autumn of that year, the representatives of the VoMi managed to force all the quarrelling Volksdeutsche fractions to vote for the government ticket at the upcoming elections. Eventually Altgayer agreed on October 31, with the Kulturbund leaders that the KWVD join that organization, and the Union's Direction decided on its session of November 20 to readmit the Renewers who had been expelled on January 13, 1935. These decisions were approved by the annual assembly on December 18.<sup>152</sup> The Kulturbund was reorganized in three regions (Gau): the Banat, Eastern Bačka and the Western Bačka with Baranya, Bosnia, Srem and Slavonia. (The last mentioned was headed by Altgayer.) As for Slovenia, since the Kulturbund was almost completely prohibited there, an organization of a separate region there was put off.<sup>153</sup> The "reconciliation" in the Kulturbund was completed in Graz (!) between June 22 and 24, 1939 when, again under the pressure from the VoMi, the moderate young Renewer, Dr. Sepp Janko, was "elected" chief of the Kulturbund. The main assembly co-opted him into the Union's Committee and "elected" him as chairman.<sup>154</sup> In that way a para-state institution from the Reich interfered in a most direct manner with the functioning of the main cultural institution of the Yugoslav Germans. However, the Kulturbund had long stopped being just a cultural association.<sup>155</sup> Its work revolved increasingly more around ideological indoctrination and increasingly less around furthering of national

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150 Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 727; Biber, *Nacizem*, p. 69.

151 This radicalization was mirrored in personal changes in Germany and within the German minorities throughout Europe. Already in mid-1937 Hans Steinacher, a comparatively moderate chief of the VDA was removed (Jakobsen, *Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik*, p. 249.); the finance minister Hjalmar Schacht resigned in August of the same year; the defense minister von Blomberg was dismissed in January 1938, and the commander of the Army von Fritsch and the minister of foreign affairs von Neurath – all of them moderate representatives of the old regime. (William Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A History of Nazi Germany*, London, Sydney 1976, pp. 328-393.)

152 Mirnić, p. 46.

153 Biber, *Nacizem*, pp. 189-190.

154 Mirnić, pp. 49-50; Biber, *Nacizem*, pp. 207-210. In his memoirs Janko insisted he had been elected "democratically". (Janko, *Weg*, p. 38.) Senz claims similarly that the Volksdeutsche representatives had "agreed" to elect Janko. (J.V. Senz, *Politische Aktivitäten*, p. 327.)

155 Some Serbian observers ascribed to it more political than cultural intentions already in 1934. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 70/183; ASANU 14530-XIV 2.) In early 1938 an initiative was launched that all German associations join the Kulturbund. The action went well, but not too quickly, since many associations had a tradition several decades long. (*Deutsche Zeitung* (Novi Sad), March 3, 1938.)

culture.<sup>156</sup> In some places the authorities noticed the Kulturbund branches exercise some kind of military drill<sup>157</sup> as well as that some members were collecting military and other information.<sup>158</sup>

Under the new leadership<sup>159</sup> in the two years preceding the April War, the Kulturbund started the action in order to enroll all Germans, so that it experienced a tremendous increment (both in number of branches<sup>160</sup> and members), encompassing greater part of the German national minority – either directly or through its sub-associations<sup>161</sup> and

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- 156 AJ, 38, 93/225; 37, 22/177; 66, 70/183; Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, fas. II; VA, pop. 17, k. 1, f. 3, d. 10 and 26; k. 21, f. 7, d. 23; f. 3, d. 23; k. 32, f. 1, d. 43; HDA, grupa XI, kut. 28, inv. br. 2881, SB ODZ, 5793/1939; ASANU 14530-II 9; Živko Avramovski, *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji*, III (1939-1941), Beograd 1996, p. 607; Mirnić, pp. 47, 58'59; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, p. 52. Indoctrination was reflected in the choice of songs for the Kulturbund performances. Thus, at a dancing party in Kovin on January 19, 1940, mostly military and morbid songs about soldierly death were sung. (IAP, 12/855.) Some leaders of the Kulturbund started declaring in public they were National-Socialists and gave other provocative public statements. (Aprilski rat, p. 253.) The claim of existence of a para-military youth organization Hitler Jugend Kammeradschaft is based on a single document from a source that was not quite unbiased, so that it should be taken with a grain of salt. (Cf. Mirnić, p. 60.) The news about preparation of armed groups before the April War of 1941 are also poorly documented. (Mirnić, pp. 70-72.) The news from June 1940 about foundation of terrorist groups on instructions from the Reich, seem not to have been confirmed in practice during the April War. (Cf. Sandor Vegh, *Le System du pouvoir d'occupation allemand dans le Banat Yougoslave 1941-1944*, in: *Les systemes d'occupation en Yougoslavie 1941-1945*, Beograd 1963, p. 498.) However, it is indisputable that some Kulturbund performances differed little from those in the Reich. (Biber, *Kočevski Nemci*, p. 37.)
- 157 This was said of the affiliations in Marenberg, Osijek, Kolut, Sekić and Feketić in the first months of 1941. (VA, pop. 17, k. 11, f. 5, d. 9; k. 26, f. 4, d. 24; k. 1, f. 4, d. 34; k. 22, f. 3, d. 39.) Military exercises were noticed in Hajdučica, Maribor and (maybe) Zagreb in May 1940 (VA, pop. 17, k. 32, f. 1, d. 40 and 48.), and in August 1940 it was observed that they allegedly organized military drill at Fruška gora. However, it is not clear from the report if the latter were organized by the Kulturbund. (VA, pop. 17, k. 528, f. 1, d. 23.) It was said of the adherents of the "Renewers" that they had been importing weapons from Hungary already between autumn 1936 and spring 1937. (Shimizu, p. 50.)
- 158 VA, pop. 17, k. 528, f. 2, d. 31; k. 36, f. 2, d. 36; AJ, 38, 240/387; 200/347. The news of organization of para-military groups was heard also by the German ambassador von Heerne in February 1941. (PA, R 29662.)
- 159 The leaders of other Volksdeutsche organizations were also exchanged. (Biber, *Nacizrm*, p. 217.) Although the inter-German squabbles didn't stop altogether, due to the dissatisfaction of radical Nazis who had been short changed when the spoils were divided, they were nothing like as big as in 1934-1938. (Mirnić, p. 51.)
- 160 During this period some affiliations were founded in places one wouldn't expect to find them at first glance, such as Kosovska Mitrovica (Spasoje Đaković, *Sukobi na Kosovu* (2nd ed.), Belgrade 1986, p. 122.) or Zenica (where members of the all three Yugoslav peoples jointly attacked the initiators.) (AJ, 14, 27/71.)
- 161 AJ, 71, 3/8; VA, pop. 17, k. 528, f. 1, d. 46; Mirnić, p. 47. The leadership of the Kulturbund claimed the organization had 305,000 members in October 1940. (Biber, *Nacizem*, p. 219; Mirnić, p. 53.) Dimić (*Kulturna politika*, III, p. 50.) adduces 30,000, but this must be a typo. From July 1, to November 15, 1940, a pause in recruitment of new members (except for Slovenia) was ordered. Then it was continued under the dominant slogan that whoever wanted to be recognized as German, had to join the Kulturbund. (AJ, 74, 9/17; 38, 93/225; 8/58; VA, pop. 17, k. 11, f. 5, d. 9; k. 22, f. 3, d. 37; k. 1, f. 4, d. 59; k. 528,

declaring itself unnoticeably the "Folks Group"<sup>162</sup> in spring 1940, without giving up formally the form of the cultural organization.<sup>163</sup> Similar tendencies were noticeable with other national minorities in the North of the country, but they couldn't be led to the utmost consequences as in the case of the Volksdeutsche organization, because totalitarian trends didn't get completely the upper hand in their mother countries, because these were not that influential, and because the Yugoslav authorities were not willing to make such great concessions to other minorities as to the Germans.<sup>164</sup> Such totalitarian trends tending at uniting of whole national minorities in

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- f. 1, d. 36; Aprilski rat, p. 254; Baš, Slovenski Nemci, p. 23; Nikica Barić, Njemačka manjina u dokumentima banskih vlasti Banovine Hrbatske, 1939-1941, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, XXXIV, 2, 2002, p. 439.) This clearly showed the totalitarian ambitions of the revamped former cultural organization. The recruiting action was finished on December 31, 1940, when, according to the Volksdeutsche newspapers, 95% of the German minority was enrolled. (Mirnić, p. 58.) Obviously, such a result should be regarded with considerable deal of scepticism, although one thing was certain: the Kulturbund became what it hadn't been until 1938 – a mass organization. It is interesting to note that already the old leadership made an appeal that all Germans join the Kulturbund and show in that way they were Germans in heart too, not only in speech. Membership in the Kulturbund was declared a duty toward the German people. (Deutsches Volksblatt, september 2, 1932.)
- 162 Janko started styling himself the Volksgruppenführer, and since February 1941 the leadership of the Folk Group started issuing its journals of announcements and orders. (Mirnić, pp. 52, 73; Komjathy, Stockwell, p. 136.) A new Dienstordnung (Rules of Service) were introduced in February 1941 that imposed the duty of all members of the Folk Group to obey the Leadership of the Folk Group and the government in Berlin. (Shimizu, p. 66.) How serious the leaders of the Kulturbund took the Führerprinzip is testified by the fact that they ordered the resettlement of the Germans from Bosnia in early March 1941. (VA, pop. 17, k. 1, f. 4, d. 60.)
- 163 For Janko and his collaborators the Kulturbund was equated with the Folk Group. (Janko, Weg, p. 40.) Officially it was put thus: "The Kulturbund is the embodiment of our Folk Community", from which followed that every Volksdeutsche had a duty to strengthen the Folk Community by joining the Kulturbund. (Deutsches Volksblatt, March 27, 1940.) Tacitly the Yugoslav authorities agreed to see in the Kulturbund the representative of the whole German national minority, and in that way de facto aided its leaders. (PA, Unterstaatssekretär, Akten betreffend Besuch Prinzregenten Paul von Jugoslawien). The main factor attracting the Volksdeutsche was the success of the Reich in foreign policy (VA, pop. 17, k. 22, f. 3, d. 53.), but people joined also for opportunism or under pressure of aggressive Kulturbund propagandists, who didn't shrink even at threats. (The leader of the Kulturbund, Janko, was no exception in this.) (VA, pop. 17, k. 528, f. 1, d. 46.) In the process, a certain number of German-friendly Slovenes, or Slovenes economically dependent of their German employers, also joined in Slovenia. (VA, pop. 17, k. 528, f. 2, d. 4; k. 32, f. 1, d. 48; k. 21, f. 3, d. 23; Baš, Slovenski Nemci, pp. 33-34.) Similar cases occurred already earlier. (Žnidarič, p. 223.) In branches in Slovenska Bistrica, Studenci, Sv. Lovrenc na Pohorju and Pobrežje most of the members were Slovenes ("Nemčuri") (AJ, 14, 27/71.) A report from Apatin noted that two colonist families from Lika joined the Kulturbund in this predominantly German town, which was at variance with its statutes. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 25.) Since the summer of 1940 the payment of the membership fee was enforced by coercive measures if needed. (Shimizu, p. 67.)
- 164 When talking about making concessions, one should mean permission to organize and perform, but they changed depending on time and place. Thus for instance, the founding of a number of branches was allowed in Slovenia in 1935 before the elections, but a

umbrella organizations were partly a consequence of the corporate way of organization in vogue during the inter-war period, and especially during the 1930s, and were partly the consequence of the impossibility for the national minorities to organize politically in Yugoslavia. Partly responsible for such trends was the lack of minority cadres for various minority organizations:<sup>165</sup> the unification of various minority organizations under the guise of cultural associations was to a large degree the corollary of personal union of leaderships of diverse minority associations. Obviously, it was difficult to express pluralism of opinions under such conditions – even in the cultural sphere alone.

In this context one should take a glance at the cultural associations of a quasi-minority, in whose mother country the totalitarian tendencies got the upper hand first. Italian cultural associations, just like schools, came into being and survived, thanks to contractual regulation of the position of the Italian optants. These optants who were a “minority sui generis”, had, according to the official Yugoslav data, 25 various associations in 1928.<sup>166</sup> Eleven of them were educational and 3 were for recreation.<sup>167</sup> Some of them were set up in places with no Italian school, and part of them were founded by the Lega culturale italiana, the successor of the nationalist organization Lega nazionale,<sup>168</sup> whereas some of them originated in the times before the First World War, and even in the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>169</sup> Credit sections also existed by associations.<sup>170</sup> In other words, the Italian

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large number of them was closed again the next year. The authorities in Ljubljana allowed their reopening only in autumn 1939 when the statutes of the Slovenian Educational Union of the Slovenes in Carinthia were approved. (Biber, Kočevski Nemci, pp. 30-32, 37.) Nevertheless, although officially disbanded, many branches of the Kulturbund in Slovenia continued operating. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 26.) It seems the Germans (the Volksdeutsche and Germans from the Reich), being active in propaganda, and sometimes as spies, bore the brunt of the authorities, just like members of other minorities and foreigners. (Cf. Biber, Nacizem, pp. 175-178; Žnidarič, p. 226.) Stojadinović's minister of the interior, Korošec particularly persecuted the Volksdeutsche and their associations in Slovenia. (Frensing, pp. 13, 18; HWBGAD, III, pp. 77, 81; Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 707, 918.) The formal reason for disbanding some branches of the Kulturbund was that Slovenes too were cooperating in them. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 705; Börsenzeitung, June 16, 1935.) This was the continuation of the Slovenian national struggle with the Germans inherited from Austria-Hungary, and at the same time the reaction to the strengthening of Nazism in Germany and Austria and among the Volksdeutsche in Slovenia too. (Cf. Žnidarič.)

165 In an undated document it is stated Hungarian associations were small and led by the same people. (VA, pop. 17, k. 76, f. 9, d. 47.)

166 Lenard, narodne manjine, p. 741. In a list by the Yugoslav authorities a considerably smaller number features. (AJ, 66, 1/1.)

167 AJ, F. 398, f. 1.

168 The Yugoslav authorities refused to allow the lega nazionale to resume operation after the First World War. (AJ, 66, 56/134.) About its activities until the First World War cf.: Ivan Pederin, Italia irredenta i Dalmacija do 1919, in: Talijanska uprava na hrvatskom prostoru i egzodus Hrvata (1918-1943), Zagreb 2001, p. 307.

169 Jaquin, p. 167.

170 Rad italijanske Kulturne lige u Dalmaciji, Narodna odbrana, br. 7, February 17, 1935, p. 101. It seems the authorities regarded these sections either as parts of cultural associations or as independent societies, depending on how it suited them. (Cf. AJ, F. 398, f. 1

cultural associations, just like cultural associations of other minorities, were engaged in economic and social work together with the cultural one. More than the societies of other minorities, the Italian ones were artificial creations, and it is questionable how many of them could survive had there been no aid from Italy, especially if one keeps in mind the emigration to Italy of part of the intelligentsia after the Conventions of Nettuno and acceptance of the Yugoslav citizenship on the part of the remaining intellectuals.<sup>171</sup> Such as they were, they had, like the Italian schools, an outspoken propaganda function.<sup>172</sup>

Minority cultural associations and organizations came into being almost exclusively in the Northern part of the country. Many dated from before the First World War, and some had to be (re)founded after it. As a rule they were local in character. They were choirs, bands, reading-rooms and amateur troupes. Due to the lack of cadres and obstacles on part of the authorities, only a few of these local associations managed to develop their activity beyond the boundaries of their local community and to attain a broader significance. There were several attempts at creating all-embracing cultural organizations, but despite aid from mother countries, this met with numerous obstacles, the two most important being the resistance on part of the authorities and disunity of the minority leaders. In terms of unification, it was the Germans who made greatest progress. They were also the first to found an organization with general aims. Apart from cultural goals it had also social and economic tasks, and other umbrella organizations tried to achieve the same. For its part, the government created obstacles both to this cultural unification and (in many cases) to local associations, suspecting them – often not without a reason – for irredentism. However, as to the attitude of the authorities, it was neither uniform, nor the same for each national minority throughout the inter-war period. As in other spheres, the relations with respective mother countries had considerable influence on the work of cultural-educational associations and organizations, and the prestige and influence of a mother country were often decisive for the freedom of cultural organization and activities.

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– where a report on the Italian minority considers them separate associations for mutual assistance.)

171 Jaquin, p. 176.

172 ASANU, 14387/8783.



## Chapter Eleven

# Other Associations and Organizations of National Minorities

We have seen in the preceding chapter that the number of minority associations was large, albeit they were unequally distributed. We dealt with cultural-educational societies and organizations first because they played a key role in preserving national traditions and national consciousness. However, we have seen that a considerable number of minority cultural associations, and particularly larger cultural organizations didn't have only cultural and educational tasks, i.e. that boundaries between cultural and other activities were not always clear-cut. Therefore we made the difference between them for practical reasons – in order to make our story easier to tell. In this chapter we shall take a brief glance at other associations and organizations of national minorities, which were sometimes sub-associations of larger, often cultural organizations, or were at least created on the initiative of these organizations.

The fate and the working conditions of these non-cultural associations and organizations basically weren't different from the fate and the working conditions of societies and organizations which had cultural tasks in their names or programs. As the cultural associations dealt with economic, sport and other matters, the non-cultural ones were engaged also in purely cultural work too.

Just like the cultural associations, they existed mainly in the Northern parts of the country that used to belong to Austria-Hungary. As was the case with cultural associations, the Italian (mostly humanitarian and supportive) societies on the Dalmatian coast were an exception. However, apart from them, during the 1930s, attempts at founding Albanian or predominantly Albanian sport clubs<sup>1</sup> which were sometimes communist-inspired, were noticed. Obviously their founders thought they would more easily get permission for sport societies in order to spread communist or national propaganda. This, however, was not the case: the authorities knew very well that sport had important ideological functions too, so that they were not willing to leave that sphere to private initiative in the Southern parts, especially since the founders were known for their anti-government attitudes.<sup>2</sup> Similar was the case with the society Merhamet, founded in Kosovska Mitrovica a few years before the Second World War, ostensibly as a humanitarian society, but in fact as an irredentist one.<sup>3</sup> Generally speaking, non-cultural associations of national minorities were almost as much keepers of national consciousness, as were the associations whose main goal was the furthering of national culture of members of national minorities.

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1 AJ, 66 (pov.), 7/17.

2 AJ, 71, 30/69.

3 The founder was the well-known Albanian irredentist Veli Deva (allegedly on order of the German military counter-intelligence service, the Abwehr). (Hasani, p. 83.)

The situation was very much different in the Northern parts, in terms of numbers, diversity and activity of the non-cultural associations there, showing similar regional differences which marked the existence of cultural societies.<sup>4</sup> When the Germans in Slovenia are in question, almost 200 of their associations were disbanded or Slovenized right after the First World War, with the subterfuge that they were nefarious for the state. The disbanding of societies was continued during the next few years after the war.<sup>5</sup> Among them were, apart from the cultural ones, many humanitarian, sports and others.<sup>6</sup> Only a few survived.<sup>7</sup> The work of the German societies engaged in humanitarian, sports, economic and other activities,<sup>8</sup> became more lively only in the second half of the 1920s<sup>9</sup>, but it was never spared the administrative and other limitations incurred by cultural societies. The authorities tried everywhere to reduce all kinds of organization of national minorities to a minimum, and this was particularly true in Slovenia.

A particular kind of associations, not only in Slovenia,<sup>10</sup> were fire-fighting societies.<sup>11</sup> To be sure, they were set up with the main task of fighting fires, but in

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4 How important regional differences were, is testified by the fact that there were more Germans in Croatian associations than in German ones in Croatia on the eve of the Second World War. (Virč, p. 54.)

5 HWBGAD, III, p. 331; SBNS, Kraljevine SHS, Redovan saziv za 1927/28, knj. IX, Beograd 1928, p. 191; PA, Abt.IIb Deutschum in Jugoslawien, Politik 25, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Suppan, Zur Lage, pp. 195-196.

6 PA, Abt. IIb, Deutschum in Jugoslawien, Politik 25, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Lenz, p. 66. Suppressing of a society with mixed goals and the confiscation of its property – the “German House” (Deutsches Haus) from Celje, provoked a big juridical process which all but reached the Council of the League of Nations. Eventually the matter was smoothed over in 1933 by a compromise: after protracted negotiations and several interventions of the German diplomacy, the Yugoslav authorities agreed to pay 500,000 dinars to the School Foundation of the Germans as indemnification for the German House. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 802-808; Idem, Zur Lage, pp. 186-187; Ein Notschrei; Die neue Regierung Uzunović. Erfüllte und nichterfüllte Versprechungen. Einsichten, Nation und Staat, VII, 5, 1934, pp. 338-340.)

7 Suppan, Zur Lage, p. 231. The Political and Economic Association of the Germans in Slovenia (Politisch-wirtschaftlicher Verein der Deutschen in Slowenien) was founded in Maribor already in 1922, with the same statutes as the Political and Economic Association for the Slovenes in Carinthia in Klagenfurt (Politisch in gospodarsko društvo za Slovence na Koroškem). It operated until 1929 (Suppan, Zur Lage, pp. 182, 199.), but it never managed to extend its activities to the whole of Slovenia.

8 Zorn, Dve poročili, pp. 92-93.

9 HWBGAD, III, p. 81; Otterstädt. Gottschee. Verlorene Heimat, p. 42.

10 According to Baš, there were 27 German firemen associations active in Slovenia between the two world wars. (Baš, Slovenski Nemci, p. 13.) Other authors adduce other numbers. Thus, according to Simonič, 32 German firemen societies of the Kočevje were united into a separate union in 1927 (Verband der deutschen Feuerwehren). (Simonič, p. 129; Hriber, p. 219.) According to J. Rus, there were as many as 44 of these societies! (Rus, p. 144.) On the other hand, according to Ilija Pržić, the Banat Romanians had only two such associations. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.)

11 They existed mainly in the former Habsburg territory. (Nikola Žutić, Sokoli. Ideologija u fizičkoj kulturi Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1929-1941, Beograd 1991, p. 15.) In the territory of the Danube Province in the 1930s, large part of firemen were Germans. (Ibid., p. 305.)



small village communities they often took over other functions too. One of them was musical – not only in Slovenia they served also as village bands.<sup>12</sup> Their trumpet signals and commands remained those from the days of Austria-Hungary for a long time, and the language of command in some places remained German or Hungarian, which particularly irritated the new authorities.<sup>13</sup> Such as they were, both in Slovenia and in the Vojvodina, they represented the living relic of the bygone times, the traces of which representatives of the new authorities so fervently wished to stamp out.<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, for members of minorities, they were not only a link with the past, but also with their co-nationals on the other side of the border.<sup>15</sup>

Sports societies also played a role in the national survival of the national minorities.<sup>16</sup> Their role was more important in towns – above all in Slovenia<sup>17</sup> where

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- 12 There were firemen societies in Slovenia as late as the early 1930s in which the Slovenians were members too, but the leadership was still in German hands. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1; Zorn, *Dve poročili*, p. 93.) Czech fire departments which existed in most of the bigger Czech settlements, were sometimes in rivalry with the local *Češka besedas*, which was, to be sure, to the detriment of the Czech national minority. (Hanzl, Matušek, Orct, p. 38.)
- 13 AJ, 14, 227/812; 123/438.
- 14 The majority of German firemen societies in Slovenia were “nationalized” only in 1933. (Slovenec, October 25, 1933; HWBGAD, III, p. 76.) The Slovenes took over the firemen society in Maribor only in 1934 (HWBGAD, III, p. 481.), and the firemen society in Celje passed from German to Slovenian hands as late as 1936. (Orožen, II, p. 559.) One of the functions of the Firemen Union of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was to give a Yugoslav stamp to the firemen’s societies. (Žutić, Sokoli, p. 305.)
- 15 To be sure, there were also ethnically mixed firemen societies. (AJ, 14, 105/404.)
- 16 Physical training had strong national undertones from the very beginning. The founder of the modern gymnastics, Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852) started gymnastics in 1811 as a means of moral and physical strengthening of the people as part of preparations for struggle against Napoleon. Jahn was an adherent of German national ideas of his time later on too. (Brockhaus Enzyklopädie, IX, Wiesbaden 1970, p. 361; *Ibid.*, XIX, 1974, p. 146.) The Sokol training, invented by Miroslav Tirš (1832-1884) in 1862, not by chance in Prague, a town torn by Czech-German conflicts, also served a national purpose. The Sokol-Movement became an outspoken Pan-Slav movement and preparation for the liberation action. (Mala enciklopedija Prosveta. Opšta enciklopedija, III, Beograd 1978 (3rd ed.), pp. 259, 391; Žutić, Sokoli, p. 6.) It was certainly no accident that the first Sokol society among the Southern Slavs was founded in Ljubljana in 1863, whereas the foundation of the Sokol in Zagreb was directly spurred by the existence of the German Turnverein in that town. (Žutić, Sokoli, p. 6.) The Sokol in the Vojvodina propagated the Serbian national idea, and in the Kingdom of Serbia they prepared the youth for the war of liberation. (*Ibid.*, p. 8.) Nikola Žutić clearly points out the nexus between physical training and national ideology: “The reason for founding and activity of the Sokol societies lay in the extolling of the nationality.” (*Ibid.*, p. 9.)
- 17 German sport clubs, according to German sources, had fulfilled national-political tasks before these were taken over by the Kulturbund. In a way, they were forerunners of the Kulturbund in those places. (The report by Dr. Max Šnuderl, p. 5, AJ, F. 110, inv. Br. 13140.) However, all this doesn’t mean there were no ethnically mixed sport associations in some places. A case in point was for instance the shooting society in Novi Sad (est. 1790), the members of which had initially been the Serbs and Germans, and since the second half of the 19th century the Hungarians too. Whereas chairmen were mostly Germans until the First World War, after it the leadership devolved onto the Serbs. (AJ, 37, 73/457.)

several German gymnastics societies<sup>18</sup> and a few important sport clubs<sup>19</sup> existed before the end of the First World War. Sports, especially soccer clubs existed in villages too,<sup>20</sup> but their number and importance were smaller; peasants, being fresh air men by the nature of their work, didn't feel such a need of going into sports.<sup>21</sup> For these reasons and because material conditions were lacking, traditions in this field were comparatively weak, so that sport never managed to receive a first-ranking position among the activities of minority organizations.<sup>22</sup> This, however, doesn't mean it was insignificant. Through it members of a minority came into contact with each other, as well as with their co-nationals from their mother countries.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, sport events sometimes gave the opportunity to the masses of minorities to give vent to their true feelings toward the state they had been living in,<sup>24</sup> which didn't leave much room for licit expression of national dissatisfaction, at least when national minorities were in question.

German gymnastics societies founded the Union of German Sport and Gymnastics Societies in 1928, which joined the Kulturbund as a sub-association in 1931 under the name of the Union of German Sport Societies in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.<sup>25</sup> Since the reorganization of the Kulturbund, its name was Volksdeutsche

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- 18 The property of the Turnverein in Celje was sequestered in 1918, and the local Sokol paid the rent to the trustee for using its gym. (Orožen, II, p. 524.)
- 19 Such were the sport societies in Kočevje, Brežice, Celje (athletic and skiing clubs), Ptuj and Maribor (the sport club Rapid, cycling club Edelweiß, hunting society Hubertus). (Baš, Slovenski Nemci, pp. 13-14; AJ, F. 398, f. 1; Zorn, Dve poročili, pp. 92-93.) The biggest and strongest German sport club in Slovenia, the Rapid of Maribor, was founded in late 1918. In a few years it managed to absorb all other sport societies in town, so that it became the only sport club XXX in Maribor from 1927 on. In the 1930s it was joined by the cycling club Edelweiß. It enjoyed financial support of the rich German locals, so that it managed to attract some of the Slovenian workers too. It collectively joined the Kulturbund with its 800-odd members in 1940. (Žnidarič, p. 225.)
- 20 Even in some Ruthenian ones: FC Zarja was established in Vrba in 1936, and FC Iskra in Kucura in 1938/39. Both were founded at the CEUYR initiative. (Biljnja, Rusini, p. 126.)
- 21 Nevertheless, the Sokol Movement was quite developed in the Czech villages, which is an additional proof that its purpose was not just to keep people physically in good shape. (Hanzl, Matušek, Orct, p. 38.)
- 22 Sport wasn't very developed in an underdeveloped country such as Yugoslavia. The largest sport association until 1929 was the Soccer Association with only 15,000 members in the 1920s. After state intervention in 1930s, it managed to gather 100,000 members. (Žutić, Sokoli, p. 15.) It is interesting to note that the Banat Romanians, who otherwise hadn't too many societies, had as many as 11 hunting societies (out of 48 associations in the early 1930s.) (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.) Lenard's comparison between the ways the Yugoslavs and Magyars went into sports is rather interesting. According to him, for the Yugoslavs the health betterment of the masses was the main thing, and for the Hungarians the prominence and competition of individuals. (Lenard, Narodne manjine, p. 738.) He, however obviously overlooked the ideological component of sport.
- 23 Baš, Slovenski Nemci, p. 14.
- 24 Thus for instance the majority of the audience at a football tournament in Subotica in 1926 openly supported the MTK from Budapest, and not the Czech or Yugoslav clubs, which wasn't lost on the representatives of the authorities. (AJ, 14, 121/434.)
- 25 Only part of German sport societies were members of this union in early 1930s. (HWBGAD, I, p. 286.)

Sportstelle (the Volksdeutsche Sport Office), and in 1937 it comprised 37 societies.<sup>26</sup> It is interesting that the singing societies were considered politically conservative among the Slovenian Germans in the 1930s, whereas the sport ones were champions of National-Socialism.<sup>27</sup> The reason was certainly the fact that the members of sport societies were mainly the young who in a large majority accepted the Nazi ideology. For its part, the Volksdeutsche Sportstelle tried to adapt, at least in form, its ideals and goals to those of the official organization and goals of the Yugoslav gymnastics.<sup>28</sup> As for the Magyars, Karoly Kovacs, the secretary of the Hungarian reading-room in Subotica, tried to unite Hungarian sport associations in the late 1930s.<sup>29</sup> As was to be expected, the governing powers didn't approve of this initiative.<sup>30</sup>

Paradoxically enough, in terms of physical training, an unexpectedly large role for members of the national minorities was played by the Sokol Movement – in the negative sense. Not by chance, it came into being in Bohemia as a Slavic answer to nationally tinged German gymnastics. Its Pan-Slav tendencies tallied nicely with the unifying and nationalist tendencies of the regime in the new state.<sup>31</sup> The foundations of the common Yugoslav Sokol organization were laid in 1919, but it never

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26 Der Auslanddeutsche, X, 7, 1937, p. 499. Some representatives of the authorities noticed that the Volksdeutsche had started leaving the Sokol in greater numbers since 1933 and founding their own sport societies. (AJ, 66, 3/6.)

27 Baš, Slovenski Nemci, p. 21. Baš himself didn't believe the singing societies were any better.

28 Žutić, Sokoli, p. 305.

29 Ibid., pp. 308-309.

30 Nouvel Danubien, February 1938.

31 Žutić, Sokoli, p. 11. Already in January 1920, the minister of education introduced the Sokol-style training and education in the Sokol spirit into schools. The gymnastics teachers were to have a Sokol training. (Dolenc, p. 129.) However, common ideology didn't prevent national friction in practice. (Žutić, Sokoli, pp. 12-13.) Yugoslavia wasn't the only country to introduce mandatory physical education permeated with national ideology. A compulsory organization, the Levente, existed in Hungary for boys between 12 and 20 years of age, which imparted gymnastic and military training under the leadership of teachers and reserve NCOs. Non-attendance was punishable by fines and prison, and the whole organization was invented as a way of imparting physical and patriotic education to the youth, circumventing the military clauses of the Trianon Peace Treaty which had limited Hungarian military effectives. Through its "commissioners" (i.e. spies) the Yugoslav government keenly observed the work of the Levente, especially in the bordering areas. (AJ, 14, 120/432; 110/414.) Partly similar "volunteer" organizations for children and youths existed in Fascist Italy since 1926: the Balilla (8-14 years), the Avanguardisti (14-18 years), the Giovani Fascisti (18-21 years). The aim was to instill the spirit of discipline into the youth, to exercise the pre-military physical, spiritual, professional and religious instruction. Access to the National Fascist Party was possible only for persons who had gone through these youth organizations. (S. William Halperin, Mussolini and Italian Fascism, New York, London, Toronto 1964, pp. 50, 123-128.) Martin Clark gives a somewhat different division of the youth organizations in Italy. (Martin Clark, Modern Italy 1871-1982, London, New York 1990 (6th ed.), p. 245.) It is clear from this that the organizations in Hungary and Italy had a somewhat broader scope of work, but they had physical and nationalist education with the ultimate aim of preparing the young generations for warfare in common with the Sokol.

became strong because some associations left it.<sup>32</sup> It was formalized in 1929 thanks to the Law on the Sokol of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which made the Sokol the only legal gymnastic organization.<sup>33</sup> Apart from physical training, it was to educate its members in the spirit of national and state unity, as it did in the previous period.<sup>34</sup> To be sure, its Pan-Slavic tendency was incompatible with the national spirit of most of the national minorities which were not of Slavic extraction. The state-regimented Sokol Movement met with only limited support even among the Slavic minorities.<sup>35</sup> With other minorities it met with resistance and constant complains.<sup>36</sup> The state authorities for their part, did their best to impose it both on teachers and pupils, although the membership was nominally voluntary. This was particularly enforced in the bordering, ethnically mixed areas.<sup>37</sup> However, the success was only partial.<sup>38</sup>

32 Dolenc, pp. 268, 272.

33 The law was passed on December 5, 1929. The Law on Associations, Meetings and Conferences of February 18, 1931 made impossible to found associations for physical training based on religious, ethnic or regional grounds. (Žutić, Sokoli, p. 40.) Immediately after the Law on the Sokol was passed, the authorities in Slovenia started disbanding German sport associations, whereas the local authorities in the Vojvodina started making difficulties for them. (PA, Abt. IIb, Deutschtum in Jugoslawien, Politik 25, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Kölnische Zeitung, February 15, 1930.)

34 Dolenc, p. 271. In some places the Sokol was engaged also in organization of amateur theatre performances. (AV, 126/IV, 2963/931.)

35 The Czech Sokol societies joined the Sokol of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in which some associations evinced a lively activity. (Hanzl, Matušek, Orct, p. 38.) Part of the Ruthenians also joined the Sokol. (Biljnja, Rusini, p. 126.) On the other hand, in the (predominantly Slovak) State Lower High School in Bački Petrovac, the interest in the Sokol was weak – allegedly because of the bad material situation of the pupils and little incentive on part of the teachers. (AV, 126/IV, 9964/30.)

36 SBNS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1932/33. godinu, knj. V, Beograd 1933, pp. 342-344; Ibid., IV, p. 333; Die deutsche Minderheit und der "Sokol", Nation und Staat, VI, 6, 1933, pp. 443-444; Žutić, Sokoli, pp. 306, 309, 310. It is dubitable if Žutić's claim that there were few Volksdeutsche in the Sokol for religious reasons (i.e. due to the resistance of the Roman-Catholic clergy) is correct. (Ibid.) There are several indications that the incompatibility of national ideologies was the preponderant reason. Thus for instance, a case of German parents demanding that the Sokol be removed from a building in the school-yard and moved into other premises, and that the mentioned building be given over to the German Turnverein, was recorded in Vršac in 1938. (AV, 126/IV, 50106/38.)

37 Žutić, Sokoli, pp. 53-57; Dimić, Kulturna politika, I, p. 450.

38 Organizations for physical training managed to encompass only 5% of the population, and the Sokol of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia only 3%. (Žutić, Sokoli, p. 56.) In some minority places, the educational authorities managed to press members of the minorities to join. Thus in Novi Vrbas 80% of the members were Germans, and the rest mainly Hungarians, whereas there were only a few Yugoslavs. (Das Sokol Jugendtreffen in Werbas, Nation und Staat, VII, 9, 1934, p. 586.) The direction of the State Public School in Novi Bečej bragged in June 1930 that all the pupils were members of the Sokol. (AV, 126/IV, 28599/30.) The school inspector of Novi Sad reported in early 1933 that almost all pupils in Novi Sad were members of the Sokol. (AJ, 66 (pov.), F. 74.) In other places, the success was much more qualified. Thus for instance, the State High School in Senta had 432 pupils (219 Slavs, 213 Hungarians and Germans). Out of them 116 (their nationality not mentioned in the document) were members of the Sokol. Even if all the members were Slavs, that would mean only somewhat more than a half of the Slavs

A special kind of association of members of the national minorities were cooperatives. To be sure, they were not particular to the minorities, but as a rule the cooperatives had a pronounced national character.<sup>39</sup> They appeared in the last third of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, primarily among peasants. The first cooperatives in the Vojvodina were founded by the Slovaks in 1868, and in time all other nationalities founded their own.<sup>40</sup> They reached a degree of development until 1918 and they were members of larger cooperative unions.<sup>41</sup> However, their development was hindered by individualistic spirit of peasants, lack of qualified leaders and other factors.

Organizing of cooperatives was continued after the First World War. They could be found with all national minorities in the Northern parts of the country. With some of them, they were significant national, if not also economic, organizations – especially if united in unions. This was typical of the Czechs and Slovaks whose cooperatives already had a tradition and which founded a common cooperative union in 1927 (Ústřední jednota československých hospodářských družstev). However, it didn't do much for the cooperative movement, since it mainly represented the interests of the members in the Yugoslav Cooperative Union.<sup>42</sup> This was probably the reason that the numerically stronger Slovaks established their own union in 1931 with 45 cooperatives in all.<sup>43</sup> The cooperatives had even greater national importance for the Germans, who founded the Agraria already in 1922, as their agricultural cooperative union. Since German cooperatives reached the highest degree of development, not only among the national minorities, and served as a model also for members of the majority peoples, and since they became an important economic factor, we shall dwell on them a bit longer.

The Swabian cooperative organization, which didn't have a great tradition in Austria-Hungary,<sup>44</sup> came into being by separation of the Central Agricultural Co-operative Agraria from the Kulturbund, which had initially set itself economic goals too.<sup>45</sup> It was clear to the Volksdeutsche leaders, just like to the leaders of other

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were in the organization. (AV, 126/IV, 43844/930.) The Sokol district of Petrovgrad complained in May 1939 of the Sokol's poor work in many villages, due to the weak activity of the teachers, some of whom were not even formally members. (AV, 126/IV, 67621/939.)

39 Ljubica Šijački wrote that the cooperatives in the Banat had, primarily a national character, and only then the economic one. (Šijački, p. 127.)

40 The only nationality that had no cooperatives, either before or after the first World War were the Ruthenians. (Avramović, pp. 114-115.) This can be construed as a reflection of their general underdevelopment, or as a consequence of Hungarian influence.

41 Šijački, p. 128.

42 Hanzl, Matušek, Orct, pp. 28-29; Avramović, p. 114. Greatest part of Slovak cooperatives were credit cooperatives. Furthermore, in several Slovak and Czech places, there were Czech and Slovak banks (Šid, Ilok, Daruvar, Bjelovar). In Novi Sad, Pivnice, Kisač and Selenča, there were branches of the Slovenska banka from Bački Petrovac, whereas the Czechs of Daruvar founded the Czechoslovak Bank in 1921, that was later moved to Zagreb. (Lidové listy, March 26, 1933.)

43 Obzor, November 19, 1933.

44 HWBGAD, I, p. 254.

45 The Agraria was founded at the session of the Kulturbund in Novi Sad on October 1, 1922. The founders were 16 private individuals headed by Stefan Kraft. (Jovan Durman, Zadrugarstvo Nemaca u Jugoslaviji do Drugog svetskog rata, Zadrugni arhiv, 2, 1954, p. 115.)

minorities, that the national survival of members of national minorities could be successfully safeguarded only if their material survival was secured.<sup>46</sup> Since the government showed no desire to help them (or members of the majority peoples, for that matter) in that, but on the contrary, through measures such as sequester and agrarian reform, actually worked against the economic interests of national minorities, they had to find the way of helping themselves. For that reason an agricultural section had existed in the Kulturbund from the very beginning; that was transferred to the Agraria once it was founded.<sup>47</sup> The cooperative model had already existed:<sup>48</sup> it only had to be popularized, developed and improved.

The Agraria made it its task to regulate selling and buying of agricultural products as well as of the finances of its members.<sup>49</sup> It was headed by Kraft until 1927, then Johann Keks until 1935, Georg Birg until November 1939 when Jakob Awender took over<sup>50</sup> - which was in keeping with the changes in the Volksdeutsche organizations in favor of the Renewers.<sup>51</sup> The Agraria became synonymous with the success of the German cooperatives, which could vie only with the success of the Slovenian ones,<sup>52</sup> although not all the German cooperatives were members of the Agraria. On the contrary, with the branching out of the cooperative organization, new central cooperatives were founded that dealt with other sectors of agriculture.

There were 39 German cooperatives in 1925, 251 in 1930, 331 in 1933 and as many as 391 cooperatives in 1940.<sup>53</sup> Their territorial dispersal was interesting: 90.49% were active in the Vojvodina, 6.17% in Croatia, 2.57% in Bosnia and 0.26% in Slovenia.<sup>54</sup> In 1927 the Agraria became only the business center for trade, selling agricultural and buying industrial goods for agriculture. It had three departments: for goods, wheat and hemp.<sup>55</sup> The first was engaged in buying agricultural machines, and it was separated in 1936 as a separate firm, the Jugoagrar, which was the

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46 Altgayer, p. 61. This was also stated in the statutes of the Kulturbund. (Plautz, p. 90.)

47 Avramović, pp. 113-114, 123; Plautz, p. 90. The Agraria was the member of the Main Cooperative Union since 1924. (Lenard, Narodne manjine, p. 736; Grentrup, p. 332.)

48 Until 1918 the Germans were mainly members of Hungarian credit associations, most of which disappeared after the First World War. (Oebser, p. 219; Avramović, p. 114.) Founding of Raiffeisen-Saving Banks began in Bosnia at the eve of the First World War, and the Union of German Credit and Economic Cooperatives was established in Banja Luka. After the First World War most of these cooperatives ceased operating due to the departure of their founder Dr. Oehler and internal squabbles. (Oebser, p. 219; HWBGAD, I, p. 500.)

49 Oebser, pp. 220, 224; Plautz, p. 90.

50 Plautz, p. 91.

51 According to a military report (probably from 1941), this post didn't satisfy the ambitious Awender who had hoped to become the Volksgruppenführer. (VA, pop. 17, k. 1, f. 4, d. 56.)

52 Daka Popović, Banat, p. 30; Lenard, Narodne manjine, p. 736.

53 Popović, Banat, p. 31; Durman, p. 116. Šijački adduces only 340 cooperatives in 1940. (Šijački, p. 149.)

54 Durman, p. 117.

55 The importance of the Agraria is testified also by the fact there are ten pages devoted to its work in 1927/28 within the article on cooperatives in the festive miscellany about life and work in Yugoslavia. (Cf. Ivan Milivoj Varga, Naše zadrugarstvo, in: Jubilarni zbornik života i rada SHS, pp. 279-289.)

representative of the largest 15-odd German machine-manufacturing firms. 34% of German export of agricultural machines into Yugoslavia went through it.<sup>56</sup>

Thanks to the branching out of the business of the German cooperatives, and the spread of the cooperative ideas, the Central Cooperative for Breeding and Selling Swine was founded in February 1930. In April 1940 it was merged with the union of animal-breeders cooperatives, the Selector that had been established in May 1931. The Selector was founded to import breeding cattle from abroad, but due to climatic and other difficulties, it achieved no major success, so that eventually it confined itself to selection of cattle, participation in exhibitions and partly to export of horned cattle on a small scale.<sup>57</sup> Indeed it was the proof that the German cooperatives were not always as successful as it seemed to the contemporaries.<sup>58</sup> The same held true of the Central Poultry Cooperative Avis, founded in late 1931.<sup>59</sup> In March 1927 the Central Agricultural Credit Cooperative evolved out of the Agraria's credit department, becoming an independent union, but only for credit transactions. It had trust, agricultural and credit departments,<sup>60</sup> and it was founded thanks to a foreign loan.<sup>61</sup> It developed the system of mandatory time-limited saving for its members, and the number of its depositors grew between 1935 and 1940 from 10,547 to 15,512.<sup>62</sup> Ninety percent of the assets of this central cooperative didn't belong to it, and Jovan Durman suspected that their great part had come as aid from the Reich.<sup>63</sup> According to other data, other German cooperatives also did business mainly with money that wasn't theirs.<sup>64</sup> The German agricultural cooperatives (some of which

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56 Durman, pp. 117-119. Durman, who is not very fond of the Volsdeutsche, accuses Agraria of breaking the foreign currency regulations in his article.

57 Daka Popović, Banat, p. 32; Durman, pp. 121-122; Oebser, pp. 222, 225-226.

58 Todor Avramović also had a somewhat idealized picture of the success of the German cooperatives and their unions. (Avramović, p. 114.) The reason for such perception on part of some observers probably lay in the fact the Agraria managed to weather the great economic depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and because main attention was turned to it, and not to the less successful central unions. (Cf. *Deutsches Volksblatt*, October 22, 1932; *Jugoslovenska pošta*, August 3, 1933.) The liquidity of the Central Agricultural Credit Cooperative and its affiliations (*Bauernhilfe*) during the crisis also shed favourable light on German cooperatives as a whole. (Scherer, *Die Donauschwaben in Jugoslawien*, p. 17.)

59 Daka Popović, Banat, p. 32; Plautz, p. 93; Durman, pp. 123-124; Avramović, p. 114.

60 Plautz, p. 92; Avramović, pp. 114, 124; Durman, p. 125. On the make-up of the members and its transactions cf.: Daka Popović, Banat, pp. 31-32. The attempt of the German Party to found a German bank in the late 1920s failed because of the government's refusal to approve it. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, fremdvölkere in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.)

61 The loan had 9% interest and was concluded with the approval of the General Inspectorate of the Finance Ministry. (Dammang, p. 182.)

62 Plautz, p. 93; Grentrup, p. 333; Durman, pp. 126-128. For the year 1935 Oebser even adduces 19,517 depositors. (Oebser, p. 222.)

63 Durman, p. 130. If one keeps in mind the initial loan, this supposition can't be discarded, but it would have to be irrefutably proven. It is certain that the credit cooperatives were the strongest part of German cooperatives and that they financed erection of "German Houses" and "Culture Houses" in several communes, serving in that way directly the national cause. (Oebser, p. 223.)

64 Šijački, p. 150. The ratio between their own and foreign capital in Serbian cooperatives was 1: 2, and in German ones 1: 20. (Ibid.)

didn't have their central organization)<sup>65</sup> had their own magazine since 1933, *Der Landwirt*, which was renamed the *Landpost* in 1940.<sup>66</sup> The German cooperative members were judged loyal and disciplined, but according to Durman, because of that, the bigger jingoists.<sup>67</sup> As for the coordination of the activities of the *Volksdeutsche* cooperative with the needs of the Reich, it came about only in 1939,<sup>68</sup> at the time the official Yugoslav foreign trade policy had already been doing it for a while.<sup>69</sup> Apart from these economic cooperatives, the *Volksdeutsche* founded also the Central Social Cooperative (*Zentral-Wohlfahrtsgenossenschaft – Zewoge*) in April 1930.<sup>70</sup> Its initial members were village burial societies. It was engaged in medical lectures, providing cheap medical treatment, social hygiene, fighting social illness, care of mother and child and "racial hygiene".<sup>71</sup> All these matters engaged the intelligentsia of the German minority already in the 1920s, which was in keeping with tendencies in Germany, but also with the deterioration of health, hygiene and morality in Swabian settlements. During the 1930s these activities in the *Zewoge* clearly assumed the tinge of Nazi care of the race. There were 44 cooperatives with 52 funeral funds, 22 departments for care of the sick, 7 day care centers (shut down by the government in 1940) and the total of 41,741 members in 1938. Local branches employed 33 doctors, 2 midwives, 3 nurses and 9 daycare nurses. Apart from several pharmacies, there was a cooperative hospital with 13 beds in Bačko Dobro Polje in 1936.<sup>72</sup> The *Zewoge* maintained its premises in Novi Sad since 1936, where three-months courses for future wives and mothers were held.<sup>73</sup> In the opinion of a contemporary German author, the *Volksdeutsche* social cooperatives in Yugoslavia were better organized than with any other German national minority in Europe.<sup>74</sup>

Opposed to such well developed German cooperatives were the "national" (i.e. Yugoslav) cooperatives in the Vojvodina, which, according to Senator Daka Popović, were weaker than they had been before the First World War.<sup>75</sup> On the other hand,

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65 Oebser, p. 229.

66 Durman, pp. 125-125; Bešlin, *Vesnik*, pp. 119-127.

67 Durman, p. 132. The latter statement should be taken with caution, since the otherwise quite informative Durman's article was written at the time one could write only badly about the *Volksdeutsche* in Yugoslavia. According to the annual report for 1940 of the district chief of Apatin, German cooperatives were indeed nationally exclusive, but they avoided ties with Yugoslav cooperatives for economic reasons i.e. in order to safeguard the German cooperatives from the "general contingencies of the economic situation." (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 7, d. 23.)

68 Altgayer, p. 62. This adapting of production to the needs of Germany didn't go smoothly everywhere. (Ibid.)

69 Adjusting of the Yugoslav agricultural production to the Reich's needs started already in 1937/38. (Dušan Lukač, *Treći Rajh i zemlje jugoistočne Evrope*, II, 1937-1941, Beograd 1982, pp. 36, 38; Cvijetić, p. 189.)

70 It is interesting that the model for the German health-insurance cooperative were the Serbian ones, founded with the American aid after the First World War.

71 Oebser, pp. 236-238; Plautz, p. 95. At first, part of German doctors refused to join this organization, balking at the cooperative health insurance, that they called the „Kassen-system“. (HWBGAD, I, p. 343.)

72 Oebser, pp. 239-241; Plautz, p. 96.

73 Oebser, pp. 241-242; Plautz, p. 97.

74 Oebser, p. 243.

75 Daka Popović, *Banat*, p. 16. In order to parry the national minorities, one didn't have to invent new forms of organization, but simply to copy the German cultural and economic



German cooperatives in Slovenia were very poorly developed – due to government pressure.<sup>76</sup>

As for other national minorities, they also had cooperatives, but they were no match for the German ones in terms of organization and efficiency. The Central Agricultural Credit Cooperative which had its seat in Budapest until 1918, existed until its liquidation in 1926 with the center in Zagreb. It comprised some 159, mostly Hungarian, credit cooperatives.<sup>77</sup> Together with catering and consumers' cooperatives, they numbered some 220 in the Vojvodina until 1918. After that, almost all of them were either abolished or merged with Yugoslav cooperatives.<sup>78</sup> Nevertheless, a number of Hungarian cooperatives was founded during the 1920s, especially around the Tisa river, but in other parts too,<sup>79</sup> and the new wave of strengthening of Hungarian cooperatives occurred in the second half of the 1930s,<sup>80</sup> which, like the cooperatives of other nationalities, had to surmount not only administrative,<sup>81</sup> but also psychological obstacles. The Romanians united their 22 credit and saving cooperatives (Peasants' Unity) in 1937 into the Central Credit Cooperative, with the seat in Vršac.<sup>82</sup> However, Romanian cooperatives were usually quickly founded and didn't last long, so that they yielded poor results, whereas the Ruthenians never managed to found cooperatives of their own at all.<sup>83</sup> The same held true of the Albanians and the Turks in the Southern parts of the country – mirroring their low consciousness on the one hand, but also (in the case of the Albanians) the lack of need for peasant cooperatives in a society that still lived, to a large extent, in large families ("zadrugas"). For their part, the not very numerous Italians, living mostly as a minority in towns, stood in greater need of associations for mutual assistance, which made up 40% of all their associations (10 out of 25).<sup>84</sup>

All in all, cooperatives were comparatively many, but nevertheless failed to influence economic life significantly, not even of certain regions – such as the Vojvodina<sup>85</sup> – let alone the whole country. They were hindered in it by a number of shortcomings – beginning with mistrust<sup>86</sup> and the individualistic way of thinking of the peasants,<sup>87</sup> as well as lack of adequate leaders and generally bad economic

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organization. Otherwise, the Yugoslavs would lose the competition with national minorities. (Ibid., p. 41.)

76 Oebser, p. 219.

77 Avramović, p. 114. Gabor Szanto's attempt at unifying Hungarian economic organizations in the early 1930s failed.

78 Mearoš, Položaj, p. 105; Idem, Mađari, p. 313.

79 Mearoš, Mađari, pp. 320-326.

80 Új Hirek, July 30, 1937; Reggeli Újság, November 20, 1940.

81 Thus for instance the police authorities in Petrovgrad in early 1938 suspected the local central office of the Hungarian credit cooperative of being the main hub of irredentist propaganda and the go-between for receiving money and propaganda materials from Budapest. (VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 36, d. 1.)

82 Popi, Rumuni, pp. 23-25; Avramović, pp. 114-115.

83 Avramović, pp. 114-115.

84 AJ, F. 398, f. 1.

85 Avramović, p. 119.

86 Thus for instance the Volksdeutsche of Slavonia were disappointed by the collapse of the Croatian-Slavonian Economic Society in Osijek after the First World War so that they became mistrustful of the cooperative organization as such. (Altgayer, p. 62.)

87 Damming, p. 171; Obzor, November 19, 1933.

conditions. The truth was that the rich and moderately well-off peasants stood most to gain from them,<sup>88</sup> but minority cooperatives were nevertheless important national institutions that helped the economically based national homogenization.<sup>89</sup>

Together with all these, there were also other minority associations (humanitarian, religious, recreational), but they were fewer: they were scattered and their work wasn't unified in unions even to the degree as was the case with the associations mentioned above. Furthermore, due to smaller numbers and more "innocuous" fields of action, they received much less attention from the authorities, so that they also left far less traces about themselves in the archival sources. In principle, they obtained operating permissions more easily and were less molested.<sup>90</sup>

It isn't always easy to separate non-cultural associations of national minorities (and to be sure others too) from primarily cultural-educational ones. Whereas the first often performed cultural functions (cooperatives organized lectures and courses, firemen played music etc.), cultural associations were engaged in economic, social, sport and other activities and matters. Therefore, and partly due to overlap of membership, minority non-cultural associations often served as affiliations or sub-associations of cultural-educational societies or organizations. This means the attitude of the authorities toward them was somewhat similar to the one they had toward the cultural associations, one of rigidity and suspicion. And yet, the attitude toward non-cultural associations and organizations was on the whole somewhat milder. This held true particularly of societies and organizations more oriented toward economic or humanitarian work. On the other hand, the closer the work of an association was to the realm of culture or politics, or the furthering of national consciousness, the stricter the government surveillance was. The minorities for their part were aware of the importance of various associations for preservation of their national consciousness and survival. This, however held true only for the Northern parts: in the Southern ones the patriarchal-organized society, with little awareness among the masses for the need for broader cultural, economic, social or sport associations, functioned almost without associations. Judging by general conditions prevailing in those parts, we may assume that the attitude of the authorities toward various associations of members of national minorities would have been in general even less propitious than in the Northern parts, inhabited by minorities with fair tradition of all kinds of associations, and with mother countries that could, through their diplomatic and propaganda apparatuses, put pressure to bear not only on the

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88 Avramović, p. 119. The Nazi Renewers, according to Janko, wanted to turn the German cooperatives tailored for the wealthy peasants, into institutions for all. (Janko, *Weg*, pp. 22-24.) However, in his memoirs Janko tends to picture the struggle of the Renewers as mostly social, spurred by social inequality, and to neglect the strong Nazi ideological influences from the Reich. According to Kosijer, the make-up of the landholdings of members of German cooperatives in 1937 looked like this: 1,700 members possessed over 50 morgen of land; 5,000 had 20 to 50 morgen; 7,000 had 10 to 20 morgen; 17,000 less than 5 morgen; 8,000 were landless peasants. (1 morgen is about 2 acres.) (Kosijer, p. 52.) If these data are correct, it means the majority of members were small and middle peasants, and not the rich as claimed by the Renewers and some other authors.

89 Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 712. In several places where the economic interest prevailed over national exclusivity, there were also ethnically mixed cooperatives. (AJ, 14, 105/404; Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 324; Popi, *Rumuni*, p. 23.)

90 Istorijski arhiv, Novi Sad (henceforth: IA), F. 150, 16379/1923.

Yugoslav authorities, but also on the world public opinion. This means the existence and work of various associations of national minorities in Yugoslavia were conditioned to the same degree by civilization differences of long duration and the needs of the minorities themselves (springing from these differences), as well as the power of influence of their mother countries.



## Chapter Twelve

# National Minorities in the Agrarian Reform and Colonization

The vast majority of Yugoslavia's population lived in the country and worked in agriculture. This was true also of the minorities whose agrarian population was on the Yugoslav average, or even much higher with some minorities. For this reason the question of land ownership was one of the key ones for them too. In Chapter Six we tried to outline the social make-up of the individual national minorities (including their participation in the landownership, as far that was possible). In this chapter we shall try to depict how the implementation of the agrarian reform and colonization affected members of national minorities, what the authorities wanted to achieve by those measures and what the result of their endeavors was.<sup>1</sup>

We have seen in the first chapter that there can be colonization without agrarian reform – provided there is no owner from whom land has to be taken away. This was typical of the former Habsburg territories during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Although the major colonization there was over in the first decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in the last third of it, there were smaller attempts at purely nationally motivated colonization in the Vojvodina, Slavonia and Slovenia.<sup>2</sup> It yielded no significant results from the point of view of the then ruling powers, but in the Vojvodina it laid the foundation for some of the social problems that troubled the province during the inter-war period.<sup>3</sup>

The situation in the Southern parts of the country was somewhat different. We have seen that Serbia had expelled the remaining Muslim population and settled the Serbian one instead. Montenegro could not proceed that radically, but it did redistribute some arable land and colonized the Montenegrin population to the detriment of the Muslim one, which it tried to oust.<sup>4</sup> The situation was repeated to a

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1 Dealing with this, one should keep in mind that, especially when figures are concerned, the literature on the agrarian reform and colonization is as chaotic as these phenomena had been in practice. (Dogo, Kosovo, p. 283.) This means all numbers in this chapter should be taken with a grain of salt and not as absolutely mirroring the situation, but rather as an illustration. (Cf. also the opinion of Đ. Krstić about that: Krstić, *Kolonizacija u Južnoj Srbiji*, p. III.)

2 Colonization by non-Yugoslav population in Bosnia was only partly politically motivated.

3 L. Katus, *Über die wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen der Nationalitätenpolitik in Ungarn vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*, in: Peter Hanák (ed.), *Die nationale Frage in der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie 1900-1918*, Budapest 1966, p. 165; Tomasevich, p. 136; *Jugoslovenski dnevnik*, January 1, 1933. The colonization of the Hungarians sometimes took place on the confiscated communal land, such as in Donja Mužlja. (Zrenjanin, p. 70.) Milivoje Erić sees rather naively in the Hungarian laws V/1894 and XXXII/1897 predominantly as a social measure. (Erić, p. 59.)

4 Bulajić, pp. 31-69, 75-130, 134-137.

degree after the Balkan Wars when colonization of abandoned or bought Muslim and state land started in the territories that Serbia and Montenegro acquired after the Balkan Wars.<sup>5</sup>

This colonization was mostly spontaneous, and only to a smaller degree directed by the state, although, such as it was, it was in the state interest.<sup>6</sup> People were coming on their own accord, buying land of the emigrating Muslims, or settling down on the land of the state or of those who had already left.<sup>7</sup> Various irregularities occurred in the process: some Muslims sold what didn't belong to them<sup>8</sup> and the lack of title deeds or their sloppiness made all kinds of speculation and fraud possible.<sup>9</sup> The authorities of Serbia and Montenegro tried to regularize this spontaneous colonization<sup>10</sup> in which they were basically interested for national and social reasons.<sup>11</sup> Thus Serbia passed the Decree on Colonization on March 5, 1914,<sup>12</sup> (supplemented on May 22 the same year), and Montenegro, following Serbia's example, passed the Law on Colonization of the Newly-Liberated Areas of Montenegro on March 12, 1914.<sup>13</sup> Both acts didn't foresee abolition of feudalism, but not ethnic discrimination in land distribution<sup>14</sup> either, albeit, as a rule, the buyers were Serbs – that corresponded with the intention of the authorities anyway. By this, the problem of agrarian overpopulation was to be solved, and at the same time, the newly acquired territories were to be ethnically secured.<sup>15</sup> In order to prevent speculations and to

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- 5 Conquering new territories to which it had neither ethnic nor historical right, in order to acquire arable land for the benefit of the surplus population, was one of the main reasons for its entrance into the First Balkan War. (Babić, *Politika*, p. 22.)
- 6 The Serbian government did next to nothing in terms of colonization except for issuing a decree about it. (Erić, pp. 113-114.)
- 7 Todorovski, p. 233; Roux, p. 192.
- 8 The departing Muslims were not asked to produce valid title deeds, whereas those who stayed were. (Dogo, *Kosovo*, p. 119.)
- 9 Erić, p. 107; Tomasevich, p. 358. Not only individuals but communes too, had fake title deeds. (Todorovski, p. 294.)
- 10 Obradović, *Agrarni odnosi*, p. 422.
- 11 The Serbian authorities themselves spread the word about the large quantity of disposable land for colonization, in order to attract settlers. (Apostolov, p. 36.)
- 12 It favoured people from Serbia and it foresaw that colonists would receive 5 ha + 2 ha of vacant state land for each member of the family, free firewood, exemption from most of the taxes, ownership of the received land after 15 years and the Serbian citizenship for those who hadn't had it until then. The last stipulation concerned above all the Serbs from Austria-Hungary and the USA who had evinced considerable interest in colonization. Moreover, settlement of auto-colonists was also foreseen. (Erić, pp. 113-114; Boeckh, p. 153; Apostolov, p. 38.) The Montenegrin authorities offered 15-30 acres for each family with 4.000 m<sup>2</sup> homestead under certain conditions, free firewood, three years' exemption from most of the taxes and ownership of land if the colonists would build a house according to a prescribed plan. (Pejović, pp. 221-222.)
- 13 Janković, *L'annexion*, p. 307; Nikola Gaćeša, *Naseljavanje Kosova i Metohije između dva svetska rata i rešavanje naseljeničkog pitanja posle Drugog svetskog rata*, in: Idem, *Radovi*, p. 247; Pejović, p. 218. The Montenegrin authorities didn't have in mind an agrarian reform, but just colonization of the land that was yet to be made arable and of the land for which it was believed the Muslims would abandon of their own free will. (Pejović, p. 218.)
- 14 Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 25.
- 15 Babić, *Politika*, p. 267; Apostolov, p. 39.

preserve land for colonization, the Serbian and Montenegrin authorities prohibited buying and selling of land.<sup>16</sup> However, the authorities of both countries couldn't untangle the relations in landownership – due to their complexity and other priorities.<sup>17</sup> For these reasons, and the wish to find a *modus vivendi*<sup>18</sup> with the Muslim elite, shortness of time and unprepared conditions, resistance on part of the locals and fear on the part of potential colonists,<sup>19</sup> only some of the interested Serbian and Montenegrin colonists actually settled down before the First World War.<sup>20</sup> Although, apart from the national component,<sup>21</sup> the agrarian reform and colonization had a pronounced social one – endowing the landless (local and immigrant), and although on the whole, it wasn't possible to implement the colonization in its full scope, some government ministers, civil servants, politicians and speculators managed to take advantage of the unsettled conditions and to buy huge parcels of land for a song, despite the prohibition.<sup>22</sup>

How did all these processes affect the Albanian and Turkish population which found themselves in a minority position after the Balkan wars? Apparently not a small part decided, or was forced to emigrate, selling their estates rather cheaply.<sup>23</sup> Part of the emigrants managed to misuse the confused situation prevailing in the first months and to sell land over which they couldn't prove ownership rights.<sup>24</sup> Part of the Muslim landowners started distributing land among

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- 16 Apostolov, p. 37; Babić, *Politika*, p. 255; Erić, p. 107; Pejović, pp. 231-232. This, however wasn't enough since part of the land was forcibly taken away from the Albanians or the state. The latter was typical of the Montenegrins in the Metohija. (Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, pp. 27, 29; Pejović, pp. 234-236.)
- 17 Babić, *Politika*, p. 264; Boeckh, p. 151.
- 18 Prominent Albanians were co-opted into the committees which distributed the land and into other government organs. (Pejović, pp. 224, 238-239; Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 29.)
- 19 Pejović, pp. 225-226; Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 27; Babić, *Politika*, p. 276.)
- 20 Babić, *Politika*, pp. 269-276; Apostolov, p. 39.
- 21 In that context, the Montenegrin government wanted to colonize first the strip alongside the Albanian border, and its Serbian counterpart alongside the Bulgarian one. (Babić, *Politika*, pp. 273, 276; Apostolov, p. 39; Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 32.)
- 22 Dogo, Kosovo, p. 119. Thus for instance, the Prime-Minister Pašić bought 3.000 ha around Priština. (Ibid.; Obradović, *Agrarni odnosi*, p. 443.) He was deprived of this landholding "for party reasons", but it was decided he should receive another one in other place. (SBNS KSHS, *Redovan saziv za 1926/27, II*, p. 437.) The heir to the Serbian throne, Alexander, bought 800 ha in Demir Kapija at a good price. (Apostolov, p. 52; Janković, *L'annexion*, p. 307.) A document from 1930 mentions that Alexander bought an estate of that size in the communes of Prždeva and Demir Kapija in 1928. The mistake concerning the year isn't to be ruled out, but it is certain that the king didn't fulfill his financial obligations until mid-1930 – allegedly because of the disputed title deeds of some of the sellers. (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1930, f. 7, 1-107.)
- 23 Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 26. It seems the majority of the migrants were poor peasants with small landholdings. (Babić, *Iseljavanje*, p. 317.) However, the most numerous emigrants from the Montenegrin territory were neither the Albanians nor the Turks, but the Yugoslav Muslims. (Ibid., p. 319.)
- 24 Todorovski, p. 233; Dogo, Kosovo, p. 119. The Yugoslav agrarian authorities annulled some of these contracts, returning the land to its original owners – the Muslims returning from Turkey. (SBNS Kraljevine SHS, *Vanredan saziv za 1923, knj. II*, Beograd 1923, p. 1475.)

sharecroppers so as to avoid the agrarian reform, whereas part of the returning Muslims leased their land to speculators who, in turn, leased it for exorbitant prices to the poor, whose position became worse than during the Ottoman rule.<sup>25</sup> However, some of the serfs (among whom the Albanians and Turks were to be found too), made use of the situation created by the fall of the Ottoman power, and stopped paying obligations to the landowners.<sup>26</sup> In short, a rather chaotic situation was created in which people, both members of the majority, and of the (new) minority, had a different fate – depending on local conditions and their ability to fish in the troubled waters. Losers and winners were to be found on both sides, but the available sources make it difficult to tell who was more numerous and on which side. But one thing is certain: the number of feudal estates dropped drastically between 1912 and 1918, whereas the number of Christian landlords and independent peasants increased.<sup>27</sup> Despite the fact that the new authorities had no desire to destroy the former Muslim elite economically,<sup>28</sup> the processes of emigration, usurpation, selling and colonization started to diminish it even before the beginning of the real agrarian reform.

The First World War and the temporary defeat of Serbia and Montenegro in it, led to the occupation by Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, under the rule of which considerable part of the anyway only partly implemented colonization was annulled: the Muslims, former landowners or their relatives and friends expelled auto-colonists. Several murders of the Montenegrins occurred in the Metohija – that were the revenge for violent behavior of some Montenegrins during and after the Balkan Wars. The auto-colonists who had bought the land were better accepted and for a great part, especially in the Serbian territory, remained on their estates.<sup>29</sup> Part of Montenegrin colonists withdrew on their own accord before the occupants and their Albanian helpers.

The end of the First World War brought about the creation of Yugoslavia, which, even before it was founded, was faced with the need to solve both national and social questions as soon as possible. Whereas it seemed the first was to a degree solved by the creation of the common state of the majority of the Southern Slavs, the latter called for urgent, but more complex solutions. The main burning social question was the agrarian one: the peasantry that made up 80% of the population of the new state, and that had already been poor before, became even poorer during the war. Its dissatisfaction erupted in autumn 1918, and threatened, in the opinion of the ruling circles, to turn into a social revolution. In order to placate the turbulent peasantry, the People's Council of Zagreb promised an agrarian reform already on November 14, 1918, but this failed to yield the desired result. Regent Alexander for his part also issued a manifesto on January 6, 1919, promising arable land for free peasants in the free state, coupled with an appeal for patience until the government solved the agrarian problem.

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25 Apostolov, pp. 29-30.

26 Apostolov, p. 29.

27 The number of feudal estates in Macedonia dropped from 2.260 to just 501. (Apostolov, pp. 51-52.) Todorovski adduces somewhat different number of the owners of feudal estates in the year 1903, stressing that the majority of them had been Muslims. (Todorovski, p. 201.)

28 On the contrary: the authorities relied on the beys, which meant the serfs had to pay their dues. (Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 32.)

29 Tomasevich, p. 358; Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 32.



The landowners were promised indemnification for the land they would lose – although there were disagreements within the government on this issue. The Temporary Regulations for the Implementation of the Agrarian Reform were passed on February 25, 1919, which set the direction of the agrarian reform and colonization in the 1920s.<sup>30</sup> The Decree on Colonization of the Southern Parts that was issued on September 24, 1924, was made law on June 11, 1931, that was somewhat amended and supplemented on June 24, 1933.<sup>31</sup> From the legislative point of view, the agrarian reform was by and large rounded out by the Law on the Liquidation of the Agrarian Reform, of June 19, 1931,<sup>32</sup> at the time it had already long ago lost breath in practice. These regulations were supposed to introduce certain order and system into a rather chaotic and contradictory process. We shan't go into the details of various facets of this extremely important social and historical process, but we shall rather limit attention to those aspects touching upon the situation of members of national minorities.

At first glance, the story about the participation of members of national minorities in the agrarian reform and colonization, is very brief and simple: for the greatest part, they participated neither in the first nor in the latter as active subjects, whereas the land for the needs of the agrarian reform was taken away from big minority landowners, communes, and sometimes from ordinary citizens.<sup>33</sup> The exceptions were members of the Slavic minorities: the Czechs, Slovaks and Ruthenians, who partly participated in carving up the estates of big landowners, albeit never on equal footing with members of the majority peoples.<sup>34</sup> There were formal and real reasons for that. The formal ones, adduced by representatives of the authorities in the Northern parts of the country until the lapse of the option right, were similar to those they adduced when denying the minorities the right to vote: until the option deadline has run out, members of these minorities were treated as foreign citizens (although the vast majority of them had no intention of

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30 Erić, pp. 156-159. They foresaw that the nearest and poorest candidates should get land first, but this was often not the case in practice, and even when it was, as a rule, they received very little land.

31 Olga Janša, *Agrarna reforma v Sloveniji med obema vojnama*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XVIII, 1964, pp. 173-174; Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, pp. 42-43, 51; Idem, *Agrarni odnosi*, p. 447. The Law on Colonization foresaw settlement on the state, communal, village, abandoned, vacant or free land, as well as on the land of outlaws, large landowners and serfs. Adequate plots for the confiscated land were to be given in exchange in other places. (Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, pp. 138-140.) In practice these stipulations were rather stretched in favour of the colonists and land was sometimes taken away also from families which were not outlaws'. (Ibid., pp. 145-147.)

32 Suppan, *Zur Lage*, p. 184.

33 Popi, Rumuni, pp. 27-29; Nikola Gaćeša, *Prilog proučavanju emigracionih problema u Vojvodini između dva svetska rata*, in: Idem, *Radovi*, pp. 491-493; Ammende (ed.), p. 362.

34 Rehak, *Manjine*, pp. 251-252; Šijački, p. 95; Gaćeša, *Vojvodanski Slovaci*, pp. 274-283; Idem, *Rusini*, pp. 322, 327-330; Drobnjaković, *Mileker*, p. 135. Out of 2,000 landless Slovak families, 170 received land. The Ruthenians were endowed with land in most of the places they inhabited in considerable numbers, but therefore they received little per capita (1.74 morgen). Moreover, a large number of them in Ruski Krstur lost during the revision of the agrarian reform in 1928 what they had gained before. Despite some modest gains from the agrarian reform, the Ruthenians on the whole, lost 4,745 morgen during the inter-war period. (Biljnja, *Rusini*, pp. 41-43.)

becoming that.)<sup>35</sup> After the option deadline had passed, members of minorities were let know, more or less overtly, that despite the fact the regulations didn't prescribe it, the Non-Slavs were excluded from enjoying the benefits of the agrarian reform.<sup>36</sup> There was just one formal reason that prevented members of these minorities from applying for plots as ex-Serbian army volunteers (which brought largest plots and biggest privileges), and that was that the legislator favored people (and their families) who had fought for the unification of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – who practically were not to be found among members of national minorities.

On the other hand, there were no formal obstacles for members of minorities to apply for land as ordinary candidates.<sup>37</sup> However, having soon learned the lesson from the adverse practice of the government organs,<sup>38</sup> they often didn't even try to obtain land from the agrarian reform.<sup>39</sup> However, there were attempts (which were sometimes even successful) at dividing communal land among members of minorities themselves, so as to prevent it from being used for the agrarian reform, or attempts at keeping the land they had bought from big landowners.<sup>40</sup> As for leasing land from colonists and other representatives of the "state people", nasty irregularities occurred sometimes to the detriment of members of national minorities who could seldom lease land under fair conditions.<sup>41</sup>

In principle, the same rules obtained in the Southern parts, but the situation was somewhat different there. First of all, there were lot of serfs there, many of whom were Albanians or Turks, who, thanks to the agrarian reform, were endowed with the land they had been tilling.<sup>42</sup> In that way, part of members of minorities had benefited

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35 Erić, p. 240. Because of such treatement, part of Romanian village poor asked the Romanian government for land for colonization in Romania. (Popi, Rumuni, p. P. 30.) 500 Romanian families from the Yugoslav Banat moved to Dobrogea in early 1930s. (Ibid., pp. 37-38.)

36 Erić, p. 240; Kecić, Vojvodina, pp. 154-155; Janša, p. 177.

37 Such obstacles were made by various regulations and internal orders of the government organs which permeated them as a red thread. (Cf. Erić, p. 296; Kasaš, O jednoj predstavi, p. 198.)

38 The answers they received were as a rule, negative. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 95; Obradović, Agrarna reforma, p. 152; Nikola Gaćeša, Nemci u agrarnoj reformi i vlasništvu obradivog zemljišta u Vojvodini 1919-1941, in: Idem, Radovi, p. 294.)

39 And yet, as late as 1925 the Hungarian landless hoped they would be granted land from the agrarian reform. (AJ, 14, 105/406.)

40 IAP, F. 91, 1920, k. 4, pr. 40; Dammang, p. 145; Gaćeša, Prilog proučavanju emigracionih problema, p. 494; Idem, Nemci, pp. 290, 293; Kolaković, pp. 123-124; Iskruljev, Raspeće, p. 443. In 1925 count Pejačević in Ruma sold the remnants of his estate mostly to the local Germans through a Serbian go-between, who also made a lot of money in the process. (Haller, Bischof, p. 306.) The Aromuns of Kruševo leased at an auction the greater part of the pastures on the Šara Mountain. (VA, pop. 17, k. 69, f. 4, d. 3.)

41 Rehak, Manjine, p. 254.

42 Tomasevich, p. 359. Feudal system was abolished in July 1919, but already the next month, the serfs were obliged to pay the temporary rent. Since April 1920 they paid the tax and the rent (which substituted the hak). Although the rent was abolished in 1922, some were still paying it in 1930. (Jovanović, Turci, p. 133.) The Law on "Southern Serbia" of December 5, 1931, left the serfs the estates up to 5 ha for free, whereas serfs with large families or living on bad land, could buy up to 10 ha. Others had to pay for the land within 30 years with 5% interest. Unlike in other parts of the country, the landlords in the Southern parts were paid both the indemnification and the rent in cash.

from the agrarian reform - not because that was the government's intention, but thanks to circumstances.<sup>43</sup> Part of them sold their land (against the law) to auto-colonists.<sup>44</sup> Part of the beys also sold their land in time,<sup>45</sup> whereas some of them wanted to appropriate land that didn't belong to them.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, the chance of members of minorities receiving or keeping land in the course of the agrarian reform through party affiliation was better in the South,<sup>47</sup> whereas massive abuses of title deeds continued after the First World War, with, so it seemed, the beys playing the main role.<sup>48</sup>

Having seen what members of minorities had received from the fund of the agrarian reform, let's see what their "input" into it had been. To be sure, big landowners "contributed" most. This was particularly true of the Northern parts of the country, since in the Southern ones, there were fewer large estates,<sup>49</sup> with much smaller land surface. Moreover, since one of the declared aims of the agrarian reform was to break the power of large foreign landowners,<sup>50</sup> the fact that a considerable part of the large landowners (usually of Hungarian or German nationality) lived outside of Yugoslavia and had foreign citizenship, was exploited in the Northern parts of the country.<sup>51</sup> In

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(Tomasevich, pp. 359-360; Erić, p. 463.) The change of their position didn't inspire loyalty toward the new state with the Albanian serfs – certainly because of its other measures. (Hrabak, Džemijet, p. 287.)

- 43 Dogo, Kosovo, p. 288; Hoxha, p. 298. According to Malcolm, as many as 4.000 Albanian families were granted land. (Malcolm, Kosovo, p. 280.) However, the gains of Albanian serfs were jeopardized by the sloppiness and malevolence of government organs and lack of documents. (Dogo, Kosovo, p. 121.) Čedomil Mitrinović believed there had been few Albanian serfs in predominantly Albanian areas. (Čedomil Mitrinović, *Kolonizacija južnih krajeva*, Beograd 1939, p. 13.) The claim of Veselin Đuretić that the Albanians were only little discriminated against in the distribution of the land, is an understatement, to say the least. (Đuretić, p. 134.)

- 44 Dogo, Kosovo, p. 121.

- 45 Erić, p. 387; Hrabak, Džemijet, p. 294. On the whole, due to wide-spread corruption and political opportunism, the treatment of the beys was not that harsh as Roux would have it, although it is certain that the indemnification that part of the Albanians had received for the confiscated land hadn't always been appropriate. (Cf. Roux, p. 194.)

- 46 Mitrinović, p. 13.

- 47 Apostolov, pp. 143, 186-189.

- 48 Đoko Bogojević, *Agrarna reforma*, in: *Jubilarni zbornik života i rada SHS*, pp. 304, 306; Apostolov, pp. 141-142; Jovanović, Turci, p. 133. Krstić writes the Albanians and Turks often sold the land that wasn't theirs by using fake title deeds. (Krstić, pp. 9, 32, 55.)

- 49 Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 56.

- 50 Macartney, Hungary and her Successors, p. 398. In Slovenia in 1922 there were 91 German landowners, 80 Slovenian, 9 Hungarian, 7 Italian, etc. (Janša, p. 182.) In Croatia in 1895, 21% of the land was in the hands of Non-Yugoslavs (18.7% of the Hungarians and Germans, 2.3% of others). (Zdenka Šimončić-Bobetko, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Hrvatskoj 1918-1941*, Zagreb 1997, p. 34.) 48.62% of large landowners in the Vojvodina were Hungarians, 21.67% Germans, 8.39% Serbs, 7.7% Jews, 6.87% Italians, 6.63% Croats, 0.06% Romanians. (Kecić, *Vojvodina*, p. 154.) The Hungarian propaganda claimed large Hungarian landowners had to bear the brunt of the agrarian reform, concluding from that, the agrarian reform was leveled against the Magyars! According to the claims of that propaganda, the Hungarian landholding was reduced by 50%, and it was even claimed that 90% of the confiscated land had belonged to the Hungarians! (Gower, pp. 65-67.)

- 51 Nikola Gačeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Sremu 1919-1941*, Novi Sad 1975, p. 31.

the Southern parts, primarily comparatively ample but mostly uncultivated state land was distributed, then abandoned land and the land of emigrants<sup>52</sup> and fugitive outlaws.<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, the land for the agrarian reform and colonization was taken also from minority communes (but not only theirs), that sometimes possessed large tracts of land, especially in the Northern parts of the country.<sup>54</sup>

Members of the Albanian national minority found themselves in a somewhat specific situation. A special wave of land confiscation from the Albanians started in 1936.<sup>55</sup> Whereas comparatively little land had been taken away from them up to that time, confiscation began of private land started then, especially in the bordering regions, leaving only 0.40 ha for each household member.<sup>56</sup> This happened because the military and other authorities had come to the conclusion that colonization thus far hadn't yielded the desired result, i.e. that the percentage of the Albanians didn't decline. Through this drastic measure the powers-that-be wanted to acquire land for further colonization on the one hand, and on the other, to destroy the basis of the Albanian existence and to force them to emigrate. This, coupled with colonization of the Serbian population, was seen as the only way to secure possession of the Southern territories.<sup>57</sup>

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- 52 Dogo, Kosovo, pp. 286-287. It seems the Yugoslav-Turkish convention of 1935 settled the problem of outstanding debts to the emigrants to Turkey, and that they were paid in full. It seems a similar arrangement, concerning estates of the Italian optants, was concluded with Italy in 1939. (Tomasevich, p. 363.)
- 53 There were also cases when the land was taken away from meritorious Albanians. (AJ, 74, 56/77.) That only goes to show how chaotic the implementation of the agrarian reform was and how dependent on a number of mostly local factors.
- 54 Gačeša, Prilog, p. 492. According to Macartney, land was taken away from 117 communes in the Northern part of Yugoslavia. (Macartney, Hungary and her Successors, p. 399.) On the same place he adduces 150 communes for the Vojvodina alone, which means either the first or the latter number is a typo. He claims Hungarian communes lost most, than those of the Bunjevci, but also Serbian ones. (Ibid., p. 402.) Since German communes were known as the richest, this Macartney's claim should be reexamined.
- 55 Obradović, Agrarna reforma, p. 186; Avramovski (ed.), Britanci, II, p. 416. According to Hakif Bajrami that wave began already at the eve of the dictatorship (Bajrami, L'oppression, p. 75.), whereas the British reports speak of ousting of the Albanians due to colonization already in 1921. (Avramovski (ed.), Britanci, I, p. 51.)
- 56 AJ, 37, 47/301; 51/315; 53/332. This was particularly visible in districts of Đakovica and Šar-Planina. In the districts of Peć and Istok, land was surveyed but not confiscated. The land for which owners had title deeds and that of the serfs wasn't subject to this measure. (Obradović, Agrarna reforma, pp. 105, 118-119; Idem, Agrarni odnosi, p. 450.) In some cases even more was confiscated than had been foreseen by the drastic ministerial decree. Sometimes the dispossessed owners were forced to pay taxes for confiscated land. (AJ, 74, 56/77; 37, 54/348.)
- 57 AJ, 37, 56/360; 53/332; VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 1, d. 16; Obradović, Agrarna reforma, p. 191. This was the ultimate meaning of the convention with Turkey about emigration of 200,000 Muslims. (Avdić, Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori, p. 113.) Although the agrarian policy toward the Albanians was very harsh, claims of some Albanian authors that whole villages had been burned in order to make room for colonists (Bajrami, Orijentacija, p. 158.) are false: there is no mention of it in quite numerous sources about this matter, and it would be absurd to burn villages for colonization, since that would mean unnecessary rebuilding of houses.

This policy, occasionally halted,<sup>58</sup> caused great dissatisfaction among the Albanians, making them susceptible to greater Albanian and Italian propaganda. It is no exaggeration to say that the agrarian question was the one that overshadowed all others for the Albanian national minority in the late 1930s.<sup>59</sup>

As for other national minorities, the Magyars and Germans primarily, they were hit by the agrarian reform in three ways. The first one, as has been already mentioned, was taking away land from large landowners. However, this measure was implemented only partly, so that large landowners (not only Magyars and Germans) still managed to retain a greater part of their estates.<sup>60</sup> On the other hand, large Hungarian landowners who had lost their possessions in Yugoslavia, acquired by an agreement the right to indemnification after a lawsuit before the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague.<sup>61</sup> As we have already said, most of these large landowners were not Yugoslav citizens, so that *de jure* they didn't belong to the respective national minorities, although their estates were important for the total economic strength of the Hungarian minority. As for the Hungarian national leaders, they always protested vehemently that large Hungarian landowners had been deprived of parts of their estates, caring more who had lost land, than who was (not) endowed with it.<sup>62</sup>

Large estates were also of importance to the minority poor who were also hit by their partial dismemberment. The reason was that German, and particularly the much more numerous Hungarian landless who had worked as servants, day-

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58 This was partly the case in 1939 (VA, pop. 17, k. 26, f. 3, d. 50; Avramovski, Prilog, p. 129.) or in March 1940. (Avramovski, Britanci (ed.), III, p. 496.)

59 AJ, 38, 8/57; 74, 90/132; VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 1, d. 16; f. 37, d. 5; k. 26, f. 2, d. 56; f. 3, d. 2; k. 519, f. 3, d. 51, 54; f. 4, d. 5; k. 7, f. 3, d. 4, 44, 45; k. 76, f. 1, d. 11, 16, 31; k. 79, f. 1, d. 17, 18, 24; k. 31, f. 4, d. 10; k. 92, f. 1, d. 6, 12; k. 95b, f. 4, d. 4; SBNS KJ, Drugi redovan saziv za 1936/37, II, p. 1153; Borožan, Velika Albanija, p. 262; Aprilski rat, p. 781. Only some more sober voices within the Army recommended that confiscation of land from the Albanians be stopped in order to win them over for Yugoslavia. (VA, pop. 17, k. 519, f. 3, d. 54; f. 4, d. 5; k. 95b, f. 4, d. 17; Bajrami, L'oppression, p. 99; Borožan, Velika Albanija, p. 250.)

60 The percentage of preservation of large estates in Slovenia was between 57.6% and 100%. (Janša, p. 188.) Nevertheless, the landowners often had to pay taxes for land they had lost years before. (AJ, 69, 7/14.)

61 The agreement was concluded between Hungary and countries of the Little Entente on April 28, 1930. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania agreed to indemnify the damaged Hungarian landowners in two separate funds within the next 35 years, whereas the second part would come from Hungarian reparations. Yugoslavia also accepted the obligation to pass a definitive law on agrarian reform within three months. (Rehak, Manjine, p. 260; Tomasevich, p. 363; Erić, pp. 528-529.) The payment was delayed and the sums, in the opinion of Hungarian large landowners, didn't correspond to the value of the confiscated land. (Gower, p. 67.) It seems in the end only small part of Hungarian large landowners received anything. (Tomasevich, p. 363.)

62 Rehak, Manjine, pp. 257-258. According to Sajti, 110.684 ha were taken away from Hungarian owners (mostly large landowners and nobles) and distributed during the agrarian reform. (Sajti, Hungarians, p. 168.) It is interesting that in Romania, where an agrarian reform was also implemented, as much as 27% of the candidates for land, were of Non-Romanian nationalities, and that they even received somewhat more land than the Romanian candidates. (Macartney, Hungary and her Successors, p. 318; Kolar, p. 141; Gaćeša, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu, p. 267; Wolf, p. 83.)

laborers or renters on the confiscated large estates lost their source of income, without being endowed during the agrarian reform. The same held true for the employees at large estates who were often dismissed after large estates had been put under sequester or carved up. In that way, the blow that was above all meant for the Hungarian and German landowning class, hit the poor very directly and painfully.<sup>63</sup> Similar was the case of the minority poor renting communal land that was partly confiscated for the needs of the agrarian reform. The latter, however, didn't affect only minority communes, but also the communes of the majority peoples.<sup>64</sup> Communal taxes in them usually rose several times, sometimes virtually skyrocketing.<sup>65</sup> The estates of religious communities were also included in the agrarian reform and they also lost some of their possessions, but the religious communities of the majority peoples (e.g. the Serbian Orthodox Church) were not exempt in the process either.<sup>66</sup> Finally, members of minorities were hit also by confiscation of land from peasants, but, even in the case of the Albanians, these were small tracts.<sup>67</sup>

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- 63 HWBGAD, I, p. 289; Gaćeša, *Prilog proučavanju emigracionih problema*, p. 495; Idem, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 118; Rehak, Manjine, p. 253; Dammang, p. 144; Frensing, p. 14; Fritz Braun, *Drei deutsche Siedlungen Slawoniens und ihre Beziehung zur Batschka*, *Der Auslandsdeutsche*, XX, 4, 1937, p. 225. Similar was the fate of Slavic day-labourers, especially on the confiscated large estates in Slavonia. (Snježana Ružić, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Slavoniji, Srijemu i Baranji 1918-1929 – odnos lokalnog stanovništva i naseljenih dobrovoljaca*, *Scrinia slavonica*, I, 2001, p. 236.)
- 64 Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 280; SBNS KSHS, *Redovan saziv za 1925-26*, knj. I, Beograd 1926, p. 489; Hoxha, p. 296; Drobnjaković, Mileker, pp. 115, 136, 179. There were even complaints (to be sure exaggerated) that communes of the "state people" were much more affected by confiscation of land than the predominantly minority communes. (SBNS KJ, *Redovan saziv za 1932/33*, knj. V, Beograd 1933, p. 123.)
- 65 Popi, *Iz političke aktivnosti*, p. 175; Ammende (ed.), p. 363. According to the MP of the German Party, Dr. Hans Moser, communal taxes rose in some places as much as 2000%! (SBNS KSHS, *Redovan saziv za 1926/27*, II, p. 405.)
- 66 Gaćeša, *Rusini*, p. 327; Idem, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Sremu*, pp. 170-190; Idem, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, pp. 63, 238-248. It remains to be researched if all religious communities suffered proportionally the same losses. For instance, the Franciscan monastery in Pančevo lost its whole small estate in the course of the agrarian reform (AJ, 69, 45/74.), but 396 morgen were taken also from the nearby Serbian monastery Vojlovica (which was to be handed over to the Romanians in accordance with the agreement between the Serbian and Romanian Orthodox Churches). (Dobrivoje Nikolić, *Srbi u Banatu*, p. 243.) Serbian monasteries of Fruška Gora lost over 4,325 morgen, or 20.42% of their possessions. (Nikola Gaćeša, *Zemljišni posedi fruškogorskih manastira u agrarnoj reformi posle Prvog i Drugog svetskog rata*, in: Idem, *Radovi*, p. 388.)
- 67 Thus for instance, the Vojvodina Swabians lost cca. 1.5% of their possession (Dammang, p. 143.), whereas 4.530 ha was taken away from the Albanians in 1939. (Đaković, p. 31.) Similar small numbers for Kosovo are adduced by Dogo, who claims that in certain outlying parts (Lab, Drenica) not more than 3% of land was taken away from the Albanians. (Dogo, *Kosovo*, pp. 122, 286.) On the other hand, according to Hakif Bajrami, the lover of grandiose numbers, „the Serbs “ have taken 381.245 ha from the Albanians! (Bajrami, *Orijentacija*, p. 166.) Truth be told, land was confiscated even from the poorer Albanians in the bordering regions, and only rarely and with difficulties did they manage to retrieve it in courts of justice. (Dogo, *Kosovo*, p. 123.) However, the land was taken away also from the Serbs, if it happened to be in the area earmarked for colonization. (Hoxha, p. 290.) Some land was

The agrarian reform, as sketched, was implemented, just like the incipient similar measures in the territories of Serbia and Montenegro before the First World War, both for social and national reasons.<sup>68</sup> It would be difficult to say which of the two was predominant – in fact this depended on the author that was judging about it: politicians and scholars for whom nationality was more important, gave precedence to the national moment.<sup>69</sup> It was also favored by officers of the Army and the Gendarmerie who saw in the colonization of the “national element”, not quite without a reason, a guarantee of order in the territories with large or predominant percentage of minority inhabitants, as well as a means of permanently tying these territories to the Kingdom.<sup>70</sup> Strategic reasons often influenced the dispersal of colonies

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taken away from some Romanian small owners in favour of the Serbian optants from Romania. Gaćeša construes this as a revenge of a kind for confiscation of land from large Serbian landowners in Romania. (Gaćeša, *Naseljavanje Srba optanata iz Rumunije u Jugoslaviju između dva svetska rata*, in: Idem, *Radovi o agrarne istorije i demografije*, Novi Sad 1995, p. 260; Idem, *Prilog proučavanju emigracionih problema*, p. 495; Idem, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, pp. 269, 272.)

- 68 Many authors never tried to put one or the other component of the agrarian reform first, realizing correctly their intertwining. (Cf. the report of Ing. Orestije Krstić in: VA, pop. 17, k. 69, f. 4, d. 3; Teofan Đ. Ristić, *Borba za zemlju i naša agrarna reforma*, Beograd 1938, pp. 51-53; Bogojević, p. 299; Juraj Demetrović, *Agrarna reforma u Jugoslaviji*, Beograd 1933, pp. 25, 30; Avramović, p. 81; Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 211; Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma u Jugoslaviji (1918-1948)*, in: Idem, *Radovi*, p. 176; Idem, *Opšta obeležja agrarne reforme u Vojvodini 1919-1941*, in: Idem, *Radovi*; Idem, *Naseljavanje Kosova i Metohije između dva svetska rata i rešavanje naseljeničkog pitanja posle Drugog svetskog rata*, in: Idem, *Radovi*, p. 247.) It would be interesting to research what motivation prevailed with colonists – existential or national. It is certain that a large number of them were guided by existential interests, although there are indications they were also aware of their national mission. (AJ, 37, 60-375; Sanja Zlatanović, “Šopovi” u Kosovskom Pomoravlju, in: Biljana Sikimić (ed.), *Skrivene manjine na Balkanu*, Beograd 2004, p. 85.)
- 69 AJ, 37, 70/419; 74, 91/135; SBNS KSHS, *Vanredan saziv za 1923*, knj. I, Beograd 1923, pp. 823, 834; SBNS KJ, *vanredan saziv za 1931/32*, knj. IV, Beograd 1932, p. 10; *Ibid.*, I, 230; *Ibid.* for 1939, I, 685, p. 712; *Ibid.*, *Drugi vanredan saziv za 1936/37*, I, p. 1104; Krstić, pp. VII, 78, 82; Anton Melik, *Problemi naše unutrašnje kolonizacije*, *Letopis Matice srpske*, knj. 303, sv. 3, 1925; Mitrinović, pp. 26, 34; Mitrović, *Naseljavanje*, p. 214; Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, pp. 98, 104, 184; *Naša severna kolonizacija*, *Agrarna misao*, 11-12, 1938, p. 4; Nikola Gaćeša, *Opšta obeležja agrarne reforme i kolonizacije u Vojvodini između dva svetska rata*, *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 3-4, 1973, p. 176; Apostolov, pp. 83-84; Ammende (ed.), p. 360. Suppan deems the national component of the agrarian reform and colonization was more important than the economic-social one. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, pp. 781-783.) Janša also deems the colonization in the Prekmurje had an outspoken national character. The first to be settled on the estates of Hungarian large landowners were Bosnians, but since they had proved to be poor colonist material, the colonization of the Slovenes from Gorica and poor areas started. (Janša, p. 188.) Some Croatian authors claim the colonization was aimed against the Croats too (Cf. Ružić, pp. 243, 247; Šimončić-Bobetko, *passim.*), but they provide little proof for this claim. Some contemporaries saw the agrarian reform as putting right of historical injustices. (SBNS KSHS, *Redovan saziv za 1926/27*, II, p. 434; *Ibid.*, for 1921/22, II, p. 262; *Kolonizacija severnih krajeva*, III, *Narodna odbrana*, December 16, 1939; Melik, *Problemi*, p. 178.)
- 70 Marco Dogo rightly says that the national goals of the agrarian reform and colonization were more visible in distribution of land than in the make-up of those from whom it had

and colonists in the process.<sup>71</sup> Authors more interested in social problems saw in the agrarian reform and colonization primarily a social measure that was to endow with land the local and immigrant village poor. The fact is that the national component was increasingly less stressed as the time went by.<sup>72</sup> However, this doesn't mean it lost importance. Since the agrarian reform and colonization affected inter-ethnic relations and the situation of national minorities, this component is of greater importance for our work, we therefore devote more attention to it.

A specific way of solving social and national question in keeping with the wishes of the governing powers was the resettlement of members of national minorities from the Northern to the Southern parts of the country.<sup>73</sup> According to that idea, the minority population in the North would be weakened numerically and made innocuous by dispersal throughout the Southern parts, where, due to their higher culture and better working techniques, they would serve as models, for the local minority and Slav population.<sup>74</sup> Not much of these ideas came to pass: only a small number of Germans, Magyars, Slovaks, Romanians and others received or bought land in the Southern parts,<sup>75</sup> whereas the civilizing and economic effects were on the whole not great, although they were felt in some places.<sup>76</sup>

We have seen that members of the Non-Slavic minorities were, as a rule, excluded from the distribution of land. Instead of local candidates from their ranks, former Serbian Army volunteers and colonists were taken into consideration, as well as local Slavic candidates, for whom, however smaller plots were reserved. The volunteers, whose number increased as the time after the First World War lapsed,<sup>77</sup>

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been confiscated. (Dogo, Kosovo, p. 288.) The interests of the local Slavic poor were often overlooked in the process, that was counter-productive even from the point of view of the ruling circles. (AJ, 37, 56/360.) The goals of the agrarian reform were similar in other countries too (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Romania), and they were partly conditioned by the make-up of the population and the fact that large estates belonged predominantly to members of the (new) national minorities. (Azcárate, pp. 62-63.)

71 Apostolov, pp. 98, 159-160.

72 Erić, p. 297.

73 Simonović, pp. 25, 29; Altgayer, p. 16.

74 Such ideas were also shared by the socialist Nedeljko Divac. (SBNS KSHS, Redovan saziv za 1921/22, V, p. 1080.) According to a newspaper item, the minister of the agrarian reform Daka Popović prepared a bill on resettlement of members of national minorities from the Northern into the Southern parts of the country in 1928. (Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 186.)

75 Krstić, p. 7; Kosovka Ristić, Naseljavanje Vojvodana na Kosovu između Prvog i Drugog svetskog rata, in: Vojvodani van Vojvodine, Novi Sad 1961, p. 30; Macartney, Hungary and her Successors, p. 427; Jovanović, Turci, p. 134; Kasaš, O jednoj predstavi, p. 199. Some Vojvodina Germans swapped smaller plots in their homeplaces for larger ones in Macedonia. (Schneefuß, p. 129.)

76 Apostolov, pp. 151-152; M. Gavrilović, Privreda, pp. 12, 79. To be sure, not only colonists from the ranks of national minorities deserved credits for these effects.

77 SBNS KSHS, Redovan saziv za 1926/27, II, p. 401. In the opinion of a German diplomat (Dr. Wachsendorf, November 15, 1921) there were many among the officially recognized volunteers who declared themselves as such out of interest, whereas even among the real ones there was a lot of scum. (PA, Abt. IIb, Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen, Bodenreform, Sozialpolitik, 10 Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.) The legislation on the volunteers made possible quite a liberal stretching of this category. (Ružić, p. 233; Josip Vrbošić, Kategorije i brojčano stanje kolonista u Slavoniji i Baranji između dva svjetska rata, Društvena istraživanja, VI, 2-3, 1997, p. 316.)



were entitled to more land than ordinary colonists. They were pillars of the regime, usually people permeated with nationalist feelings, which led to conflicts with local minority population on several occasions.<sup>78</sup> Colonists were divided into auto-colonists who bought their land or simply usurped it (which was typical of Montenegrins in the Metohija), and settlers colonized with the government aid. In the later phase since 1929, the Union of Agrarian Communities started buying vacant land and settling colonists (who had to pay for the land within ten years),<sup>79</sup> but it didn't have ample means at its disposal. The advantage of this way was that people were settled also in places where no state-owned land was available, that buyers immediately became fixed, i.e. no one could remove or transfer them, that they received land that was already cultivated and that the enmity of the local population was less.<sup>80</sup>

The assistance of the state for colonists was by no means great. They were granted 5 ha for the head of the family, 4 ha for each married member of the household and 2-3 ha for the unmarried.<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, they were usually granted free railway transportation (this being no big help in parts with very few railway-tracks<sup>82</sup>), free firewood, a loan with no interest, exemption from state taxes for ten years<sup>83</sup> and communal taxes for five years – provided they settled within six months,<sup>84</sup> started tilling the land immediately, built a house within two years and

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78 AJ, 14, 85/336; Dammang, p. 145; Sajti, Hungarians, p. 169; Hrabak, Džemijet, p. 79. The situation around Skopje was peculiar. According to a report from 1936 the Muslim population lived in harmony with the colonists, but disliked the local Christians. The report explained this as follows: "They seem to like the first because of their sincerity, open-mindedness and courage, whereas they hate the latter because of their bandit activities." (AJ, 37, 45/296.) Also according to Đorđo Krstić colonists fared better among the Albanians and Turks than among the Macedonians. (Krstić, p. 58.) It is not to be ruled out that these reports, like many others, reflect to the same degree the distrust of the powers-that-be toward the Ethnic-Macedonian population, as the real situation. The volunteers were not welcome among the Croats in Slavonia either – predominantly for the same economic reasons as among members of minorities. (Ružić, p. 237.)

79 Apostolov, pp. 124-128; Obradović, Agrarni odnosi, pp. 453-454. The Union of the Agrarian Communities bought 3.073 ha in Kosovo and settled down 314 families in 1938.

80 VA, pop. 17, k. 69, f. 4, d. 7; k. 26, f. 3, d. 50; Mitrinović, pp. 23-25; Demetrović, p. 30. The colonization through buying proved more stable both in peacetime and during the Second World War, when greater part of the colonists was expelled. (Ristić, p. 37.) This way of colonization was practised since 1930 also in Italy (Lorena Vanelo, *Colonizzazione e snazionalizzazione nelle campagne della Venezia Giulia fra le due guerre*, in: *L'imperialismo italiano e la Jugoslavia. Atti del convegno italo-jugoslavo Ancona 14-16 ottobre 1977*, Urbino 1981, p. 498; SBNS KJ, *Drugi redovan saziv za 1936/37*, I, p. 834.), Germany, Hungary (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 21.), and in Austria it was practiced by the German nationalist organization in Carinthia, the Heimatbund (aided by the German government since 1934). (Barker, p. 179.)

81 Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 157. Volunteers received more.

82 The sole railway-line in "Southern Serbia" was for a long time the line Skopje-Kosovska Mitrovica. (Dogo, Kosovo, p. 121.)

83 Tax exemption was at first for three, than five, and eventually for ten years. (Hadri, p. 59.) In a way, this testifies to lack of success of the colonization, i.e., the inability of the colonists to find their feet.

84 In the beginning colonists were exempted from taxes, and later on they wouldn't and couldn't pay. (Kršev, p. 53.) In many places they simply refused to pay communal taxes which for that reason and because of the confiscation of communal land, hit the local

started repaying the loans to the Union of the Agricultural Communities.<sup>85</sup> In the Southern parts, the state or the para-state Union of the Agrarian Communities (the membership in which was mandatory for colonists) built houses for the colonists.<sup>86</sup> However, as a rule they were of poor quality, ramshackle and insalubrious, just like the first houses built by the colonists themselves.<sup>87</sup> In the Southern parts the colonists were sometimes put into Albanian houses – vacant bandits' or houses still inhabited by the Albanians who helped the colonists build houses for themselves as quickly as possible in order to leave theirs.<sup>88</sup> Water was a particular problem since many colonies were built without the previous examination of the terrain and were therefore built on arid soil.<sup>89</sup>

Land had been cultivated only in some cases. Especially in the South where the percentage of arable land was small anyway, colonists received quite large tracts of vacant state or communal land which had yet to be cleared and cultivated.<sup>90</sup> Since colonists were as a rule poor people with few tools, they had simultaneously to clear the ground and to build houses, their life was hard indeed.<sup>91</sup> Colonists had to pay back for their land later on, which due to the above described living conditions, they usually couldn't do. Volunteers didn't have to pay for their land, but still couldn't make a take-off.<sup>92</sup> In some places a particular problem was the fact that colonists' fields were as much as 10 km away from their houses or colonies. On the other hand, they suffered hatred of the local population – both minority and majority ones – which regarded them either as intruders and usurpers of the land that could have been divided between the local poor, or as nationally and politically inimical

population much more severely. (SBNS KSHS, Redovan saziv za 1926/27, II, p. 405.) Obviously, such behaviour stirred dissatisfaction of the local population that wasn't spared by the tax authorities. (AJ, 74, 51/72.) In some places colonists refused to pay for maintenance of dykes which led to their deterioration and endangering of the safety of settlements. (PA, Abt. IIb Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2.)

- 85 Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, pp. 162, 183. The latter fact particularly angered the local population, since communes were enlarged, their needs increased, communal land which in many cases had served for covering considerable part of communal expenditures was in many cases confiscated, and colonists paid no communal taxes despite all this, although they acquired the same rights in the commune as natives. (Obradović, *Agrarni odnosi*, p. 449.)
- 86 Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 153.
- 87 SBNS KJ, vanredni saziv za 1931/32, knj. I, Beograd, 1932, p. 10; *Ibid.*, for 1939, I, p. 685; Obradović, *Agrarni odnosi*, p. 450.
- 88 Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, pp. 178-179, 202.
- 89 SBNS KJ, Vanredni saziv za 1931/32, IV, Beograd 1932, p. 10; *Ibid.*, Drugi redovan saziv za 1936/37, knj. II, Beograd 1937, pp. 422, 1104-1105; SBS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1935/36 i redovan saziv za 1936/37, knj. I, Beograd 1937, p. 408; Krstić, p. 14.
- 90 Šaletić, p. 7; Ristić, p. 33. 95% of the land the colonists received in the Southern parts was untilled. (Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 153; Bataković, *Kosovo*, p. 38; *Idem*, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 63.)
- 91 SBNS KJ, Vanredan saziv za 1931/32, IV, Beograd 1932, p. 10. Sometimes due to their poverty, colonists became economically dependent on members of national minorities. (SBS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1935/36 i 1936/37, I, p. 408; Mitrinović, p. 19; Avramovski, *Britanci*, I, p. 51.)
- 92 Arpad Lebl, *Prilog istoriji agrarne reforme i kolonizacije u Vojvodini 1781-1941*, Zadrinski arhiv, I, 1953, p. 64; Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 85.

element.<sup>93</sup> In the Southern parts, colonists were endangered by the kaçaks in the first after-war years, so that they often literally had to work with rifles on their backs.<sup>94</sup>

What critics of the implementation of the agrarian reform particularly condemned, was land distribution in accordance with party affiliation and the instability of the colonists' holdings. In a situation in which almost every post or right depended on party affiliation, receiving and maintaining land by a colonist was often conditional on the candidate's party membership<sup>95</sup> or on the political situation. Depending on which party held the post of the minister of the agrarian reform, land was granted or taken away from colonists, and in certain cases even members of minorities could get some land if they were in the right party.<sup>96</sup> Sometimes local politicians, wooing the votes of the local (minority and majority) population as well as the local authorities, hindered the implementation of the agrarian reform and colonization.<sup>97</sup> All this caused insecurity with the colonists, which adversely influenced their working efforts. Moreover, as late as the early 1930s most of the colonists' holdings were still not registered in their names, i.e. they still weren't *de jure* their property. This made possible depriving politically undesirable colonists (including volunteers) of their land at any given moment, weakening their economic position and their standing with the natives.<sup>98</sup>

The character of colonists themselves (including volunteers), combined with the above-described hard living conditions, in many cases presented an obstacle to the success of the colonization. First of all, part of the colonists didn't evince

93 Krstić, pp. 60, 75; Vickers, p. 108; Apostolov, pp. 145-147; Jovanović, *Jugoslovenska država*, p. 219; Zlatanović, pp. 85, 87-88, 91; Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 45; Erić, pp. 411-412; AJ, 74, 56/77; 14, 143/497; 178/658; Šimončić-Bobetko, p. 218; SBNS KJ, *Vanredan saziv za 1939*, I, pp. 685, 842; *Ibid.*, *Drugi redovan saziv za 1936-37*, II, pp. 1104, 1153; Dimić, *Borozan*, I, pp. 219, 224, 320; Hadri, p. 61; Bajrami, *L'oppression*, p. 84; Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors*, p. 402; Vrbošić, pp. 317, 322; Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, pp. 192-196, 198. This aversion, especially in the South, sometimes spilled over into aggressivity which made itself manifest in attacks on colonists' property, and even on colonists themselves. On the other hand, this caused oppressive measures on part of the government. In some cases, colonists couldn't stand the pressure of the natives, so they moved away. (AJ, 74, 56/77; VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 1, d. 3; k. 31, f. 4, d. 10; k. 95b, f. 4, d. 16, 17; Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, pp. 114, 197; *Idem*, *Agrarni odnosi*, p. 452; Vaso Šaletić, *Kolonizacija Južne Srbije, Agrarna misao*, 11-12, 1938, pp. 2-3; Erić, pp. 411-412.) Claims of the *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije* (I, Zagreb 1980) that colonization didn't lead to deteriorating inter-ethnic relations between the Albanians and Non-Albanians is an ordinary forgery in keeping with political correctness of a regime based on "brotherhood and unity", as the national policy of the communist Yugoslavia was styled.

94 VA, pop. 17, k. 69, f. 4, d. 7; Ristić, p. 34. In a document from 1921 it is said that colonists around Priština indeed suffered from kaçaks and Muslims, but even more from corrupt Serbian civil servants, priests and teachers in whose pockets all aid meant for the colonists eventually flowed. (AJ, 14, 178/658.)

95 SBNS KJ, *Redovan Saziv za 1932/33*, V, p. 124; Janša, p. 183; Ružić, pp. 229, 232, 239.

96 Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 116; Dogo, *Kosovo*, p. 123; Avramović, p. 85.

97 VA, pop. 17, k. 69, f. 4, d. 7; Krstić, pp. 49, 52, 55, 59, 61.

98 AJ, 74, 51/72; SBNS KSHS, *Redovan saziv za 1927/28*, I, p. 130; SBNS KJ, *Vanredan saziv za 1939*, I, p. 712; *Ibid.*, for 1931/32, I, p. 231; *Ibid.*, *Drugi redovan saziv za 1936/37*, II, p. 1106.

such a high national consciousness as the government wanted.<sup>99</sup> On the other hand, others manifested too strong a national consciousness but not the necessary tact in dealing with their new neighbors of a different nationality, which in some cases led to conflicts.<sup>100</sup> A considerable part of the colonists was thoroughly unprepared and unsuited for their new environment. Highlanders from Lika, Herzegovina or Montenegro were sent to the Vojvodina and Slavonia to compete in an economic rat-race with the steeled Swabians and Hungarians who had lived for centuries in a developed environment, totally different from the areas where the poor colonists were coming from.<sup>101</sup> On the other hand, the cultivated inhabitants of the Vojvodina, used to the legal state, roads, market economy, comfortable houses etc., were sent to what they called "the wild Kosovo",<sup>102</sup> to start a new life there, despite adverse natural conditions and a hostile environment.<sup>103</sup>

On the other hand, some of the colonists weren't very diligent.<sup>104</sup> Faced with hardships of the colonist life, they preferred to (illegally) sell the land they had received and to return to their home-places, or to rent the land to economically stronger members of minorities and to live in a nearby village doing nothing or encumbering a petty state or communal office.<sup>105</sup> In that way the land confiscated from minority communes or large landowners fell again into the hands of minorities, annulling thus one of the main goals of the agrarian reform and colonization. In order

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99 AJ, 74, 16/28. Various complications which had nothing to do with nationality question occurred during the agrarian reform and colonization. Thus in the village of Trnovac in the commune of Bujanovac land that they had bought from the Muslims already in 1913 was taken away from six Serbian veterans in 1925 in order to be distributed among colonists. (AJ, 74, 91/134.)

100 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2; Obradović, Agrarna reforma, pp. 186-187; Roux, p. 215; Gaćeša, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu, p. 259.

101 SBNS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1932/33, V, p. 124; Ibid., Vanredan saziv za 1939, I, p. 702; Gaćeša, Opšta obeležja, p. 244. Milan Grol even claimed the situation of the colonist poor was worse than that of the local ones who could count on help from their relatives and neighbours. (SBNS KSHS, Redovan saziv za 1925/26, II, p. 555.)

102 Ristić, p. 35.

103 Similar problems with adapting had the colonists in Slavonia. (Ružić, p. 246.)

104 This is said of the optants from Hungary in Ovče Polje, Macedonia, in a document from 1924. (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1926, f. 3, 107-121.) In another document (probably from 1929) it is claimed of the Montenegrin colonists in the Vojvodina, that they were lazy. (AJ, F. 335, f. 18.) Krstić says the same of the Montenegrin settlers in the Metohija. (Krstić, p. 16.) Jovanović adduces examples of Montenegrin colonists selling away the tools and butchering oxen they had been given by the agrarian authorities. (Jovanović, Jugoslovenska država, p. 222.)

105 AJ, 37, 70/419; 60/375; 74, 91/135; PA, Abt. IIb Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen, Bodenreform, Sozialpolitik, 10 Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Janša, p. 188; HWBGAD, I, p. 336; Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 70-71, 94; Teofan Đ. Ristić, pp. 90-91; SBNS KSHS, Redovan saziv za 1925-26, II, 587; SBNS KJ, Vanredan saziv za 1939, I, pp. 702, 843; Vrbošić, p. 323; Šimončić-Bobetko, p. 218; Iskruljev, O Vojvodini, pp. 16-17; Ružić, pp. 238, 247; Haller, Bischof, p. 306; Krstić, p. 22; Erić, pp. 392, 396, 523; Gaćeša, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Sremu, pp. 236, 249; Idem, Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu, p. 120, 318, 321, 327, 343, 344. All this doesn't mean all colonists were ruffians, arsonists and racists as they are depicted by some Albanian authors. (Cf. Bajrami, Orijentacija, p. 166.)

to put an end to this and to increased buying of land by members of national minorities,<sup>106</sup> a decree limiting transfer of real estates, that has already been mentioned, was issued. It, being a purely administrative measure, failed to check the trend of land slipping into the hands of economically stronger part of minority population,<sup>107</sup> particularly German, but it managed to add yet another complaint to their list of grievances.<sup>108</sup>

The state authorities, particularly the military and police ones, often regarded the colonists as a guarantee of public and state security in the endangered minority areas, sometimes demanded, depending on the state of the security (primarily in the Southern parts), that they be armed, and that members of minorities even be resettled.<sup>109</sup> This was particularly envisaged for the Albanian-populated areas where the percentage of Slavic population was particularly low, where the terrain was often mountainous and wooded, convenient for hiding bandits and difficult for operations of security forces.<sup>110</sup> The reliable Slavic element was to be settled in such areas, and especially alongside roads, borders and in other strategic places.<sup>111</sup> Some observers considered Montenegrins as most suitable colonists for such goals since they were most similar to the Albanians in their mentality and the way of life.<sup>112</sup> According to that school of thought, the Albanians were impressed by the warrior-

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106 Erić, p. 524. The tendency of the Magyars and Germans to buy land from often light-minded and not overly diligent Serbs was noticed already during the 19th century (Slavko Gavrilović, *Srem, Banat i Bačka od sredine XVIII do sredine XIX veka*, Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, 6, 1972, p. 15; Idem, *Privredne i društvene prilike u Indiji*, p. 157; Marković, *Pravoslavna srpska parohija*, pp. 22, 34, 64.) and it worried the Yugoslav authorities ever since the beginning of the inter-war period. (AJ, 14, 104/401.)

107 In some areas the authorities didn't even try to prevent this. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 169.)

108 SBNS KJ, *Vanredan saziv za 1939*, I, pp. 655-656; Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 790; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 212; Kasaš, *O jednoj predstavi*, p. 198. A similar measure was applied also in Austrian Carinthia during the inter-war period (Wutte, *Lobmeyr*, p. 70; Barker, p. 193; SBNS KJ, *Drugi redovan saziv za 1936/37*, II, p. 359; Theodor Weiter, *Die slowenische Volksgruppe in Kärnten. Geschichte, Rechtslage, Promstellung*, Wien, Leipzig 1936, p. 75.), Nazi Germany (AVII, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 21.), Fascist Italy (Milica Kacin-Wohinz, *Jože Pirjavec, Storia degli sloveni in Italia 1866-1998*, Venezia 1998, p. 39.), as well as in Hungary since 1939 (Johann Weidlein, *Die nationale Bodenpolitik Ungarns*, in: Idem, *Pannonica. Ausgewählte Abhandlungen und Aufsätze zur Sprach- und Geschichtsforschung der Donauschwaben und der Madjaren*, Schorndorf 1979, p. 317.) and during the First World War (in 1917) it had been introduced also in the historical Kingdom of Hungary. (R.W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians*, p. 524.)

109 VA, pop. 17, k. 76, f. 2, d. 32; k. 26, f. 3, d. 50; k. 69, f. 4, d. 1; SBNS KJ, *Vanredan saziv za 1931/32*, knj. IV, Beograd 1932, p. 10; Ibid. For 1939, I, pp. 655-656, 696; Dimić, *Borožan*, I, pp. 321, 330-331; Ibid., II, Beograd 1999, pp. 587, 715, 727, 734, 743, 855; Mitrinović, p. 42; Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 93, 165; Šaletić, p. 11; Krstić, pp. 10, 37, 77; Milenković, *Stav*, p. 108. The most notorious proposal in this vein was the several times published and even translated essay by Vaso Čubrilović that was often used as a crucial proof of Serbian wicked intentions towards the Albanians. (Cf. *Velika Srbija*, VI, 54, 1995.)

110 Đaković adduces examples of purely security colonization. (Đaković, p. 33.)

111 Obradović, *Agrarni odnosi*, p. 451; Hoxha, p. 292.

112 Krstić, pp. 17, 75, 82; Dimić, *Borožan*, II, p. 734; Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, p. 135. The Montenegrins moved into the confiscated kačak houses, caring little about the possible revenge or title deeds. (Dogo, *Kosovo*, p. 122.)

like Montenegrins whom they feared to a certain extent, but whom they hated because of their (the Montenegrins') propensity for excesses. According to other opinions, exactly this penchant for violence of theirs was what was disturbing peace in the Albanian inhabited regions.<sup>113</sup> Some more level-headed representatives of the authorities blamed the way the agrarian reform was implemented in the Albanian areas for the state of security there.

Although the agrarian reform and colonization featured as an important national task,<sup>114</sup> in everyday political practice it was just one of the matters with which parties and politicians wanted to score points in the political struggle,<sup>115</sup> or, what was equally often, to protect interests of their members and adherents. The leading party in Yugoslavia, the People's Radical Party, had no unified attitude toward the agrarian reform and colonization,<sup>116</sup> and the internal differences on this issue went above all along the regional lines:<sup>117</sup> whereas the Radicals from the Vojvodina were mostly in favor of preservation of large estates, their Bosnian counterparts were favoring a more radical agrarian reform. In practice, however, those favoring a more moderate agrarian reform and colonization prevailed, the tendency being intensified in the first post-war years by the cooperation with the Džemijet.<sup>118</sup> Until 1924 when the Independent Democratic Party split from it, the Democratic Party, which wanted especially to destroy foreign large estates, particularly under the influence of its members from the former Habsburg territories, favored a somewhat more radical agrarian reform and colonization.<sup>119</sup> The attitude of the Union of the Agriculturists was even more radical, but rather for social than for national reasons.<sup>120</sup> Both the Radicals and the Democrats utilized the agrarian reform for winning over and tying political adherents.<sup>121</sup> On the other hand, in order to woo minority votes, there were several Serbian MPs working in practice against the agrarian reform and colonization, siding with local population and local authorities against the settlers. This embittered rabid nationalists who believed that the agrarian reform and colonization

113 VA, pop. 17, k. 12, f. 2, d. 7; k. 26, f. 3, d. 51; Dimić, Borozan, II, pp. 757, 760, 775; Obradović, Agrarni odnosi, p. 452. It was not only the Montenegrin colonists who were condemned for their arrogance. (Obradović, Agrarna reforma, p. 179.) Sometimes the haughtiness and national intolerance of the local Serbian population was adduced as the source of disorder in the Albanian-inhabited territories.

114 Mitrinović, Kolonizacija, p. 9.

115 SBNS KSHS, Redovan saziv za 1921-22, IV, p. 106; M. Gavrilović, Privreda, p. 78.

116 The party paid lip-service to national goals of the agrarian reform and colonization. (Obradović, Agrarna reforma, p. 69.)

117 Milenković, Stav, p. 15.

118 Milenković, Stav; Apostolov, pp. 170-171; Nikola Gaćeša, Agrarni programi građanskih partija u Jugoslaviji između dva svetska rata, in: Idem, Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije, Novi Sad 1995, pp. 129-136. Sreten Vukosavljević accused the Radicals in Parliament in 1923 that they had blocked the agrarian reform and the emigration of the Muslims in the Southern parts, so as not to run afoul of the Albanians and Turks. (SBNS KSHS, Vanredan saziv za 1923, knj. I, Beograd 1923, p. 337.)

119 Milenković, Stav, pp. 38, 59; Agrarni programi, pp. 146-152. After the IDP has left it, the DP lost interest in the agrarian reform. (Apostolov, p. 174.) On the other hand, the IDP failed to do anything about it once it got the chance. (Gaćeša, Agrarni programi, p. 152.)

120 Nadežda Jovanović, Život za slobodu bez straha. (Studija o životu i delu dr Dragoljuba Jovanovića), Beograd 2000, pp. 133, 137, 139; Gaćeša, Agrarni programi, p. 156.

121 Ružić, pp. 232, 239.

should be implemented at any price in the interest of the Slavic element – if need be even against the interests of the local Slavs (who were often Macedonians or Croats). As for the Croatian (Republican) Peasants' Party, it was more interested in Croatian national question than in any other, so that it wanted above all the colonization of the Croats in Croatia. For this reason, one of its leaders, Pavao Radić when he was the minister for the agrarian reform, implemented a revision, in the course of which many adherents of the PRP and the DP lost the land they had previously received.<sup>122</sup> This was in keeping with the practice then that the ruling parties rewarded their adherents. At the same time, being above all a national party, the CRPP avoided making clear its views on the agrarian reform.<sup>123</sup> As for the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, it was against the agrarian reform and colonization in Muslim-inhabited areas,<sup>124</sup> aware of the class interests of beys and that these two measures were practiced in favor of Christians, especially the Serbs. As for the leading Slovenian party, the SPP, it favored the agrarian reform on the one hand, the majority of large landowners in Slovenia being foreign, whereas on the other hand, being a clerical party it demanded that possessions of the Roman-Catholic Church be exempted from the agrarian reform.<sup>125</sup> In other words, national and ecclesiastical interests were more important for it than social concerns.

Among minority parties, the Cemiyet, which was predominantly an organization of beys, showed particular interest in the agrarian reform. From its very foundation, the agrarian question had the highest priority for it.<sup>126</sup> Its leaders insisted on limiting the scope of the agrarian reform, on larger land maximums and higher indemnification for confiscated land<sup>127</sup> - which more or less they managed to wrest from the Radicals and Democrats in tense negotiations preceding the passing of the "Vidovdan Constitution".<sup>128</sup> Later on the party tried to block the agrarian reform in

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122 Šimončič-Bobetko, pp. 96-97, 267, 283.

123 Milenković, Stav, p. 49; Šimončič-Bobetko, pp. 96-97.

124 Apostolov, pp. 180-183; Gaćeša, Agrarni programi, p. 165.

125 Gaćeša, Agrarni programi, pp. 143-144.

126 Dimić, Borozan, I, pp. 355-356; *Ibid.*, p. 777.

127 The Cemiyet demanded that the owners be left 30 ha, and that the rest be divided between the landlord and serfs in the ratio 25 : 75%, with a proviso that the serfs had to pay for the land they received. (Obradović, Agrarna reforma, p. 71.)

128 Only a day before the voting in the Parliament they managed to reach an agreement that financial indemnification would be given for confiscated land, that until that question was settled a rent was to be paid, that the owners who had no other land than that of the serfs be left 20 ha of arable land if they wanted to go into agriculture and in case they had their own land apart from the one held by the serfs, they were only to be paid financial indemnification. If a bey's land for his own use wasn't larger than 100 ha, it would remain his. (Obradović, Agrarna reforma, p. 56; Rehak, Manjine, p. 234; Jovanović, Turci, p. 134; Hrabak, Sreten Vukosavljević, pp. 12-13; Dogo, Kosovo, p. 137; Gaćeša, Agrarni programi, p. 133; Milenković, Stav, pp. 58-60; Apostolov, pp. 141, 169; Gligorijević, Parlament, pp. 103-110.) After the constitution had been passed, the government tried to avoid fulfillment of the insufficiently clear agreement and the Cemiyet started proving there were no serfs in "Southern Serbia", i.e. that all who were tilling the land were either the owners or sharecroppers. (Obradović, Agrarna reforma, p. 72; Dogo, Kosovo, p. 137.) The landlords complained the state was paying small rents, and some of them were taking rent both from the state and from the serfs. Some landlords were pressing Albanian serfs to buy land, whereas the authorities were pressing the

the South, above all to guard the interests of its leaders.<sup>129</sup> During the 1930s, Albanian politicians, often well supplied with land themselves,<sup>130</sup> used the aggravated agrarian question of their co-nationals for their own political promotion by promising salvation from the agrarian reform and instrumentalizing their complaints.<sup>131</sup> As for the Hungarian Party, it also took, too obviously, the side of the (above all Hungarian) large landowners.<sup>132</sup> To be sure, it also demanded that the poor Hungarians who had been hit by the dismemberment of large estates also receive land during the agrarian reform, but not nearly so vociferously: people who stemmed from the old Hungarian elite couldn't have the real understanding for the needs of the poor. As for the German Party, the demands that the Volksdeutsche take part in the distribution of the land too, were more or less constant,<sup>133</sup> although for the Germans, thanks to a somewhat better social make-up, the question of the agrarian reform never was as acute as for the Magyars.<sup>134</sup> The parties of the Slovaks and Romanians also demanded participation of these nationalities in the distribution of land, but they had no significant possibility of influencing political events.<sup>135</sup>

From all that has been said, it is clear that the agrarian reform and colonization satisfied none of the parties involved: the state, which due to poverty, bad organization and incompetent administration, but also due to corruption and party politics, gave little help to the colonists. It also didn't get the firmly rooted guardians of the newly acquired and predominantly minority-inhabited territories: the colonists were dissatisfied with their hard life, which made some of them (particularly the Montenegrins in the Metohija) incline toward communism,<sup>136</sup> or rendered them economically dependent on members of minorities;<sup>137</sup> large landowners were unhappy because

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very same serfs to emigrate. (Obradović, *Agrarna reforma*, pp. 113-114.) The Law on Regulation of agrarian Relations in the Former Provinces of Southern Serbia and Montenegro of December 5, 1931 also foresaw indemnification for confiscated land, but the serfs received it without payment and without having to pay the rent, but their plots were small (under 20 ha in 51.52% of the cases, and even under 5 ha in 13.44% of cases.) (Obradović, *Agrarni odnosi*, pp. 445-446.) The landlords kept complaining as late as the second half of the 1930s that the indemnification they had received had been too small. (SBNS KJ, *Redovan saziv za 1935/36*, I, pp. 422-424.)

129 Milenković, Stav, p. 86; Apostolov, pp. 177-180; Hrabak, JMO, p. 170; Gligorijević, *Parlament*, p. 157; Hoxha, p. 262.

130 Thanks to connections and corruption several rich Albanian leaders managed to preserve their estates. (Hoxha, p. 297.)

131 VA, pop. 17, k. 7, f. 3, d. 10; k. 26, f. 3, d. 2; Borožan, *Velika Albanija*, p. 201.

132 Gaćeša, *Agrarni programi*, p. 169; Idem, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 280. The party coordinated its activities in this matter with them and the Hungarian government. (Rehak, *Manjine*, pp. 257-258.)

133 SBNS KSHS, *Redovan saziv za 1926/27*, II, pp. 401, 406; SBNS KJ, *Redovan saziv za 1932/33*, V, p. 161; Plautz, p. 51.

134 Gaćeša deems the German Party gradually lost interest in this matter (Gaćeša, *Agrarni programi*, p. 168.), but from the demands of the German leaders until 1941 it is plain to see that they (and their "grass-roots") were still interested in agrarian problems.

135 Popi, *Formiranje*, 329, Slovaks were given some land during the agrarian reform, but not to the extent as members of majorities. (Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, pp. 282 – 291.)

136 SBNS KJ, *Drugi redovan saziv za 1936/37*, II, p. 1105.

137 AJ, 74, 91/135; Šaletić, p. 8.



they had lost considerable part of their estates,<sup>138</sup> and the indemnification they received was usually late and inadequate; communes which had lost land were dissatisfied because of the shortfall of income and the inability to help their poor themselves; the landless peasants from among minorities were dissatisfied that they had been skipped in the distribution of land and/or that they had lost jobs at the dismembered large estates. Irregularities and corruption during confiscation and distribution of land only additionally disgruntled the citizens involved in the distribution of land and in settlement.<sup>139</sup> In terms of solving the social question no success was scored.<sup>140</sup> In the words of Josef Rotschild: too many people were given too little land.<sup>141</sup> Not only that: many who had needed it didn't get it, whereas many who couldn't or wouldn't till it got it, and many who had it and didn't till it, lost it. In that way, instead of solving social problems, the agrarian reform aggravated them – and social problems in multi-ethnic societies always tend to translate into national conflicts, especially if there is a difference in social and political status among the ethnic groups. In terms of achieving the “national goals”, the little that the agrarian reform and colonization achieved in changing the ethnic make-up<sup>142</sup> of minority areas was annulled during the Second World War.<sup>143</sup> In that context it wouldn't even be too much to say that they actually contributed to deterioration of the inter-ethnic relations and therefore to the tragedy of the events during the Second World War. Finally, the agrarian reform and colonization, by carving up of large landed estates which (especially in the Northern parts of the country) to a large extent had worked for the

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138 In the Southern parts, where there were few large estates, holdings over 100 ha almost disappeared, whereas only 70 of those over 300 ha remained. 60% of the landlords was left without their (often small) estates, becoming journeymen, apprentices or beggars. (Jovanović, Turci, p. 135.)

139 SBNS KSHS, Vanredni saziv za 1923, I, p. 826.

140 Erić, pp. 525-527.

141 Rotschild, p. 269. Due to the large number of candidates, small plots, only halfway liquidation of large estates, irregularities and abuse, even the Yugoslav population remained dissatisfied. (Gaćeša, Specifičnosti, p. 233.) Members of minorities had even more reasons for dissatisfaction.

142 Erić, p. 525. The arrival of the colonists in Kosovo didn't even augment the use of the Serbian language. On the contrary, the number of Serbian officials, teachers and colonists who spoke Albanian with the Albanians increased. (VA, pop. 17, k. 69, f. 4, d. 6.) Some contemporaries deemed the colonization had been a total failure in changing of the ethnic make-up. (VA, pop. 17, k. 69, f. 4, d. 1.) Although the last census in the inter-war Yugoslavia was taken as far back as 1931, claims of Roux and Hajredin Hoxha that the colonization affected considerably the ethnic make-up of Kosovo, the Metohija and Western Macedonia have no corroboration in contemporary sources (Roux, p. 195; Hoxha, pp. 289-290.): on the contrary, these sources keep insisting that proportions of the population hadn't changed, or even that they became even more unfavourable for the Slavic population. (Cf. Mitrović, pp. 26-27.) A few pages further that much is said by Roux and Hoxha too! (Roux, p. 201; Hoxha, p. 291.) Changes did occur, but only on the local level in some communes.

143 Nikola Gaćeša, Stradanje srpskih naseljenika u Drugom svetskom ratu, in: Idem, Radovi iz agrarne istorije i demografije, Novi Sad 1995. Perhaps paradoxically the only region where no expulsion of the inter-war colonists occurred was the Yugoslav Banat under German rule! (Idem, Agrarna reforma u Jugoslaviji, p. 179; Idem, Stradanje, p. 364.) The reason lied partly in the unwillingness of the German occupational authorities in Serbia to shelter the expellees. (PA, R 29663.)

market, and by bringing in the unsuitable labor force, together with the drawing of the new frontiers and other consequences of the war, influenced negatively the agricultural production.<sup>144</sup> In the light of all these facts, it is doubtful if the opinions of some authors, even if qualified, about the predominant success of the agrarian reform can be accepted.<sup>145</sup>

Finally, here are the results of the agrarian reform and colonization in areas with considerable percentage of minority population. In Kosovo 226,525 ha was earmarked for the needs of the agrarian reform (160,035 ha out of that was arable land). Out of that the state-owned land comprised 84,153 ha, communal 32,866 ha, ecclesiastic 384 ha, private 5,044 ha, abandoned and *kaçak* land 5,228 ha. Until January 1, 1939 there was distributed: 90,269 ha to 11,474 colonists; 11,338 ha to 6,626 local candidates (as addition or indemnification); various institutions received 1,358 ha, etc. There remained 81,855 ha undistributed.<sup>146</sup> In the Vojvodina 172,975 families received and 54,874 families bought land during the agrarian reform until the end of 1934. Some more families received land until 1940, but their number was small. Among the 172,975 endowed families, 143,891 were the local ones (who received on the average 2 morgen, or 1 ha). The 20,348 volunteers received 7.8 morgen on the average (64% of the volunteers being from other parts of the country). There were also 4,271 colonist families and 2,700 families of refugees.<sup>147</sup> According to some not-quite-reliable data, 4,290 families of volunteers, 2,514 families of colonists and auto-colonists, 143 optant and refugee families were settled in Slavonia and Syrmium during the inter-war period, and some 1,000 families in Baranya.<sup>148</sup> All this affected the ethnic make-up of the colonized areas, but in

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144 Avramović, pp. 74-75.

145 Obradović thinks the colonization in Kosovo was economically successful because the soil until then uncultivated, began to be tilled, the fruit-growing was improved and the colonists also brought with them the first agricultural machines. (Obradović, *Agrarni odnosi*, p. 454.) Tomasevich deems that colonization was a predominantly successful experiment. (Tomasevich, pp. 361, 367.) Janša states the colonization in Slovenia didn't satisfy the colonists, but nevertheless reduced the power of foreign landowners. (Janša, p. 188.) Gaćeša has a positive opinion about the results of the agrarian reform and colonization but adduces no evidence for it, whereas he dismisses adverse views as arbitrary. (Gaćeša, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, pp. 380-381.)

146 Obradović, *Agrarni odnosi*, pp. 452-453. After the revision of the agrarian reform in 1945 the Albanians were given back 15,784 ha, i.e. 30% more than had been taken away from them as individuals! (Ibid., p. 453.) Different data about confiscated and distributed land can be found in the works of Bataković, Hadri and Gaćeša. (Bataković, *Kosovo*, p. 38; Idem, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, p. 63; Hadri, p. 60; Gaćeša, *Naseljavanje Kosova i Metohije*, p. 251.)

147 Tomasevich, pp. 366-367. Gaćeša adduces different data, which only goes to show how relative the inter-war statistics had been. (Cf. Nikola Gaćeša, *Kolonizacija Srba i Crnogoraca u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji i FNRJ*, in: *Seobe srpskog naroda od XIV do XX veka. Zbornik radova posvećen tristogodišnjici Velike seobe Srba*, Beograd 1990, pp. 116-117; Idem, *Agrarna reforma i kolonizacija u Banatu*, p. 377.)

148 Vrbošić, pp. 319-320; Ružić, p. 241. These two authors maintain that colonization in Slavonia and Baranya was part of the premeditated Serbian expansion, at the detriment of, above all, the Croats, but they fail to corroborate this by proofs from archival sources. (Cf. also Šimončić-Bobetko, *passim*.) For all we know now, there is no doubt that

the last resort failed to change their ethnic structure significantly. The agrarian reform was implemented more radically in the Southern parts (including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia) than in the Vojvodina, Slavonia and Slovenia.<sup>149</sup> The reasons should certainly be looked for in the larger (in terms of numbers and area) power of big estates in the Northern parts, resistance on part of some of Yugoslav politicians from those areas who also possessed large landed estates or were connected with their owners, and partly in the international lobby of large landowners from the former Hungarian territories who resorted to international legal institutions in the struggle to protect their interests – using in the process all the diplomatic, financial, social and other advantages of their social status with which Albanian and Turkish beys couldn't reckon.

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colonization in Slavonia and Baranya were aimed, as in other places, at reducing the percentage of minority inhabitants.

149 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 784.



## Chapter Thirteen

# Religious Communities Comprising National Minorities

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was not only a multi-ethnic, but also a multi-confessional state. That was the consequence of the political unification of a region in which the by-gone centuries had spread three large religions and had brought in members of several other smaller denominations. As a consequence of a complex historical development, almost no religious community in the territory of Yugoslavia was mono-ethnic.<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, almost no nationality in the region was mono-confessional, although the leading peoples in the state, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, to a large extent were.<sup>2</sup> As for members of national minorities, only the Turks and not very numerous Poles were characterized by an outspoken mono-confession-alism, whereas all other minority communities were, to all intents, multi-confes-sional in different proportions.

Religious differences among the members of the one and same national minority were often significant and they led to tensions<sup>3</sup> that weakened the minority in its relations with the state. The most obvious was the religious intolerance among the Germans<sup>4</sup> who were 80% Roman-Catholics and 20% Protestant.<sup>5</sup>

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1 Even the national Serbian Orthodox Church wasn't purely Serbian in its ethnic composition, since it also comprised the Macedonians, Bulgarians, Vlachs of Eastern Serbia, a certain number of Aromuns, Greeks etc. As for the Romanian Orthodox Church in the territory of Yugoslavia, at the moment of the state's foundation, the process of separation of certain number of Serbs from the bishopric of Caransebeş wasn't completed yet.

2 We won't tackle here the complex problem of the nationality of the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks). On various aspects of that issue cf.: Srećko M. Džaja, *Die politische Realität des Jugoslawismus* (1918-1991). Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung Bosnien-Herzegovinas, München 2002.

3 Schneefuß, p. 39.

4 Altgayer, p. 18; Lendl, pp. 26, 28; Maier, p. 11; Oswald Deuerling, *Deutsche Siedlungen in Slawonien*, *Nation und Staat*, VI, 5, 1933, p. 293; Stanić, p. 120. The head of the Educational Department of the Danube Province deemed as late as 1939 that the private German teachers' training college was, due to religious cleavage, much less nefarious for the state in Protestant Novi Vrbas, than it would have been in a predominantly Catholic town. (AJ, 14, 27/71.) How deep the rift had been is testified also by the accusation of the German Roman-Catholics voiced 40-odd years afterwards, that the Yugoslav authorities had favoured the German Evangelical Church. (As a proof the fact is adduced that it had been given a plot of land for building a church in downtown Belgrade, although it had already sold an expensive lot in the city centre, which had also been given it as a grant.) Michael Lehmann, *Die katholischen Donauschwaben in Serbien* (1918-1945), in: *Die katholischen Donauschwaben in den Nachfolgestaaten*, p. 227.)

5 The Protestants were nationally better preserved than the Catholics so that they joined in the national movement after the First World War more massively, and the Nazi propaganda spread among them faster in the 1930s. A smaller number of nationally

Its depth mirrored the religious gap in Germany itself and influenced the homogenization and organization of the German minority. The Protestants were nationally more conscious and more active in the process. There was also a pretty deep rift between the Muslims and Roman-Catholics among the Albanians, the latter being some 10% of the Albanian population.<sup>6</sup> Although some observers thought it wasn't that important any more,<sup>7</sup> after the occupation of Albania by Italy in 1939, a clear difference could be noted in the attitude of the Muslims (who were all against Italy) and the Roman-Catholics (who became the main disseminators of Italian propaganda),<sup>8</sup> which testified that the confessional difference among the Albanians didn't become irrelevant yet. Among the Magyars, there was mainly the division in the Roman-Catholic majority and the Calvinist minority, with the latter considering themselves the best Hungarians, and their denomination a real "Hungarian religion". Among the Ruthenians, apart from the Uniate majority, there was also an Orthodox minority, which caused mutual frictions. On the other hand, the tiny Uniate minority among the Romanians never caused problems and is hardly ever mentioned in the contemporary sources. The same was true of the Roman-Catholic minority among the Slovaks.<sup>9</sup> In this chapter we deal with the organization and role of religious communities in the life of national minorities, as well as with the position of national minorities within (mostly) multi-ethnic religious communities.

First, let's have a look at what the financing of religious communities looked like in percentages in 1922/23 through 1926/27:<sup>10</sup>

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conscious German Catholics converted from Roman-Catholicism to the German Evangelical Church at that time. However, this doesn't mean there were no Germans, Roman-Catholic priests spreading Nazi ideas. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 24.)

- 6 According to Rahimi, religious differences became more acute among the Albanians already during the Turkish reforms in 19th century when the Ottoman government instigated the Muslims against the Christians. (Rahimi, *Verska podeljenost*, p. 305.) This policy from which foreign powers profited, led to open clashes in the early 20th century. (Ibid., p. 309.) Clashes occurred during the First World War too. (Bushati, p. 154.) During the First World War Gerhard Gesemann talked to the Roman-Catholic Albanians in Prizren who considered themselves "Latins", whereas they regarded their Muslim compatriots as the "Turks", denying they had had anything in common with them, despite the common language. (Gerhard Gesemann, *Die Flucht: Aus einem serbischen Tagebuch 1915-1916*, München 1935, p. 111.) Gesemann also noted that devout Albanian Muslims hated the Albanian Catholics more than the Montenegrins. (Ibid., p. 151.)
- 7 This was the view of American observers in Albania. (Dimić, Borožan, II, pp. 306, 410.)
- 8 VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 37, d. 5; *Aprilski rat*, pp. 880-881. Some Roman-Catholics even thought they would call the shots under the changed circumstances, at the detriment of the Albanian Muslims and the Serbs. (VA, pop. 17, k. 22, f. 3, d. 49.)
- 9 There were several Roman-Catholic Slovaks of whom no-one took care in the national affairs. (Slovenský deník, April 29, 1932.)
- 10 The Hungarian Minorities in the Succession states, p. 97. According to the official data, the government spent the following sums on various religious communities: for the Serbian Orthodox Church 38.326.630 dinars; for the Roman-Catholic Church and the Uniate Church 26.526.209; for the Islamic Religious Community 15.377.202; for the German Evangelical Church 642.000; for the Slovak Evangelical Church 400.000 dinars; for the Reformed Church 402.000; for the Old-Catholic Church 368.865. (Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui, p. 202.) In percentages, the Serbian Orthodox Church received 46.6%, the Roman-Catholic and Uniate Church 32.2, the Islamic Religious Community 18.6%, the

Denomination	% of Pop.	% of money 1922/3	% of money 1924/5	% of money 1925/6
<b>Catholic</b>	39.4	11.2	25.4	23.5
<b>Serb. Orth.</b>	46.6	67.1	45.1	48
<b>Muslim</b>	11.1	17.2	14.3	14.05
<b>Protest.</b>	1.8	0.2	0.4	0.5

This table shows that not all religious communities were funded in proportion to their participation in the total population. The Serbian Orthodox Church received more than its due, whereas the Roman-Catholic and Protestant churches received less. On the other hand, the Islamic Religious Community received more than was its share in the total population (and the same held true of the Jews). From this one could draw conclusions as to the attitude of the state toward certain religious communities, but they would be mostly wrong. Thus for instance, the authorities showed no particular predilection for the Muslims (including the Slavic ones).<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the authorities were usually well disposed towards the Protestants, but this failed to make impact on financing.<sup>12</sup> Obviously, different factors, apart from the property of certain religious communities (which could explain smaller subsidies for the Roman-Catholic Church) played a role in determining the size of state grants. How complicated the relations of the government with religious communities comprising national minorities were, will be seen from the following part of this chapter.

The largest multi-ethnic religious community (which was that also in its own definition), was the Roman-Catholic Church. It had its ecclesiastical organization throughout the Yugoslav territory, although it wasn't equally old, strong or developed in all parts of the country. The main regions of the Roman-Catholic Church were the former Habsburg territories inhabited by the Croats and Slovenes which had joined the Roman Church already in the Middle Ages. The Catholic majority existed also in the former territory of Southern Hungary. Since the Roman-Catholic religion was the state religion for centuries in the Habsburg Monarchy, and since

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German Evangelical Church 7.8%, the Slovak Evangelical Church and the Reformed Church 4.8% each and the Old-Catholic Church 4.5%. Macartney adduces different numbers but similar proportions. (Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors*, p. 425.) Representatives of minorities (especially of the Protestant ones) protested at such division of the money, and in general against what they had seen as favouring the Orthodox Church. (PA, Att. IIb Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3; SBNS KSHS, Redovan saziv za 1927/28, IV, p. 195; Kasaš, O jednoj predstavi, p. 197.) From the Serbian side it was expostulated that smaller religious communities received more money per capita than larger ones. (S. Traicki, *Verska politika Kralja Ujedinitelja*, Letopis Matice srpske, knj. 343, sv. 1, 1935, p. 11.)

11 The Slavic Muslims also complained of discrimination. (Hrabak, JMO, pp. 158, 165; Atif Purivatra, *Jugoslovenska muslimanska organizacija u političkim odnosima u Jugoslaviji*, Sarajevo 1974, *passim*.)

12 In some cases the authorities were willing to help religious communities collect the money to which these laid claim. (AJ, 69, 63/102.)

tolerance for others was granted only later and with difficulty,<sup>13</sup> this affected considerably the confessional make-up of national minorities that settled during the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries in the territories that would become part of Yugoslavia in 1918. The Roman-Catholic religion was the faith of the state, of the monarch and of the greater part of the nobility. This nobility shaped to a large extent the confessional affiliation of their subjects, and thereby also of the colonists in the South Slav regions. Thus, the majority of the immigrant members of minorities, especially the Germans and Hungarians, belonged to the Roman-Catholic Church. Only the Patent of Tolerance of Joseph II made a somewhat larger colonization of the Protestants possible, as had been mentioned. The Roman-Catholic Church had long been in the service of the ruling strata, and during the 19<sup>th</sup> century it increasingly came to serve the majority or dominant nationality in an often multi-ethnic territory.<sup>14</sup> This means, the national divisions permeated the Church ranks, whereas priests among certain peoples, wanting other national leaders, became national champions and people who decisively shaped the character of a national movement.<sup>15</sup>

Whereas the Roman Catholic Church in the Austrian part of the Monarchy<sup>16</sup> was to a large extent split along the ethnic lines, in Croatia and Bosnia it became the tool of assimilation of the immigrant minority population. As a rule, they had no priests speaking their languages, and demands for the use of mother-tongue in religious service were met with refusal.<sup>17</sup> In that way, the Roman-Catholic Church became one of the main means of Croatization,<sup>18</sup> which it remained also during the inter-war period.<sup>19</sup> For that reason, the matter of this religious community in Croatia

- 13 The Patent of Tolerance of Joseph II gave limited rights to the Protestants in Austria and Hungary. The Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia was the most intolerant in religious matters: it was only in 1859 that the Protestants were granted rights of residence. This was the consequence of both the influence of the Roman-Catholic Church and the wish to protect municipal rights from the onslaughts of the Hungarian, to a large extent Calvinist, nobility.
- 14 Thus for instance the Lavantian bishopric was transferred to Maribor in 1859, where it became an important Slovenian national institution in this predominantly German town. In the 1850s the Slovenes were also trying to take over the bishopric of Seggau. (Grafenauer, *Narodnostno stanje*, pp. 386, 389.)
- 15 This was particularly typical of the Slovenes, whose political scene remained predominantly clerical in character until the Second World War.
- 16 The position of the Roman-Catholic Church in the Habsburg Monarchy was regulated by the Concordat of 1855. (Radmila Radić, *Država i verske zajednice 1945-1970*, Beograd 2002, p. 33.)
- 17 The Pan-Slav Josip Juraj Strossmayer was particularly well-known for his spurning of demands for the use of mother-tongues in the Church, although he himself was of German origin, and although he colonized Germans and other minorities on the estates of the Đakovo bishopric. (Anton Scherer, Manfred Straka, *Kratka povijest Podunavskih Nijemaca/Abriss zur Geschichte der Donauschwaben*, Osijek, Zagreb, Split, Graz, Stuttgart 1999, p. 101.)
- 18 Scherer, *Die Donauschwaben*, p. 12; Schneefuß, p. 139. Oberkersch is of the same opinion, although he adduces several parishes in which it was preached in German or in Croatian, Hungarian and Slovenian. (Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen in Syrmien, Slawonien, Kroatien und Bosnien*, pp. 135-140.) Several Hungarian villages of the Đakovo bishopric turned Calvinist because the bishop didn't allow them to have church service in Hungarian. (Szita, p. 178.)
- 19 The Czechs from several Slavonian villages complained of having ecclesiastical service in Latin. (Jugoslavski Čehoslovaci, March 2, 1933.)



in that period was no problem for the state in the context of the minority question: On the contrary, it was one of the few in which the tendencies of the state and the Church coincided.

The position of the Roman-Catholic Church in Hungary was similar to that in Croatia. There it completely stood in the service of Magyarization, drawing on the 900 years-long ties of the Hungarian crown with Rome. The Church and the state worked hand in hand in spreading the Hungarian language and the state idea. Not only priests of Hungarian nationality took part in this, but also Germans, Bunjevci, Šokci, Slovaks and others who had passed through Hungarian theological schools, becoming in the process, the tools against their own peoples.<sup>20</sup> For these reasons a considerable part of the Catholic clergy in the Vojvodina remained pro-Hungarian even during the inter-war period, which was a serious hurdle for the Yugoslav authorities.<sup>21</sup>

There were incomparably fewer Roman-Catholics in the Southern parts,<sup>22</sup> and most of them were of Albanian nationality. Austria-Hungary, and then Italy, tried to win them over at the turn of the century by opening schools, educating priests, by diplomatic measures etc.<sup>23</sup> The acquisition of the territories inhabited partly by the Albanian Catholics, whom Austria-Hungary had championed, was one of the main reasons that the Kingdom of Serbia concluded a Concordat with the Vatican in 1914, desirous of preventing interference in its internal affairs of both the Vatican and (what was actually much more important) of the unsympathetic neighboring great power.<sup>24</sup> Montenegro, which already had a Concordat, wanted to limit the Austro-Hungarian influence by hindering the work of Roman-Catholic schools in its territory and by forcible conversions of the Catholics to Orthodoxy.<sup>25</sup>

The First World War brought about great changes in political frontiers that cut through boundaries of several Roman-Catholic dioceses, some of which had a many-centuries-long tradition. Aware of the important role the Roman-Catholic Church had played in the newly acquired territories, which, moreover, were inhabited to a large extent by the non-Slav minority population, the Yugoslav authorities wanted to put under control of the Yugoslav Roman-Catholic episcopate those parts of bishoprics the centers of which had remained abroad. This was part and parcel of

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20 Jaszi, *The Dissolution*, pp. 174, 324; Altgayer, p. 3; C.A. Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, p. 17; Hoensch, p. 31.

21 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 327.

22 The thesis could be probably defended that the Habsburg Reconquista (up till the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina) ended on the Sava and the Danube, equally for military, historical and political reasons which confined it to the territory of the Historical Hungary, as well as for religious reasons: the majority of the population of the Balkan Peninsula being non-Catholics. The monarchy crossed the Sava and the Danube only in the era of modern imperialism when the religious factor no longer played the role it had played during the Austro-Turkish wars of the 17th and 18th centuries.

23 Bushati, pp. 105-108, 122, 128; Nikola Žutić, *Vatikan i Albanci u prvoj polovini XX veka (do 1941.)*, Beograd 2000, pp. 18-23; Dimić, *Kulturna politika*, III, pp. 125-126.

24 Dragoljub R. Živojinović, *Vatikan, Srbija i stvaranje jugoslovenske države 1914-1920*, Beograd s.a., pp. 13-47; Žutić, *Vatikan*, pp. 26-27, 34-40. Montenegro, in which some 6.000 Roman-Catholic lived in the early 20th century, had regulated its relations with the Holy See through the Concordate of 1886. (Živojinović, p. 23; Ćorović, pp. 558, 565; Radić, p. 33; Žutić, *Vatikan*, p. 45.)

25 Babić, *Politika*, pp. 208-214.

the policy of separation of members of minorities from the undesirable national, political, cultural and religious influences of their mother countries, and was the more necessary since the greater part of the clergy was hostile to the new state.<sup>26</sup> The Vatican took its time, so that the apostolic administrators for the severed parts of the Kalocsa, Csanad, Pecs and Szombathely bishoprics<sup>27</sup> were named only in 1923 after repeated insistence from the Yugoslav side.<sup>28</sup> In that way the Vatican recognized the existence of the new frontiers, but was still not willing to create new bishoprics – in order not to burn its boats in respect of the defeated party.

When the apostolic administrators were appointed, care was taken that they were men agreeable both to the Vatican and to the Yugoslav government. In Subotica the Bunjevac Lajčo Budanović<sup>29</sup> was appointed for the Bačka. He had played quite a prominent role in 1918 and later on turned to be unyielding both toward national minorities and the central government in Belgrade.<sup>30</sup> The Banat was put under the future Belgrade archbishop (from 1924) Rafael Rodić.<sup>31</sup> Smaller portions were severed from the Austrian bishoprics of Klagenfurt and Graz, so that it met with less resistance. Jezersko was put under the Ljubljana bishopric, the Mežica valley and the Prekmurje were subject to Maribor bishopric whereas the Podravina and Baranya were put under auspices of the Đakovo bishopric – but only as apostolic administrations.<sup>32</sup>

The non-Slavic clergy in the Northern parts of the country was partly weakened by emigration of German and Hungarian intelligentsia after the end of the First World War. Nevertheless, especially in the first years after that, it still represented a significant part of the Roman-Catholic clergy of those parts and despite the change in ecclesiastical hierarchy, considerably influenced the faithful of the minority nationalities.<sup>33</sup> Therefore they were under keen surveillance by the authorities which observed if the clergy showed any anti-state tendencies or offered passive resistance.<sup>34</sup> In that context, a special problem was the Yugoslav clergy with Hungarian sympathies, which felt solidarity with the defunct historical Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>35</sup>

26 AJ, 69, 7/15; Nikola Žutić, *Kraljevina Jugoslavija i Vatikan. Odnosi jugoslovenske države i Rimske crkve 1918-1935*, Beograd 1998, pp. 75, 81; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 327. The Hungarian ecclesiastical hierarchy was not willing to renounce the lost territories either, and it supplicated political factors of the world in that sense. (AJ, F. 336, f. 48.)

27 Their bishops were known as great Hungarian nationalists. (Žutić, *Kraljevina*, pp. 65-66.)

28 Bringing of the diocesan boundaries in accordance with the state borders was demanded also by the Yugoslav bishops on several occasions. (Žutić, *Kraljevina*, pp. 65, 69-70.)

29 Haltmeyer, p. 230; Žutić, *Kraljevina*, p. 76.

30 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 334.

31 Radić, p. 34.

32 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, pp. 79-86.

33 AJ, 69, 7/11. Hungarian priests often appeared in the role of leaders of local branches of the Hungarian Party. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 329.)

34 A report of the Ministry of the Interior from mid-1923 appraised the clergy of the Yugoslav part of the Pecs bishopric as disloyal, and even engaged in espionage. (AJ, 69, 7/15.) In 1933 the priest Julije (Gyla?) Horvath was suspected of being the chief irredentist in Bezdan. (AJ, 63 (pov.) 1933, f. 15.)

35 In 1923 trips to Hungary were temporarily prohibited for the priests from the bishoprics with centres in that country. (AJ, 14, 159/555.) The Department for the Protection

In order to stop expressions of pro-Hungarian sympathies, the Ministry of Religions forbade in August 1923 mentioning of the Virgin Mary as protectress of Hungary, and the next month, coats of arms, inscriptions, as well as statues of (the first Hungarian king) St. Stephen which reminded of the historical Hungary.<sup>36</sup>

On the whole, the minority population of the Vojvodina had a national mainstay in its Roman-Catholic clergy, although complaints about the lack of priests, especially Hungarian ones, became increasingly louder over time.<sup>37</sup> The reason this happened was that the Yugoslav bishops, willing to wean their clergy and the faithful from the centuries-old influences, approved of the priests' education only in theological schools in the country.<sup>38</sup> The priests, foreign citizens, who were present in certain number, couldn't significantly alleviate the lack of a clerical cadre.<sup>39</sup> In Slavonia, the majority of priests was either Croat or Croatized, so that the clergy there acted rather as assimilators than as preservers of minority nationalities. In Slovenia the German clergy remained the strongest where the Germans were most compact – in the isolated enclave of Kočevje, that, like the rest of Carniola, had a rather clerical tinge.<sup>40</sup> On the other end of Slovenia, in the Prekmurje, pro-Hungarian sympathies were expressed within the framework of the Roman-Catholic Church.<sup>41</sup>

The ecclesiastical authorities were differently disposed towards fulfillment of minority, particularly linguistic, rights of their faithful. The primacy of the "state language" was never questioned, whereas the use of minority languages differed

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of the State of the Ministry of the Interior pointed out in early 1928 that clergy, particularly the Roman-Catholic one in the Vojvodina was negligent in promoting love of the King. (AJ, 69, 182/286.)

- 36 The Bunjevci of Sombor rebelled successfully against this, and these orders were not executed very severely in other places either. (Grentrup, pp. 129-130.)
- 37 Reggeli Újság, February 3, 1941; Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 329. This lack was particularly acute where the Roman-Catholic clergy of the needed nationality had been in short supply already before the war – among the Poles in Bosnia. (Drljača, Kolonizacija, pp. 50-51.)
- 38 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3. The Belgrade arch-bishop Rodić allowed minority theology students to study abroad. (Märkische Zeitung, September 15, 1933.) His successor Josip Ujčić recalled the German students (who had been able to study abroad from early 1930s) with the explanation that there were enough educational institutions in Yugoslavia. (Michael Lehmann, Die katholischen Donauschwaben im jugoslawischen Banat (1918-1941), in: Die katholischen Donauschwaben in den Nachfolgestaaten 1918-1945. Im Zeichen des Nationalismus, Freilassing 1972, p. 185.) This view was shared by the Yugoslav authorities who deemed priests should be educated in the country so that they could do it a triple service in political sense". (AJ, 69, 44/79.)
- 39 Grentrup, p. 97.
- 40 In Kočevje harmony between the clergy and the people prevailed until the appearance of the Nazis. (Grentrup, p. 94.) Until the late 1930s the Kočevje Germans were led by parson Joseph Eppich from Stara Cerkev. After the "Renewers" victory he was removed from his position of the minority leader. (Biber, Nacizem, p. 33, caption under the photo facing p. 72.)
- 41 Žutić, Kraljevina, pp. 65, 73-75, 79. One of the main manifestations of pro-Hungarian feelings was the celebration of St. Stephen, the first Hungarian king. A formal excuse was easy to find, since it was a red-letter day until 1923. (AJ, 69, 7/11; Žutić, Kraljevina, p. 65.)

from diocese to diocese or from one apostolic administration to the other.<sup>42</sup> The archbishop of Belgrade, Rafael Rodić was more forthcoming in this respect than was Lajčo Budanović, the apostolic administrator of Subotica, although in the latter's territory there was church service in minority languages too.<sup>43</sup> In the Đakovo bishopric, the bishop Akšamović only started giving signs in the late 1930s that he would be willing to introduce more multi-linguism in the Church service.<sup>44</sup> In the largest diocese, the Zagreb archbishopric, there were few members of minorities, and even less use of minority languages.<sup>45</sup> In Slovenia, German parishes were gradually slipping from German into Slovenian hands, so that the use of the German language was constantly declining.<sup>46</sup> Ecclesiastical services in the mother tongues of the minorities were a real rarity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>47</sup> Members of minorities were particularly afraid of the possibility of the introduction of Old-Slavonic as the liturgical language.<sup>48</sup> The Germans, and particularly the Magyars were ill-disposed toward this, and in some places they even threatened they would convert to Protestantism if it were introduced.<sup>49</sup> However, nothing came of switching to Old-Slavonic because the hierarchy soon cooled to this idea which could basically bring the Roman-Catholic and the Serbian Orthodox Churches closer together.

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- 42 The state authorities in Bosnia eyed with suspicion the not very numerous Polish priests who arrived in early 1930s. (Drljača, Marija Dombrovska, p. 135.) Otherwise, the Poles had no priests of their own and they were exposed to denationalization both on part of the Croatian clergy and Serbian teachers. (Ibid., p. 142; Idem, *Kolonizacija*, p. 55.)
- 43 Haltmayer, p. 255.
- 44 AJ, 66 (pov.), 99/283; Geiger, Nijemci, pp. 132-133; Biber, Nacizem, p. 195; Josef Werni, *Die katholischen Donauschwaben in der Diözese Diakowar (1918-1945)*, in: *Die katholischen Donauschwaben in den Nachfolgestaaten 1918-1945. Im Zeichen des Nationalismus*, Freilassing 1972, p. 299. Nevertheless, multi-linguism existed in that bishopric even before that, albeit not everywhere to the necessary extent, as can be discerned from demands for its introduction from 1933. (Werni, pp. 293-294, 296-297.) Most insistent in the matter of use of the mother tongue in this diocese in the late 1930s were the Germans headed by the Kulturbund. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 70/183.) This was yet another proof of the increased national consciousness of the Slavonian Germans. In 1940, under the changed foreign political situation, the Magyars in Donja Lendava made similar demands. (VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 2, d. 32.)
- 45 Josef Werni, *Die katholischen Donauschwaben in der Erzdiözese Agram (1918-1945)*, in: *Die katholischen Donauschwaben in den Nachfolgestaaten 1918-1945. Im Zeichen des Nationalismus*, Freilassing 1972, pp. 329-334.)
- 46 On the whole, the ecclesiastical leaders addressed their subordinates in Croatian or Hungarian in the Vojvodina and in Slovenian in Slovenia. Diocesan journals published announcements in Croatian, Hungarian and Latin in the Vojvodina, in Croatian and Latin in Croatia and in Slovenian and Latin in Slovenia. Only pastoral letters for the Volksdeutsche were in German. (PA, Abt. IIb, Religion- und Kirchenwesen, Politik 16, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.)
- 47 Hoffmann, p. 35.
- 48 The Yugoslav Roman-Catholic episcopate asked the Vatican for the introduction of the Church service in Old-Slavic language and (mediaeval Slavic) Glagolitic alphabet right after the First World War (Živojinović, pp. 325, 391.), but later on, due to worsening relations with the state and the Serbs, the idea lost popularity.
- 49 Grentrup, p. 181; Wiener Zeitung, July 6, 1937.

In the Vojvodina the Roman-Catholics (most of whom were Hungarians and Germans) were hit by the confiscation of Church estates and the abolition of confessional schools for the maintenance of which they were partly intended. Some twenty monasteries of the School Sisters of Notre Dame, who imparted instruction mainly in Hungarian, were also shut down,<sup>50</sup> i.e. they had to reorganize as a separate congregation in 1930, with the seat in Subotica and not in Kalocsa.<sup>51</sup> This happened within the general attempt of the state to bring education and upbringing of the youth under its control, which provoked strong resistance on part of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.<sup>52</sup>

The national mainstay of the minority population within the Roman-Catholic Church were various associations, fraternities<sup>53</sup> – mostly of local importance – as well as ecclesiastical communes which sometimes came into conflict with their respective bishops.<sup>54</sup> All these associations transmitted, apart from the religious message, the national one too. Through them the ideological struggle within certain national minorities sometimes took place: such for example, were German Roman-Catholic youth associations which offered the most significant resistance to the spread of National-Socialism among the Volksdeutsche youth of the Vojvodina.<sup>55</sup> Similar role of a keeper of the religious thought and national language, but also that of a forum for the clash of ideological views, was played by the minority Roman-Catholic press, which formed part of the minority press not to be underestimated.<sup>56</sup>

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50 It was not only that the language of instruction had been Hungarian, but sometimes irredentist ideas were also foisted through it. (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1927, f. 3, 122-161.)

51 Žutić, Kraljevina, pp. 345, 349-358; Haltmayer, p. 258; AJ, 14, 105/406.

52 Ljubodrag Dimić, Kulturni boj Rimokatoličke crkve i države, in: Idem, Nikola Žutić, Rimokatolički klerikalizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918-1941. Prilozi za istoriju, Beograd 1992, pp. 135-269.

53 The Italians in Dalmatia also had similar fraternities. One of them in Split (in which it seems, there were also Italian citizens), had the right to elect its own priest. (AJ, 69, 7/11.) Another one existed in Dubrovnik. (Rad italijanske kulturne lige u Dalmaciji, p. 101.)

54 This was the case of the communes in Pančevo, Vršac, Bela Crkva, Veliki Bečkerek which ran afoul of the Belgrade archbishop Rafael Rodić over his imposition of unlawful taxes. He eventually disbanded these communes. (Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 333.) The faithful of Vršac came into conflict with this prelate over the dismissal of parson Jakob Anders (who had arbitrarily reduced fees for Church ceremonies) so that the parishioners even gathered 6.500 signatures on a petition to the Pope in which they asked that the priest be reinstated. They also asked support in this matter of the primate of Hungary – the fact that certainly mirrored their dissatisfaction with their status within the Roman-Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1934, f. 16; Stampa, June 23, 1934.) It should also be said that in several places, out of ignorance, resistance was put up against the decrees about ecclesiastical communes, published for the Bačka in September 1923 and for the Banat in August 1925. (Grentrup, pp. 78-79.)

55 Altgayer, pp. 53-54; Biber, Nacizem, p. 75. In order to parry the Nazis, these associations imitated in their work the then popular organizational and visual forms practiced also by the Nazis. (Haltmayer, p. 263.) They started dispersing in spring 1938, and the Roman-Catholic Church was later pushed into defensive by the increasingly aggressive pro-Nazi youth that didn't even shrink from excesses. (VA, pop. 17, k. 1, f.4, d. 36.) However, the Catholic resistance never stopped altogether. (Biber, Nacizem, p. 75.)

56 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 330; Bešlin, Vesnik, pp. 149-168; Lehmann, Die katholischen Donauschwaben im jugoslawischen Banat, p. 181; Haltmayer, pp. 245-246.

For national reasons, the state authorities also wanted to put under their control the Roman-Catholic hierarchy in the Southern parts of the country. Like in the Northern part, ecclesiastical delimitation wasn't carried out in Montenegro and the Metohija, where Franciscans from Scutari, who had been appointed without the Yugoslav government's consent and paid by Italy, served in nine parishes. Their provincial Pavle Dodaj didn't want to yield to the demands of the Yugoslav government to send only such priests who wouldn't interfere with Yugoslavia's domestic policy.<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, in Skopje<sup>58</sup> the energetic Albanian citizen Lazar Miedia, characterized in the Yugoslav sources and by his Slavic collaborators as a great Albanian nationalist, was sitting on the archbishop's chair. He had been installed during the First World War without the consent of the Serbian government.<sup>59</sup> Compromised in an affair, he left his chair and fled to Albania in 1922 where he became metropolitan of Scutari.<sup>60</sup> After some time the archbishopric was reduced to a bishopric, and Miedia was succeeded by the Slovene Franc Gnidovec, who was also regarded with suspicion by the authorities because he celebrated mass in Hungarian and German for soldiers in Prilep in June 1925.<sup>61</sup>

Italy very much took advantage of the unsettled circumstances, aiding the Roman-Catholic clergy and directing it against Yugoslavia. For this reason it made tackling the problem of delimitation with the Albanian Franciscans more difficult, so that it started only in 1924. The Franciscans of the Southern parts were separated from the Scutari Franciscan province and joined to the Bosnian one in early 1925, but actually only in August of that year. This was done in order to prevent the eventual anti-state activity of foreign friars and in order to protect Yugoslav interests. The Bosnian Franciscans didn't like the new task and they did their best to get rid of it – with the subterfuge that the parishes were far away and that they didn't speak the language of the faithful. The Vatican, for its part, kept Yugoslav priests in Albania and Albanian and Italian ones in Yugoslavia, so that 5 parishes were served by Albanian and 2 by Yugoslav citizens.<sup>62</sup>

The Bosnian Franciscans were relieved of part of their troubles in March 1926 when the Supreme Direction of the Franciscan Order in Rome detached the parishes in Hoti, Grude and Vuksanlekaj from the Bosnian and attached them to the Montenegrin Direction of the Franciscan Province of Naples. The Ministry of Faiths wasn't happy about it and demanded that the Montenegrin Direction be separated from the Naples Province. However, this was not granted.<sup>63</sup>

The Yugoslav authorities weren't satisfied with the ethnic make-up of the Roman-Catholic clergy on the Albanian border in the early 1930s either: at the time 8 Albanian, 5 Italian and only 10 Yugoslav priests served there. Such ethnic structure

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57 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, p. 106-107.

58 The bishopric of Skopje had 18 parishes and two monastery chapels in 1937. (*Ibid.*, p. 164.)

59 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, p. 105; *Idem*, *Rimokatolička crkva i hrvatstvo. Od ilirske ideje do velikohrvatske realizacije 1453-1941*, Beograd 1997, p. 174; *Idem*, *Vatikan*, p. 101. It seems Miedia's Yugoslav priests were not immune to nationalism, and that may be partly the reason that the Yugoslav documents depict him in such a negative light.

60 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, p. 162; *Idem*, *Vatikan*, p. 100.

61 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, p. 164.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 104-110; *Idem*, *Vatikan*, pp. 73-76.

63 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, pp. 111-112; *Idem*, *Vatikan*, pp. 77-79.

prevented the government from implementing its national policy there, whereas it opened for the Vatican, and particularly Italy, the gates for the penetration into the Balkans.<sup>64</sup> It should be pointed out that the Yugoslav authorities had no trust in the Yugoslav priests in that region either, considering them educated in an Italian spirit and of Italian leanings, or at least nationally passive.<sup>65</sup> As for the Albanian priests, throughout the inter-war period, the authorities regarded part of them not only as Italian agents, but as spies too.<sup>66</sup> It is certain that Albanian priests were strengthening the national consciousness of their flock,<sup>67</sup> whereas they cherished no loyalty to the state.<sup>68</sup> Furthermore, as the few better educated men among their co-nationals, they often represented them before the authorities or explained laws to them.<sup>69</sup> The state, in perpetual conflict with the Roman-Catholic Church, couldn't utilize them for its goals, or even prevent their anti-state activities. On the other hand, the Islamic Religious Community complained on several occasions of proselytism of the Roman-Catholic Church in the Southern parts,<sup>70</sup> although one gets the impression that its fears, in view of the few cases of conversion, were exaggerated.<sup>71</sup>

On the whole, the question of members of national minorities within the Roman-Catholic Church and in its relations with the state was always of secondary importance, and usually part of a broader context of the relations between the state and the Roman-Catholic Church, i.e. between the state and minorities. As an international institution, the Roman-Catholic Church had often been in the service of the dominant nation until 1918: this was particularly true of Croatia and Hungary. After

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64 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, p. 112.

65 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, p. 156; *Idem*, *Vatikan*, p. 110; VA, pop. 17, k. 12, f. 2, d. 7.

66 VA, pop. 17, k. 12, f. 2, d. 7; k. 22, f. 3, d. 50; AJ, 14, 182/673; Dimić, *Borozan*, II, p. 811; Žutić, *Vatikan*, pp. 87, 109. In August 1919 Roman-Catholic priest of Zlokućani was accused of having provoked the clash between the Albanians and Serbs in May of that year, in which there were several casualties and during quenching of which the Army had destroyed 76 Roman-Catholic houses (which were rebuilt with government aid later on). (AJ, 69, 182/287.)

67 A military document from 1940 estimated that Roman-Catholics were the most dangerous among the Albanians, and that they would allegedly massacre the Serbs in case of war. This was ascribed to the influence of the Roman-Catholic clergy. (VA, pop. 17, k. 12, f. 2, d. 7.)

68 According to a letter from the Ministry of the Army to the Ministry of the Interior from 1920, all Roman-Catholics of Kosovo and the Metohija were anti-Yugoslav. (AJ, 69, 7/11.)

69 AJ, 38, 20/61.

70 AJ, 74, 54/75; 63 (pov.), 1935, f. 15; 1934, f. 16, 1-300; Žutić, *Rimokatolička crkva*, pp. 175-176.

71 In their reply to the petition to the League of Nations by three Albanian Roman-Catholic priests of 1930, the Yugoslav authorities adduced only the example of Don Michael Karabalus who had converted 20 Muslim families in the village of Letica. (AJ, 305, 8/18.) In the complaint by the Reis-ul-Ulema (the Muslim religious chief) from 1934, 7 converts in the village of Gornja Stubla, are mentioned. (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1934, f. 16, 1-300.) Claims of some authors the number of Roman-Catholics had doubled thanks to proselytism in 1918-1941, need as yet to be proved. (Cf. Žutić, *Vatikan*, p. 98.) It is not to be ruled out that the so-called "larmane" (mottled – Alb.), i.e. crypto-Catholics who had pretended they were Muslims under the Ottoman rule, were responsible for this alleged increase. (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1934, f. 16, 1-300; Stavro Skendi, *Religion in Albania During the Ottoman Rule*, *Südost Forschungen*, XV, 1956, p. 324.)

1918 the Yugoslav authorities tried to use it for similar goals of “nationalization” of predominantly minority-inhabited regions. Due to the conflict that soon flared up between the state and the Church, and due to the unfavorable ethnic (but also educational!) make-up of the clergy, this was not possible. As for the Roman-Catholics among the minorities, they were mostly directed as before 1918 by minority priests, or priests educated in a non-Yugoslav spirit. This guidance was sometimes toward awakening of national consciousness, and sometimes toward the former or present dominant nation.<sup>72</sup> It may be said that the Croat or Croatized clergy continued to Croatize,<sup>73</sup> whereas the Hungarian and pro-Hungarian priests continued to foster Hungarian state and national idea. The German Roman-Catholic priests were for greater part either nationally lukewarm or Hungarian-friendly,<sup>74</sup> whereas the Albanian ones combined the Albanian national propaganda with the Italian one – which was particularly visible in the late 1930s.

The second in terms of the number of members of national minorities it comprised, was the Islamic Religious Community (IRC). The Muslims inhabited predominantly those parts of the new state that had belonged to the Ottoman Empire until 1878 or 1912. Since the Ottoman Empire was a theocratic state in which civil rights depended on religious affiliation, Islam was the dominant religion to a much higher degree than was the case with Catholicism in the Habsburg Empire. Therefore it was more difficult for the Muslims in the Southern parts to accept the new state – unlike the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who were Slavs and already used to Christian power.

There were some 15,000 Muslims left in Serbia after the Congress of Berlin, and they were headed by the mufti of Niš. He became the Supreme Mufti after the Balkan Wars. There were imams in larger towns, but the whole organization was not fixed by law. Islam belonged to the recognized confessions, and although it wasn't equal, it enjoyed material support from the government. Similar was the position of the IRC in Montenegro.<sup>75</sup> The position of Muslims after the Balkan Wars had been partly regulated by the peace treaty of Constantinople with Turkey, but repudiated by Serbia once Turkey joined the central Powers in 1914.<sup>76</sup> After the First World War, practically two Muslim religious organizations came into being:

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72 AJ, 66, 51/105.

73 PA, Abt. IIB, Religion- und Kirchenwesen, Politik 16, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.

74 Grentrup, pp. 91-93. Friendliness toward Hungary, coupled with Catholicism were the basis of their resistance to National-Socialism. (AJ, 14, 27/71.) The Reichsverband für die katholische Auslandsdeutschen tried to nationally awaken the German Roman-Catholics, by sending financial and other aid.) Altgayer, pp. 65-66; Steinacher, p. 565.) This organization was founded, certainly not by chance, in 1918, and in 1926 was joined by 36 associations and unions, as well as 34 male and 13 female monastic orders. The bishop of Osnabück Wilhelm Berning was in charge of South-Eastern Europe since 1934. (Lehmann, p. 213.) As for the nationally conscious German intelligentsia, it was indifferent toward the Roman-Catholic Church but attended services because the national movement needed the support of the Church. On the other hand, the religiosity of the majority of the Swabians wasn't too fervent. (Grentrup, pp. 27, 30-31.)

75 AJ, F. 398, f. 1; Radić, Država, p. 30; Boeckh, pp. 89-90.

76 Boeckh, pp. 89-90. Litigation concerning inheritance and marriage were regulated in accordance with the Sharia law and muftis were in charge of vakyf affairs. (Rebac, p. 658.)



one for the former Habsburg lands with the center in Sarajevo, and the other for the territory of Serbia and Montenegro headed by the Supreme Mufti in Belgrade (who spread his authority over the new territories only in 1923).<sup>77</sup> Until 1929 the organization remained more or less as it had been in 1919. The Decree about the Management of the Vakyfs for Serbia and Montenegro became the law in 1922, and in keeping with it, the Ministry of Faiths had the power of management and supervision. The clergy paid by the vakyfs was appointed by the minister of faiths in agreement with the Supreme Mufti. The surplus of the vakyf income was paid into the Central Vakyf Fund in the Mortgage Bank. In the judiciary, Sharia law was not introduced, but the Serbian law on Sharia courts of 1883 was extended to the Southern parts,<sup>78</sup> although it wasn't strictly abided.<sup>79</sup> A new Law on Sharia Courts was passed in 1929, but its implementation in the Southern parts was delayed.<sup>80</sup> There were 40 muftidoms with 40 muftis, secretaries and attendants in Southern Serbia in late 1920s, and all of them were state employees. Imams were entrusted with the keeping of registers in 1928.<sup>81</sup>

The authorities didn't want the two Islamic religious communities to unite, and the Southern one was, to all intents, run by the Ministry of Faiths until the early 1930s, which appointed supreme, district and county muftis and communal imams, who were all civil servants. Formally the government recognized the Bosnian Reis-ul-Ulema as the supreme Muslim chief in the country, but practically prevented his influence from spreading outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>82</sup> On the other hand, ever since the early 1920s the Bosnian Muslims were showing hegemonic tendencies toward their Southern co-believers. However, these were unwilling to accept that, which made the real unification of the Muslims in the whole country impossible.<sup>83</sup>

Finally, the Constitution of the IRC of 1930 which eventually determined the organization of the IRC in the whole country, stipulated that all religious officials and organs (except for the communal council) were appointed and not elected. Nine muftidoms (3 in minority regions – Bitola, Skopje, Prizren) were created.<sup>84</sup> In that way,

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77 The Great Muftidom was founded in December 1920, and Abdul Baki-Efendija who had spent the First World war with the Serbian government on Corfu and on the Thessalonica front, was appointed the first mufti. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 95.) However, the appointment of the mufti did little to normalize the situation in the IRC: vakyfs were without protection and some cemeteries and mosques usurped. (*Ibid.*, p. 147.)

78 Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 172.

79 SBNS KSHS, *Redovan saziv za 1921/22*, V, p. 754.

80 *AJ*, F. 398, f. 1; *Rebac*, p. 658; *Pržić, Zaštita*, p. 224; *Radić, Država*, pp. 30-31. Under the new law, the Sharia courts became only departments of district courts. (*AJ*, 74, 75/107.)

81 *Rebac*, p. 659. Ilija Pržić adduced in the early 1930s 263 state imams and 22 muftis paid by the government, as well as 310 khojas paid by vakyfs and the faithful. (*AJ*, F. 398, f. 1.) Three Muslim MPs complained in 1921 to the minister of faiths that imams in the Southern parts had lower wages than beadles and constables, whereas the wages of muftis corresponded to those of beadles. (*AJ*, 69, 53/86.) It is clear that such emoluments couldn't win the Muslim religious officials for the new state.

82 *Radić, Država*, p. 31.

83 *AJ*, 37, 51/315; *Piraku*, *Kulturno-prosvetni pokret*, p. 361; A. Mušović, p. 278. This, however didn't rule out occasional cooperation. (Hrabak, *JMO*, p. 166.)

84 *Ustav Islamske verske zajednice Kraljevine Jugoslavije od 9. avgusta 1930*, in: *Zakonodavstvo o Islamskoj verskoj zajednici Kraljevine Jugoslavije*, Beograd 1932; *Pržić, Zaštita*, p. 225; *Radić, Država*, pp. 31-32.

almost the whole organization of the IRC in the Southern parts was put under state control.<sup>85</sup> The authorities held this for necessary, because, on the one hand, the majority of religious officials of those parts were poorly educated (in terms of knowledge of the “state language” and in general), and on the other, hostile to the Christians and the state.<sup>86</sup> The authorities tried to make these feelings of the Southern Muslims’ leaders innocuous by appointing politically correct and better educated Slavic Muslims of the Sandžak and Bosnia-Herzegovina,<sup>87</sup> but they were met with the resistance of local Albanian and Turkish Muslims.<sup>88</sup>

The tendency of the state to put all religious communities under its control could be observed with all religious communities, but it was most obvious in the case of the Islamic Religious Community. This was not by chance: in terms of numbers it was incomparably weaker than the Roman-Catholic or the Serbia Orthodox Church. Moreover, unlike the former, it could neither count on a strong support from abroad, nor on the forthcoming of the ruling Belgrade circles like the latter. Comparatively poor,<sup>89</sup> organizationally weak and ethnically heterogeneous,<sup>90</sup> with rather uneducated clergy,

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85 This wasn’t achieved without resistance of the Southern Muslims, who were aided in this by those of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Hrabak, JMO, p. 165.)

86 AJ, 69, 49/78; 37, 53/332; 63, 137/x 1923; Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, p. 131; Pirraku, Kulturno prosvetni pokret, p. 361; Limanoski, p. 26. Some IRC officials were accused of overt Italian and Albanian propaganda and even espionage. (AJ, 63 (pov.) 1934, f. 16, 1-300.) Nevertheless, the authorities showed understanding for the low educational level of the IRC officials by making it possible by the Constitution of the IRC that the muftis’ secretaries in the muftidoms of Skopje, Bitola, Prizren, Novi Pazar and Pljevlja remain in service ten years after the Constitution came into force, regardless of their (un)education. (Ustav IVZ, p. 68.) The low level of education of the local Muslims had as a consequence that some of the IRC scribes were Serbs. (AJ, 69, 49/78.)

87 Rebac, p. 659.

88 AJ, 37, 51/315. For their part, the Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina despised the Albanians. (Popovic, La presenza turca, p. 16.)

89 It wouldn’t be wrong to say that the property of the IRC didn’t bear the brunt of the authorities as much as the property of larger religious communities. The reason wasn’t the bigger forthcoming of the state, but the smaller property of the religious community. Complaints at confiscation or destruction of mosques and graveyards, by the very fact that they mentioned individual cases, proves the practice was not so general as the anti-Yugoslav propaganda sometimes would have had it. (AJ, 305, 8/18; 63 (pov.), 1932, f. 11, 1-90; AJ, 69, 53/86; Bajrami, L’oppression, p. 85; Hrabak, Džemijet, p. 34.) The authorities usually claimed the mosques had been taken for another (necessary) purpose or that they had been torn down because they had been so run-down that they were irreparable, whereas part of the property was confiscated since it no longer served a vakyf (endowment) purpose. (AJ, 63 (pov.) 1932, f. 11, 1-90.) There were 636 mosques in Albanian places in the late 1920s. (Avramovski, Prilog pitanju, p. 123.) For the whole of “Southern Serbia” the government adduced the number of 665 mosques in 1935 (Yougoslavie d’aujourd’hui, p. 86), whereas the Banus of the Vardar Province R.D. Trifunović claimed 58 mosques had been built in its territory between 1918 and 1936. (AJ, 66, 22/55.) Pržić speaks about 635 mosques in the Southern parts in the early 1930s. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.) It would be difficult to say how reliable these data are, and how many mosques served predominantly the needs of members of the Albanian and Turkish national minorities.

90 Hasan Rebac wrote about three kinds of Islam in Yugoslavia: the Serbian, Albanian and Turkish. According to him they differed among themselves like the Greek, Serbian and Romanian Orthodoxy. (Rebac, p. 653.)

cut off from its (politically, culturally and economically anyway weak) co-believers by political boundaries and great distance, it became a natural prey to state engineering. When its autonomy was restored by a government decree with the legal force and by the changes of the Constitution of the IRC in February and October 1936 respectively, it was done in order to make the leader of the Bosnian Muslims Mehmed Spaho join the YRC government, and not out of the real conviction on the part of the government, the religious communities needed an autonomy.<sup>91</sup> However, this didn't stop the interference of the state authorities with the internal affairs of the IRC, which was much more overt than in the case of any other religious community.<sup>92</sup> On the other hand, the Albanian leaders were hiding their anti-state activities under the guise of the religious structure of the Muslims,<sup>93</sup> and they used the Vakuf-Mearif Assembly as a political arena,<sup>94</sup> or a means of coming to cushy offices subsidized by the government.<sup>95</sup> Sometimes, however the Reis-ul-Ulema had to intervene in certain cases when life and security of the Muslims was endangered in some places.<sup>96</sup> In other words, due to the general situation in the society and the

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- 91 Radić, *Država*, p. 32; Petranović, I, pp. 277-278. In an analysis of an anonymous activist of the YRC from Skopje, it is said that not only the religious autonomy of the Muslims shouldn't be interfered with, but it should be broadened because "it prevents them from reaching economic prosperity." (AJ, 37, 9/55.)
- 92 AJ, 37, 3/14. The most outstanding example was a (short-lived) appointment of Fevzija Hamzić, an adherent of the YRC as the naib in the Vakuf-Mearif Assembly in 1937. The opposing party was led by Ferhat Bey Draga and Hasan Rebac, and their candidate was Kadri Sali, supported also by the MP Ugrin Joksimović. (AJ, 37, 51/315.) Hamzić resigned in October of the same year, which was the victory of Draga's policy and the defeat of that of the government (obstructed also by parts of the YRC on the spot), that had been pursued also through pressurizing of voters. (Ibid.) At the same time, this was the defeat of the Slavic Muslims by the Albanian and Turkish ones. (AJ, 37, 25/197; 53/334.) Observers saw the elections for the Vakuf-Mearif Assembly as foreboding for the future parliamentary elections. (AJ, 37, 25/197.) The Muslims of Skopje complained in 1936 that although they were more numerous and richer than the Muslims of the Sandžak and Montenegro, they had just one representative in the Vakuf-Mearif Assembly, whereas the latter had ten. (AJ, 37, 54/352.)
- 93 VA, pop. 17, k. 519, f. 3, d. 521. The elections for the Vakuf-Mearif Assembly in 1937 were represented to the masses by some Albanian politicians as a referendum on secession of Kosovo from Yugoslavia and unification with Albania. (AJ, 37, 53/334.) On the other hand, there were cases (for instance at the elections of 1938) when Albanian politicians pursued political agitation through religious slogans. (VA, pop. 17, k. 92, f. 1, d. 2.)
- 94 Thus for example Ferhat Bey Draga managed to be elected chairman of the Vakuf-Mearif Assembly in Skopje and to put his men in other offices. The authorities interpreted this as his wish for continued political activity within a body whose existence was guaranteed by constitution. (VA, pop. 17, k. 92, f. 1, d. 23a.)
- 95 AJ, 37, 51/315.
- 96 Such was the case on the occasion of the elections of 1938 when the gendarmes used hand grenades and rifles against the Albanians in the commune of Galjbulje, because the Albanians refused to vote as ordered by the gendarme sergeant. The incident resulted in casualties and in taking into the woods of a large number of people headed by the MP candidate and a well-known Albanian politician Sherif Voca. The Reis-ul-Ulema begged that the situation be investigated immediately. (AJ, 63 (pov.) 1939, f. 1, 1-150.) Similar interventions occurred already in the 1920s, but only partly due to persecutions of the Southern Muslims. (Purivatra, pp. 71, 90.)

historically inherited situation and position of both the religious communities and national minorities in the South, the IRC couldn't fully function as an autonomous religious community of all Muslims.

The Yugoslav Authorities used the religious reforms in Atatürk's Turkey<sup>97</sup> to point out the propitious situation of the Muslims in Yugoslavia. In that they were supported by the more conservative part of the Islamic clergy.<sup>98</sup> Yugoslavia became the stronghold of the orthodox and conservative Islam between the two world wars.<sup>99</sup> This, however wasn't enough to win the majority of the Muslims for the young state, since many government measures in the field of agrarian policy, education, human rights, everyday life and politics estranged the Muslims.<sup>100</sup>

Numerically and economically even much weaker<sup>101</sup> than the IRC were Protestant religious communities, of which there were several in Yugoslavia. We won't consider here such tiny neo-Protestant communities as the Baptists or the Nazarenes,<sup>102</sup> but rather the traditional Protestant churches – the Lutheran and the Calvinist ones – which had a longer tradition and which comprised the vast majority of the Protestant faithful in the country. What was typical of these churches was that their members, unlike the members of the Roman-Catholic Church and the IRC, were in vast majority members of national minorities: the Germans, Slovaks and Hungarians. They also contained a certain number of Slovenes and a few Croats and Czechs, but due to their non-Yugoslav majority and organizational structure, they had a predominantly minority character.

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97 The caliphate was abolished in the reformed Turkey in 1923, the office of Sheik-ul-Islam (minister of faith and the supreme priest) also, the vakyf funds were confiscated, confessional schools secularized, madrasas were abolished as religious schools, as well as sharia courts, civic code on Swiss model, criminal on Italian and commercial on German model were introduced, dervish orders were abolished and holy graves were shut down as places of pilgrimage, wearing of the zar and fez was prohibited and wearing of Western caps and hats prescribed, Western dances were introduced and in 1928, women were granted the right to vote in local elections, and soon afterwards in the parliamentary ones too. (Lord Kinross, *Atatürk. The Rebirth of a Nation*, London 1966, pp. 385-386, 411-417; H.C. Armstrong, *Kemal paša (Sivi vuk)*, Beograd 1938 (2nd ed.), pp. 335-341, 364-365, 446-447; Kurt Zinke, *Die neue Türkei. Politische Entwicklung 1914-1929*, Stuttgart, Berlin, Leipzig 1930, pp. 387-388, 395, 399.)

98 AJ, 69, 10/24.

99 Gligorijević, *Između pravoslavlja i katoličanstva*, pp. 447-449, 451.

100 One of such measures which cut into the religious customs of the Muslims was enforcement of closure of shops on Sundays, that was implemented in the Southern parts – although it was against the positive regulations. (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1934, f. 16, 1-300.) The Muslims were also estranged by the way the Serbian and Croatian press wrote against Islam and the Muslims. (Ibid.) The Muslims opposed also the imposed celebration of St. Sava, even only as a popular and not ecclesiastical (sic!) holiday. (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1932, f. 11, 1-90.)

101 The leadership of the Evangelical Church lacked money even for the simplest stationary needs in 1922. Pensions for priests and their widows were a great dream. (AJ, 63, 69/97.)

102 About them cf.: Slavko Hranisavljević, *Ostale hrišćanske veroispovesti*, in: *Jubilarni zbornik života i rada SHS*, p. 651. Judging by a list of 251 Nazarenes in prison, the majority were Serbs and Magyars. (AJ, 74, 232/347.) Nazarenes started expanding among the Slovaks too after the First World War. (Jutarnji list, November 3, 1931.)

The Evangelical and the Reformed Churches were developed only in the former Habsburg territories and in Serbia (in Belgrade). Until 1918 they had no unified organization, and this continued, despite the wishes of the Yugoslav authorities, throughout the inter-war period. The Lutherans and Calvinists in the Habsburg Monarchy were divided into organizations in Austria, Hungary and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Lutherans of Styria and Carniola were part of the Austrian Evangelical Church which encompassed both Evangelicals and Reformists. It was founded on synodal-presbyterian principle with some consistorial elements.<sup>103</sup> During the last decades of the Habsburg power Protestantism expanded in (predominantly) German towns of Lower Styria, within the nationalist German movement "Los von Rom" which championed severing ties with Rome claiming Protestantism was the real German religion.<sup>104</sup> At that time, Evangelical religious communes were founded in Celje, Maribor etc, which, although numerically small, exercised disproportionate social and economic influence thanks to the social status of their members.<sup>105</sup> These communes, like those in Bosnia, Zagreb and Belgrade, were bi-confessional, i.e. they united believers of Augsburg (Lutheran) and Helvetian (Calvinist) confessions.<sup>106</sup> After the First World War some of these communes were weakened due to emigration of part of their members, but they continued playing an important, often even leading, role in the national movement of the local Germans.

However, the vast majority of the Protestants in Yugoslavia stemmed from the Montan District of the Hungarian Evangelical Church which comprised Croatian-Slavonian, Bačka, Syrmium and Banat seniorities. It did comprise Calvinists too, but ecclesiastical communes were mono-confessional. Unlike the German model on which the Austrian Evangelical Church was organized, the Hungarian one was organized on the Württemberg, and particularly on the Swiss model with synodal-presbyterian structure in which the main role was played by communes and which was headed by a lay General Inspector elected for life. Because the vast majority of the Protestant faithful stemmed from the Hungarian Evangelical Church, the influence of its institutions on the Evangelical churches in Yugoslavia after the First World War was very strong.<sup>107</sup>

The development of the Evangelical Church in Bosnia was yet different. Not only were the Protestants of Bosnia-Herzegovina the youngest branch of traditional Protestantism in Yugoslavia, but their communes had a somewhat different organizational history. Scattered, they functioned independently for a long time, only to be

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103 Balduin Saria, *Die Gründung der Deutschen evangelisch-christlichen Kirche A.B. im Königreich Jugoslawien*, Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft, VII, 1960, p. 267; Georg Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche in Jugoslawien 1918-1941*, München 1980, p. 60.

104 Thus the Evangelical community in Maribor was founded in 1862. Until 1914 it reached the number of cca. 3000 members. After the First World War it dwindled to 1000 due to emigration. (*Mariborer Zeitung*, December 10, 1932; Žnidarič, p. 226.) The reason of conversion was often the use of the language in the church service and they occurred also during the first years after the First World War. (*Kölnische Volkszeitung*, August 21, 1932.)

105 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 50.

106 Balduin Saria, *Die Gründung*, pp. 264-265.

107 *Ibid.*, pp. 266-267; Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche* pp. 55-58. Such organizational structure, among other things, presupposed also strong influence of the laymen, who participated on equal footing in running the church.

united in 1909 into the United Evangelical Parochial Communes of Bosnia-Herzegovina (or colloquially the Bosnian Synod). In 1916 the Bosnian communes passed a Constitution in five articles, the last of which contained a peculiar provision that the Sarajevo parson Johann Ludwig Schäfer would be the life-long chairman of the Bosnian Synod - which remained in force even after his death!<sup>108</sup> The Evangelical commune in Belgrade was founded with Prussian aid in 1855 and it got its Constitution in 1907.<sup>109</sup>

Apart from having such a motley organizational tradition and confessional division (177,000 Lutherans and some 60,000 Calvinists), the Protestants in the new state were characterized also by ethnic diversity. Among the Evangelicals, there were some 102,000 Germans, some 52,000 Slovaks and around 22,000 Slovenes and a few Hungarians. The Reformed were in their majority of Hungarian nationality with some 15,000 Germans and a very few Croats from the village of Tordinci – a quaint last remnant of the quenched Croatian Protestantism – as well as the Czechs in Uljanik.<sup>110</sup> The relations between members of these peoples within common churches were not always idyllic.<sup>111</sup>

The break-up of the Habsburg Empire was followed by the break-up of the Evangelical ecclesiastical organizations in its territory. Unlike the Roman-Catholic Church that had always been international and which always adjusted the borders of its dioceses with the state ones with much difficulty, the more flexible Protestants, with their tradition of local churches, reconciled themselves quickly with the new situation and buckled down to found a new ecclesiastical organization for the new state. Slovenian communes (10) of the Prekmurje Seniorate of the Hungarian Evangelical Church, seceded from it and formed their own seniorate on June 19, 1919.<sup>112</sup> Some ten days later, the three German Evangelical communes (Maribor, Celje and Ljubljana) seceded with their affiliations from the Austrian Evangelical Church and formed the Seniorate of the Evangelical Communes in Slovenia.<sup>113</sup>

Seniorates seceded also from the Hungarian Evangelical Church in the territory that fell to Yugoslavia, i.e. they were divided in accordance with the new state frontiers. Five communes with five affiliations and three preaching stations were united into the new, Upper-Croatian Seniorate comprising some 6,000 Germans, 600

108 AJ, 69, 62/99; Saria, *Die Gründung*, pp. 264-265; Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche* pp. 67-68; Hoffmann, p. 31; Kraljačić, *Kolonizacija*, p. 123. The first draft of the Constitution which didn't foresee Schäfer's life-long tenure see in: AIDGL, HA 1327.

109 Saria, *Die Gründung*, pp. 265; Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche* p. 65.

110 Daniel Kern, *Die Reformierte Kirche im Königreich Jugoslawien 1918-1941 und Südungarn 1941-1944*, in: Roland Vetter (ed.), *Keine bleibende Stadt. Beiträge zur Geschichte deutscher Protestanten aus Jugoslawien*, s.l. 1990, p. 103; Saria *Die Gründung*, pp. 263-264; Gerhard May, *Die Reformierte Kirche in Südslawien (Jugoslawien)*, in: Georg Wild (ed.), *Franz Hamm. Festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag*, München 1981, p. 39. Somewhat different figures are adduced by Slavko Hranisavljević: 93.849 Germans, 54.884 Slovaks and 23.147 Slovenes. (Hranisavljević, p. 647.)

111 This concerned particularly the relations between the Germans and the Slovaks where struggle for dominance or tendency to separate occurred in several places since the last third of the 19th century. (Krajčović, p. 208; Haller, *Die Entstehung der deutschen Tochter-siedlungen*, p. 243; Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen in Syrmien, Slawonien, Kroatien und Bosnien*, p. 142.)

112 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche* pp. 53, 70; Saria, *Die Gründund*, p. 268.

113 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 50, 70.

Hungarians and 400 Slovaks.<sup>114</sup> The first step towards founding a new common Evangelical church in the new state was made by convening a conference in Novo Selo by Vinkovci on September 14-15, 1920. Representatives of all Protestant ecclesiastical organizations of the new state were present, including the Macedonian Baptists. The main topic of the talks was to be unification of all Protestant churches in the country, but it couldn't be achieved due to diverging religious and national tendencies. The Macedonian Baptists were not interested in unification but in support for their separatism, whereas representatives of the Reformed Church rejected the union with the Lutherans and left the assembly already on the first day.<sup>115</sup> The common Evangelical church was the wish of the authorities,<sup>116</sup> but also of the German Evangelicals, who on their part wanted no union with the Baptists. The Slovaks shared similar views on the organization of the church, but due to national mistrust final agreement couldn't be reached. Nevertheless, they agreed that they wanted a common church and they elected several committees to run the ecclesiastical affairs and prepare the unification. They were to be supervised by a common Managing Committee of 12 members, headed by Adam Vereš, who was also recognized by the government.<sup>117</sup>

The unification of various seniorates didn't augur well because of the separatist tendencies that had made themselves manifest even before the conference in Novo Selo, as well as after it. Already on August 24, ten Slovak communes stepped out of the Bačka Seniorate and set up one of their own. Five Slovak communes of the Banat did the same on October 27. In late March of the next year the same thing happened in the Croatian-Slavonian Seniorate. The fate of the would-be common church was to all intents sealed on June 27, 1921 when the three Slovak seniorates were united into a separate ecclesiastical district, headed by the former senior of the Bačka, Samuel Štarke as the diocesan administrator and the former senior superintendent of Syrmium, Dr. Cyril Abaffy as a vicar of the district superintendent.<sup>118</sup>

This was the beginning of the Slovak Evangelical Church that continued to be built at the district convents in mid-1925 and meetings of the Synod in late October 1925, in December 1926 and in March 1928, as well as at the elections for the District Representation on January 3, 1929.<sup>119</sup> The Slovak Evangelical Christian Church of Augsburg Confession in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (*Slovenská evanjelická kerstanska cirkev augšburgskeho vyznania v Kralóvstve Juhoslávskom*)

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114 Ibid., p. 71.

115 Vereš (ur.), p. 8.

116 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 73, 97.

117 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 72-74; Vereš (ed.) p. 8. The Germans were the majority in the Managing Committee, although its chief was a Slovak. (AJ, 69, 62/99.) Vereš became the spiritual head of the Slovak Evangelical Church later on, succeeded by Samuel Štarke in 1933. (*Slovenski denik*, May 3, 1933.)

118 At first they didn't sever all ties with other Evangelicals, but only repudiated the decisions from Novo Selo. They claimed they recognized the Managing Committee which remained in formal existence until July 1923. (Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 74-75; Vereš (ed.), p. 8; Saria, *Die Gründung*, p. 270.) Hranisavljević adduces June 30, 1921 as the date of the Slovak secession. (Hranisavljević, p. 647.)

119 Vereš (ed.), pp. 8, 15.

got its final shape by the law that was passed on it on April 28, 1930 and by its Constitution.<sup>120</sup>

Entreaties for unity of the common Managing Committee had failed, and soon after the Slovak separation a discussion was initiated about the Committee's legitimacy (disputed by the Slovaks), which ended by the conclusion (tabled by the Germans) that it should remain in existence as a common administrative organ.<sup>121</sup>

Nevertheless, the separatist tendencies, this time of the Germans, continued, so that representatives of the 7 non-Slovak seniorates (one of them Slovenian) decided at a meeting on November 21, 1921, to found a new Managing Committee with spiritual and secular representatives of all seniorates. Similar was the decision of a meeting on December 7, which concluded that the old Managing Committee no longer existed and that a new one should be formed. This was somewhat mitigated later on by the concession that the Managing Committee did exist, but it was said, it didn't represent the Germans and Slovaks.<sup>122</sup> Finally, on June 2, 1923 an assembly was convened in Novi Sad at which representatives from 70 communes of 8 non-Slovak seniorates gathered. The Slovenian, Bosnian and Belgrade seniorates were confessionally mixed, but they agreed to accept the common decisions. The main one concerned the unification of all seniorates into the Evangelical District of the Augsburg Confession in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes<sup>123</sup> with a (temporary) District Church Council that was to run the Church between the district convents.<sup>124</sup> The authorities recognized the creation of the Evangelical District on March 12, 1924.<sup>125</sup> Although there were initiatives for the unification of the two Evangelical Churches later on too,<sup>126</sup> it never came about due to continuous squabbles on the local level, so that the Law on the Protestant Churches of April 16, 1930 (in whose

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120 Vereš (ed.), p. 17. Despite its name, the Slovak Evangelical Church wasn't purely Slovak. Due to circumstances a number of ethnically mixed communes remained within it. From one of them in Veliki Bečkerek, after protracted squabbling and recriminations for hegemonism, the Germans and Magyars separated in 1932. (Matthias Merkle, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche im Banat*, in: Roland Vetter (ed.), *Keine bleibende Stadt. Beiträge zur Geschichte deutscher Protestanten aus Jugoslawien*, s.l. 1990, p. 29; Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 169; Aleksandar Stanojlov (ed.), *Petrovgrad, Petrovgrad 1938*, p. 139; *Jugoslovenski dnevnik*, August 30, 1932; *Novosti*, November 9, 1932.) National tensions occurred in Vojlovica too, where the Slovaks seceded in 1923, accusing the Germans that they had wanted to impose their priest. (Vereš (ed.), p. 182.)

121 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 75.

122 Ibid., p. 77.

123 Hranisavljević, p. 648. The German name was allegedly imposed on this organization by the authorities in the process of making the law on Protestant denominations, ostensibly in order to alienate the Slovenes. (Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 101, 105.) According to Saria, the Germans didn't want to shut the door for an eventual co-operation. (Saria, *Die Gründung*, pp. 271-273.)

124 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 77-78, 86. The Slovenian seniorate decided to join the German ones already in February 1922. Vereš explains that by the fact Slovenian priests had allegedly been Hungarians and Magyarones (Vereš (ed.), pp. 14-15.), although it is not clear why this would be the reason for the Slovenes to join the Germans?!? The Slovaks repeatedly tried to win over the Slovenes, but always to no avail. (Saria, *Die Gründung*, p. 274.)

125 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 86.

126 Ibid., pp. 133-135; Saria *Die Gründung*, p. 276.



preparation representatives of the Protestant Churches also collaborated)<sup>127</sup> legalized such a state of affairs, recognizing a German and a Slovak Evangelical Church (but leaving the door open for an eventual merger in the future), as well as a Reformed Church. The Law foresaw quite strong government supervision, but in practice it granted considerable autonomy to these Churches, including the right to use the mother-tongue within the church and the possibility of founding separate seniorates for members of peoples who were a minority within a Church.<sup>128</sup> Like in the case of the Slovaks, the organization of the German Evangelical Church was crowned by passing the Constitution that was under Hungarian (i.e. Swiss) democratic influence, which provided for a large role of communes and equal participation of laymen in the administration of the Church.<sup>129</sup> The Zagreb senior Dr. Philip Popp came to the helm, firstly as the bishop-administrator, and from 1931 as the bishop,<sup>130</sup> who, thanks to his tact and skill to remain on good terms with everyone, improved the relations between the Church and the state,<sup>131</sup> managed to become a *persona grata* on the Belgrade court,<sup>132</sup> maintaining at the same time good contacts with the Croatian elite in Zagreb and Lutheran circles in Germany.<sup>133</sup> The German Evangelical Church had 8 seniorates with 58 German, 8 Slovenian, 2 Slovenian-Hungarian and 2 German-Hungarian parishes in 1935.<sup>134</sup> Its Slovak counterpart had 3 seniorates and 25 parishes.<sup>135</sup>

The third Protestant Church in the Yugoslav territory was the Reformed Church. It was formally founded in Sombor on June 21, 1922 by 52 Calvinist communes, when Peter Klepp from Torža was elected senior.<sup>136</sup> The Church was divided into four conseniorates: the Baranya, Bačka, Banat and Croatian-Slavonian,<sup>137</sup> whereas the Protestant Law of 1930 divided it into the Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern Church areas. The first three were considered Hungarian, and the last mentioned one German.<sup>138</sup> The Church vehemently opposed the attempts of the government to unite it with the two Lutheran Churches, and it was only the Calvinists of Slovenia and Bosnia who, in keeping with the old tradition, joined the German Evangelical Church.<sup>139</sup> Like the two Lutheran Churches, it adopted the Constitution in July 1933 which introduced the division of seniorates as prescribed by the Protestant Law, as

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127 Kern, p. 112.

128 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 98-103.

129 *Ibid.*, p. 105-109.

130 Wilhelm Roth became the secular chairman. (PA, Abt. IIb, Religion- und Kirchenwesen, Politik 16, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.)

131 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 130.

132 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 175; Saria, *Die Gründung*, p. 279.

133 PA, Abt. IIb, Religion- und Kirchenwesen, Politik 16, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 158-161, 175, 186.

134 *Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui*, p. 213.

135 *Ibid.*, p. 214.

136 AJ, 69, 63/102. The election of Klepp testifies in a way to the slipping of leadership from the hands of the Magyars into the hands of the (to be sure Hungarian-friendly) Germans. (May, p. 45.)

137 AJ, 69, 63/102; Hranisavljević, p. 650.

138 Kern, p. 108. According to May, it was the trick of the Magyarized Germans who by creating a German church area prevented the separation of the nationally conscious Germans and their unification with the German Evangelical Church. (May, p. 45.)

139 Kern, p. 112.

well as the presbyterial-synodal organization and the unity of the communes. Supreme senior Agoston Sandor was given the title of bishop.<sup>140</sup> His person was the formal reason for which the Germans threatened with secession in late 1940: he was allegedly a friend of the Jews and spoke neither German nor Serbian. They proposed the pro-German Lajos Horvath as his successor,<sup>141</sup> and in case their demand wasn't met, they threatened secession.<sup>142</sup> This was in keeping with the increased self-assertiveness of the Yugoslav Germans on the eve of the Second World War and immediately after the first German victories in it. In the changed situation in Europe and in the country, the Hungarian clergy consented to the division of the Church on February 3, 1941.<sup>143</sup> In 1935 the Reformed Church had 4 seniorates with 38 Hungarian, 12 German, one Croat and one Czech congregations.<sup>144</sup>

All three Protestant Churches, despite their national and organizational differences, shared a number of common characteristics and problems, which made their position somewhat similar. Not even the Slovak Evangelical Church could boast of special treatment at the hands of the Slavic state.<sup>145</sup> However, that treatment of the Protestant Churches, on the whole, wasn't bad, especially after the Law on Protestant Religious Communities had been passed.<sup>146</sup> Although they were financially somewhat neglected, just like the Roman-Catholic Church, unlike the latter they were perceived as the less dangerous adversaries by the authorities, which made greater forthcoming possible.<sup>147</sup>

The three Protestant Churches had the main reason for discontent because of confiscation of schools and insufficient influence on religious instruction<sup>148</sup> (especially until the Law on Primary Schools had been passed, introducing mandatory religious instruction imparted by priests of respective denominations according to plans made

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140 Kern, pp. 114-115. Agoston was expelled from the country in early 1927, although he was a Yugoslav citizen. It turned out, it hadn't been done at the order of the Ministry of the Interior. (AJ, 69, 63/101.) Obviously, it was some kind of conflict with the lower authorities. It was probably also the reason he couldn't get a passport the next year. (Ibid.)

141 According to some accusations he was noted for anti-state activities in 1926. (AJ, 69, 63/101.)

142 VA, pop. 17, k. 528, f. 2, d. 42.

143 AJ, 74, 9/17.

144 Yougoslavie d'aujourd'hui, p. 214. The Czech parish existed in Veliko Središte in the Banat and its believers complained in 1925 of their priest, a Magyarized Slovene from Prekmurje who succeeded the deceased Czech parson. They demanded to bring a priest from Bohemia, which the leadership of the Church didn't refuse in principle. (AJ, 69, 63/109.) It is obvious from this that the Reformed Church wasn't spared the national tensions either, even before the Germans came forward with their demands in the late 1930s.

145 The leaders of the Slovak Evangelical Church expected that the Slovaks "should have priority "in the Slav state, and not that they "would remain back", but the powers-that-be adopted a more balanced attitude. (AJ, 69, 62/97.) The leaders of the Slovak Evangelical Church even complained their Church received less money than its German counterpart. (Narodna jednota, September 19, 1931.) There were also complaints that the authorities didn't answer official letters of the Slovak Evangelical Church, as well as that hundreds of petitions yielded no results. (AJ, 69, 62/99; 62/98.)

146 Wild, Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche, pp. 143, 343; Merkle, p. 31; Saria Die Gründung, p. 278.

147 Saria, Die Gründung, p. 278; Macartney, Hungary and her Successors, p. 424.

148 AJ, 69, 63/102; 62/99; 74, 75/100; May, p. 43; Wild, pp. 88, 90.

in cooperation with the Ministries of Education and Churches).<sup>149</sup> However, other religious communities complained about the same thing. As in case of the minority Roman-Catholic priests, the Evangelical and Reformed ones were also in short supply. As a rule, the clergy was poorly paid.<sup>150</sup> Furthermore, many of them didn't want to serve in poor and scattered parishes where the life of priests was as hard as that of their flock.<sup>151</sup> The poverty of both ecclesiastical communes and priests and the Church as a whole,<sup>152</sup> was a serious hindrance that made more difficult any kind of activity, and coupled with other factors, caused a chronic lack of priests, which was only for smaller part covered by bringing clergy from abroad.<sup>153</sup>

Wishing to sever spiritual ties between the Calvinists in Yugoslavia and Hungary, the authorities didn't allow clerical studies in Hungary, but they sent Reformed theology students either to Cluj or to the West.<sup>154</sup> The Evangelical theology students could, on the other hand, study in Germany, Slovakia, Austria, Switzerland or elsewhere abroad, since there was no Evangelical theological faculty in the country.<sup>155</sup> In that way the Protestant Churches in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia remained in touch with the streams of modern Protestantism. That connection existed also through the aid they received from various Protestant associations abroad, as well as through their membership in some of the world associations of Protestant Churches.<sup>156</sup> Because of

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149 Nevertheless the law didn't make possible religious instruction in all kinds of schools, and it stipulated that those imparting it had to know the official language, which usually wasn't the case with the Reformed ministers. (Kern, p. 128.) The state didn't pay the rent regularly for the school buildings it used.

150 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 259; Kern, p. 108.

151 Kern, p. 108, 123. There were reformed priests who themselves had to till the priest's field or even to work as day-laboureres. (Kern, p. 123.)

152 Occasional additional state subsidies failed to substantially improve the material conditions of the Protestant Churches. (AJ, 69, 62/99.)

153 AJ, 69, 62/99; 62/98; 63/102; SBNS KSHS, Redovan saziv za 1927/28, IV, p. 194. In early 1930s the Reformed Church had 28 ministers, 9 auxiliary ministers, 9 levites and 8 communes had to share priests with other communes. (May, p. 42.) The German Evangelical Church, on the contrary, had filled the necessary number of priests in 1935, so that theology studies were not encouraged in the next two years. (Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 179.)

154 Kern, p. 119; May, p. 42; Hranisavljević, p. 649. The Hungarian, pro-government Pester Lloyd wrote in the early 1930s that there had been 54 Reformed parishes in Yugoslavia, 28 of which remained without priests, since the authorities allegedly prevented the education of the necessary substitutes. (Pester Lloyd, January 15, 1930.) We didn't find proofs for such a radical attitude of the authorities toward the education of the Calvinist clerical junior staff. On the other hand, studying in Cluj was a bit absurd from the government's point of view, because although that town was in the allied Romania, students could just as well be infected by Hungarian nationalist spirit there, as in Debrecen or somewhere else in Hungary.

155 AJ, 69, 62/99.

156 Thus for instance, the Reformed Church was member of the World Alliance of Presbyterians. (Kern, p. 116.) The District Convent of the German Evangelical Church decided in 1929 that it would join the International Union for Defense and Furthering of Protestantism, and the cooperation with the Evangelical Church in Germany and other Protestant churches was also developed. (Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 90, 153, 159, 173, 175.)

poverty,<sup>157</sup> of the three Churches, the property of which was rather scarce, the ties with associations abroad were not only important for remaining in touch with theological streams, but also for the material aid which alone could help some ecclesiastical communes survive.<sup>158</sup>

From the national point of view, the Protestant Churches were of great importance for national preservation of their faithful. This was clear already in the days of the Habsburg Empire. Although the Hungarian Evangelical Church, like all institutions in the country, also showed Magyarizing tendencies,<sup>159</sup> national minorities managed to preserve themselves better within its framework<sup>160</sup> thanks to the tradition of literacy in the mother-tongue and the reading of the Bible.<sup>161</sup> For this reason, it was not by chance that a considerable number of German national leaders stemmed from among the Protestants,<sup>162</sup> and that the Slovaks in the Vojvodina were nationally more awake than their partly Roman-Catholic co-nationals in Slovakia.<sup>163</sup> As for the Hungarian Calvinists, they traditionally considered themselves the best of Magyars.<sup>164</sup> By imparting religious instruction in the mother-tongue, church service and even by literacy courses sometimes organized

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- 157 Poverty was so great that it caused the clergy to despair. (Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 251.)
- 158 AIDGL, HA, 1327; Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 131, 133, 137, 152, 163, 209; May, p. 42; Saria, *Die Gründung*, p. 281. Aid was coming from the USA, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany. The main donor was the association for helping the Protestant Diaspora, the Gustav Adolf Verein from Germany. (On it cf.: Hermann Wolfgang Beyer, *Die Geschichte des Gustav Adolf-Vereins in ihren kirchlichen und geistesgeschichtlichen Zusammenhängen*, Göttingen 1932.) Despite substantial help it supplied, it was often under attack from German nationalists who disliked its narrow confessional activity and the name of the Swedish king who had striven to destroy the First German Reich. (Altgeyer, p. 65.) In 1931 it was decided to found a Yugoslav branch of the Gustav Adolf Verein. (*Morgenblatt*, September 24, 1931.) On the other hand, the Slovak Evangelical Church hesitated long to ask foreign donors for financial aid, but when it wasn't forthcoming from the state, taking the example of the German Evangelical Church which asked for and received money from abroad, the Slovak evangelical Church also decided to take that step in 1926. (AJ, 69, 62/99.)
- 159 Hungarian influence was sometimes felt among the Slovaks even after 1918. (Vereš (ed.), p. 122.) On the other hand, the nationally conscious Slovaks used the opportunity to get rid of that influence. Thus the Slovaks from Padina demanded in 1921 that the local Hungarian priest "who had been poisoning the Slovaks with Hungarianism for 30 years" and who had denounced the Slovak intelligentsia, be expelled across the demarcation line. (AJ, 69, 62/98.)
- 160 AJ, F. 398, f. 1.
- 161 The not very numerous Roman-Catholic Slovaks in the Vojvodina were mostly Magyarized, unlike the Evangelicals. The same held true of a large number of Magyarized German Catholics, as opposed to nationally more aware German Protestants.
- 162 The Evangelical priest Karl Goszner from Nova Pazova was the head of the local branch of the Kulturbund, and for this he was suspended by the Ministry of Faiths in early 1922. (AJ, 69, 62/98.)
- 163 Siracki, *Slovaci u Vojvodini*, p. 117; Macartney, *Hungary and her Successors*, p. 389; Gottas, p. 359.
- 164 AJ, F. 398, f. 1. The German Calvinists stated awakening nationally only after the First World War, so that some even stated thinking about secession from the Reformed Church. (May, p. 45.)

by the Protestant churches in order to enable their believers to follow the church service and to read the Bible,<sup>165</sup> they performed a very important function in preserving the national identity, in a way the Roman-Catholic Church and the Islamic Religious Community couldn't and wouldn't do. For these reasons the national role of these Churches was top-grade, despite the fact that actually all of them (including the Slovak Evangelical Church) were more or less multi-ethnic: the autonomy of ecclesiastical communes and the internal organization of the Churches created also possibilities for national organizing within the Church such as other religious communities didn't allow – this being in keeping with the more liberal spirit of Protestantism.

The national character of the state, but also the ethnic make-up of the Protestant Churches sometimes led to conflicts with the authorities. The refusal to celebrate St. Cyril and St. Methodius, and St. Sava, various thanksgivings and requiems<sup>166</sup> was excused by some priests by nonexistence of the veneration of saints and requiems in Protestantism, although the powers-that-be saw nationalist reasons behind this subterfuge. On the other hand, the authorities sometimes prohibited their employees to celebrate some protestant holidays although they had the legal right to do so.<sup>167</sup> Some Evangelical ministers, particularly German ones, were suspected as heralds of foreign propaganda, or even espionage.<sup>168</sup> There were also examples of Reformed Hungarian ministers suspected of irredentism.<sup>169</sup> In the case of the German Evangelical Church during the 1930s, it was obvious it was

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165 Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 132. The Reformed Church organized even Sunday schools for a while with that aim. It managed to overcome the mistrust of the authorities thanks to the aid of the Serbian Orthodox Church. (May, p. 44.)

166 AJ, 69, 63/101; 62/99; 62/98; Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 91. Sometimes the celebration of St. Peter's Day, that had been declared a state holiday, was also disputed. (AJ, 69, 62/99.) On the other hand, the Slovaks accepted without demur the celebration of the Serbian national holiday, St. Vitus Day. (AJ, 69, 62/99.) By imposing celebrations of these holidays the state authorities clearly stressed the Slavic character of the state, whit which the Slovaks naturally reconciled themselves much more readily than the Germans and Hungarians. However, the ever tactical bishop Popp, called in a circular letter in 1935 on his clergy to commemorate the year of St. Sava, saying that he (St. Sava) had been for the Serbs what Luther had been for the Germans, reminding them of the very good relations between the German Evangelical Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church. (AJ, 63 (pov.), 1935, f. 22, 1-161.)

167 AV, 126/IV, 43467/1938; 54768/938. It can't be ruled out that the reasons were rather ignorance than ill will.

168 AJ, 69, 62/98; 14, 66/216; AV, 126/IV, 15755/31; *Aprilski rat*, p. 748. However, on the eve of the April War, there were certain German Evangelical priests who were not to the liking of the Volksgruppenführer Janko: a case in point was the respected Wilhelm Kundt from Pančevo, whose "sin" was that he had been the member of the Rotary Club. (VA, pop. 17, k. 528, f. 1, d. 46.) In Prekmurje the authorities observed with dissatisfaction the influence of Hungarian and Magyarized Evangelical clergy in the first years after the First World War. (AJ, 69, 62/98.)

169 AJ, 69, 63/101; VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 1, d. 2. In the opinion of inspector Rakočević, all Reformed priests were adversely disposed toward the state in early 1922. (AJ, 69, 7/15.)

subject to influence from the Reich,<sup>170</sup> although its chief, bishop Popp, managed to retain good relations with the Yugoslav authorities until the end.<sup>171</sup>

All three Protestant churches had their mouthpieces: the Reformed Church published the monthly *Magvető* in Hungarian in 3,000 copies, and the journal of the same name but in German, the *Säemann*, in 800 copies.<sup>172</sup> The Slovak Evangelical Church published *Evanjeličky hlasnik*,<sup>173</sup> whereas the German Evangelical Church had several journals.<sup>174</sup>

Apart from these, there were also two religious communities with practically mono-ethnic membership: the Uniate Church and the Romanian Orthodox Church, i.e. that part of the Caransebeş bishopric that remained within Yugoslavia after the new borders had been drawn.

The Greek-Catholic (or Uniate) Church came into being through acceptance of the union with Roman-Catholic Church of part of the Orthodox Ukrainians, through the so-called Unions of Brest-Litovsk and Uzhgorod in 1596 and 1648 respectively.<sup>175</sup> Their co-nationals in the Yugoslav lands, usually known as the Ruthenians, have come to their new homeland mostly as Uniates, and partly as Orthodox.<sup>176</sup> Apart from them, a small number of Serbs and some Macedonians (desirous of separating themselves from the Serbs and Greeks) also accepted the union. The head of the Uniates in greater part of what would become Yugoslavia in 1918 was the bishop of Križevci.<sup>177</sup> This post was held by Julije Dobrecki until 1917, when he was replaced by the Ruthenian Dionisije Njaradi who became the apostolic administrator. He enjoyed the support of the Yugoslav government, Croatian authorities and the Roman-Catholic Church in the country after 1918. This brought him the title of the bishop on March 20, 1920, and on October 19, 1923 all Uniates in the Kingdom came under his jurisdiction. The sole exception were the Greek-Catholics in Bosnia-Herzegovina who had an apostolic administrator of

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170 Barić, pp. 451-452. The resistance that occurred through the youth activities was weaker than among the Roman-Catholics. (Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 325.) On the other hand, Popp visited Hitler on February 22, 1934, and in 1935 three of his priests attended the annual congress of the Nazi party. (Wild *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, pp. 186, 191.) Bishop Popp knew how to approach the Nazis in the 1930s, adopting also the Nazi salute "Heil!" with the uplifted right arm. (HDA, BV BH – kabinet bana, kut. 62, 72213/40; Barić, p. 445.) All this was in accordance with the greater amenability of the Evangelical Church in Germany to National-Socialism. (Cf. Grunberger, p. 485.)

171 Barić, p. 452. Popp even made good propaganda for the Yugoslav regime in the Protestant countries of Scandinavia and elsewhere. (AJ, 382, 4/9.) His adulation to the regime sometimes passed beyond the good taste (AJ, 74, 196/280.) and his servility wasn't approved of by all the Volksdeutsche either. (PA, Abt. IIb, Religion/ und Kirchenwesen, Politik 16, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.)

172 May, p. 44.

173 AJ, F. 398. f. 1.

174 Bešlin, *Vesnik*, pp. 169-181; Wild, *Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche*, p. 152.

175 Kostelnik, *Prilog*, 133.

176 Ibid.

177 The Greek-Catholics in the future Yugoslav territory had been subject to the archbishopric of Kalocsa until 1777, and ever since to the Uniate bishopric of Križevci. (Jeremić, p. 8.)

their own.<sup>178</sup> It is interesting to note that the Vatican subjected all Greek-Catholics to Njaradi, although several limitrophe parishes had been cut into two by the new state borders.<sup>179</sup> In that way the Vatican certainly wanted to strengthen the Uniate Church and fortify the position of its bishop. His diocese had some 60,000 faithful (the vast majority of them Ruthenians) and 51 priests, whereas ten parishes were vacant.<sup>180</sup> The clergy had a university degree obtained either in Zagreb or at the Collegium ruthenicum in Rome.<sup>181</sup>

It may freely be said that no other religious community or its clergy played such an important role for a national minority in the inter-war Yugoslavia, as was the case with the Uniate Church for the Ruthenians.<sup>182</sup> The Uniate clergy was the largest and the most important part of the Ruthenian intelligentsia and it was the main factor not only in the religious, but also in the cultural life of the Ruthenians.<sup>183</sup> The Ruthenian priests were also behind the leading Ruthenian cultural organization, the "Prosvita" and its journal. Typical of it was conservatism, nationalism,<sup>184</sup> and at the same time Hungarian-friendliness and intolerance of Orthodoxy. Considerable part of the Ruthenian clergy belonged to the extreme nationalist Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists which sided with the Nazis during the Second World War.<sup>185</sup> Such very conservative views of the Uniate clergy spurred the left-wing intellectuals to start promoting the return to the Orthodox Church. Although some 100 families converted, the Serbian Orthodox Church didn't lend its support to this movement.<sup>186</sup> For his part, the bishop Njarady energetically opposed the tendency of returning to the Orthodoxy.<sup>187</sup> Throughout the inter-war period the Greek-Catholic Church remained the main prop of the Ruthenian national life, just as it had been until 1918. This was the consequence of poverty, underdevelopment and insufficient stratification of the Ruthenian society which had no middle class (including a larger lay intelligentsia) worth mentioning. Under such circumstances, the importance of the Church for this national minority surpassed the role religious communities played among most other national minorities.

The Church played a similar role with another national minority, which had a rather similar social make-up to that of the Ruthenians – with the Romanians in the Banat. Just like the Ruthenians, they belonged to the oppressed peoples of the

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178 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, pp. 130-131; Idem, *Rimokatolička crkva*, p. 184. There were three Uniate parishes in Bosnia: Prnjavor, Derventa and Dubrava. (Kraljačić, *Kolonizacija*, p. 123.)

179 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, pp. 131-132.

180 Ibid., p. 133.

181 Jeremić, p. 8.

182 The Ruthenians called the Greek-Catholic religion the "Russian [i.e. Ruthenian] religion". (Jeremić, p. 3.)

183 Strehaljuk, pp. 84, 89. The main national holidays of the Ruthenians were the "kirvajs" (anniversaries of the consecration of churches). (Vranešević, pp. 237, 241.)

184 The Uniate clergy in Bosnia agitated against the Poles. (Drljača, Marija Dombrovska, p.135.)

185 Biljnja, *Rusini*, pp. 45-46, 58-60, 79-83.

186 Ibid., pp. 63, 86-87; Jeremić, p. 7; Gaćeša, *Rusini*, p. 355; Busuladžić, p. 180. (Gaćeša claims the Serbian Orthodox Church (like the Roman-Catholic one) used the fact that the Uniate Church received no state subsidies to encourage conversion to Orthodoxy, although indirectly.)

187 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, p. 131.

Habsburg Monarchy, and just like the Ruthenians (at least in the Western Banat) couldn't boast a stronger bourgeoisie or lay intelligentsia, not to mention the nobility. Under such circumstances, the Church and the clergy took over many roles played by members of other strata in the more developed societies.<sup>188</sup> We have already seen that the leaders of the Romanian Party had been priests for the large part,<sup>189</sup> as well as that they had headed Romanian cultural and economic associations.<sup>190</sup>

The problems caused by the separation of the Romanian Metropolis from the Carlowitz one in 1864, were not over by 1918, because the process of division of ecclesiastical communes, monasteries and their property went on.<sup>191</sup> This spoiled the relations between the Serbian and Romanian churches, but also those of the two peoples at the turn of the century.<sup>192</sup> The question to whom the Banat would belong after the First World War marred the relations further, and the drawing of the border created new problems in the ecclesiastical field. For these reasons, the matter of the Romanian Orthodox Church, i.e. of that part of the Caransebeş bishopric which had remained in the Yugoslav part of the Banat, was, together with the negotiations about the concordat with the Vatican, the only question of a religious community that was solved primarily through negotiations with a foreign country, and not in the direct interaction between the Yugoslav state and a respective religious community within the country. In that way the Romanian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia gained the importance that was disproportionate to the number of its faithful and clergy and its property. The negotiations about the solution of the ecclesiastical question were coupled with those about schools (as already mentioned), as an addition to the contract of alliance between the two countries. The negotiations were led on several occasions, and were equally difficult like those about schools.<sup>193</sup> The Romanian side proposed the foundation of vicariates, but the Yugoslav side refused it quoting the

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188 According to the official Yugoslav data, there were 45 Romanian priests in the early 1930s, and each of them allegedly had a plot of 32 morgen, whereas the Church communes had plots of 100 morgen. (AJ, F. 398, f. 1.)

189 AJ, 69, 8/18; Popi, Formiranje, p. 327.

190 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/185; Popi, Formiranje, p. 21. Such broad activity of the Romanian priests caused many to be entangled and compromised in various scandals, which diminished their respectability in the eyes of the Romanian peasantry. (AJ, 38, 109/247.)

191 AJ, 69, 7/11. A group of Serbs from Sv. Jovan near Vršac switched from the Romanian to the Serbian Orthodox Church. At the same time, according to a report of the metropolitan of Vršac, Ilarion, a tendency to switch to the Serbian Orthodox Church appeared among the Romanians too, which was, according to him, to be supported, in order to make "nationalization", "or more correctly put, Serbization of the local population" possible. (AJ, 69, 8/17; Drobnjaković, Mileker, p. 164.) The Romanian ecclesiastical commune protested at this (knowing the division of the property was to follow), but the authorities dismissed the complaint. (AJ, 69, 8/17.)

192 Bradvarević, o.c.; Stevan Bugarški, Umetnost življenja uz ine – iskustva sa teritorije današnje Rumunije, in: Etnički odnosi Srba sa drugim narodima i etničkim zajednicama, Beograd 1998, p. 167; Subotić, Crkveni spor, pp. 98-101; Drobnjaković, Mileker, pp. 108, 130, 158, 160, 181. In these disputes, the Hungarian authorities, as a rule, sided with the Romanians. (Pecinjački, p. 186.)

193 It was the Yugoslav side which had a more inexorable attitude which it excused by adducing the canon law, the peace treaty of St. Germain, danger of a precedent etc. (ASANU, 14387/10012; 14387/9988.)



canon law and demanding that the state borders be also the ecclesiastical ones. Since this wasn't accepted, Yugoslavia proposed vicars subject to bishops of respective host-countries.<sup>194</sup> The agreement was reached only in 1934 when it was agreed that bishoprics be set up in both countries (one in Vršac for the Romanians, and the other for the Serbs in Timișoara), headed by diocesan vicars. Romania ratified the convention in April 1935 and Yugoslavia never, since the Yugoslav authorities deemed the convention hadn't been in the Yugoslav interest.<sup>195</sup> So it happened that the Serbian vicariate in Timișoara opened before the Second World war, and the Romanian one in Vršac only in 1971!<sup>196</sup> At the same time, the Serbian clergy in Romania was in a better position than their Romanian opposite numbers in Yugoslavia since the first received the money from the Romanian government and subsidies from Yugoslavia, whereas the Romanian priests were paid only by the Romanian government.<sup>197</sup> It is therefore clear why the Romanian clergy, which had been nationally very conscious already before the First World War, increasingly leaned towards jingoism.<sup>198</sup>

The Romanian Orthodox Church had 19 churches and 23 schools as well as over 181 morgen of land in Yugoslavia in 1929.<sup>199</sup> It suffered losses both in property (also subject to the agrarian reform),<sup>200</sup> and in staff – part of the clergy being interned,<sup>201</sup> and part having emigrated to Romania. The Romanian clergy was, in the opinion of the Yugoslav authorities, imbued with Romanian nationalism,<sup>202</sup> offering often passive resistance to the authorities.<sup>203</sup> On the whole, because of that and because of the insufficient knowledge of the “state language”<sup>204</sup> of considerable part of the Romanian clergy, it wasn't suitable to be a real representative of the Romanian national minority before the authorities. On the other hand, due to the same religion, part of the Serbian ruling circles hoped that that fact would facilitate assimilation of the Romanians, which the authorities tried to encourage by some measures.<sup>205</sup>

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194 ASANU, 1458/I-31; AJ, F. 398, f. 1.

195 AJ, Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, f. II; Cerović, p. 30; Popi, Rumuni, p. 124; Idem, *Jugoslovensko-rumunski odnosi*, p. 132; Schmidt-Rösler, *Rumänien*, pp. 445-448; Dušan Sabljčić, *Srpsko školstvo u Rumuniji 1919-1989*, Temišvar 1996, pp. 25-26. (Sabljčić claims the Yugoslav party didn't even paraph the convention.)

196 Popi, Rumuni, p. 124.

197 The Romanian government paid the Romanian priests already in the 1920s. (Popi, Rumuni, p. 117.)

198 Popi, Rumuni, p. 126.

199 Margan (ed.), p. 372.

200 Popi, Rumuni, p. 124.

201 Ibid., p. 49.

202 AV, 81, 922/1919; Popi, Rumuni, p. 52.

203 AV, 126/IV, 2317/30; 81, 248/1918.

204 AV, 126/IV, 3964/931; 23117/30; 2201/31; 45420/31; 33257/31.

205 One of them was the pressure that orthodox churches had to be built in the Serbian-Byzantine style. This affected the Romanian village of Ovča too, where the Belgrade architect Radivoje Predić refused to build a church in the Romance style as the Romanians demanded, but in the Serbian-Byzantine in order to give the village a Serbian look. This was explained by the fact that the village had been a Serbian one until recently, which was allegedly still visible in some family names. The Ministries of Faiths and of Building supported this, refusing, with formal excuses the original plan. (AJ, 69, 8/17; Kolaković, pp. 128-129; Branko Vujović, *Crkveni spomenici na području grada Beograda*, II, Beograd 1973, p. 213.) However, the law prescribing the Serbian-Byzantine style for

Religion played a very important role in the life of national minorities. This was particularly true of smaller, predominantly mono-confessional religious communities, such as the Ruthenians, Slovaks and Romanians, where the clergy was the backbone of the whole intelligentsia. The Roman-Catholic Church comprised a large number of Germans and Hungarians, as well as Poles, Czechs and a smaller number of Albanians and Slovaks, but since the hierarchy was Yugoslav, it could foster the national language and consciousness only on the local level in places where they were a minority, nationally conscious priests. Nevertheless, even this had large importance for the preservation of the national identity of members of minorities. The Islamic Religious Community was formally under stronger government control, but, due to the language barrier and the mistrust of the Muslim society in the South, it is questionable as to what extent the influence of the state was felt on lower levels. It is certain that the IRC served the Southern Muslims partly as a substitute for the impossibility of overt political action and opposition to the authorities. The three Protestant churches managed despite their ethnic variety, and thanks to their flexible organization to be keepers of the national heritage of their flocks. The success of their work was marred by the small number of their faithful, dispersion and, above all, lack of money. The Uniate Church was the real mainstay of the national life, and the Romanian Orthodox Church also to a degree, although the latter was undermined by corruption and disunity of the clergy. It was the champion of Romanian nationalism, so that it failed to regulate its position with the aid of the mother country – despite the alliance between Yugoslavia and Romania – due to the rigid attitude of the Yugoslav authorities.

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churches was mandatory only for the Serbian Orthodox Church. (Žutić, Rimokatolička crkva, p. 186.)

## Chapter Fourteen

# National Minorities in Yugoslavia's Foreign Policy

As we have already seen (particularly in the chapter on the legal situation of national minorities), the influence of foreign policy on the position of national minorities has always been great. Indeed, it can be said that the very definition of the term "national minorities" is very much dependent on the situation created as a consequence of foreign-policy interaction between states. Among other factors, the situation of national minorities throughout Europe during the inter-war period was deeply conditioned by inter-state relations. This was fully valid also for the national minorities in Yugoslavia which had mother countries bordering on, or at least not far away from the South-Slav kingdom. In this chapter we shall discuss the role and importance of the minority question in Yugoslavia in the relations of the Kingdom with the mother countries of the respective minorities, as well as the petitions that representatives of the minorities from Yugoslavia were sending to the Council of the League of Nations, which was in charge of watching over the Convention on Protection of Minorities.<sup>1</sup> A complete explication of this topic would, to be sure, require an exhaustive study of both the foreign policy of Yugoslavia and of the mother countries of the minorities, discussion of the role of the minority question in the foreign policy and a study on minority policy of the League of Nations. A single chapter within the framework of this book cannot offer an in-depth analysis of this problem, so that we shall confine ourselves to outlining the minority question in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia and of the mother countries having minorities in Yugoslavia. We shall also mention main cases when Yugoslavia had to defend its policy before the League of Nations from accusations of minority politicians and the foreign powers backing them.

Yugoslavia was faced with the question of national minorities on the international scene already at the moment of its creation, when the Convention on Protection of Minorities was imposed on it, like on other new states. The period of time as the League of Nations and the whole system of international relations defined by the Versailles peace treaties functioned, proved that the minority question was always present in European politics, but that it hadn't too large an importance in the international relations. The same held true of the Yugoslav foreign policy: the question of national minorities – both of those living in Yugoslavia and of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries, was never a first-grade question. To be sure, the minority question popped up time and again, but more often in the press and the parliament than in the diplomatic relations in which it always had to take the back seat in favor of strategic matters. The ruling circles of Yugoslavia preferred, for reasons of domestic and foreign policy, not to touch upon the minority question, so that

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1 The question of the situation of Yugoslav minorities in neighboring countries shall be discussed in the next chapter.

it never reached such importance as could be expected from the number of members of minorities.

Although the Convention on the Protection of Minorities had regulated their position in terms of the law of nations, that was done in an extremely summary and often imprecise way. This paved the way for arbitrary, as a rule restrictive, interpretations on part of the state as well as to complaints on part of members of national minorities. For these reasons, an idea of regulating the legal status of minorities through bilateral agreements appeared with many states and national minorities. However, these agreements were few due to the refusal of the leading Yugoslav circles to tie their hands with international obligations, and also partly due to the same attitude of some governments of interested mother countries.

It was not by chance that Italy was the country with which the question of its minority was arranged first and into smallest details.<sup>2</sup> On the one hand, the number of Italians in Yugoslavia was infinitesimal, so that eventual concessions were not so conspicuous as precedents in favor of other, larger minorities, especially since large part of the Italians acquired Italian citizenship thanks to these accords, so that they *de iure* didn't count as members of the minority any longer. However, it was much more important that the leading circles of Yugoslavia perceived (and quite justifiably too) Italy as a dangerous and aggressive neighbor, who had to be propitiated, among other things, also by granting concessions to its minority, thus preventing Italy from interfering with Yugoslavia's domestic affairs. However, although this solution didn't obviate the Italian menace, it did serve as a model to other minorities in the country in their struggle for greater minority rights.

Another state with which the position of its minority was partly regulated through a bilateral (and reciprocal) agreement, was the neighboring and allied Kingdom of Romania.<sup>3</sup> Despite the alliance and family ties between the ruling dynasties, the Yugoslav authorities were loath to conclude a convention on schools and the Orthodox Churches in the Banat. The first one was concluded but never ratified (the Bled Agreement of 1927), and eventually signed in 1933, whereas the latter was concluded in 1934 but never ratified. During the negotiating process that went on throughout the 1920s and in the early 1930s, the reluctance of the Yugoslav side to solve minority questions in that way was more than obvious. Various reasons were adduced, the main one being the fear of a precedent.<sup>4</sup> Because of such an attitude of

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2 As we have seen in chapter five the situation of the Italians in Yugoslavia (including optants who had no obligation to emigrate) was regulated by the treaty of Rappalo in 1920, by the Convention for General Agreements in Rome in 1923, as well as by other acts known in the relevant literature as the Conventions of St. Margherita. (Rehak, Manjine, pp. 184-197; Pržić, pp. 143-146.)

3 Rehak, Manjine, pp. 207-211; Die jugoslawisch-rumänische Schulkonvention; Török; Gligorijević, Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija, pp. 86-88. It is interesting that even before the peace treaties were signed in Paris Yugoslavia offered Romania to solve the minority problem between the two countries through a population transfer. (AJ, F. 330, f. 4.)

4 About the negotiation preceding the Bled Convention cf.: Gligorijević, Jugoslovensko-rumunska konvencija, pp. 79-86; Popi, Jugoslovensko-rumunski odnosi, pp. 67, 76-77, 98, 104-105, 117, 132-133; Schmidt-Rösler, Rumänien, pp. 427-436; Pržić, pp. 151-153; Rehak, Manjine, pp. 202-207; ASANU, 14387/9924; 14387/9942; 14387/9096; 14387/9920; 14387/9936; 1438/8783; 14387/10012; 14387/9988; 14387/10017;

the Yugoslav authorities, the implementation of the conventions on schools was slow and incomplete, and the convention on Orthodox Churches wasn't even ratified.<sup>5</sup> The minority question was one of the few marring the relations between the two allied countries.<sup>6</sup>

On the other hand, almost from the beginning, Romanian diplomats arrogated the right to intervene for the Romanian minority in the country, and, as in the cases of diplomats of some other countries, the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepted this interference into its internal affairs for the sake of good bilateral relations.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, Romanian ambassadors also played the role of referees and organizers of the Romanian minority in the Yugoslav Banat,<sup>8</sup> whereas the Romanian Party received instructions from Bucharest as to its political moves in the 1920s.<sup>9</sup>

As for the Romanians outside of the Banat, the Romanian authorities showed officially no interest in the Vlachs of North-Eastern Serbia or the Aromuns in Macedonia, who *de iure* didn't enjoy the status of national minorities.<sup>10</sup> However, this doesn't mean that a steady interest in them didn't exist in the Romanian public opinion. This interest was kept alive by various nationalist, and particularly émigré associations.<sup>11</sup> Aromunian emigrants from Macedonia were particularly prominent in this respect.<sup>12</sup> However, the Yugoslav government did its best to confine the discussion of the minority matters to the Banat Romanians, whereas the common interests aimed against revisionist Hungary were also more important to official Bucharest, than was insisting on the minority question.<sup>13</sup>

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1450 XIV 2; 1458/I-31; AJ, 66, 56/140; 66 (pov.), 71/185; 69, 8/17; Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, f. II; SBNS KSHS, Redovan saziv za 1927/28, I, pp. 292, 301. The British diplomats interpreted the stiff attitude of Yugoslavia by fear the Vlachs of Eastern Serbia could ask for the same privileges as the Banat Romanians. (Avramovski (ed.), Britanci, I, p. 164.)

5 Schmidt-Rösler, pp. 245-248.

6 Avramovski, Britanci (ed.), I, p. 226.

7 AJ, 14, 144/503; 229/817.

8 AJ, 38, 109/247.

9 Popi, Formiranje, p. 336.

10 Dragoljub Petrović, Pregled rumunskih revandikacionih težnji na teritoriji severoistočne Srbije do Drugog svetskog rata, Braničevo, XIV, 2-3, 1968, p. 86.

11 Aprilski rat, pp. 42-46; AJ, 38, 52/120; 66 (pov.), 71/185; PA, Abt. IIb Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3; Adverul, November 19, 1929; Il littorio dalmatico, December 4, 1929; Vitorul, January 19, 1930; Curentul, January 15, 1930. This was one of the reasons why in the Political department of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs an exchange of minorities with Romania was considered in December 1940. (Pokrajinski arhiv u Mariboru, Ostavština Antona Korošca, kut. 4.)

12 Their activity has always been great, but it was particularly intensified at the time of the Italian attack on Greece, when they started disseminating propaganda about the "Latin Macedonia" which was to be liberated by Fascist Italy and eventually put under its protection. (Sguardo retrospettivo sul movimento nazionalista dei macedo-romeni nella penisola balcanica, Bucuresti 1940; Makedonia, 81-88, October 15-November 15, 1940; Porunka vremei, November 1, 1940; Buna vestire, September 26, 1940.)

13 There were interventions in favour of the Aromuns, but they were only occasional and the Yugoslav authorities strove to gradually suppress that question. (AJ, 69, 8/17.) Romania has already shown previously that the Aromuns served it only as a chip in

The Hungarian revisionism was the main reason that the relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary remained more or less constantly bad throughout the inter-war period.<sup>14</sup> Such inter-state relations coupled with historical resentment because of the decades of Magyarization, fear of the irredenta and nationalism of the ruling circles in Yugoslavia, caused little forthcoming for the Hungarian minority. Whereas that minority was perceived as a necessary evil by the Yugoslav state, for the official and unofficial Hungary it was a vehicle of revision of the territorial solutions of the Trianon Peace Treaty.<sup>15</sup> In the first years after it had been signed, hoping for a speedy revision, the Hungarian government didn't use the question of its minorities in the neighboring countries. However, when it became clear there would be no revision soon, the minorities became a stock in trade of the Hungarian revisionist propaganda.<sup>16</sup>

It may be said that the relations between Hungary and its neighbors of the Little Entente were a vicious circle of mistrust and hostility. The official Hungary neither could nor would renounce revisionism, because otherwise the regime would have lost a steady propaganda tool for diverting the attention of the public from economic, social and political problems in Hungary.<sup>17</sup> There was a consensus in all strata of the Hungarian society as to the need of revision of the Trianon Peace Treaty, although the opinions diverged as to the extent of the revision: should it be confined to predominantly ethnic Hungarian territories or should a revision *in toto* that would restore to Hungary all parts of the historical Hungary be demanded.<sup>18</sup> Irredentist ideas permeated all classes thanks to thousands of larger and smaller irredentist associations,<sup>19</sup> so that even small extremist parties (the "lunatic fringe") enjoyed large

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diplomatic bargaining. (L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, New York 1959 (2nd ed.), p. 521.)

- 14 Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*; Idem, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941*.
- 15 In the spring of 1940 the Yugoslav government proposed an exchange of populations between the two countries which would comprise resettlement of the Magyars to Hungary with simultaneous transfer of the Serbs, Croats and Ruthenians from Hungary to Yugoslavia. To be sure, the Hungarian government declined the proposal. (Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941*, p. 385.)
- 16 Macartney, *Hungary and Her Successors*, p. 457; Anikó Kovács-Bertrand, *Der ungarische Revisionismus nach dem ersten Weltkrieg. Der publizistische Kampf gegen den Friedensvertrag von Trianon (1919-1931)*, München 1997, p. 286.
- 17 AJ, 14, 114/421; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*; Loránt Tilkovszky, Pál Teleki (1879-1941). A Biographical Sketch, Budapest 1974, p. 38; Hoensch, p. 103, 195; R.W. Seton-Watson, *Treaty Revision and the Hungarian Frontiers*, London 1934, pp. 18, 46-47. Macartney, on the other hand, didn't deem the meaning of revisionism was diversion of attention from social problems and the regime's responsibility for them; according to him, the regime didn't combat social dissatisfaction by diversion but by oppression. (Macartney, *October the Fifteenth*, p. 5.) On the other hand, the bug-a-boo of Hungarian revisionism also served the ruling circles of the Little Entente as "the opium for the masses". (Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, p. 544.)
- 18 Hanák (ed.), *Die Geschichte*, p. 197.
- 19 Macartney, *October Fifteenth*, pp. 30-32. The Yugoslav authorities kept a vigilant eye on the Hungarian irredentist scene and the activities of larger irredentist organizations, as well as their ties with individuals and minority organizations from Yugoslavia. (AJ, 14, 114/421; 166/619; 118/430; 124/444.)

popularity with the masses.<sup>20</sup> These associations received considerable support from the large number (some 300,000) of Hungarian civil servants, intellectuals, officers etc. who had fled, or had been expelled from the countries of the Little Entente.<sup>21</sup> For these reasons the ruling Hungarian circles neither would nor could renounce revisionism, which had direct consequences for its bilateral relations with the neighboring countries.

At first revisionism kept a low profile and was mainly left to various associations (which more or less enjoyed the moral and financial support of the government),<sup>22</sup> and only after 1927 did it get a more prominent place in the official policy.<sup>23</sup> The more prominent place of revisionism in the official policy was made possible by the political and economic stabilization of the regime in the late 1920s, whereas Hitler's accession to power in Germany in the early 1930s, inspired Hungarian revisionists with fresh hopes.<sup>24</sup> It should be pointed out that the "Southern direction" of revision was the weakest<sup>25</sup> – due to the smaller number of Magyars and the smaller territory that Hungary lost to Yugoslavia.<sup>26</sup> This caused several attempts at rapprochement with Yugoslavia, aimed at destruction of the Little Entente.<sup>27</sup> The first such attempt was the "Mohacs speech" of Regent Horthy in which he offered a rapprochement to the Serbs, and which really led to platonic advances between the two countries, in the framework of which the Hungarian ambassador asked for better treatment of the Hungarian minority. However, Italy interfered and prevented the rapprochement of the two countries, so that the whole episode didn't bring about any concrete improvement of the situation of the Magyars in Yugoslavia.<sup>28</sup>

The second attempt at improving the position of the Hungarian national minority in Yugoslavia through the influence of the mother country was in 1929, in the year when Germany started a large offensive on the European stage in the struggle for the rights of (German) minorities. The Hungarian government certainly wanted to profit from that wave and it addressed the Yugoslav one with the demand concerning the Hungarian minority. The Yugoslav government was willing to accommodate Hungarian demands to a certain degree, but then, despite promises given to the Hungarian ambassador Forster early that year that the new regime would grant

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20 Hoensch, p. 114.

21 Mocsy, pp. 239-240.

22 Ever since 1921 there was an Irredenta Department in the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, p. 165.)

23 Among other things, this was made manifest also by increasingly more frequent breaches of military clauses of the Trianon Treaty. (Hoensch, p. 120; Bajagić, pp. 18-21.)

24 Bajagić, p. 19.

25 Kovács-Bertrand, p. 130.

26 According to the Hungarian propaganda, Hungary lost to Romania 103.000 km<sup>2</sup> and 5.237.000 inhabitants; to Yugoslavia 63.000 km<sup>2</sup> and 4.150.000 inhabitants; to Czechoslovakia 62.000 km<sup>2</sup> and 3.517.000 inhabitants; to Austria 4.000 km<sup>2</sup> and 292.000 inhabitants. This represented 72% of the territory and 64% of the country's population. (Europe at the Parting of the Ways. War or Peace?, Budapest [1933?], p. 18.) The Hungarian propaganda declared all inhabitants of the lost territories Magyars, manipulating the figures in that way.

27 Hanák (ed.), *Die Geschichte*, p. 204; Gyula Juhász, *Hungarian Foreign Policy 1919-1945*, Budapest 1979, pp. 76-82.

28 AJ, 14, 120/433; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, p. 318-319; Juhász, pp. 81-82; Sajti, *Changes*, p. 135.

more rights to minorities,<sup>29</sup> it backed up under the influence of the allies from the Little Entente and of Poland.<sup>30</sup> Eventually, it all boiled down to empty promises.<sup>31</sup> As long as the European circumstances were firmly defined by the peace treaties from the Paris suburbs and by the treaties that were their consequence, Yugoslavia abided by the internal discipline and logic of the existence of the Little Entente.

Since the Dictatorship of January 1929 worsened the situation of national minorities, a number of Hungarian complaints (to be dealt with later on), partly prepared with the aid from the Hungary's Foreign Ministry, was launched to the Council of the League of Nations. This wasn't conducive to the improvement of relations between the two countries, and it also mirrored the deterioration of the situation of the Hungarian national minority, particularly in 1932.<sup>32</sup> The great economic crisis pushed soon all other issues to the back burner.<sup>33</sup> The murder of King Alexander in 1934, in which Hungary was also implicated by the logistic support it had lent to the terrorists, extremely worsened the already bad relations.

The relations were somewhat relaxed the next year,<sup>34</sup> and in 1936 Hungary tried to approach Yugoslavia again, this time at Germany's instigation. However, it didn't want to do it without posing some conditions: one of the main ones was the improvement of the situation of the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia. It partly came about.<sup>35</sup> In February next year Hungary offered an agreement on national minorities, but Yugoslavia refused to conclude one without Czechoslovakia and Romania.<sup>36</sup> This attempt was also made at the demand of Germany, which directed Hungary to (temporary) reconciliation with Yugoslavia and Romania and stronger turning against Czechoslovakia that had been earmarked as the first victim of the Reich.<sup>37</sup> The negotiations between Hungary and the Little Entente in the first half of that year led to no agreement, partly due to the question of national minorities (that couldn't be granted the concessions the Hungarian government had demanded), and partly due to difference in willingness of the countries involved to reach an agreement: the most willing was Czechoslovakia, in an agreement with which Hungary was least interested.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, the improved atmosphere in the inter-state relations influenced the position of the Hungarian national minority in Yugoslavia, where many parallel classes and several cultural associations were opened.<sup>39</sup> The similar trend

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29 Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933*, p. 396.

30 Vinaver notes that this action of the Hungarian government was started simultaneously with the strengthening of revisionism. (*Ibid.*, p. 412.)

31 *Ibid.*, p. 402.

32 Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 105.

33 Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska, 1933-1941*, p. 551.

34 Hungary conditioned the improvement of the bilateral relations with the improvement of the situation of the Hungarian minority. (Mesaroš, *Mađari*, pp. 122-123.)

35 The Hungarian Cultural Association (*Magyar Kozmuvelodesi Egyesulet*) that had been banned in 1934 was granted permission to resume operating, and the reading room (*Magyar olvasokór*) in Subotica was also opened. (Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1934-1941*, pp. 187, 198.)

36 Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1934-1941*, p. 214.

37 Lukač, pp. 94-97.

38 Lukač, p. 99; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941*, p. 223.

39 Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941*, p. 244. This improvement was noticed also by the contemporary Hungarian press. (*AJ*, 38, 159/306.)



was continued the next year, although an agreement about national minorities wasn't reached at the negotiations that the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, Comnen, led in the name of the Little Entente with the Hungarian ambassador Barbossy in Bucharest. Nevertheless, an agreement on military equality which also foresaw an improvement of relations was signed in August.<sup>40</sup>

The matter of an agreement on minorities between Yugoslavia and Romania on the one, and Hungary on the other side was on the agenda in September next year again, in a significantly different situation: Czechoslovakia was no more and Hungary, leaning on victorious Germany, was stronger. Romania and Yugoslavia refused the Hungarian proposal of the minority agreement, and Hungary the Romanian counterproposal, making a possible political treaty or a non-aggression pact conditional on the conclusion of an agreement on national minorities first. As for the representatives of Yugoslavia, in early October they transmitted the opinion of their government that no formal agreement on minorities was necessary. At that, Yugoslavia proclaimed itself willing to sign a declaration proposed by Romania, however, without tying therewith its hands for eventual further negotiation with Hungary.<sup>41</sup>

The process of gradual rapprochement between the two countries, which had been going on, with failures and stoppages, since 1936, brought about a certain alleviation of the situation of the Hungarian national minority in Yugoslavia, and the hope for even greater improvement.<sup>42</sup> The process was crowned on December 12, 1940 by the signing of the Pact of Eternal Friendship.<sup>43</sup> Although it was formally a bilateral agreement, it was also concluded at the bidding of Germany that wanted to have a stabile situation in South-Eastern Europe. With this pact Hungary wanted to get free hands in Southern Transylvania and Yugoslavia to strengthen its position that had been greatly weakened by the loss of traditional allies France and Czechoslovakia, the impotence of Great Britain, territorial curtailment of Romania and the increasing pressure of the Axis powers.<sup>44</sup>

The Pact on Eternal Friendship influenced favorably the development of the cultural life of the Magyars in Yugoslavia: the Hungarian Cultural Union, founded on November 24, 1940, developed a lively activity so that until mid-March 1941, 109 local branches were established. The improvement of the minority's situation in

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40 Vanku, pp. 278-258; Vinaver, *Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941*, p. 288. Vanku mentions an agreement on the minorities paraphed in Bled on August 23, 1938, but it apparently left no practical trace – partly due to the destruction of Czechoslovakia which came about soon afterwards.

41 *I documenti diplomatici italiani*, nona serie: 1939-1943, volume I, Roma 1954, pp. 43, 137, 156, 198, 268, 408.

42 VA, pop. 17, k. 21, f. 3, d. 8; *Magyarország*, January 31, 1940; Mesaroš, *Mađari*, pp. 213, 217.

43 During the negotiations of the Pact, Yugoslavia had offered the exchange of populations (into which the Ruthenians of the Subcarpathia would have been included due to the too small number of Yugoslavs in Hungary) with eventual cession of districts of Senta and Bačka Topola. Hungary refused to negotiate about this, wishing to get both the territory and the population at some later point. In any case, Yugoslavia wasn't willing to appear as the initiator of such a solution. (Sajti, *Hungarians*, pp. 110-113; *Idem*, *Changes*, pp. 145-146.)

44 Tilkovszky, Pál Teleki, p. 54; Lukač, pp. 457-459; Mesaroš, *Mađari*, p. 218; Juhász, pp. 179-180.

other fields also seemed to be in the offing.<sup>45</sup> This was discussed at the visit of the Yugoslav foreign minister Aleksandar Cincar-Marković in Budapest on February 27, 1941, on the occasion of the exchange of ratifications of the Pact of Eternal Friendship.<sup>46</sup>

The question of the Hungarian national minority in the relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary was last mentioned on the eve of the Axis attack on Yugoslavia – as an excuse for the use of Hungarian troops on the side of the aggressors. The aggressive Hungarian circles headed by regent Horthy, foreign minister Bardossy and ambassador to Berlin Sztojaj, insisted the hour for the Southern revision had come, claiming the Serbs, by their putsch of March 27, had annulled the Pact on Eternal Friendship with Hungary too!<sup>47</sup> Military preparations were made under the official slogan, their purpose was to protect the Hungarians in Yugoslavia<sup>48</sup> who, according to the reports of the Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade Bakacs-Bessenyey and Senator Varady, were not endangered at all.<sup>49</sup> Despite this, in his proclamation on April 10, as the Hungarian troops were invading the Yugoslav territory, Horthy stressed they were coming to protect the Hungarians from anarchy,<sup>50</sup> showing yet again that national minorities are usually just pawns on the checkerboard of their mother countries.

As was the case with other minorities, the Hungarian diplomatic representatives in Yugoslavia also appropriated not only the right to interfere with internal affairs of the host country by intervening occasionally in minority matters,<sup>51</sup> but also with the internal affairs of the minority itself, by trying to direct its political behavior;<sup>52</sup> the activities of cultural associations,<sup>53</sup> the writing of the minority press to influence the personal matters within minority organizations etc. This was achieved either by convincing or by financial blackmail. The Hungarian minority leaders for their part, aware that the national minority couldn't improve its position by itself, kept constantly in touch with the Hungarian Embassy, heeding instructions from there and reporting on the situation.<sup>54</sup>

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45 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 220-226.

46 Amtan Czettler, Pál Graf Teleki und die Außenpolitik Ungarns 1939-1941, München 1996, p. 194.

47 Tilkovszky, Pál Teleki, p. 59.

48 Ibid., p. 61; Czettler, p. 223. Bardossy dished up the same explanation also to the British. (Juhász, p. 183.)

49 Czettler, p. 222; Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941, p. 401. The same was claimed by prime minister Teleki in his farewell letter before his suicide. (Czettler, p. 233; Lázár, p. 198.) The Hungarian minister of foreign affairs ordered the ambassador in Belgrade and the consul in Zagreb on March 31, 1941 to collect data on even the slightest excesses against the Magyars. However, these two reported on April 1, there had been no excesses. (Juhász, pp. 183-184.)

50 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 229.

51 Ibid., pp. 149-150, 173; Sajti, Hungarians, pp. 105-106; Idem, Changes, p. 147.

52 Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933, p. 384; Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 199, 204-205, 209; Sajti, Changes, pp. 136-137, 141; Idem, Hungarians, pp. 3, 34-35, 47, 55, 65, 76, 79, 95, 182.

53 Mesaroš, Mađari, p. 106; Sajti, Hungarians, pp. 32, 41, 57-58, 118-119, 152-153, 165; Idem, Changes, p. 150.

54 Mesaroš, Mađari, pp. 199, 204-205, 209.

The biggest revisionist power on the continent, Germany, had also the largest number of its co-nationals in a minority status in the newly formed Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the First World War. For this reason, it is no wonder that the minority question always played a certain role in the relations between the two countries.

The (small) German Reich, tailored according to Bismarck's taste, showed little interest in German minorities in other countries until the First World War. Maintaining friendly relations with Austria-Hungary (where a large number of Germans were subjected to Hungarian assimilationist policy) and the overseas expansion were the main tenets of the German foreign policy which had no place for the German European Diaspora.<sup>55</sup> Very few people cared about the Germans in the Habsburg Monarchy or Russia.<sup>56</sup> The First World War developed national solidarity on the one hand, and on the other, ended with the loss of German territories and the break-up of Austria-Hungary, putting a large number of Germans into the position of national minorities within the new, unfriendly states. For these reasons, a strengthened feeling of national unity developed, which overstepped the new political boundaries.<sup>57</sup> Belonging to the nationality became more important than the citizenship,<sup>58</sup> and the national element became a substitute for the lost state sovereignty.<sup>59</sup> Although the interest was aimed in the first place at the Germans living in the territories lost in the war (the so-called *Auslandsdeutschen*), it helped awake also the interest in the Germans living further away (the so-called *Volksdeutsche*).<sup>60</sup> Like in Hungary, the number of nationalist organizations, usually connected with various state organs, increased drastically, and they were for great part meant to protect the Germans abroad.<sup>61</sup> Due to the new domestic and foreign political situation in which the defeated Germany had found itself, the care of the *Volksdeutsche* became part and parcel of the German foreign policy – that was basically revisionist. The aid the Germans in the European countries received was partly financial and partly diplomatic, and since 1923 the Foreign Ministry was in charge of it.<sup>62</sup> However, this doesn't mean the aid wasn't coming from various associations – which were often go-betweens for transmitting government money – making it difficult to determine how great the material aid had actually been.<sup>63</sup>

What was the role meant for the German minorities in other countries? The aim of the Weimar Republic's *Volksdeutsche* policy was to preserve them as

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55 Schechtmann, p. 128; Henry Cord Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815-1948*, The Hague 1955, pp. 47-51.

56 H.C. Meyer, p. 114.

57 Ibid., pp. 296-297; Karl-Heinz Grundmann, *Deutschumpolitik zur Zeit der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie am Beispiel der deutsch-baltischen Minderheit in Estland und Lettland*, Hannover-Döhren 1977, p. 49.

58 Grundmann, p. 57.

59 Jacobsen, p. 162.

60 Grundmann, p. 47.

61 Ibid., pp. 123-128. In the late 1920s, 120 associations for protection of the Germans abroad from Germany and other countries were members of the umbrella-organization *Deutscher Schutzbund für das Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtum* (est. in May 1919). (Schot, pp. 107-113.)

62 Grundmann, p. 140.

63 Ibid., pp. 141-153, 409; Schot, pp. 131-134, 176-178, 243-248; Höpfner, pp. 96-97.

Germans for Germany's long-term political and economic interests, and in the last resort, for the revision of the peace treaties.<sup>64</sup> This opinion was also shared by some German diplomatic representatives in Yugoslavia,<sup>65</sup> and one of the main representatives of the German minority in the Kingdom, Dr. Stefan Kraft proposed (out of conviction or for reasons of political marketing) that the Volksdeutsche serve as a bridge for Germany in its penetration to the South-East.<sup>66</sup> Similar ideas of German minorities in Europe as tools of the Reich's foreign policy were shared by Hitler too,<sup>67</sup> and some other Nazi bigwigs after 1933.<sup>68</sup> In the process, the dominance of the Reich's interests remained unchallenged throughout the inter-war period.<sup>69</sup> In other words, the question of German minorities abroad wasn't irrelevant for the German Foreign Ministry, but it never had the topmost priority.<sup>70</sup>

Yugoslavia, and indeed the whole of South-Eastern Europe, weren't situated on the main strategic road of the German foreign policy, so that the Volksdeutsche of these parts awoke interest of the German diplomacy after a certain delay. They never played such an important role in it as did the Germans of Czechoslovakia or Poland,<sup>71</sup> who partly used to be citizens of the Reich until 1918 and who lived within the main German sphere of interest. Yugoslavia and the Weimar Republic established diplomatic relations in summer 1920. The major concern of the first German ambassador to Belgrade, Friedrich von Keller, was to improve bilateral economic and cultural relations, in which he was fairly successful.<sup>72</sup> Unlike the relations with the neighboring Hungary, the relations with Germany developed mostly well and they reached their culmination in 1928.<sup>73</sup>

The minority question played a larger role in the bilateral relations only since 1925. In that year, as has already been mentioned, the *beating* of the Volksdeutsche leaders during the election campaign took place, which spurred the German diplomacy to express its dissatisfaction.<sup>74</sup> Since then, the Volksdeutsche question would remain a steady topic in the bilateral contacts, but not the main one – partly due to the diplomatic and military impotence of Germany.<sup>75</sup> Because of the conflict with Italy in 1926/27, the Yugoslav authorities treated the Volksdeutsche

64 Christoph M. Kimmich, *Germany and the League of Nations*, Chicago, London [1976], pp. 134, 138; Komjathy, Stockwell, p. 5.

65 Höpfner, pp. 119, 341. Ambassador Ulrich von Hassel considered them in 1930 a bridge to Yugoslavia. (AJ, 38, 47/105.)

66 This opinion was aired by ambassador Olshausen on August 25, 1924. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2.)

67 Komjathy, Stockwell, pp. 11-12; Hermann Rausching, *My Confidential Talks With Hitler*, New York 1940, 61-63; Brown, p. 146; Rimscha, p. 33.

68 That much was openly stated in 1938 by Hermann Behrends, the deputy of the chief of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle, the para-state agency organized in order to unify and direct the work with the Volksdeutsche. (Jacobsen, p. 244.)

69 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4; Schechtmann, p. 28; Höpfner, pp. 342, 351.

70 Grundmann, p. 216.

71 Höpfner, p. 341.

72 Ibid., p. 102.

73 Ibid., p. 103.

74 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2; Avramovski, Britanci, I, p. 307.

75 Höpfner, pp. 314-315.

somewhat more leniently, showing also a desire for a rapprochement with Germany. The Volksdeutsche leaders suggested the German diplomacy to use the unfavorable foreign-political situation of Yugoslavia and its trade negotiations with Germany to put the pressure to bear upon Yugoslavia to give more rights to the German minority, but the Auswärtiges Amt refused, pointing out to the primacy of the whole of the German foreign-political interests.<sup>76</sup>

The relations were cooled in 1928 because of the Yugoslav bill on Primary Schools. Although the Yugoslav authorities kept reassuring the bill wasn't aimed against minorities and that the draft would be changed, or that the law wouldn't apply to the Volksdeutsche, it was passed in late 1929 without changes, which caused additional dissatisfaction in Berlin.<sup>77</sup> On the whole, since mid-1929 the question of the German minority became increasingly the central one in the German-Yugoslav discussions.<sup>78</sup> As a precondition for the improvement of relations, the need for the situation of the Volksdeutsche to be improved was adduced,<sup>79</sup> and some more sober voices in Yugoslavia pointed out that the situation of the German minority should be improved in order to reach a rapprochement with Germany.<sup>80</sup> The next year the Volksdeutsche journalist Hilde Isolde Reiter and the former MP Dr. Wilhelm Neuner were arrested and beaten up, which outraged the German public and diplomacy,<sup>81</sup> and triggered the complaint by representatives of the German minority to the Council of the League of Nations over the confiscation of the "German House" in Celje, that had been put off for some time. Hard pressed, the Yugoslav authorities issued the school decrees already mentioned, made possible the work of the Kulturbund and the founding of the private German teachers' training college.<sup>82</sup> Just how unwillingly the concessions had been granted testifies to the fact that the German diplomacy had to exercise additional pressure to force their actual implementation.<sup>83</sup> Despite all this, the Volksdeutsche question remained less important in the bilateral relations

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76 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3 and 4; Höpfner, p. 316.

77 PA, Abt. IIb, Unterrichtswesen, Politik 17, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Abt. II, Politische Beziehungen Jugoslawien und Deutschland, Politik 2, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3; Senz, Politische Aktivitäten, p. 314. Already before the bill was passed Stefan Kraft threatened international complications in case it became the law. (Gligorijević, O nastavi, p. 80.)

78 Höpfner, pp. 317-320. This was partly the consequence of the increased engagement of Germany in favour of the rights of its minorities in the course of that year.

79 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4; Abt. II Politische Beziehungen Jugoslawien und Deutschland, Politik 2, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3. Ambassador to Belgrade, Olshausen, reasoned the other way round on May 6, 1926: the improvement of the inter-state relations would contribute to the improvement of the situation of the Volksdeutsche. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3.)

80 AJ, 38, 48/106; 47/105; 184/331.

81 AJ, 38, 47/105; Empörende Methoden der südslawischen Polizei. Der Skandal um die Verhaftung des ehemaligen deutschen Abgeordneten Dr. Neuner und der Schriftstellerin Hilde Reiter, Nation und Staat, III, 10-11, 1930.

82 Höpfner, pp. 320-322.

83 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5; Höpfner, p. 322; Kraft, p. 135; Hamburger Nachrichten, March 1, 1931. The lower authorities in Slovenia particularly sabotaged opening of parallel classes. (Kraft, p. 134.)

than the trade matters throughout the existence of the Weimar Republic,<sup>84</sup> whereas financial aid (as for other Germans in South-Eastern Europe) remained rather modest.<sup>85</sup> The official German policy toward the Volksdeutsche remained conservative<sup>86</sup> and aimed at the cooperation with the host countries, which was recommended to the Volksdeutsche leaders too.<sup>87</sup>

Hitler's accession to power introduced no significant changes to the German Volksdeutsche policy in Yugoslavia. As for the official German diplomacy, practically until the German attack on Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, it championed the same moderate and restrained policy in that matter, keeping in mind the Reich's interests, even to a higher degree than had been the case during the Weimar Republic. This was partly understandable: Germany started pursuing a world policy once again and there was little room for the Volksdeutsche in it. One of the more important roles of the German diplomacy in the process was to curb the Volksdeutsche hot-heads, who, with their improvident actions, could spoil the basically good inter-state relations which were Berlin's primary concern. To be sure, the Volksdeutsche remained present as a topic in the bilateral relations, but within that framework, from a second-grade matter, they became the third-grade one. In other words, despite its ultra nationalist rhetoric, the Hitler regime was even more willing than the Weimar Republic to shut both eyes to the infringement of the Volksdeutsche rights, if it were in the supreme interest of the Reich.<sup>88</sup> This tallied completely with the idea (basically championed also by the diplomacy of the Weimar Republic) that the Volksdeutsche were there to serve the interests of Germany and not vice versa.

However, the situation wasn't that simple in practice. Apart from various nationalist associations that had taken care of the German Diaspora already in the days of the republic (which were taken over by the Nazis after 1933), after Hitler's accession several purely Nazi organizations sprang up which had the ambition to subject the Germans in various European countries to their influence. They often vied with each other, and due to their extreme ideology and lack of tact, their behavior was, as a rule, at odds with the wishes of the *Auswärtiges Amt*.<sup>89</sup> It was only after the VoMi, headed by the Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler had come victorious out

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84 Höpfner, p. 342.

85 PA, Abt. IIb, *Deutschtum in Jugoslawien*, Politik 25, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1; Höpfner, p. 351. The reason lay equally in the secondary importance of the Germans in this region for the German foreign policy, and in the lack of money.

86 So for instance ambassador von Keller warned on October 6, 1922 that the German diplomacy should protest at the infringement of the Volksdeutsche rights, but not too often, since that wouldn't be in the interest of the Reich. (PA, Abt. IIb, *Unterrichtswesen*, Politik 17, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.) German diplomat Eisenlohr from the embassy in Belgrade deemed on April 24, 1924 that an eventual intervention by the Reich in favor of the Volksdeutsche could provoke accusations of pan-Germanism and endanger the interests of both Germany and the Volksdeutsche. (PA, Abt. IIb, *Nationalitätenfrage*, *Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien*, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 2.) German consul in Zagreb, Freundt thought in April 1930 that the Volksdeutsche complaint to the League of Nations over the "German House" could deteriorate the situation of the Volksdeutsche and the German-Yugoslav relations. (PA, Abt. IIb, *Deutschtum in Jugoslawien*, Politik 25, Jugoslawien, Bd. 1.) Such restrained policy had its adherents among politicians in Germany too. (AJ, 14, 86/342.)

87 Höpfner, p. 351.

88 Numerous examples from whole Europe see in: Lumans, *passim*; Shimizu, pp. 43-45.

89 Lumans, *passim*; Jacobsen, pp. 195-239.

of the clash of authorities in 1938, that the Volksdeutsche work became more orderly. The increasingly less influential Auswärtiges Amt now had just one opponent whose influence on German minorities throughout Europe became decisive: the German diplomacy was left with the task of checking the precipitation of the Volksdeutsche Nazis and of appeasing the host governments because of their excesses and clumsiness of the Nazi agencies.<sup>90</sup> In the conflict between the old Volksdeutsche leadership and the young "Renewer"-lions, the German embassy headed by von Heeren sided with the old guard, just like his colleagues in other European countries where similar situations occurred among members of German minorities.<sup>91</sup> However, as the Nazis grew stronger and the political course in Germany became increasingly more radical, the importance of the Auswärtiges Amt's support dwindled after 1937.<sup>92</sup> Indeed, before the elections of 1938, even the AA (now headed by the Nazi Ribbentrop), had to lend its support to the "Renewers" with a view to forging a unified Volksdeutsche front – that was in the Reich's interest.<sup>93</sup>

Due to such a situation, the Volksdeutsche question didn't play a prominent role in the inter-state relations of Yugoslavia and the Third Reich.<sup>94</sup> For good economic, and increasingly good political relations, the official Berlin was prone to overhear the Volksdeutsche complaints.<sup>95</sup> The hub of the relations with the Volksdeutsche themselves shifted to the interaction between their leaders and the Nazi institutions from Germany, whereas the German diplomacy strove to check the Volksdeutsche excesses and to prevent them from making pacts with the more extreme political streams on the Yugoslav scene.<sup>96</sup> The Yugoslav authorities sometimes took steps against the Volksdeutsche excesses, and the German diplomats in Belgrade couldn't do much for the culprits, disapproving themselves the thoughtless behavior and the ties the hot-spurs had with emissaries from the Reich whom they perceived as spoiling the inter-state relations.<sup>97</sup>

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90 Jacobsen, p. 609.

91 Biber, Nacizem, pp. 47, 50; Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 731; Brown, p. 138; Shimizu, p. 42.

92 Brown, p. 145. The new Kulturbund leadership was brought into office by the VoMi in 1938/39, and the sole concession to the foreign policy concerns was the fact that it wasn't the extremest "Renewers" who were brought to the helm. (Biber, Nacizem, pp. 208-209.)

93 Shimizu, p. 59.

94 Thus for instance, it was hardly mentioned on the occasion of the visit of prime minister Stojadinović to Hitler in early 1938. (Suppan, Zur Lage, p. 234; Milan Stojadinović, *Ni rat ni pakt. Jugoslavija između dva svetska rata*, Rijeka [1970], p. 456.) Similar was the situation on the occasion of the visit of the Yugoslav foreign minister Aleksandar Cincar-Marković to Berlin in late April 1939. The Volksdeutsche were discussed only on the second day of his stay, after questions of Yugoslav withdrawal from the League of Nations and its adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact and relations with Hungary. It was similar during the visit of prince-regent Paul. (Želimir Bob Jurčić, Ivo Andrić u Berlinu 1939-1941, Sarajevo 1989, pp. 59, 62, 66.)

95 Komjathy, Stockwell, 132. Ambassador von Heeren appraised the situation of the Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia (with the exception of Slovenia) as satisfactory. (Biber, Nacizem, p. 90; Suppan, Zur Lage, 234; Stojadinović, p. 456.)

96 PA, B 103320; Biber, Nacizem, pp. 71-73; Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 727; Komjathy, Stockwell, pp. 133, 137.

97 Johann Wuescht, *Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich. Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen 1933-1945*, Stuttgart 1969, p. 255. Von Heeren

The most extreme example when the German diplomatic representatives had to clear the confusion engendered by Nazi ideologues happened in October 1939 when Hitler in his speech on the occasion of victory over Poland announced resettlement of German minorities from East European countries. The idea awakened the interest of the Yugoslav authorities too, which wanted to get rid of the increasingly pesky national minority, so that they instructed their ambassador to Berlin, the future Nobel-prize winner, Dr. Ivo Andrić to inquire into the matter. The news caused stir among the Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia too, so that the German embassy had to publish an official statement that the resettlement of the Volksdeutsche from Yugoslavia wasn't relevant at that moment, and that once it became relevant, it would be executed only on a voluntary basis.<sup>98</sup>

Like in the case of the Hungarian minority, the German minority received a prominent place in the inter-state relations in the days preceding the German attack on Yugoslavia. In a propaganda blitz, the German media dished out to the world public a heap of lies about persecutions of the Volksdeutsche by the new Yugoslav government that had come to power by the coup d'état.<sup>99</sup> In the process they mentioned incidents several years old which had previously been passed over in silence in the interest of good bilateral relations. The White Book that came out a little later showed that the accusations of manhandling had been more than exaggerated.<sup>100</sup>

The German national minority in Yugoslavia was particular in many respects, among other things, because it had two mother countries claiming at least a theoretical right to it. Apart from Germany, Austria, which defined itself as a German state during the inter-war period, also perceived itself as the mother country of the Germans in Yugoslavia. Despite this, it did even less for the Volksdeutsche than Germany. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, stronger interference would vehemently open the thorny question of the Slovenian minority in Carinthia. Furthermore, Austria emerged from the war as incomparably weaker (and smaller) than

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complained to the VoMi in 1939 of the activities of Gustav Halwax who had been secretly recruiting for the Wehrmacht and organizing para-military groups in the country. The ambassador pointed out how nefarious this had been for the relations between the Reich and Yugoslavia, so that the VoMi had to keep Halwax in check for some time. (Mentzel, p. 137.) The German military attaché also considered the work of Nazi agencies counterproductive in July 1939. In his opinion, the improvement of the inter-state relations would automatically improve the situation of the Volksdeutsche over time. (Aprilski rat, p. 272.)

98 VA, pop. 17, k. 22, f. 1, d. 57; Jurčić, pp. 89-90; Schechtmann, p. 239; Komjathy, Stockwell, p. 139. The claim of the Volksdeutsche author Johann Wuescht that Berlin wanted to resettle the Germans from South-East Europe (Wuescht, p. 253.) can't be accepted, since a firm decision on that hasn't been reached until the end of the Second World War. There were even no plans about it. (Anton Scherer (ed.), *Unbekannte SS Geheimberichte über die Evakuierung der Südostdeutschen im Oktober und November 1944 sowie über die politische Lage in Rumänien, Ungarn, der Slowakei, im Serbischen Banat und im „Unabhängigen Staat Kroatien“*, Graz 1990, p. 6; Robert L. Koehl, *RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939-1945. A History of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Germandom*, Cambridge 1957, p. 42.)

99 AJ, 38, 242/389; Shimizu, p. 91.

100 The numerous crimes on which the Goebbels propaganda reported in April 1941 were reduced to a few broken noses and windows. (Dokumente zum Konflikt mit Jugoslawien und Griechenland, Berlin 1941, *passim*.)



Germany, so that it had no possibility of pursuing an offensive foreign policy. Due to a bad economic situation, that was also the consequence of the war and territorial dismemberment, economic relations with Yugoslavia came first also for Austria.<sup>101</sup> Nevertheless, the Volksdeutsche leaders, not only from Slovenia, kept constant contacts with Austrian diplomatic representatives, expecting their support, just like that of their German colleagues.<sup>102</sup> Unlike their German opposite numbers, no Austrian ambassador managed to win confidence in Belgrade.<sup>103</sup> On the occasion of the visit of the chancellor Seipel in Belgrade in 1923, a bilateral solving of minority questions, disregarding the Convention on Protection of Minorities, was guaranteed,<sup>104</sup> but this solution never materialized – most likely because the governments of the two countries were reluctant to take on those kinds of obligations.<sup>105</sup> As for the Yugoslav side, the political *status quo* was more convenient for it than for Austria.<sup>106</sup> Central governments of both countries basically considered the minority question a domestic one, but the governments in Ljubljana and Klagenfurt didn't quite see things in that light.<sup>107</sup> This contradiction basically made a solution of the minority question based on reciprocity impossible.<sup>108</sup> The minorities were primarily seen as hindrance and not as a binding link.<sup>109</sup> For this reason the Yugoslav government wasn't particularly interested in the cultural autonomy of the Carinthian Slovenes<sup>110</sup> – surely so as not to have to grant something similar to the Germans in Yugoslavia.

The question of the German minority in Yugoslavia, and particularly in Slovenia, was raised in Austria by nationalist politicians. Thus in early 1924 MPs of the Greater German People's Party interpellated the chancellor about the bad situation of the Volksdeutsche in Slovenia. The inquiry of the Austrian consul in Ljubljana confirmed their allegations, but the consul Kohlruss adduced the Germans from Slovenia didn't want Austrian intercession, fearing the reprisals that would ensue.<sup>111</sup> German right-wing politicians in Austria were raising the question of the Volksdeutsche later on too, but it served more as a means of pressure in the inter-state relations.<sup>112</sup> On the Volksdeutsche question, which in the case of Austria increasingly revolved also around the question of the Slovenians in Carinthia, an ever larger role began to be played by Germany, that had joined the League of Nations in 1926, and with which Yugoslavia gradually tried to achieve a rapprochement, from the following year onwards.<sup>113</sup> In

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101 Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 826, 830. Austria vied with Germany and Italy for the first place in the Yugoslav imports. (Arnold Suppan, Jugoslavija i Austrija od 1919. do 1938. Susjedstvo između kooperacije i konfrontacije, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 3, 1988, p. 10.)

102 Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 821-822.

103 Suppan, Jugoslavija, p. 6.

104 Ibid., p. 11; La Bulgarie, June 10, 1932.

105 British diplomats thought the minority question still was not spoiling the inter-state relations at that time. (Avramovski, Britanci, I, p. 238.)

106 Suppan, Jugoslavija, p. 7.

107 Ibid., p. 11; Idem, Jugoslawien, p. 819.

108 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 921.

109 Suppan, Jugoslavija, p. 13.

110 Ibid., p. 12; Idem, Jugoslawien, pp. 859, 864.

111 Suppan, Zur Lage, pp. 194-195; Idem, Jugoslawien, p. 843.

112 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 819.

113 Suppan, Zur Lage, p. 202; Idem, Jugoslawien, p. 697. German consul in Zagreb Seiler wrote on November 10, 1926 that the Austrian government had kept low profile in

early 1930 the Austrian ambassador Ploennies proposed a tripartite treaty on minorities between Austria, Germany and Yugoslavia, but this failed because the German ambassador deemed Germany wouldn't accept obligations concerning Lausitz Sorbs and Slovenian coal-miners in Westphalia, whereas the Austrian Foreign Ministry considered that Yugoslavia wasn't politically stable enough for such a treaty.<sup>114</sup> In the 1930s Austria increasingly confined its interest to the Germans in Slovenia,<sup>115</sup> whom Ploennies considered bearers of Austrian economic and cultural influence, and whose disappearance would cause great damage to Austrian interests.<sup>116</sup>

From 1932 the Italian policy did its best to separate Austria from Yugoslavia so that king Alexander started turning increasingly to Germany, which was pressurizing the small Alpine republic. This orientation was sealed in July 1934 when Austrian Nazis fled to Yugoslavia, which gave them shelter after their failed coup.<sup>117</sup> Thus the overall relations between Austria and Yugoslavia during the inter-war period were marked more by confrontation than by cooperation, which explains why the Austrian influence, unlike the German one in the 1930s, failed to contribute to the improvement of the situation of the Volksdeutsche in Yugoslavia. Although the minority question was not considered to be of prime importance in the bilateral relations, it kept popping up, contributing to the worsening climate between the two countries.<sup>118</sup>

The largest national minority according to the 1931 census, the Albanians, had the smallest mother country.<sup>119</sup> Throughout the inter-war period it never really managed to consolidate and to pursue to any degree an independent foreign policy. The Yugoslav aspirations to its territory which made themselves manifest on several occasions, and particularly Italy's wish to bring the whole country under its control and to use it as a stepping stone for its penetration into the Balkans, coupled with the inherited backwardness and tribal and religious diversity, made stabilization of the situation in the country impossible. Albania remained a factor of instability in the already unstable Balkans also because numerous gangs have found refuge in its territory. For these reasons the relations with Albania were nothing like so diversified as with mother countries of other national minorities. Also, this is certainly the reason why the diplomatic relations aren't so well explored as in the case of other-mentioned countries. Apart from the embassy in Belgrade, Albania maintained in Yugoslavia consulates in Skopje and Bitola, as well as several honorary consuls in other towns.<sup>120</sup> It was typical that Albanian consulates didn't have seats in the

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minority question. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker in Jugoslawien, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3.)

114 Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 899-900.

115 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 891.

116 Ibid., p. 899.

117 Suppan, Jugoslavija, p. 7.

118 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 819.

119 As we have seen, some propagandists claimed more Albanians had lived outside Albania, or even in Yugoslavia alone.

120 Honorary consuls resided in Split, Zagreb and Dubrovnik. The title was usually born by businessmen, Yugoslav citizens with merits for Albanian trade in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia had, besides the embassy in Tirana, consulates in Scutari, Valona and Korça. (Vuk Vinaver, Fašizam i jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi na početku Drugog svetskog rata, Istorijski zapisi, XXIII, knj. XXVIII, 1-2, 1970, p. 102.)

central Albanian-inhabited region, but rather at its fringes – which partly reflected Ottoman traditions and was partly connected with administrative importance of these towns in the inter-war Yugoslavia.<sup>121</sup>

Little is known about the overall inter-state relations. One thing is certain: in the minority question the Yugoslav authorities were not willing to go very far in terms of reciprocity, the Yugoslav minority in Albania being infinitesimal, especially in comparison with the Albanian one in Yugoslavia.<sup>122</sup> In 1923, and then under the prime minister Fan Noli too, Albania tried to bring the matter of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia before the League of Nations, but these attempts ended in failure.<sup>123</sup> The regime of Ahmed Zog, installed with Yugoslavia's help in late 1924 in place of the government of the nationalist bishop Stilian Fan Noli in which the arch-irredentist Hasan bey Prishtina had served as a minister, made it possible to put an end to sorties of the kaçak gangs from Albania. However, it soon turned to Italy, spoiling thus the plans of the ruling Yugoslav circles who had hoped they would draw Albania into their orbit.<sup>124</sup> For these reasons, as well as because of previous Italian attempts to gain a foothold in Albania, the Yugoslav policy toward Albania basically always served the policy of resistance to the Italian penetration,<sup>125</sup> and only secondarily solving the minority question (which was basically sought elsewhere and with different means). This doesn't mean Albania was completely absent from the thinking of Yugoslav officials about the solution of the Albanian question in Yugoslavia. The division of Albania appeared several times (1915, 1921, 1924, 1926) as a means to weaken the Italian influence and to liquidate the irredenta. For the last time this proposal was aired in the two studies of members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ivan Vukotić and the later Nobel-prize winner, Dr. Ivo Andrić from early 1939. They proposed the annexation of Northern Albania in order to quench more easily the Albanian irredentism and to facilitate resettlement of part of the Albanians and assimilation of the rest of them within the Yugoslav state.<sup>126</sup>

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121 This held true particularly for Skopje. It may be assumed that living and working conditions of consuls were more agreeable in these towns than in Priština or Peć. On the other hand, it is doubtful if the Yugoslav authorities would have agreed to have Albanian consulates in the midst of the predominantly Albanian-inhabited territory.

122 Ljubodrag Dimić, *Školsko pitanje i odnosi između Jugoslavije i Albanije 1918-1939* (manuscript), pp. 20-21. (The paper was published in the omnibus volume: *Stanovništvo slovenskog porijekla u Albaniji*, Titograd 1991, which I unfortunately couldn't obtain. I would like also to use this opportunity to thank Professor Dimić for putting the manuscript of this paper at my disposal.)

123 Bajrami, *L'oppression*, p. 82; Avramovski (ed.), *Britanci*, I, p. 170. The Noli government aided also incursions of gangs into the Yugoslav territory. (Hrabak, *Džemijet*, p. 230.)

124 Avramovski, *Jugoslovensko-albanski*, pp. 72-74; Idem, *Albanija između Jugoslavije i Italije*, *Vojno-istorijski glasnik*, 3, 1984, pp. 176-180; Zamboni, pp. LI-LIX.

125 Avramovski, *Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi*, p. 67.

126 Zamboni, p. LXIII; Bogdan Krizman, *Elaborat dra Ive Andrića o Albaniji iz 1939. godine*, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, IX, 2, 1977, pp. 77-89. These last proposals were connected with fear Italy would occupy Albania, i.e. they came into being as an attempt at reducing negative effects in that case. (Avramovski, *Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi*, p. 78.) For the same reasons, this solution was championed by representatives of the Main General Staff. (Stojadinović, p. 514.) The Italian foreign minister Ciano spoke to Stojadinović on January 16, 1939 about the division of

On the other hand, Albania kept an eye on the situation of its co-nationals in Yugoslavia, although it didn't undertake many direct steps.<sup>127</sup> Occasionally diplomatic interventions with representatives of Western powers occurred.<sup>128</sup> However, the danger of irredentism of the official Albania was mostly platonic.<sup>129</sup> To be sure, Zog's regime paid occasional lip service to Greater Albania, but in practice it did little to materialize it.<sup>130</sup> The same held true of its concern for the Albanians in the neighboring countries.<sup>131</sup> The reason was a double one: Albania was too weak to undertake something more serious about the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. This went both for the diplomatic and any other kind of action. At the same time, the émigré Kosovars, who were the loudest champions of the Greater Albanian idea, were at the same time great enemies of Zog and his regime.<sup>132</sup>

One of the few direct measures to protect the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia was undertaken by the Albanian diplomacy after the Yugoslav-Italian friendship agreement of March 25, 1937. Albania hurried to reach a rapprochement with Yugoslavia too, and within that action, it posed the question of the Albanian national minority. The Yugoslav authorities a priori refused to discuss that matter, with the excuse Yugoslavia hadn't deprived the Albanians of any right: they never had any schools and they were granted civic equality, roads, better hygienic conditions etc., what they hadn't had under the Ottoman rule.<sup>133</sup>

The Albanian diplomacy evinced the largest activity concerning the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia on the occasion of signing of the Yugoslav-Turkish convention on emigration to Turkey of 400,000 Muslim families from the Southern parts of Yugoslavia. At that point it started spreading strong propaganda against

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Albania between Italy and Yugoslavia. (Stojadinović, pp. 517-518; Galeazzo Ciano, *Diario*, I, Milano, Roma 1947, p. 26.)

127 David J. Kostelancik, *Minorities and Minority Language Education in Inter-War Albania*, *East European Quarterly*, XXX, 1, 1996, p. 80. In its statement of October 1, 1920 on the occasion of its joining the League of Nations in which it promised to observe rights of minorities, Albania consented in article 3, to mutual voluntary exchange of populations with neighbouring countries. (*Liga naroda i manjine*, p. 26.)

128 Avramovski, *Britanci*, I, p. 602; *Ibid.*, II, pp. 314-315, 415.

129 The Kosovo Committee vegetated, showing weak activity. (VA, pop. 17, k. 959, f. 2, d. 2, 7.) With Italian aid, the Albanian authorities founded a new one in 1936, but it didn't evince much activity either. (VA, pop. 17, k. 27, f. 3, d. 40, 41, 43; f. 4, d. 17, 35.) This other Kosovo Committee, which had its seat in Scutari, was condemned as "capitulating", by Hakif Bajrami. (Bajrami, *L'oppression*, p. 80.)

130 Zamboni, p. 464; Schmidt-Neke, p. 159; Rotschild, pp. 362, 366. So for instance, Zog had himself crowned as the king of the Albanians (and not of Albania) in 1928, which provoked Yugoslav protests. Eventually everything ended with that: with an empty title and with futile protests. (Avramovski, *Jugoslovensko-albanski odnosi*, p. 75; *Idem*, *Britanci*, I, 508; Zamboni, pp. 468-471; Rotschild, p. 366.) Zamboni supposes Zog had taken that title in order to fortify his position in Albania and to steal the march on Hasan Prishtina who was on the Italian pay-list. One of such measures of platonic irredentism was the appointment of Ismet Kryeziu as the prefect of the "future District of Kosovo and the Metohija". (Hadri Kosovo, p. 71.) It was certainly one of the ways to appease the impatient Kosovars.

131 *Albanien und die Balkankonferenz*, *Nation und Staat*, V, 3, 1931, p. 209.

132 VA, pop. 17, k. 95a, f. 2, d. 1; Schmidt-Neke, p. 159; Fisher, p. 70.

133 Avramovski, *Prilog*, p. 125.

emigration among the Albanians in Yugoslavia, whereas official representatives were sent to Turkey to dissuade it from signing and implementing such a convention.<sup>134</sup> Ostensibly under the pressure of the public opinion, the Albanian government proposed to the Yugoslav one negotiations on emigration of the Albanians to Albania, but the Yugoslav government refused to discuss it.<sup>135</sup> For their part, Yugoslav officials hypocritically reassured Albanian diplomats there would be no resettlement of the Albanians from Yugoslavia.<sup>136</sup> British diplomats in Belgrade thought Yugoslavia had been pursuing a policy of systematically pressurizing the Albanians so as to make them emigrate.<sup>137</sup> According to a report from mid-1938, the Albanian government was opposed to the emigration of the Albanians from Yugoslavia because it would stymie its territorial ambitions.<sup>138</sup>

Probably the last attempt of the Albanian diplomacy to intercede in favor of the Albanians in Yugoslavia was indirect, just a few months before the occupation of Albania. Italian foreign minister Galeazzo Ciano, who had already been plotting the invasion at that time, received Zog's aide Serregi who handed him Zog's letter in which the Albanian king begged Ciano for some kind of intervention with the Yugoslav government in favor of the Albanians in Yugoslavia. Ciano's reaction was cynical enough: "If things go well and if Stojadinović wants us to act determinedly, I'll show Zog intercession all right!"<sup>139</sup>

It was only the Italians who gave teeth to the organized Albanian irredentism. Soon after the occupation of Albania, the Italian foreign minister Ciano came to the idea to kill two birds with one stone by encouraging Albanian irredentist hopes: to divert the attention of the conquered Albanians on the one hand and to "keep a dagger directed at Yugoslavia's spine" on the other.<sup>140</sup> Mussolini himself championed similar ideas in May of that year.<sup>141</sup> Ciano didn't believe sincerely that Italy could get Kosovo and the Metohija,<sup>142</sup> but nevertheless, the Italian authorities started systematically instigating Albanian nationalism.<sup>143</sup> Until they were abolished, the Albanian diplomatic and consular representations had been spreading the Italian-Albanian propaganda about the upcoming liberation among the Albanians in Yugoslavia.<sup>144</sup>

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134 AJ, 37, 53/332; Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, f. II; VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 1, d. 16; k. 79, f. 1, d. 24; Avramovski (ed.), *Britanci*, III, p. 59. King Zog also acted in the same sense – allegedly at a secret meeting in Istanbul with Ferhat bey Draga and Turkish officials. (Hoxha, p. 266.) Albanian foreign minister traveled to Ankara after the convention had been signed, to dissuade Turkey from its implementation. (Momir Stojković, *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi*, II, p. 417.) Ferhat bey Draga and MP Malić Pelivanović also intervened in order to prevent the implementation. (Avdić, *Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori*, p. 124; Jovanović, *Iseljavanje*, pp. 10-11.)

135 Hoxha, p. 310. Allegedly, the Albanian government offered to take on 40-50.000 Albanian peasants when it got wind of the negotiations with Turkey. (Avramovski, *Britanci*, II, p. 416.)

136 AJ, Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, f. II.

137 Avramovski, *Britanci*, II, p. 416.

138 AJ, 37, 28/206.

139 Ciano, p. 24.

140 *Ibid.*, p. 85; Vinaver, *Fašizam*, pp. 99-100; Fisher, pp. 71-72.

141 Vinaver, *Fašizam*, p. 104.

142 Fisher, p. 84.

143 Ciano, p. 269; Vinaver, *Fašizam*, pp. 105, 119-121.

144 VA, pop. 17, k. 26, f. 2, d. 35; Avramovski, *Prilog*, pp. 132-135; Hadri, *Kosovo*, p. 71.

As we have seen the question of the Albanian and Turkish minorities was connected both on the spot and in the diplomatic activity of Yugoslavia, Albania and Turkey. The latter, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and consolidation of the republic, established good relations with Yugoslavia in 1925: the lack of common border and radical changes in Turkey contributed to the development of friendly relations.<sup>145</sup> In minority matters they were mostly confined to mutual assistance in emigration of the Muslims from Yugoslavia, and the sole moot point was the indemnification Turkey demanded for 100,000 hectares of land the emigrants allegedly had left behind in their old homeland.<sup>146</sup> The Turkish authorities had been inviting the Muslims from the Balkans to emigrate to Turkey since 1914, and such policy was continued after the First World War too.<sup>147</sup> Due to the general anti-minority attitude of the ruling circles, Yugoslavia encouraged and facilitated the emigration of the Muslims in order to obtain space for the colonization of Slavic settlers.<sup>148</sup> In that way the push and pull factors worked hand in hand, and the question of property wasn't posed in the inter-state relations in the same way as in the case of other mother states. It was typical that the Turkish authorities weren't bothered much about the nationality of the emigrants, i.e. they didn't pay attention if these had actually been Ethnic Turks or not.<sup>149</sup> Insisting on Turkish nationality was only declaratory and meant for propaganda purposes.<sup>150</sup>

These views of the two countries led to signing of the convention on emigration of some 200,000 Muslims from the Southern parts on July 11, 1938.<sup>151</sup> It is not quite clear who initiated this convention,<sup>152</sup> but it seems Yugoslavia was the

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145 Jovanović, *Iseljavanje*, p. 7.

146 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

147 Dogo, *Muslimani*, pp. 456-457. Only in 1929 Turkey became master of its own customs and immigration policy. (Jovanović, *Iseljavanje*, p.4.) The Law on Colonization was passed in June 1934, and the convention with Romania was concluded in the same year providing for emigration of the Muslims within five years. The Turkish authorities intended to settle the "appropriate element" in the vacated regions bordering on Iraq and Iran, from which the Kurds had been "cleansed" in the early 1930s, and where the colonization of the local Turks had failed. (*Ibid.*, p. 5.)

148 *AJ*, 382, 1/61; *VA*, pop. 17, k. 22, f. 3, d. 49; Avdić, *Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori*, p. 113. Before the world public the Yugoslav government depicted the process of Muslim emigration and Slavic colonization as purely social measures aimed at helping the landless. (*AJ*, 382, 1/61.) The emigration process was simplified by the Law on Citizenship of 1928 which provided for express cancellation of citizenship and civic duties of the non-Slavic citizens who wished to emigrate. They were also granted privileges on their emigration and when selling their property. (Jovanović, *Iseljavanje*, p. 8.)

149 Bandžović, p. 153. According to British reports, the ruling Turkish circles kept on purpose blur the difference between the terms Turk and Muslim (Dogo, *Muslimani*, p. 459.) which were synonymous in the minds of many Balkan Muslims.

150 Dogo, *Muslimani*, p. 462; Avramovski, *Britanci*, III, p. 88. Allegedly that was the attitude of Kemal Atatürk, who insisted that only Turks and no Albanians immigrate. (Gazmend Shpuza, *Ataturc et les Relations albano-turques*, *Studia albanica*, 2, 1981, p. 137.)

151 Avdić, *Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori*, p. 119. The Albanian consul in Skopje claimed in 1937 that the Yugoslav authorities wanted to resettle 100.000 Albanians, claiming the Turks had already left (Vickers, p. 119.), what was, to be sure, not true.

152 There are indications Yugoslavia proposed solving the question of the Muslim emigration through negotiations with Turkey in 1934 (Bandžović, *Iseljenici*, p. 143.) In mid-1937 Yugoslavia demanded a convention on that matter. (Avdić, *Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori*, p. 114.) In early 1938 the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* wrote that the

more active partner. However, it is certain that it agreed with the wishes of the ruling circles of both countries. The convention prescribed from which districts of "Southern Serbia" the Turks and people of "Turkish culture" would be resettled. It was foreseen that Yugoslavia would pay 20 million Turkish liras for 40,000 families, and the way of payment was also established: 30% in foreign currency and 70% in Yugoslav dinars into a special account of the Turkish government with the Yugoslav National Bank, to be used for Turkish payments in Yugoslavia. The convention was to enter into force when approved by both governments. The emigration was to be spread over six years.<sup>153</sup> Eventually the convention was never implemented due to lack of money in Turkey, i.e. its demand for a revision of the financial part of the agreement (that also had been the thorniest one during the negotiations of the convention), although the Yugoslav foreign minister Aleksandar Cincar-Marković was willing to accept even the worsened financial conditions.<sup>154</sup>

Much less is known about the role of the minority question in the relations with Czechoslovakia and Poland. On the one hand, their minorities were comparatively small (particularly the Polish one), whereas Yugoslav minorities in these countries didn't exist, on the other. Furthermore, there was no common border, but there were many common interests within the framework of preservation of the post-war status quo. The state was more forthcoming toward Slavic minorities (particularly toward the Slovaks and Czechs) than toward others.<sup>155</sup> The same held true of

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Yugoslav government had asked of Turkey to resettle 200.000 Turks into Turkey. (Cumhuriyet, January 25, 1938.) A month later, at the meeting of the Council of the Balkan Treaty, Turkey initiated regulating the emigration of the Muslims from the Balkans through inter-state conventions. (AJ, 382, 1/61; Avdić, *Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori*, p. 113; Bajrami, *Konventa*, pp. 268-269.) This was discussed also on the occasion of the visit of Turkish foreign minister Rusdi Aras to Belgrade in May of that year. (Reichspost, May 13, 1938.) Eventually the negotiations opened in June 1938 in Istanbul. (Avdić, *Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori*, pp. 116-119.)

153 Jovanović, *Iseljavanje*, pp. 9-10; Avdić, *Jugoslovensko-turski pregovori*, pp. 119-122; Bajrami, *Konventa*, pp. 251-258. According to Avdić lists of people desirous of emigrating were being made ever since 1934. Allegedly emigration became mandatory for the peasants who had signed up. (Avdić, *Opšti pregled*, p. 163.)

154 Jovanović, *Iseljavanje*, p. 10; Vickers, p. 118; Bajrami, *Konventa*, p. 268. Bajrami's claim the convention wasn't implemented due to the intervention of the Yugoslav revolutionary youth (Bajrami, *Konventa*, p. 271.) is pure nonsense and is due to the ideology of the time when his article was published. Moreover, it is at variance with the document he himself quotes on page 268. The claim of Momir Stojković that the convention wasn't implemented because of the intervention of the Albanian diplomacy is also not true. (Stojković, *Balkanski ugovorni odnosi, 1876-1996*, II, p. 417.) It is interesting that the Turkish consul in Skopje stated in October 1938 that the convention wouldn't even be signed since the Albanian government had used all means at its disposal to prevent it, and because even in the Turkish government there had been persons opposed to it. (VA, pop. 17, k. 94, f. 1, d. 16.) The next year, the same consul agitated against emigration to Turkey. (VA, pop. 17, k. 22, f. 3, d. 49.) It is not to be ruled out that he did this following the instructions of his government which wanted to revise the financial part of the agreement first and to ratify and implement the convention only after that. (Bajrami, *Konventa*, p. 268.)

155 Thus, the Czechoslovak minority was allowed to maintain several private schools. (Sirkacki, *Mesto*, p. 50; Gligorijević, *Politička istupanja*, p. 155.)

representatives of Czechoslovakia.<sup>156</sup> In the interest of good relations with the allied country, the Czechoslovak authorities and press were prone to turn a deaf ear to complaints of the Czechs and Slovaks from Yugoslavia about insufficient minority education,<sup>157</sup> taking in that way the similar stand as Germany, that the whole (i.e. the mother country and its interests) was more important than the numerically weak national minority. The Czechoslovak ambassador Robert Fidler went so far in his forthcoming toward the host country as to state in 1932, that it would be no misfortune if the Czechs and Slovaks in Yugoslavia assimilated linguistically.<sup>158</sup> However, all this doesn't mean Czechoslovak representatives didn't intervene in favor of their co-nationals in some cases – it only seems such cases were comparatively rare.

Polish diplomatic representatives keenly monitored the situation of the Polish minority.<sup>159</sup> They were much less satisfied with the situation of the Polish national minority in Bosnia than were their Czechoslovak colleagues. Thus Polish ambassador V. Ginter considered in 1934 the situation of the Polish colonists in Bosnia unsatisfactory, that they had been brutally handled and discriminated against.<sup>160</sup> The consul in Zagreb, Stefan Fidler Alberti also deemed that the status of the Poles had been bad and the attitude of the authorities hostile.<sup>161</sup> However, he had intervened in favor of his co-nationals, which, in his opinion, brought about a drastic improvement in the behavior of the local authorities toward the Poles.<sup>162</sup> This was yet another example when a foreign diplomat undertook to intervene in favor of Yugoslav citizens, and when the Yugoslav authorities accepted such an intervention. The Polish diplomacy hoped to improve the situation of the Polish national minority through the improvement of the bilateral relations of the two countries.<sup>163</sup> This indeed happened after the ratification of the Polish-Yugoslav agreement from May 1933, so that the consul in Zagreb considered in February 1938 that the attitude of the authorities toward the Poles had become so good, that one couldn't demand anything more in that respect.<sup>164</sup> Like in the case of the Romanians, Germans and Magyars, in the case of the Poles, the improvement of the situation of the national minority was the consequence of the improved inter-state relations. Once again the Yugoslav authorities proved they were willing to bend to the necessities of the foreign policy.

Apart from featuring more or less significantly in the inter-state relations, the minority question played a role for the Yugoslav diplomacy also in the League of Nations which was the guarantor of the implementation of the Convention on Protection of Minorities. The procedure of submitting complaints about infringement of minority rights to the Council of the League of Nations, was developed gradually over the first few post-war years. In its final form it foresaw several steps. Firstly, the Secretary General had to determine if the petition was acceptable at all. In order to be so, it had to be concerned with the protection of minorities in accordance with the Convention on Protection of Minorities, i.e. it couldn't have a separatist tendency, it

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156 AV, 126/IV, 18525/31.

157 AJ, 38, 32/77; 66, 7/16.

158 Vreme, December 19, 1932.

159 Drljača, Marija Dombrovska, pp. 133-135, 137-138, 142, 144, 146-148.

160 Ibid., p. 134.

161 Ibid., pp. 133-134.

162 Ibid., p. 140.

163 Ibid., p. 146.

164 Ibid., pp. 146-147.



couldn't be anonymous or from not a well-established source, it couldn't be couched in rough and insulting language, and it couldn't deal with a subject already discussed by the League of Nations.<sup>165</sup> If the Secretary General established that the form of the petition was acceptable, he would send it to the accused country which had three weeks to answer if it had remarks concerning the petition. If yes, the state was granted two more months (and more if need be) to send its remarks. After that, these would be sent, together with the petition, to a committee of three (in more difficult cases of five) countries, none of which could be a neighbor of the accused country or a mother country of the complaining minority. This committee would then submit a report to the Council of the League of Nations, which would make a decision, if one hadn't been found previously. If necessary, the procedure could be speeded up. The committee of the three countries was not obliged to submit the petition to the Council for a decision, even if it had found that the complaint had been justified.<sup>166</sup> This procedure had many critics, above all among national minorities and countries with the largest Diaspora, but the attempt of Germany and Canada of 1929 at reforming it ended up only with a certain increase in its publicity.<sup>167</sup> The major flaw of such a procedure of protection of minority rights was the inability of the Council of the League of Nations to take measures against the offending country. For this reason, even when it did intervene, the Council interceded between the accuser and the accused country. In other words, the Council sought political and not legal solutions. For the latter, in contentious cases, the Permanent Tribunal of International Justice at The Hague was in charge, whose decisions were also not mandatory. Thus, its power was primarily of a moral character.<sup>168</sup> All this was in keeping with the primary task of the League of Nations of protecting the world peace above all, and not national minorities as such, i.e. of protecting national minorities only inasmuch as the oppression of them could endanger the world peace.<sup>169</sup> The successes achieved in finding compromises behind the scenes remained unknown to the public opinion, so that the perception of the efficacy of the League of Nations in protecting minorities was actually worse than deserved.<sup>170</sup> Despite the procedure like this, it failed to satisfy both the accused states, unhappy with the breach of their sovereignty, and national minorities.<sup>171</sup>

The number of petitions from all over Europe was quite high: until 1929 there were some 300, and between 1929 and 1939 as many as 585.<sup>172</sup> Yugoslavia was accused 25 times until 1929,<sup>173</sup> but the bulk of the petitions aimed against Yugoslavia

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165 Rosting, p. 23; Fr. Wertheimer, *Deutschland, die Minderheitenschutz und der Völkerbund*, Berlin 1926, p. 47; Erler, p. 411.

166 Wertheimer, pp. 47-50; Pržić, pp. 277-283; Rosting, pp. 20-24; Erler, pp. 409-434; Jungmann, pp. 16, 21; Azcárate, pp. 104, 179-199; Schot, pp. 7-9.

167 Carole Fink, *Defender of Minorities: Germany and the League of Nations 1926-1933*, *Central European History*, V, 4, 1972, pp. 346-347; Pržić, pp. 284-286.

168 Pržić, pp. 296-299; Walters, pp. 175, 404.

169 Walters, p. 409.

170 Schot, p. 10.

171 Azcárate, pp. 130-131.

172 Some 150 were rejected as unacceptable in the first group, and 243 in the latter. (Rehak, Manjine, p. 128.)

173 Erler, p. 412.

started from that year on.<sup>174</sup> In the remaining part of this chapter we shall deal with the main petitions to the Council of the League of Nations complaining of treatment of national minorities in Yugoslavia, and how it managed to extricate itself.

Apart from the Bulgarians, all other petitions to the League of Nations concerning breach of minority rights in Yugoslavia were sent by the three “big” national minorities: the Albanians, Hungarians and Germans. Already in its reply to the letter sent to it by the secretary of the League of Nations on January 11, 1921, on the eve of its accession to the League, Albania asked for a “sincere intervention of the League of Nations in favor of the Albanians under the rule of Yugoslavia and Greece”.<sup>175</sup> The Albanian delegate Midhad Frashëri complained on March 3 and April 29 of that year of the extermination of the Albanians and all sorts of mishandling by the Yugoslav authorities, and three more letters with the same topic arrived from Tirana in the course of that same year.<sup>176</sup> The next year, a violent memo by the “Albanian colony in Sofia”, was put *ad acta* with the concurrence of the Albanian delegation.<sup>177</sup> A petition by the “Muslims of Kosovo and the Metohija and Serbian Macedonia” arrived from Constantinople in January 1923, demanding creation of a Greater Albania, and was rejected as unacceptable precisely on those grounds.<sup>178</sup> A petition of the Albanian cultural association Dëshirë from Sofia in favor of the Albanian refugees in Bulgaria to whom Turkey denied entrance, was also shelved in September of that year.<sup>179</sup> The next accusation came on September 26 of the same year, and it was sent by the leading Albanian irredentists Hasan bey Prishtina, Bedri bey Pejani and Bajram Cur. They accused the Yugoslav authorities of terror over the Albanians, burning of villages under the guise of chasing the kaçaks, of massacres, confiscation of land – all of which encouraged emigration to Turkey. The Yugoslav authorities replied with disqualifications that Hasan Prishtina was a terrorist, separatist and a convicted war criminal, that the Albanians were neither peaceful nor civilized citizens but backward robbers who had gained ground to the detriment of the Serbs during the previous fifty-odd years. They were depicted as a people without history and national consciousness, to which the Yugoslav authorities had only started bringing civilization and progress (with already perceptible success). Allegedly, the latter was seen also in the fact that the majority of the Albanians started helping the authorities in the struggle against gangs accused of disrupting the cultural development of the Albanians. Finally, this argumentation reminiscent of European colonial rhetoric in an African country, was coupled with the final conclusion that the Albanians were happy with their situation, the conclusive proof being the fact they had 14 MPs in

174 Some 47 petitions were submitted against Yugoslavia until 1939. Half of them were submitted by the pro-Bulgarian Macedonians, not included in the present work. They submitted the majority of their petitions during the 1920s. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 797; Azcárate, p. 49.) The newspaper Демократически гласник from Sofia wrote on June 5, 1931 of 15 petitions from Yugoslavia until that year: one in 1923, 1924 and 1928 respectively, two in 1929 and as many as 10 in 1930!

175 AJ, 69, 9/21. On joining the League of Nations Albania was obliged to give a statement about the protection of minorities which contained the stipulations of the Convention on the Protection of Minorities.

176 Dogo, *Kosovo*, pp. 253-254; Kokalari, p. 160.

177 Dogo, *Kosovo*, p. 254.

178 Ibid., p. 252.

179 Ibid., p. 256.

the Parliament, to none of whom it occurred to complain. If it hadn't been for the British representative Chamberlain, the committee of three would have shelved the matter quickly. As it was, a correspondence developed, in which the fact that the Hak had been suppressed, the Cemiyet disbanded, Ferhat bey Draga and others arrested in the meantime (of which Bedri Pejani complained in an anonymous petition of September 25, 1925, that had therefore been rejected), militated against Yugoslavia. Although the Yugoslav government did not reply to the enquiry about the reasons why the Cemiyet had been disbanded, the Albanian petition was finally shelved on March 4, 1926.<sup>180</sup> The Albanian consul-general in Switzerland and the representative in the League of Nations M. Blinishti and the Committee of the Albanian Colony in Turkey of Constantinople, submitted in March and April 1924 complaints accusing Yugoslavia of terrorizing the Albanians and making their life unbearable, but they were refused because the secretary of the Minority Section H. Rosting preferred to believe the Yugoslav government's explanation that the mentioned occurrences had been unrest with casualties on both sides.<sup>181</sup> A similar petition was sent the next year by the Committee for Liberation of Kosovo (the so-called "Kosovo Committee"), but it too wasn't taken into the procedure.<sup>182</sup> In 1924 even the Albanian nationalist prime minister Fan Noli submitted a petition by Prishtina, Cur and Pejani to the League of Nations dealing mainly with the murder of one of the main kaçaks, Azem Bejta. Since all the three main petitioners were on international wanted lists, the petition was never brought before the Council.<sup>183</sup>

In March 1927 Hasan Prishtina sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations Sir Eric Drummond, but the latter appraised it as too general, unclear and full of offensive phrases and hostility.<sup>184</sup> Prishtina, who had established contacts with Italian representatives in Vienna, received an explicit approval by Mussolini to petition the League of Nations, but then, at an Italian suggestion, desisted in October of the same year.<sup>185</sup> The Balkan Committee from London sent a complaint to the secretary of the League of Nations on July 10, 1928, complaining of a lack of minority schools in "Southern Serbia", the absence of members of minorities in the administration and arbitrariness by the officials. Although the petition concerned all inhabitants of these parts, it was obvious that the members of the committee had mostly the Bulgarians at heart. The Yugoslav government used this, claiming in its remarks of November 23, 1928 there were no Bulgarians in "Southern Serbia" and consequently, no minority problem there. Other minorities were less dealt with: it was said there were 526 Albanian and Turkish teachers, as well as a madrasa in Skopje, and that the Turks and Albanians had never complained to the Yugoslav authorities. As for the allegation that ethnic make-up of the officialdom didn't correspond to the ethnic make-up of the population, it refuted it with a juristically formally correct claim that no act made observance of national proportions within the

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180 AJ, 305, 8/18; Dogo, Kosovo, pp. 260-265.

181 AJ, 305, 8/17; Dogo, Kosovo, p. 255.

182 Hoxha, pp. 241-242.

183 Politika, December 11, 1924. The newspaper wrote Fan Noli had been brought to power by a revolution, and asked if another one, that was in progress at that moment (with Yugoslav aid, which wasn't mentioned) would sweep him out of it.

184 AJ, Stalna delegacija pri Društvu naroda, F. 15, dosije II; Dogo, Kosovo, pp. 178, 234-235.

185 AJ, Stalna delegacija pri Društvu naroda, F. 15, dosije II; Zamboni, p. 460; Dogo, Kosovo, p. 179.

civil service mandatory.<sup>186</sup> The Yugoslav reply was a typical example of half-truths and arbitrarily construed facts that the authorities of the Kingdom utilized in their replies to the League of Nations.

Hasan Prishtina submitted his petition on March 2, 1929, complaining in it, that the Yugoslav authorities denied schools and the right to use their mother tongue, civil rights, personal security to one million (sic!) Albanians, that they confiscate Albanian land, unjustly assess taxes and prevent assembling. The Yugoslav government answered on July 11 of the same year, accusing Prishtina of being a separatist, rebel and Serb-baiter who abused the League of Nations for propaganda purposes. The government said it would send a reply only out of respect for the Council of the League of Nations. In it, it claimed on August 21, the Albanians had schools and teachers paid for by the state. As for the emigration, it was said that it had been going on ever since the Turkish times, and that it was on a small scale, for religious and economic reasons. Consequently, the colonization wasn't leveled against the Albanians. The government asserted the Albanians had political rights, freedom to use their language and the press. It was claimed the taxes had been correctly assessed, and murders were explained by blood feuds. The committee of three of the League of Nations (Finland, Persia and Great Britain), after obtaining some additional explanations, favorably construed the Yugoslav reply in the sense that schools attended by the Albanians were schools in Albanian. With some little more dilly-dallying, the matter ended at that.<sup>187</sup> Such an end was typical for the minority petitions to the League of Nations, which was more prone to convince itself that the accused states had told the truth, rather than to investigate minority complaints more closely and possibly bring itself into an impossible situation of having to act.

The next Albanian petition (already quoted several times in the present work) was signed by three Albanian Roman-Catholic priests (Stefan Kurti, Luig Gashi and Gjon Bicaku) who escaped from Yugoslavia to Albania in January 1930. There they were received by the Albanian prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs as well as by other officials. According to them, they had escaped in order to avoid arrest and disciplinary punishment by their bishop Gnidovec, whereas the Belgrade press claimed they had run away because of financial malfeasance.<sup>188</sup> Despite the displeasure of the Vatican, the priests managed, with the discrete aid of the Italian ambassador in Vienna, to reach Geneva, where they handed the petition on May 5, 1930, that was published in Innsbruck soon afterwards.<sup>189</sup>

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186 PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4.

187 AJ, 305, 8/18; Stalna delegacija pri Društvu naroda, F. 15, dosije 15; Branislav Gligorijević, Položaj Šiptara u Jugoslaviji i odluka Saveta Društva naroda, Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis, 1-2, 1998, pp. 233-240; Dogo, Kosovo, pp. 228, 237-248. It is typical that the reply to the Yugoslav remarks wasn't penned by Hasan Prishtina, but by Italian consul in Bitola, Mazolini instead. (Dogo, Kosovo, p. 248.)

188 AJ, 38, 20/61. Il popolo d'Italia, February 5, 1930; Dogo, Kosovo, p. 268.

189 Dogo, Kosovo, pp. 268-270. Dogo doesn't rule out the possibility that someone from the Italian embassy in Vienna or from the Vatican Propaganda Fide for which they had been working, helped the three priest pen the petition. He doubts three village priests had such juridical knowledge and systematic argumentation. (Dogo, Kosovo, p. 271.) Indeed some details indicate the real authors were not the three priests. So for instance, on page 10, it is spoken about the colonization "des Monténégriens et des Bosniaques de

The petition of the three priests is in a way a summary of the previous Albanian petitions and it mainly repeats their accusations. Bicaku, Kurti and Gashi accused the Yugoslav authorities in their extensive petition of massacres over the Albanians, destruction of villages and the murder of the priest Gjeçove, terror aimed at spurring the Albanians to emigrate, arrests, requisitions, confiscations, arbitrary agrarian reform (with minimal indemnification), corvee (allegedly paid for the Serbs and without payment for the Albanians) and limitation of personal freedoms, and even prohibition of wearing of the Albanian national cap and imposition of wearing of the Serbian one. Accusations that public offices had been inaccessible to Albanians were adduced (which was true of the state offices, but not of the communal ones for which, as claimed in the petition, candidates had been appointed), as well as of gerrymandering. Furthermore, accusations of unjust tax assessments were aired, and that the use of the Albanian language was prohibited, just like private Albanian schools and every kind of intellectual life, that religious freedoms were breached by confiscation and destruction of religious buildings and graveyards. The authors of the petition demanded in the end sending of a special commission to investigate the situation.

The Yugoslav government answered only on November 15 (which only goes to show for how long the procedure could be stretched out if necessary). It was stated in the reply that the Albanians themselves were responsible for the victims, i.e. that they fell in the course of establishing order. A whole series of massacres was denied, and the authorities were acquitted of guilt for murders. The government's reply claimed the Albanians enjoyed complete linguistic and religious freedoms, whereas emigration was ascribed to religious fanaticism and reluctance to reconcile themselves with the loss of privileges or to the wish to escape punishment. The agrarian reform was depicted as a social measure from which all nationalities benefited, and in the course of which the land had been confiscated from all in accordance with the law, including Serbian monasteries. As for the Albanian civil servants, it was admitted they were few, but it was said that with the accession of the new, better educated generations, their number would rise, whereas it was said the majority of the communal mayors were Albanians. It was also stated that in the tax commissions, provincial council etc., the Albanians had been represented too (what was true, albeit the ratio always remained dubitable). It was claimed the freedom of language existed, although it was admitted there was no Albanian press. The latter was explained by lack of readers – what really was the main, albeit not the only reason. For several schools it was said they had come under state control on their own demand (which was not very likely) and for cultural societies, that they had never existed. (At that it remained unclear why, lacking a precedent, they couldn't be founded.) It was similarly claimed of Albanian schools, which had hardly existed, and allegedly the Albanians had never even asked for them. It was said of the Albanian literary language it didn't exist, so that there were no books or magazines, i.e., that the knowledge of Albanian was of next to no use. The existence of the Albanological Institute in Belgrade was quoted as an attempt at improving the Albanian literary language. The existence of religious freedoms was affirmed too, i.e. that certain measures that had been undertaken, hadn't been

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Sreme et du Donate" (sic!), which shows lack of knowledge of geographical and ethnic circumstances of the land. (A), 305, 8/18.)

leveled against freedom of religion.<sup>190</sup> After a further query, the Yugoslav authorities gave supplementary explanations in the same vein,<sup>191</sup> so that eventually this ambitiously written Albanian petition also ended unsuccessfully. In 1931 Hasan Prishtina made yet another attempt at moving the League of Nations to action by a petition that summarized his earlier complaints as well as the petition of the three escaped priests. In that way he disqualified himself, since it contained matters already discussed by the League of Nations.<sup>192</sup>

Another minority that complained to the League of Nations more frequently were the Magyars. Unlike the Albanians, they did it by leaning even more on the mother country, which posed as their champion anyway. Indeed, Budapest stood behind most of the petitions sent in the name of the Hungarian minority, and this was no secret for the Yugoslav government either.<sup>193</sup> It was typical that Hungarian petitions became more frequent only in the early 1930s as the dictatorship in Yugoslavia worsened the situation of national minorities. One of the first Hungarian complaints wasn't sent directly to the League of Nations, but to the conference of powers in Genoa in May 1922. In it Hungary complained of the situation of its minorities in the neighboring countries and begged the conference to influence the League of Nations to improve that situation.<sup>194</sup> Two months later, representatives of Hungary complained of the expulsion of the Magyars from the Bačka and the Banat. The Yugoslav government replied that not the Yugoslav citizens (i.e. members of the minority) but foreign (Hungarian) subjects had been expelled and returned in kind accusing Hungary of treating badly the Yugoslav minorities, teachers and diplomatic representatives in that country.<sup>195</sup> It is typical that the official Budapest was rather reserved toward submitting petitions to the Council of the League of Nations directly by representatives of the Hungarian national minority. Thus the Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade, Hory, held back the leaders of the Hungarian Party from petitioning the League of Nations, fearing reprisals against the minority.<sup>196</sup>

However, the main wave of Hungarian petitions started soon after the introduction of the dictatorship.<sup>197</sup> The former Secretary-General of the Hungarian Party Imre Prokopy started submitting them, but in fact the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was behind them.<sup>198</sup> His first complaint of November 20, 1929, concerned the prohibition of the use of the Hungarian language by the officials of the commune of Subotica. Five more petitions followed during April and May of the next year: about how nefarious for the Hungarian minority the Yugoslav educational policy was, about measures of local authorities, about sacking en masse of Hungarian teachers and the Law on Teachers' Training Colleges, about primary schools, as well as about secondary

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190 AJ, 305, 8/18; Dogo, Kosovo, pp. 271-273.

191 AJ, Stalna delegacija pri Društvu naroda, F. 15, dosije II.

192 Dogo, Kosovo, p. 249; La sera, March 3, 1931; Revue des Nationalités, May 1931.

193 Sajti, Hungarians, p. 133.

194 AJ, 305, 8/18.

195 AJ, 305, 8/18.

196 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 169.

197 The Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade claimed in May 1929 he too had encouraged Budapest to start sending complaints to the League of Nations. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4.)

198 Sajti, Hungarians, pp. 134-137; PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5.

and high schools.<sup>199</sup> The next year he submitted three more petitions about the school situation, prohibition of the Hungarian language and treatment of Hungarian sports, cultural and other associations. Further petitions followed, and their number reached 20 by February 28, 1933!<sup>200</sup> In the main of these petitions complaints were aired of the Yugoslav educational policy that demanded of minority teachers knowledge of the official language, made founding of private schools impossible, analyzed family names. Furthermore, opening of Hungarian secondary and teachers' schools was demanded and the use of the Hungarian language after the 4<sup>th</sup> grade of primary school (to which Yugoslavia legally wasn't formally obliged by the Convention on the Protection of the Minorities), restitution of school-buildings, abolition of preparatory classes etc. A smaller number of Hungarian classes was adduced in them than given by the official statistics.<sup>201</sup> The petition concerning associations complained about their disbanding, introduction of the "state language" as the official one in minority associations, demands that one half of their programs had to be in the "state language", as well as about confiscation of libraries, museums etc.<sup>202</sup>

As in other cases, the Yugoslav authorities replied by sexed-up statistics, half-truths (e.g. that studying in Hungary was possible – which was true only in a limited number of cases) or counterarguments (e.g. that teachers had to speak the official language in Hungary too, that firing of teachers for lack of language skills was a temporary measure and that some had already been reinstated, that there had been disproportionately many schools for the Magyars and too few for others before 1918). For the preparatory classes of which Prokopy and associates complained, it was said they were not mandatory – which *de iure* was true – although the local educational authorities put the pressure to bear upon members of minorities to enroll their children in them. The complaint that communal schools had been confiscated was refuted with an argumentation that communes had been in charge of maintaining school buildings. As for the name analysis, the practice was soft-pedaled.<sup>203</sup> To complaints about secondary and teachers' schools it was replied that Yugoslavia wasn't obliged to grant such schools (which was juridically speaking true), but it was replying only in order to refute Hungarian accusations. The Yugoslav government claimed the Hungarians could attend secondary schools abroad too (which was true only in very limited number of cases), that Hungarian classes were often too small but tolerated by the educational authorities in spite of that. Enrollment according to the territorial principle to which Prokopy also objected, was defended as a measure to prevent constant changing of schools and having too many applicants.<sup>204</sup> A too small number of teachers was

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199 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184.

200 Pétition présenté a la Société des Nations au sujet de l'enseignement primaire de la minorité hongroise et de la loi du 5 décembre 1929 sur l'enseignement primaire en Yougoslavie, s.l. 1930; Pétition présenté a la Société des Nations au sujet de l'enseignement secondaire hongroise en Yougoslavie, Genève 1930; Pétition présenté a la Société des Nations au sujet de la destitution en masse des instituteurs de la nationalité hongroise en Yougoslavie et de la loi yougoslave du 27 septembre 1929 sur les écoles normales d'instituteurs, Budapest 1930; ASANU 14530-II6/15; AJ, 305, 8/18; Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933, pp. 422-423.

201 Dimić, Kulturna politika, III, pp. 77-78.

202 AJ, 305, 8/18.

203 ASANU, 14530-II6/15; AJ, 305, 8/18; 38, 402/553.

204 AJ, 305, 8/18.

charged on Hungarian disinterest for teachers' training colleges.<sup>205</sup> To the petition concerning associations, it was replied there had been some 190 (registered!) associations in Yugoslavia, and that only those that had overstepped their statutes had been dissolved. (At that one couldn't discern from the number alone how many of these associations actually worked and with what intensity.) The demand for keeping books in the "state language" was excused by lack of language skills on part of some civil servants. It was claimed the laws on that matter were not aimed against minorities.<sup>206</sup> Apart from the above-mentioned petitions, the Magyars from Yugoslavia addressed the League of Nations also with two petitions of smaller scope. The first one was filed by the former official of the District Court in Veliki Bečkerek Zsigmond Polyi, who complained that he had been fired after 40 years of service in 1918 without the right to a pension.<sup>207</sup> The other petition which wasn't signed by indefatigable Prokopy, was sent by Leo Deák and nine citizens of Senta who complained of obstruction of the continuation of building of Roman-Catholic church in that town. The latter case was dropped after some complications, due to the willingness of the Yugoslav authorities to solve it by a compromise.<sup>208</sup> Some of the mentioned petitions found no great echo in Geneva,<sup>209</sup> which is understandable in view of the total number of petitions raining on the Council of the League of Nations, as well as of the pettiness of some of the subjects. Although they didn't achieve the desired effect in the League of Nations, the Hungarian petitions partly helped improve the treatment of the leaders of the Hungarian minority by the authorities and the situation of Hungarian education for a while.<sup>210</sup>

The largest national minority (according to the first post-war census), the Germans, refrained for a long time from seeking the aid of the League of Nations to get their rights. The reason was certainly to be found in a somewhat better treatment of the majority of the Volksdeutsche immediately after the foundation of Yugoslavia, in the unwillingness of the German diplomacy to seek the intervention of the Council and in the hope that political maneuvering in the inner politics and the influence of Germany would manage to improve the position of the German national minority. For the first time the Germans threatened with the League of Nations on the occasion of the draft bill on primary schools, indirectly through the German Foreign Ministry in September 1929, although they had started thinking about the petition already in autumn 1928. The imposition of the dictatorship and the inability of representatives of minorities to influence decisions concerning minorities too, spurred them to materialize their intention.<sup>211</sup>

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205 ASANU, 14530-II6/15.

206 AJ, 305, 8/18.

207 Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 249.

208 AJ, 71, 30/60; 63 (pov.), 1933, f. 14, 1-260; Mesaroš, Položaj, p. 249. The building of the church had started already before the First World War, but after it was prevented, by the (predominantly Serbian) local authorities in this predominantly Magyar town. The reason was that the Roman-Catholic church would screen off the Orthodox one and would be too close to the Orthodox cross.

209 Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1933-1941, p. 57.

210 Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933, p. 423; Pester Lloyd, June 9, 1933.

211 At first the Volksdeutsche leaders deliberated if they should file a general complaint, or complain about the particular case of the "German House". (PA, Abt. IIb, Politische Beziehungen Jugoslawien und Deutschland, Politik 2, Jugoslawien, Bd. 3.) The official of the Auswärtiges Amt, Reinbeck tried to convince the leader of the Yugoslav Germans,



Nevertheless, the first petition of the Yugoslav Germans<sup>212</sup> wasn't submitted to the League of Nations over schools but over confiscation of the "German House" (Deutsches Haus) in Celje. It was filed by lawyer Walter Riebl in June 1930.<sup>213</sup> The process before the organs of the League of Nations dragged on until the end of February 1935 when the Yugoslav government finally agreed to fulfill the promises it had previously given and to end the dispute with a compromise by paying the School Foundation of the Germans in Yugoslavia 500,000 dinars as indemnification for the confiscated "German House."<sup>214</sup> Despite partial success of this petition, the Volksdeutsche didn't petition the League of Nations again. On the one hand, their main protectress, Germany, left the League of Nations in 1933,<sup>215</sup> and on the other, its rise in the 1930s awakened hopes the situation (that had already been partly mended)

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Kraft to postpone the petition to the League of Nations until it was clear if the Yugoslav foreign minister Marinković would fulfill his promise to talk with king Alexander about the Volksdeutsche remarks on the bill on primary schools (on which ministers for education and the interior held adamant views). (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 4.)

- 212 In early April 1929 the Germans from Slovenia wrote a memo for the League of Nations about their situation, but it was never sent because the Austrian diplomacy didn't deem it opportune. (Suppan, *Zur Lage*, p. 204.)
- 213 The society "German House" was founded in 1898 with the task of raising money and building a house that would be the centre of the Germans in Celje and its vicinity and that would serve as counter-weight to the Slovenian "People's House". The money was raised throughout Germany and Austria since nationalist circlets considered it their duty to support the Germandom at such a prominent and endangered spot. Due to financial difficulties after the First World War the house was formally sold to eleven Celje Germans, whereas the statutes of the society were changed, albeit not its goal. The Slovenian authorities refused to recognize the change of the statutes in July 1919 with the explanation the association had breached them by selling the house. For the same reason the society was disbanded soon afterwards and its property put under sequester. Higher authorities confirmed these decisions in 1924 and 1926. The legal attempt to turn the house over, in keeping with the society's statutes, to the association the Südmark that was to hand it over to another association with similar goals failed because the authorities didn't recognize the right of the association "Union" (est. 1924) to take over the house. In December 1924 the District Chief of Maribor turned the house over to the association the "Celje House". The complaint of the Südmark to the Supreme Court in Zagreb yielded no result, so that Riebl, having secured the support of the German and Austrian diplomacies, filed a complaint with the League of Nations. (PA, Abt. IIb, Nationalitätenfrage, Fremdvölker, Politik 6, Jugoslawien, Bd. 5; Suppan, *Zur Lage*, pp. 185-187; Idem, *Jugoslawien*, pp. 801-808.) Attorney Riebl was arrested in December 1930, which was meant as pressure on the Volksdeutsche. (Münchener Neuste Nachrichten, December 15, 1930; Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, December 15, 1930.)
- 214 Völkischer Beobachter, February 17, 1935; Karner, p. 43. During the debate in the League of Nations, the Yugoslav representative Fotić claimed the Yugoslav authorities had confiscated the "German House" quite justifiably, because it had allegedly been meant for Germanization. (Jutro, October 13, 1933.) The compromise was in the offing already in 1933 (Slovenec, September 26, 1933.), but the Yugoslav authorities delayed its implementation.
- 215 Germany joined the League of Nations in order to help its minorities in European countries. The final goal was their survival with a view to revising the Paris peace treaties. When the activity within the League of Nations failed to yield the desired results, Germany left the organization. (Cf. Kimmich, o.c.)

would further improve under the influence of the increasingly more powerful Reich, rather than under that of the increasingly impotent League of Nations. A similar tendency of leaning more on the mother country, rather than on the weakening League of Nations could be observed with the Hungarians too. It was typical of all the three "big" minorities that petitioned the League of Nations that, as a rule, they did it co-operatively, with the active support of diplomacies of their mother countries or of some other interested powers. In that way, they tried to give more weight to their complaints. To be sure, this complicated international relations, but in some cases it still yielded some, albeit scanty, results for minorities.

Even scantier were the results achieved by the Congress of the Organized Minorities of Europe which was active from 1925 to 1938. It united a large number of national minorities. Its mainstay were German, Hungarian and Jewish minorities.<sup>216</sup> Despite frowning by the authorities, representatives of the Germans and Hungarians from Yugoslavia were almost always there. Minority congresses were not official organizations but an association of national minorities whose aim was to put pressure to bear upon the League of Nations and its members, to improve the position of minorities. Their sessions as a rule took place three days before the opening of the annual general assembly of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, the influence of the Congress remained way behind that of the League of Nations which by its cautiousness in minority matters, indirectly weakened the power of the Congress too, which, having been just an informal organization, had even less authority than the League of Nations. In the 1930s due to the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations, discrimination against the Jews in that country and because of the wish of German minorities to use the Congress for foreign policy aims of the Nazis, it started falling apart due to dropping out of several ethnic groups.<sup>217</sup> In any case, the minority Congress never posed a significant problem for the Yugoslav diplomacy.

The Yugoslav authorities eschewed addressing minority questions on the foreign policy scene because they feared interference with their internal affairs. However, such interventions of mother countries couldn't be avoided. Their representatives intercede with the Yugoslav authorities for the improvement of the situation of their minorities, but they also interfered with internal affairs of minorities themselves, directing them in accordance with the policy of their respective states. The situation of some minorities (the Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Romanians, Italians) was really improved in the direct interaction between Yugoslavia and their mother countries. The power and the influence of a mother country or its improved

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216 On the Congress see: Sabine Bamberger-Stemmann, *Der Europäischer Nationalitätenkongreß 1925 bis 1938. Nationale Minderheiten zwischen Lobbytendum und Großmachtinteressen*, Marburg 2000. It is typical that representatives of the Magyars from Yugoslavia participated in 1925 only on Budapest's insistence - fearing it could spoil the cooperation between the HP and the PRP. (Sajti, Hungarians, pp. 128-129.)

217 Pržić, pp. 306-312; Új Hírek, December 19, 1938; Rad kongresa narodnih manjina, *Nova Evropa*, 23, 1933; Rad kongresa narodnih manjina, *Nova Evropa*, 6, 1931. The journal for minority questions *Nation und Staat* also regularly observed the work of the minority congresses. The Congress formally continued working after 1938 too, and even during the Second World War but as a weak German puppet. (Cf. Bamberger-Stemmann, pp. 383 ff.)

relations with Yugoslavia brought in the process also the alleviation of the situation of respective minorities. As for the complaints of members of minorities to the League of Nations, they were partly rejected for formal reasons, and partly delayed, only to eventually have an outcome that was, as a rule, more favorable for Yugoslav diplomacy than for the national minorities. The League of Nations had neither the power nor the will to impose a stricter observance of minority rights, even on a comparatively small and weak country, by European standards, such as was Yugoslavia.



## Chapter Fifteen

# Yugoslav Minorities in the Neighboring Countries

Drawing of the borders of the newly-created Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, not only failed to satisfy the most extreme nationalists among the leading peoples of the new state, but also often didn't correspond to the ethnic situation on the ground. A large number of Yugoslavs were left outside of the new state – partly because they had lived scattered as minorities among members of neighboring peoples and partly because of the impossibility of the young Kingdom to militarily or diplomatically achieve their annexation. (This was particularly the case of the Slovenes and Croats in Istria and the Slovenes in Austria.) Almost all of them found themselves within the neighboring countries which themselves had larger or smaller minorities in Yugoslavia, which often raised the question of reciprocity – if not in diplomatic relations, then at least within the Yugoslav public.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, all neighboring countries undertook the obligation, by signing the Convention on the Protection of Minorities or by giving a statement to that effect on joining the League of Nations, to observe the minimum of minority rights that had been declared the international standard in that matter after the First World War. The sole exception was Italy which referred to its ancient civilization and (what was more important) its status as a great power, for which it claimed, they were a sufficient guarantee that it would respect minority rights. In this chapter we shall give a short survey of the situation of Yugoslav national minorities in the neighboring countries: on the one hand in order to understand their importance for the bilateral relations with the respective mother countries and on the other, to create a comparative picture of the situation of national minorities in the region – with the final aim of determining if the situation of national minorities in Yugoslavia was better or worse than in the surrounding countries.

The largest Yugoslav minority existed in Italy, for the greatest part in Istria. It numbered some 300,000 Slovenes and 100,000 Croats,<sup>2</sup> with a negligible number of

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- 1 In political tug-of-war with representatives of the German minority even the Lausitsa Sorbs were sometimes mentioned as an example how the mother country of one of the minorities which so vehemently demanded their rights badly treated a minority some Serbian circles in Yugoslavia, because of its similarly sounding name, regarded as their Diaspora. (SBNS KSHS, Vanredan saziv za 1925. godinu, Beograd 1925, p. 218; Ibid., Redovan saziv za 1926/27, III, p. 328.)
  - 2 The number of members of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries is no less dubitable than the number of members of national minorities in Yugoslavia. According to the Austrian census of 1910, there were 421.000 Italians and 480.000 Slovenes and Croats in that territory. According to the Italian census of 1921 there were 287.561 Slovenes and 92.800 Croats in Italy. With Rijeka (Fiume) there were 362.671 Yugoslavs (foreigners included) in Italy in 1925. However, Yugoslav authors reckoned there were 530.308 in 1921, or "at least" 600.000 in 1931. According to unpublished Italian data,

Serbs. For the greatest part, they became Italian subjects only after 1918,<sup>3</sup> having been Austrian citizens (except those in Rijeka who were Hungarian) until then. They inhabited part of the territory promised to Italy by the secret London Treaty that was the basis for Italy's entrance into the war. Although the treaty didn't remain in force as a whole, thanks to its military and diplomatic clout among the allies, Italy managed to grab from the still unconsolidated Yugoslavia considerable territories inhabited to a large extent or even predominantly by a non-Italian, Slavic population.

Italian politicians (including the king himself) promised all rights to the inhabitants of the newly-annexed territories.<sup>4</sup> Despite that, a quite strict Italianizing military regime was introduced, under which several popular leaders of these two nationalities were arrested, interned or expelled. Organization of assemblies was forbidden and the press confiscated.<sup>5</sup> Already in the first days of Italian rule, 149 Yugoslav schools were denied permission to continue operating.<sup>6</sup> Removing (arrests, internment, expulsion) of the undesirable priests (who refused to celebrate mass in Italian) started,<sup>7</sup> as well as sacking of Croat and Slovene civil servants.<sup>8</sup> Such a nationally intolerant policy was basically supported by all Italian parties, although those from the center and the left wing of the political spectrum favored a somewhat less violent and more gradual assimilation.<sup>9</sup> After abolition of the military administration, the regime was somewhat softened, but excesses of nationalist Italian groups continued.<sup>10</sup>

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there were 251.759 Slovenes and 130.354 Croats, as opposed to 559.553 Italians in the newly-annexed territories in 1936. (Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, p. 32; *L'Italie et la minorité yougoslave*, Ljubljana 1931, pp. 6-7; *The Position of the Yugoslav Minority in Italy*, Ljubljana 1927, p. 6; Tone Ferenc, *Milica Kacin-Wohinz*, Tone Zorn, *Slovenci v zamejstvu. Pregled zgodovine 1918-1945*, Ljubljana 1974, p. 12; *Naši u inostranstvu*, in: *Jubilarni zbornik života i rada SHS*, p. 766; Ammende (ed.), p. 474.) Obviously, the same factors we have touched upon when talking about the number of members of national minorities in Yugoslavia were also at work in the making of these censuses and estimations.

- 3 Italy got Val del Natisone, Val del Torre and Val Resia by a referendum in 1866, along with several tens of thousands of Slovenes who were subject to violent assimilation during the next decades. (Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, pp. 23-24.)
- 4 Jaquin, pp. 56-61; Milica Kacin-Wohinz, *La minoranza sloveno-croata sotto l'Italia fascista*, Quaderni, VIII, 1984/85, p. 91; Idem, *Jugoslavensko-talijanski odnosi i slovensko-hrvatska manjina u Italiji između dvaju ratova*, in: *Talijanska uprava na hrvatskom prostoru 1918-1943*, Zagreb 2001, p. 72; *Italian Genocide Policy Against the Slovenes and the Croats. A Selection of Documents*, Beograd 1954, pp. 11-12; *Patnje našeg naroda pod Italijom*, *Narodna odbrana*, 23, 1927, pp. 426-427; *The Position*, pp. 8-11.
- 5 Jaquin, pp. 63-65. It lasted until August 1919 when a civilian commissariat was introduced. (Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 38.)
- 6 Mate Demarin, *O denacionalizaciji hrvatskog školstva u Istri u doba vojne okupacije od 1918. do aneksije 1920. godine*, *Zbornik za historiju školstva i prosvjete*, 4, 1968, pp. 13-16; Jaquin, p. 92; *The Position*, p. 15.
- 7 *Italian Genocide Policy*, p. 31; *The Position*, pp. 18-20.
- 8 *Italian Genocide Policy*, p. 35.
- 9 Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 42; Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, p. 32.
- 10 Because of one such, bishop Andrej Karlin had to escape to Yugoslavia in December 1919. Certainly the most significant incident was the burning of the "People's House" in Trieste on July 13, 1920, that was a retaliation for a skirmish between the crew of an

The new territories were officially annexed in 1921, and by 1927 Austrian laws were substituted by Italian ones. The administrative division that was introduced in the meantime was not favorable for the Slovenes and Croats because it was so designed as to leave them in the minority.<sup>11</sup> The first elections in 1921 were coupled with terror and bloodshed, but the Slovenes managed to elect five MPs.<sup>12</sup> On the whole, between mid-1921 and mid-1922 a large offensive of the Fascists ensued, in the course of which they managed to bring the Julian Mark under their control – even before they officially came to power in the whole country.<sup>13</sup>

Mussolini's accession in 1922 worsened the situation of the Yugoslav national minorities further still,<sup>14</sup> especially so since the Slovenes had split into the liberals and clericals in mid-1922.<sup>15</sup> The process of deterioration of the status of the Slovenian and Croat national minorities under the Fascist rule went in parallel with the strengthening of the Fascist regime and the dwindling of civic and political liberties in general.<sup>16</sup> The school reform of educational minister Gentile reduced Slovenian and Croatian language to optional subjects in 1923, only to abolish them altogether two years later.<sup>17</sup> All Slovenian and Croat schools were gradually shut down by 1928/29.<sup>18</sup> Courses of the Slovenian and Croatian languages were forbidden, and studying abroad made impossible.<sup>19</sup> According to the Yugoslav data, out of some 900 Slovenian and Croat teachers working in 1918, some 800 were dismissed, whereas

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Italian ship and Yugoslav gendarmes in Split in which two Italian sailors had been killed. (Kacin-Wohinz, p. 92; Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, p. 33; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 39; Italian Genocide Policy, pp. 45-51.) "People's Houses" in several other Slovenian and Croat places were also burnt down in that year, and attacks on printing-houses, editorial offices etc. also occurred. (L'Italie, p. 8; Pitanje, p. 427.)

11 Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 36.

12 At the next elections, due to the unfavorable electoral system, the Yugoslav minorities elected only two MPs, and later on, none. (Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, p. 30; Ammende (ed.), pp. 489-490; Italian Genocide Policy, p. 59; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, pp. 50-51.)

13 Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, pp. 48-54.

14 Jaquin, p. 65.

15 Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 59.

16 Adriano Andri, *Scuola e "diffusione della cultura nazionale" nella Venezia Giulia durante il fascismo (1926-1942)*, Quaderni, VIII, 1984/85, p. 199; Halperin, pp. 40-46; Clark, pp. 222-228, 242-251.

17 Fran Barbalić, Ive Mihovilović, *Proscription du slovene et du croate des écoles et des églises sous la domination italienne (1918-1943)*, Zagreb 1945, p. 11; Italian Genocide Policy, 67; L. Trnjegorski, *Jugoslovenske manjine u susednim zemljama*, Beograd 1938, p. 20; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 70; L'Italie, pp. 11-12; Patnje, p. 429; Darko Dukovski, *Politički, gospodarski i socijalni uzroci egzodusa istarskih Hrvata u vrijeme talijanske uprave 1918-1943*, in: *Talijanska uprava na hrvatskom prostoru i egzodus Hrvata (1918-1943)*, Zagreb 2001, pp. 103-105.

18 According to Yugoslav data, 530 primary and 7 secondary schools were closed down under these measures. (Patnje, p. 428; Ammende (ed.), pp. 475-478; Kacin-Wohinz, p. 93; Jaquin, pp. 92-98; Mirjana Domani, *Hrvatsko školstvo u Istri za vrijeme talijanske uprave*, in: *Talijanska uprava na hrvatskom prostoru i egzodus Hrvata (1918-1943)*, Zagreb 2001; Ante Cukrov, *Hrvatsko osnovno školstvo u Istri od 1918. do 1945. godine*, in: *Talijanska uprava na hrvatskom prostoru i egzodus Hrvata (1918-1943)*, Zagreb 2001, pp. 417-462.)

19 Ammende (ed.), p. 481.

the remaining ones were sent to the interior or emigrated to Yugoslavia.<sup>20</sup> For denationalization of the Slavic population, day care centers (the only that were permitted) of the organizations Lega Nazionale and Italia redenta were set up in the newly-annexed regions, and children and youths were forced or enticed to “voluntarily” join the Fascist youth organizations.<sup>21</sup> Together with teachers, Yugoslav civil servants were also sacked and Italian clerks from the South were brought to their places, to whom the local Italian population was as foreign as the Slavic one.<sup>22</sup>

Slovenian and Croat cultural associations were subject to chicanery from the beginning of Italian rule, and their disbanding also started soon. After a meeting of Party secretaries in 1927 the process was speeded up, so that all Yugoslav associations were closed down by 1928.<sup>23</sup> The same happened to almost the whole of the Yugoslav press by the end of 1929.<sup>24</sup> In late 1928 and early 1929 a large action of confiscation of Croat and Slovenian books took place, although they had been approved by censorship. Distribution of Yugoslav books remained punishable by fines (albeit not in high amount) later on too, and their importation was prohibited until 1937.<sup>25</sup> Cooperatives fared better only in some cases. Attacks on them had started already in 1918, and gained impetus since 1927. Most of them were abolished, after having been infiltrated by Fascists and put under their control first. Only a small number managed to survive during the 1930s.<sup>26</sup> The official use of Slovenian and Croatian was forbidden: officially since 1923 in administration, and since 1925

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- 20 Mate Demarin, *Položaj hrvatskog učiteljstva Istre između dva svjetska rata*, Zbornik za historiju školstva i provjete, 6, 1971; Barbalić, Mihovilović, pp. 12-14; Ammende (ed.), pp. 472, 478; Patnje, p. 429; L'Italie, p. 13; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 70; Italian Genocide Policy, pp. 67-79.
- 21 Jaquin, pp. 66-67; Ammende (ed.), pp. 479-480; Nasrtaj Lega nazionale protiv Slovenaca i Hrvata u Italiji, Narodna odbrana, 1, 1928; Trnjegorski, p. 21; L'Italie, pp. 15-16; The Position, p. 18; Ferenc, Kazin-Wohinz, Zorn, pp. 71-72. However, a Yugoslav document judged the attempts at assimilation through school as weak. According to it ¾ of Italian teachers were women who wanted to live in peace with their Slavic environment and on good terms with the local priest. For that reason, it was deemed, that the denationalization program went on only in larger towns. It was also estimated that evening courses and military service also yielded little results. (AJ, 38, 93/225.) Another document reports that Italian teachers from the South were totally corrupt, violent and without any intelligence. (AJ, 38, 93/225.) Teachers were encouraged to work more diligently at denationalization by financial awards. (Andri, p. 201.) A factor that, among others, hindered the realization of the Fascist plans of assimilation through school, was chronic lack of money. (Andri, pp. 198-199.) Truancy also contributed to poor effects of schools. (Ibid., p. 199.)
- 22 AJ, 38, 93/225; Patnje, p. 428; Italian Genocide Policy, p. 35.
- 23 Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, pp. 74-75; Jaquin, pp. 130-131; Ammende (ed.), pp. 475-476; Italian Genocide Policy, pp. 85-86; Trnjegorski, p. 23; Patnje, p. 430; Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, p. 55; Dukovski, p. 111. There were some 500 Slovenian associations alone, as well as some 450 libraries (that were also abolished).
- 24 Trnjegorski, pp. 24-25; Ammende (ed.), pp. 481-484; Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, p. 55; Ferenc, Kazin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 76; Italian Genocide Policy, p. 87; L'Italie, pp. 17-20; Jaquin, pp. 102-111.
- 25 Italian Genocide Policy, p. 89; L'Italie, pp. 21-22; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 77.
- 26 Trnjegorski, pp. 18-19; Naši u inostranstvu, p. 767; Jaquin, pp. 136-140; Ammende (ed.), p. 491; Ferenc, Kazin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 75; Italian Genocide Policy, p. 129; L'Italie, p. 30; Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, p. 40; Dukovski, pp. 127-129.



before courts too, but in practice even before that. On the eve of the Second World War it was forbidden in the Church too.<sup>27</sup> Being one of the main pillars of national consciousness of the Slovenes and Croats, the Roman-Catholic Church came under fire of the Italianizing policy already much earlier. The Italian authorities started pressuring the Yugoslav clergy from the very start, and they didn't even shrink from internment of the bishop of Krk, Mahnič, whereas the bishop of Trieste, Karlin had to flee Italy before Fascist terror. The Church hierarchy partly offered certain resistance to such interference of the secular authorities with ecclesiastical affairs, and partly aided Italianizing tendencies. The Vatican lent mild and ineffective moral support to the persecuted Slovenian and Croat clergy and the faithful, but since the Concordat with Italy in 1929, even that ceased. Part of Italian priests did not behave overly Christian or brotherly in the process, and some even received financial enticement from the government for such behavior in the 1930s.<sup>28</sup>

Since 1918 changing of place names started (which was legalized in 1923), whereas a unique means of spiritual terror was the forcible change of personal names. They were at first written in Italian orthography, and since 1927 a campaign for "returning to their original form" of all family names of allegedly Italian or Latin origin set in. In that way some 56,000 names were Italianized in Istria until 1933. Giving "politically incorrect" names was prohibited since 1925, and since March 1928 civil servants were empowered to retroactively change those names they deemed not Italian enough. Use of new names was made mandatory under penalty of fine.<sup>29</sup>

Apart from these denationalization measures which were always coupled with violence in form of arrests, internment, intimidation, manhandling, fines, firing, and expulsion from the country, the Italian authorities, apart from using the bad economic situation in Istria, resorted to economic pressure by means of tax and credit policy, economic discrimination, limiting transfer of real-estate along the border and by buying of indebted Slovenian and Croat estates, with the aim of economically ousting, and if possible forcing the Slovenes and Croats to emigrate either to Yugoslavia or to inland Italy where they would be more easily assimilated. A special firm was founded in 1931 (*Ente per la Rinascita Agraria delle Tre Venezie*) to buy Yugoslav estates and settle Italian colonists, but (due to lack of Slovenian and Croat large estates that could be subjected to an agrarian reform) actions in this field were

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27 Ammende (ed.), p. 472; Ferenc, Kazin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 73; Italian Genocide Policy, pp. 111-112, 115; The Position, pp. 20-23; Jaquin, pp. 113-116.

28 Dukovski, pp. 108-109; Ivan Grach, *Istarsko svećenstvo u borbi*, in: *Talijanska uprava; Fran Barbalić, Vjerske slobode Hrvata i Slovenaca u Istri, Trstu i Gorici*, Zagreb 1931; Živojinović, pp. 332-339; Tristano Matta, *La chiesa cattolica e la politica di snazionalizzazione degli sloveni e dei croati durante il fascismo*, in: *L'imperialismo italiano e la Jugoslavia*, Urbino 1981; Trnjegorski, pp. 26-30; Ammende (ed.), pp. 504-509; Barbalić, Mihovilović, pp. 17-25; Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, pp. 38-39; Ferenc, Kazin-Wohinz, Zorn, pp. 77-80; Jaquin, pp. 117-125; Italian Genocide Policy, pp. 25-33, 55-57; *L'Italie*, pp. 48-60; Andri, pp. 201-202. According to Yugoslav data only until 1931 some 100 Yugoslav priests had been driven out and Italian ones brought into some 30 parishes.

29 Ammende (ed.), pp. 485-488; Trnjegorski, p. 25; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 73; Italian Genocide Policy, pp. 117-119; Patnje, pp. 430-431; *L'Italie*, pp. 22-27; Jaquin, pp. 77-89.

modest compared to the colonization in Yugoslavia.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, psychological, physical and economic pressure spurred a large emigration of the Slovenes and Croats from Italy.<sup>31</sup>

How did official Yugoslavia react to such a difficult situation of its co-nationals in the neighboring country? It may freely be said that except from observing the situation, it did nothing for them. To be sure, voices in favor of the “enslaved brothers” were quite frequent and quite loud in the parliament and in the public,<sup>32</sup> but they could not move the Yugoslav diplomacy to act. The reason was the too great a difference in strength in favor of Italy, which was the dominant partner in the bilateral relations throughout the inter-war period, almost constantly threatening Yugoslavia – both from the North, as well as often from the South, through Albania. Being in such a cleft stick, the Yugoslav authorities had to lead the policy of appeasement.<sup>33</sup> By the Treaty of Rappallo and later documents, the Italian minority was granted a number of rights which the Slovenes and Croats in Italy

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- 30 I. Mihovilović, *Talijanska kolonizacija Julijske krajine*, Anali Jadranskog instituta, I, 1956; Lorena Vanelo, *Colonizzazione e snazionalizzazione nelle campagne della Venezia Giulia fra le due guerre*, in: *L'imperialismo italiano e la Jugoslavia*. Atti del convegno italo-jugoslavo, Ancona 14-16 ottobre 1977, Urbino 1981; Šimončič-Bobetko, p. 248; Dragovan Šepić, *Talijanski iredentizam na Jadranu*. Konstante i transformacije, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, VII, 1, 1975, 21; Trnjegorski, pp. 18-19; *L'Italie*, p. 30; Patnje, p. 430; *Italian Genocide Policy*, pp. 129-147; Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, pp. 39-41; Dukovski, pp. 130-139; Pavao Ravlić, *Gospodarski uzroci iseljavanja Hrvata i drugih stanovnika Istre između dva svjetska rata*, in: *Talijanska uprava na hrvatskom prostoru i egzodus Hrvata (1918-1943)*, Zagreb 2001. According to some estimates, some 7,000 estates passed from Yugoslav to Italian hands between the two world wars. However, the number of colonists wasn't large: between 1934 and 1938 the Ente di Rinascita delle Tre Venezie settled only 104 families. (Vanelo, p. 489; Kacin-Wohinz, pp. 98-99.)
- 31 According to the usual estimates in Yugoslavia, some 100,000 Yugoslavs emigrated: some 70,000 to the mother country and some 30,000 to other countries. (Šepić, p. 20; Kacin-Wohinz, p. 99; *Italian Genocide Policy*, pp. 133, 143.) According to Ravlić some 58,000 Croats and 20,000 Slovenes left Istria. (Ravlić, pp. 549, 559.) After some reports, these refugee vented their frustrated nationalism on national minorities in Yugoslavia. (*Saarbrücker Zeitung*, January 24, 1933.)
- 32 Patnje, passim; SBNS KSHS, *Redovan saziv za 1921-22*, IV, pp. 8-10; *Ibid.* For 1925/26, I, pp. 170-175; *Ibid.* for 1927/28, I, pp. 20-29; SBNS KJ, *II redovan saziv za 1936/37*, III, pp. 831-837; SBNS KJ, *Redovan saziv za 1935/36*, I, p. 290; *Ibid.* for 1937/38, I, p. 206. Depending on the political needs of the moment, the Yugoslav authorities muzzled the press not to write about the minorities in Italy. (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 11, 1931.) Anti-Italian demonstrations were regularly dispersed. (Đorđević, *Organizacija*, p. 74.) Emigrants from Italy often didn't meet with a warm reception on part of the local population in Yugoslavia, whereas they received only a small help from the government. They founded several associations with revisionist and irredentist platforms – which could only harm the official foreign policy. Under Italian pressure, the Yugoslav authorities reduced financial support in 1935-1937, and in September 1940 they even disbanded the union of these associations. (Andrej Vovko, *Organizacija jugoslovanskih emigrantov iz Julijske krajine do leta 1933*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XXXII, 4, 1978; *Idem*, *Zveza jugoslovanskih emigrantov iz Julijske krajine v letih 1933-1940*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XXXIII, 1, 1979; Kacin-Wohinz, *Jugoslavensko-talijanski odnosi*, pp. 92-93.)
- 33 Jaquin deemed the Yugoslav authorities had reconciled themselves to the fate of the Slovenes and Croats in Italy. (Jaquin, p. 153.)

couldn't dream of. Only the pact concerning Rijeka of 1924 foresaw reciprocal rights for the local Yugoslavs, on the model of the privileges of the Italians in Dalmatia.<sup>34</sup> The position of the Slovenes and Croats under Italian rule was temporarily and moderately improved after the Yugoslav-Italian treaty of Friendship in March 1937, but despite tiny concessions, it failed to basically improve the situation of the Yugoslav minorities, because Italian (only oral!!!) promises were not fulfilled.<sup>35</sup>

This hard situation of the Yugoslav minorities and lack of efficacious assistance from the official Yugoslav organs on the one hand, and terror of the Fascist regime on the other, pushed part of Slovenian and Croat youths into terrorism. They expressed their dissatisfaction with the state of minority rights by symbolic actions against government organs and institutions, in an attempt to attract the attention of the world to their fate. These organizations enjoyed certain support of émigré and nationalist circles in Yugoslavia from which they received propagandistic literature, but weapons too.<sup>36</sup> Apart from terrorism, they were engaged in distribution of anti-Fascist literature but also in espionage. In 1935 the main Slovenian terrorist organization, the TIGR, joined forces with the Communist Party of Italy in the struggle against the regime.<sup>37</sup> After an attempt on Mussolini's life in October 1926, the Law on Protection of the State was passed, on the basis of which the Special Tribunal was founded that tried crimes against the security of the regime. Members of the Yugoslav minorities were overrepresented among its customers, with 33 out of 42 of capital punishments adjudicated by the Tribunal, hitting the Slovenes and Croats.<sup>38</sup>

In the (somewhat exaggerated) words of Slovenian propagandists, the fate of the Slovenes in the Austrian part of Carinthia was not a bit better than that of their co-nationals in Italy. However, the position of the Burgenland Croats seemed to contrast favorably with it. The different position of the two Yugoslav minorities in Austria wasn't due only to its federal constitution, but to historical reasons too. The Carinthian Slovenes formed a natural continuation of the Slovenian ethnic mass which was partly Germanized over centuries. As such, they claimed the right of primacy and resented the more the ethnic losses during the centuries, particularly those suffered at the hands of the Austrian Germans since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>39</sup> On the other hand, the Burgenland Croats were comparatively late settlers

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34 Pržić, p. 146; Jaquin, p. 54; Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, pp. 35-36; Kacin-Wohinz, p. 94.

35 AJ, Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, f. II; Trnjegorski, pp. 31-33; Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, p. 63; Kacin-Wohinz, Jugoslavensko-talijanski odnosi, p. 86. On the occasion of conclusion of the Pact of Friendship with Italy, the situation of the minorities was a secondary matter at best for the Yugoslav government. (Enes Milak, *Italija i Jugoslavija 1931-1937*, Beograd 1987, pp. 140-141.)

36 Đorđević, Organizacija, p. 74; Kacin-Wohinz, pp. 97-98.

37 Ammende (ed.), pp. 496-500; Kacin-Wohinz, Pirjavec, pp. 58-62; Kacin-Wohinz, pp. 101-102; *L'Italie*, pp. 39-40; Italian Genocide Policy, pp. 153-155; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, pp. 81-97, 104-110.

38 Ammende (ed.), pp. 495, 500-504; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, pp. 111-113; Italian Genocide Policy, pp. 151-155; *L'Italie*, p. 36, 42-46.

39 Hans Haas, Karl Stuhlpfarrer, *Österreich und seine Slowenen*, Wien 1977, pp. 7-23; Tone Zorn, *Pogled na položaj Koruških Slovenaca u prošlosti i sadašnjosti*, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, IX, 1, 1977, pp. 69-71. On the German side, it was insisted that Germanization had been a peaceful and natural process caused by the necessities of life. (Wutte, p. 10.)

and throughout the history in their relations with the authorities they had to do with the Hungarians and not with the Germans, which significantly determined their position within the young Alpine republic. We shall first deal with the situation of the Carinthian Slovenes, and then with that of the Croats in Burgenland.

We have seen that hot-heads in Ljubljana had intended to pose the demand for the whole of Carinthia in 1918 – by way of indemnification for historical injustices,<sup>40</sup> but that under the influence of reality and realists they had to give up the idea.<sup>41</sup> However, certain territorial aspirations on the Slovenian side survived,<sup>42</sup> so that armed clashes between Slovenian and Yugoslav troops on the one side and Austrian paramilitary formations on the other occurred in Carinthia in 1919, after which an armistice was negotiated that lasted until the plebiscite prescribed by the victorious powers. To that end, the contentious territory was divided into two zones (A and B), the first being under the control of the Yugoslav authorities. The plebiscite was to take place there first: if the majority of the population voted in favor of annexation to Yugoslavia, the plebiscite would take place in the Northern, zone B, too. The Plebiscite in the zone A on October 10, 1920 ended unfavorably for Yugoslavia because 59.04% of the population (partly Slovenian too) voted for remaining in Austria.<sup>43</sup> This was the consequence of the better German propaganda,<sup>44</sup> the support to the German cause of the Austrian Social Democracy that was influential among the Slovenian village poor,<sup>45</sup> mistakes and roughness of the Yugoslav authorities in the temporary occupied territory<sup>46</sup> and decades of Germanization that had spread German influence through various channels.<sup>47</sup>

40 Barker, p. 97. A survey of "historical injustices" from the Slovenian standpoint see in: I. Žolger, M. Brezigar, L. Erlich, N. Županič, *La question du Prekmurje, de la Styrie et de la Carinthie: La Carinthie*, Paris 1919. A survey of Germanization during the 19th and early 20th centuries see in: Janez Stregar, *Njemački nacionalizam i protislovenska djelatnost u austrijskoj Koruškoj*, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, IX, 1, 1977, pp. 136-149. The "historical injustice" was proven, among other things, with the constant diminution of the number and percentage of the Slovenian population in Carinthia: from 102.252 (29.7%) in 1880, to 82.212 (21.2%) in 1910. (Fran Zwitter, *Die Kärntner Frage*, Klagenfurt 1979, p. 74; Žolger et al., p. 29.)

41 Veiter, p. 41; Kerekes, p. 137.

42 Slovenian aspirations to Carinthia remained alive throughout the inter-war period (Wutte, Lobmeyr, pp. 10; Wutte, p. 39.) and even after the Second World War.

43 Kerekes, pp. 139-140, 228-233; Barker, p. 165; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 145.

44 The Germans put the stress on regional consciousness and economic interests, compared the industrialized democratic Austrian republic with the backward, undemocratic Yugoslav monarchy etc. (Zorn, Pogled, pp. 74, 77; Wutte, pp. 138-140; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, pp. 136-137; Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 681.)

45 On that cf. particularly: Janko Pleterski, *Koroški Slovenci in plebiscit*, in: *Koroška in Koroški Slovenci. Zbornik poljudnoznanstvenih in leposlovnih spisov*, Maribor 1971, pp. 169-180.

46 Wutte, pp. 55-59, 121-131.

47 Zwitter, *Die Kärntner Frage*, pp. 23, 29-32; Barker, pp. 146-147; Theodor Veiter, *Die slowenische Volksgruppe in Kärnten. Geschichte, Rechtslage, Problemstellung*, Wien, Leipzig 1936, pp. 50-54. Some Slovenian authors deem, not quite without arguments, that in view of all the historical advantages in German favor, granting of equal conditions to both parties before the plebiscite, de facto favored the Germans. (Cf. Anton Dolar, *Koroški plebiscit in načelo paritete*, Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje, XXXII, 1-4, p. 1937.)

In that way Carinthia (i.e. its largest part) remained in Austria with some 65,000 Slovenes.<sup>48</sup> According to some opinions, the greater part of them was not nationally conscious,<sup>49</sup> but the other part was more pugnacious and dissatisfied with its position, which deteriorated after the plebiscite.<sup>50</sup> Part of them (mostly teachers and priests) left (voluntarily or under duress) for Yugoslavia after the plebiscite<sup>51</sup> and helped, with other national activists, keep alive and present in the Yugoslav public the problem of the Slovenian minority in Carinthia as well as undisguised irredentist ambitions.<sup>52</sup>

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- 48 According to the first Austrian post-war census, there were 36.169 Slovenes in Carinthia; in 1934 there were 26.128. The Nazis found 45.000 people with Slovenian mother tongue in 1939, but only 7.900 of them declared Slovenian nationality. (Barker, p. 191.) Veiter adduces a bit different data. (Veiter, p. 127.) Together with fear, weak national consciousness, pressure and possible irregularities, the question about adherence to a "cultural circle" and not about the people or mother tongue was responsible for such results. (Haas, Stuhlpfarrer, p. 69.) Suppan explains the outcome of the plebiscite by anti-Slovenian policy. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 680.) Country head Gröger estimated in 1922 there were some 65.000 Slovenes living in Carinthia, whereas Veiter estimated their number as 55,000. (Veiter, pp. 127, 130.) A private Slovenian census found 71.452 Slovenes in Carinthia in 1923 (Zwitter, Kärntner Frage, p. 17.), and a Slovenian national cadastre 97.219. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 684.) However, the Slovenian propaganda spoke about 90.000 Slovenians in Carinthia (Carinthiacus, *The Position of the Slovenes under Austria compared with that of the German Minority in the Serb, Croat, Slovene Kingdom*, Ljubljana 1925, p. 20; Ammende (ed.), p. 306; Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 810; SBNS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1932/33, III, p. 68.) and some authors of as many as 120,000. (Trnjegorski, p. 49.) Furthermore, 3,830 and 4,452 Slovenes lived in Styria according to the Austrian data of 1934 and German ones of 1939 respectively. (Tone Zorn, *Slovenci na avstrijskem Štajerskem*, Časopis za zgodovino in narodopisje, L, 1-2, 1979, pp. 439-440.) Like other figures, these were doubted by part of Slovenian authors. (Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 170.) Shortly put, a numerical confusion reigns in this matter – as always in the case of the contested territories and minorities who claim they are oppressed. However, the fact is that representatives of the Slovenian minority complained in vain to the League of Nations at the 1934 census. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 810-812.)
- 49 ASANU, 14439/382, Zbirka V. Marinkovića; Barker, p. 175; Zwitter, Kärntner Frage, p. 21; Naši u inostranstvu, p. 767. As late as September 1932 the Yugoslav defense minister considered the Slovenes along the Austrian border nationally poorly conscious, despite 14 years of Yugoslav rule. (AJ, 66, 3/6.)
- 50 Haas, Stuhlpfarrer, p. 34; Zorn, Pogled, pp. 78-79. The direct consequence of the plebiscite was sacking (according to Slovene data) 58 teachers, 28 priests and dozens of nationally conscious workers (railway-men and miners above all). Furthermore 30 priests were transferred. (Tone Zorn, *Prispevek k problematiki preganjanja koroških Slovencev po plebiscitu*, Kronika, XXIV, 3, 1976, p. 170.) According to other data, together with other intellectuals, 32 priests and 57 teachers were fired. (Carinthiacus, p. 16.) Veiter ascribes the deterioration to constant Germanization furthered by German nationalist associations and to the wish for economic betterment, as well as to the activities of German parties who split the Slovenes. (Veiter, pp. 63-66.)
- 51 Barker, p. 176; Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 750-751; Haas, Stuhlpfarrer, p. 35. The claim that whole Slovenian intelligentsia had left Austria, is exaggerated. (Cf. Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 151.) From the German side it was denied that any Slovenian intellectuals had been forced to leave. (Wutte, Lobmeyr, p. 67; Martin Wutte, *Die Lage der Slowenen in Kärnten*, Nation und Staat, V, 5, 1932, p. 300.)
- 52 This lobby which often called for reciprocal measures against the Germans in Yugoslavia, was quite loud in the press and parliament, but the practical results of their agitation (at least when the improvement of the situation of the Carinthian Slovenes) were

Even before the First World War the complaints of the nationally conscious Slovenes were about the lack of Slovenian schools and the existence of only the so-called *utraquist* (i.e. bilingual) ones in which Slovenian had actually been only an auxiliary means of instruction until children learnt enough German to follow all-German instruction – which usually happened already in the second semester of the first grade.<sup>53</sup> Connected with this was lack of Slovenian teachers (particularly nationally conscious ones), i.e. teachers who would have sufficient knowledge of Slovenian.<sup>54</sup> In answering such complaints, the central government in Vienna kept pointing out the federal constitution<sup>55</sup> and the Carinthian authorities adduced the existing school law and claimed that the Slovenes allegedly had never asked for purely Slovenian instruction.<sup>56</sup> Slovenian leaders managed only by a petition to the League of Nations in 1922 to open, for a while, three all-Slovenian private schools. As for Slovenian secondary schools, there was no such thing. Indeed, in the Klagenfurt high school, where Slovenian used to be a mandatory subject for the Slovenes before the First World War, it became only facultative after it. Only such Slovenes were accepted to teachers training colleges for whom it was presumed they would easily be Germanized.<sup>57</sup> The *Deutscher Schulverein Südmark* had the task of implementing that part of the Germanizing educational policy which the state didn't dare implement – setting up of private schools, organizing activities of associations, caring for bilingual teachers etc.<sup>58</sup>

Since the bad position of the *Volksdeutsche* in Slovenia was often excused by the bad position of the Slovenes in Austrian Carinthia, the Slovenian Germans turned to the Carinthian German parties in 1926 demanding that these design a plan of cultural autonomy for the Carinthian Slovenes that would then, in keeping with the principle of reciprocity, be applied to the *Volksdeutsche* in Slovenia too.

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as scanty as in the case of the Yugoslavs in Italy. (SBNS KSHS, Redovan saizic za 1921/22, IV, p. 11; *Ibid.*, V, pp. 851-853; *Ibid.*, Vanredan saziv za 1923, I, p. 393; *Ibid.*, Redovan saziv za 1925/26, IV, pp. 474-476; *Ibid.*, za 1927/28, IX, pp. 251-256; SBNS KJ, Redovan saziv za 1932/33, III, pp. 67-74; *Ibid.* za 1933/34, I, pp. 92-94; *Ibid.*, II redovan saziv za 1936/37, II, pp. 812-814, 830-831; *Ibid.* za 1937/38, I, pp. 202-205.)

53 Dušan Nečak, *Pogled na razvitak manjinskog školskog pitanja slovenske manjine u austrijskoj Koruškoj*, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, IX, 1. 1977, p. 110. The number of *utraquist* schools was steadily declining: there were 86 in 1923, and only 78 in 1938. Nečak claims wrongly they were abolished only in April 1941. (*Ibid.*, p. 112.) In fact, they were shut down already at the beginning of the 1938/39 school-year. (AJ, 38, 93/225.)

54 The Slovenes complained German jingoist teachers sabotaged even that minimum of Slovenian instruction. (Ammende (ed.), p. 309.) According to Austrian data, there were 219 Slovenian classes with 217 teachers in mid-1934. Out of them, allegedly 156 spoke Slovenian (only 129 had a certificate of that, whereas 27 worked without it), while the rest taught in upper grades in which there was no Slovene instruction anyway. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 759.) On the other hand, Stergar claims almost no teachers of *utraquist* schools spoke Slovene (Stergar, p. 153.) although such a claim seems exaggerated. According to Yugoslav allegations, only one Slovenian teacher was employed in 1938, and he worked in a German village. (Trnjegorski, p. 45.)

55 Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 831.

56 Wutte, *Lobmeyr*, pp. 45-46; Wutte, pp. 17-19; Trnjegorski, pp. 44-45.

57 Barker, pp. 181-182; Veiter, pp. 60, 68-72, 105-106; Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, pp. 798-800.

58 Haas, *Stuhlparfarrer*, pp. 41-42.

Carinthian parties accepted the proposal (although it seems not with excessive zeal) and, with the participation of Slovenian representatives (which didn't last until the final draft), designed a plan of cultural autonomy in 1927. It provided for a national cadastre so that the minority rights would be enjoyed by the people listed in it. This caused the first serious debate: the Slovenes demanded that enrolling into the cadastre be mandatory on the basis of "objective" national characteristics such as the family language and origin. The Germans, on the other hand, favored voluntary enrolment based on "subjective" characteristics, i.e. based on personal decision. Slovenian leaders were aware they would lose in that way a large number of nationally non-conscious or German-friendly Slovenes, so that they offered fierce resistance. Eventually, however, they accepted the "subjective" principle. Nevertheless, the negotiations were broken down in 1929 over the question of autonomous schools: the nationally conscious Slovenes demanded that all *utraquist* schools be automatically turned into Slovenian minority schools, whereas the Germans wanted the *utraquist* schools to remain bilingual and that the Slovenes open their own autonomous schools in Slovene. They in turn had no money for that so that this German idea was unacceptable to them. The Slovenes didn't consent to the modified German proposal that an *utraquist* school should become a Slovenian one if 2/3 of parents demanded it. Although there were attempts at restarting the negotiations, the idea of a cultural autonomy was never again seriously taken up.<sup>59</sup> It is important to note that official Belgrade never showed much interest in the negotiations on the cultural autonomy of the Carinthian Slovenes<sup>60</sup> - surely for fear the Germans in Yugoslavia would demand the same rights in keeping with the principle of reciprocity, and that other national minorities would then demand the same rights as the *Volksdeutsche*.

Since school had been and remained firmly under German influence, the main Slovenian national prop was the Roman-Catholic Church, i.e. its lower clergy. As in other Slovenian parts, the national movement in Carinthia had a predominantly clerical tinge, since teachers usually belonged to the liberal camp, which was identified with Germanism.<sup>61</sup> After the failed plebiscite some of the priests were removed from their parishes or left for Yugoslavia because of the pressure. The main German nationalist organization in the province, often personally intermingled with the government and always its prolonged arm, the *Kärntner Heimatbund* tried to "improve" the ethnic make-up of the clergy by putting the pressure to bear upon the hierarchy, and strove to turn many formerly Slovenian parishes into "bilingual" ones.<sup>62</sup> On the

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59 Andreas Moritsch, *Das Projekt einer Kulturautonomie für die Kärntner Slowenen im Jahre 1927*, *Österreichische Osthefte*, XX, 1, 1978; Tone Zorn, *Kulturna avtonomija za koroške Slovence in nemška manjšina v Sloveniji med obema vojnama*, *Zgodovinski časopis*, XXVIII, 3-4, 1974; Werner Hasselblatt, *Die Kulturautonomie der Slowenen in Kärnten*, *Nation und Staat*, I, 1, 1927; Ammende (ed.), pp. 310-318; Barker, pp. 183-187; Zorn, *Pogled*, pp. 79-80; Haas, *Stuhpfarrer*, pp. 54-65; Veiter, pp. 80-107; Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, pp. 860-867.

60 Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 859; Idem, *Jugoslavija*, p. 12.

61 Zwitter, *Kärntner Frage*, pp. 27-28; Veiter, p. 77; Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 759.

62 Žutić, *Kraljevina*, pp. 83-84. On the whole, the Slovenes were not dissatisfied with the attitude of the Roman-Catholic Church toward them. (Ammende (ed.), p. 321.) From the German side it was complained there had been several predominantly German parishes with Slovenian priests and it was denied that Slovenian clergy was replaced by German

other hand, there was no possibility for the official use of Slovenian, with the explanation, "all Slovenes spoke German."<sup>63</sup>

Slovenian associations continued to exist,<sup>64</sup> but they were also subject to the pressure of the Heimatbund, particularly between 1921 and 1925.<sup>65</sup> Therefore some of them just vegetated. The Carinthian Slovenian Party, which because of its clericalism couldn't unite all Slovenians, wasn't strong enough to enter the federal parliament, but it had a few MPs in the provincial diet.<sup>66</sup> Unlike the territories that fell to Italy, the Slovenian press was never so developed in Carinthia and there was just one national paper during the inter-war period – *Koroški Slovenec* – which, due to the resistance in the province, was published in Vienna.<sup>67</sup> As for the economy, there was an economic discrimination against the nationally conscious Slovenes and their co-operatives. There was also a limitation of transfer of real-estate in the bordering zone,<sup>68</sup> but the colonization of the Germans from the Reich, Sudetenland and Poland practiced by the Heimatbund, was on an even smaller scale than in Italy.<sup>69</sup>

The introduction of the authoritarian regime brought the Slovenes only a slight improvement of their situation, since it enabled them to join some of the newly-created government organs on lower levels. Although they showed more loyalty to the new authorities than did the rabid German nationalists, the influence of the latter remained uncontested in the province, so that the position of the Slovenian minority couldn't be improved despite the negotiations between the

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with no strings attached; ostensibly that was done due to lack of Slovenian clergy. (Veiter, p. 77; Wutte, Lobmeyr, pp. 65-66.)

63 Those who didn't speak it nevertheless, were offered services of an interpreter. (Barker, p. 188.)

64 Ammende (ed.), p. 321. Important societies were Political and Economic Society for the Slovenes in Carinthia (est. 1921), Slovenian Christian-Social Union (est. 1922). There were also some 20 clubs. The Catholic Association for Additional Education, the Slovenian School Society, the Drama Society and 34 branches of savings banks also existed. Hermagora's Society moved to Yugoslavia, whereas only its affiliation with some 3-4.000 subscribers (out of 90.000 in the whole Slovenian territory before the war) XXX remained in Carinthia. After the plebiscite there were also 43 cultural societies. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 761-762; Veiter, p. 73; Barker, p. 177; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 152.)

65 Barker, p. 177; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 151.

66 Barker, p. 176. According to Veiter, it couldn't always refrain from irredentism and it allegedly disseminated false information about the Carinthian Slovenes. (Veiter, pp. 73-74.)

67 Veiter, p. 73. It was only the Nazi authorities who permitted the journal for children *Mladi Korotan* to appear in 1938. (Trnjegorski, p. 58.)

68 Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 753-755; Barker, p. 192; Veiter, p. 75; Carinthiacus, p. 23; Wutte, Lobmeyr, p. 70; Naši u inostranstvu, p. 768. This measure was toughened after the Anschluss. (Haas, Stuhlpfarrer, p. 81.)

69 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 752; Haas, Stuhlpfarrer, p. 42; Ammende (ed.), p. 321. For acquisition of Slovenian estates and colonization of the Germans the Bodenvermittlungsstelle was created which cooperated with the VDA, the Südmark etc. (Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 156; Barker, p. 179; Tone Zorn, *Koroški Slovenci v prvi avstrijski republiki*, in: *Koroška in koroški Slovenci. Zbornik poljudnoznanstvenih in leposlovnih spis*, Maribor 1971, p. 194; Stergar, pp. 153-155.) The more massive colonization was meant to be executed on a larger scale only after the beginning of the Second World War – combined with the resettlement of the Slovenes.



representatives of the Slovenes and the Austrian government.<sup>70</sup> In some matters things got even worse.<sup>71</sup>

The Anschluss of Austria worsened the situation of the Carinthian Slovenes once again. From now on their fate would be determined according to the domestic and foreign political plans of Hitler's Reich. The Slovenian leaders rushed to express their loyalty to the new powers-that-be,<sup>72</sup> but this didn't prevent the Gestapo from arresting some of them already in the first days.<sup>73</sup> After the first months during which the Nazis kept the Slovenes in suspense, the situation of the Slovenian minority deteriorated further still: the Slovenes were removed from the provincial administration, utraquist schools were abolished, Slovenian courses and cultural assemblies prohibited, children were enrolled in Nazi youth organizations against the will of their parents, Slovenian shops were boycotted, the network of spies was extended, the colonization of the Germans intensified etc. However, due to the foreign policy consideration with respect to Yugoslavia, Germany refrained from using all the oppressive measures from its repertoire on the Slovenian minority until April 1941.<sup>74</sup> It was only the attack on Yugoslavia that opened the floodgates, so that paradoxically enough, it can be said that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which in practice did next to nothing to protect the Carinthian Slovenes,<sup>75</sup> by its very existence served this minority as a lightning-rod against the worst. If the situation of the Carinthian Slovenes is compared with that of the Volksdeutsche in Slovenia, it could be said that formally the position of the Carinthian Slovenes was in many respects similar to that of the Germans in Slovenia, but void of the economic power and social prestige the latter had.

The situation of the Burgenland Croats was considerably different, just as the situation of Burgenland was different. The Croats moved into Burgenland during the 16<sup>th</sup> and in early 17<sup>th</sup> century from Northern Dalmatia, Western Bosnia and Western Slavonia. Croat and Hungarian magnates resettled or wooed them from their Southern estates endangered by the Turks, to their safer landholdings in the North.<sup>76</sup> Thanks to

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70 Barker, pp. 189-190; Ferenc, Kazin-Wohonz, Zorn, p. 161; Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 764; Haas, Stuhlpfarrer, pp. 68-73; Veiter, pp. 108-116, 138-155; Zwitter, Kärntner Frage, p. 42. (Nevertheless the Slovenes were allowed to open several private schools and to maintain a few courses. Furthermore some Slovenes were appointed mayors or managers.) (Veiter, p. 124.)

71 So for instance German place-names became mandatory in 1936. (Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, p. 160; Barker, p. 190.)

72 Tagespost, March 20, 1938; Wiener Zeitung, April 1, 1938; Freie Stimmen, April 1, 1938; Kosier, pp. 81, 83.

73 Barker, p. 192; Stergar, p. 146.

74 Haas, Stuhlpfarrer, pp. 74-84; Zorn, Pogled, pp. 81-84; Ferenc, Kacin-Wohinz, Zorn, pp. 165-166; Tone Zorn, Priključitev Avstrije k nacistični Nemčiji in protinacistični boj koroških Slovencev, in: Koroška in Koroški Slovenci. Zbornik poljudnoznanstvenih in leposlovnih spis, Maribor 1971, pp. 200-201. The planning of the resettlement of the Slovenes was also started since September 1940. (Barker, p. 193.)

75 When, soon after the Anschluss, the Carinthian Slovenes visited prime minister Stojadinović to ask him to start immediate negotiations with the German authorities in order to protect the Carinthian Slovenes, he retorted that the premature touching of that question couldn't be useful and that Yugoslavia couldn't quarrel with Germany over 65,000 Slovenes. (Die Zeit, March 24, 1938.)

76 Johann Dobrovich, Volk an der Grenze – Schicksal und Auftrag. Zur Geschichte der Burgenländischen Kroaten, Eisenstadt 1963, pp. 41-101; Schreiner, pp. 11-20; Mate Ujević,

ecclesiastical autonomy, they managed to ethnically survive.<sup>77</sup> The national awakening started slowly in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, although ties with Croatia weren't very strong.<sup>78</sup> During the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the national movement experienced a halt, but then, since the end of the century, its basis started to broaden.<sup>79</sup>

Drawing of the border in Burgenland between Austria and Hungary, left some 80% of the local Croats in Austria and some 20% in Hungary in which, it seems, they experienced the minority fate better than the one before 1918.<sup>80</sup> As for some 40,000<sup>81</sup> Croats who were joined to Austria, they found themselves in a completely new historical situation. They changed the nation-state in which they were a minority overnight, and simultaneously they had to change the cultural circle toward which they inclined and to learn the new official language. Their social structure was incomplete (being mostly peasants and a few merchants) and their intelligentsia raised in a Hungarian spirit,<sup>82</sup> which made adjusting to the new conditions more difficult.<sup>83</sup> Luckily for them, the Austrian authorities showed relatively great tact in the integration of their minority. The newly-attached territories were organized as a separate federal province, Burgenland. Since Hungarian laws remained long in force there, the Croats profited by some of them. It was particularly important that they managed to preserve their confessional schools, whereas only the communes under the influence of the German Social-Democracy turned their confessional schools over to communes, loosing thus in some cases Croat teachers.<sup>84</sup> Although Croatian

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Gradišćanski Hrvati [Zagreb] 1934, pp. 5-10; Mirko Valentić, *Gradišćanski Hrvati od XVI stoljeća do danas*, Zagreb 1970, pp. 18-26; Idem, *Obilježja povijesnog razvitka Gradišćanskih Hrvata*, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, IX, 1, 1977, pp. 95-97; Ammende (ed.), p. 327.

77 Valentić, *Obilježja*, pp. 99-100.

78 Schreiner, p. 33. The Burgenland Croats took over the Croatian adaptation of the Latin alphabet by Ljudevit Gaj, but not the Croatian literary language. (Valentić, *Obilježja*, p. 101.) Zagreb showed more interest in the fate of the Burgenland Croats only in the early 1930s, but the Yugoslav authorities suppressed the Society of Friends of the Burgenland Croats in Zagreb. (Valentić, *Gradišćanski Hrvati*, pp. 34, 36-37.) It remains to be researched if the society was disbanded due to the animosity of the authorities toward the Croat name and culture as claimed by Valentić, or perhaps because of the bilateral relations with Austria.

79 Schreiner, p. 33; Valentić, *Obilježja*, p. 102.

80 Valentić, *Obilježja*, pp. 103-104. Some 10,000 Burgenland Croats remained within Hungary in 20 places. (Ammende (ed.), p. 236.) According to Trnjegorski, 15,000 Burgenland Croats remained in Hungary. (Trnjegorski, p. 67.) According to Ujević they could freely use their mother-tongue at school and church. According to him, the clergy was good, although not all the teachers, some of whom evinced Magyarizing tendencies. Moreover, textbooks for Croat schools lacked and their importation was forbidden. (Ujević, p. 79.)

81 According to the Austrian census of 1923, there were 41,761 Croats in Burgenland, and in 1931, 40,151. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 676.) However, Croat sources claimed some 60,000 Croats lived in Austrian part of Burgenland. (*Jubilarni zbornik života i rada SHS*, p. 768.) A private census initiated by M. Meršić found 72,459 Burgenland Croats, but allegedly some 30,000 of them lived outside of Burgenland. (Kosier, p. 85.) Thus, the accuracy of the Austrian census was confirmed in a way.

82 Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, pp. 732, 735; Ujević, pp. 32-34.

83 The Burgenland Croats entered Austria split into those of Hungarian sympathies and those who were not afraid of the new state. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 735.)

84 Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 741; Schreiner, p. 48; Ujević, p. 75; Mirko Valentić, *Školska problematika Gradišćanskih Hrvata*, *Časopis za suvremenu povijest*, IX, 1, 1977, pp.

schools lacked teachers<sup>85</sup> and particularly textbooks,<sup>86</sup> these problems began to be gradually overcome: in 1927 Croat representatives managed to obtain real minority schools.<sup>87</sup> Cultural societies did exist,<sup>88</sup> although it took quite some time before the common cultural union was created.<sup>89</sup> As for the church, the Croats had 41 out of 186 priests in Burgenland,<sup>90</sup> which however, wasn't enough.<sup>91</sup>

In political life too, after a brief try at the activity of a separate Croat party (1923), the Croats took part in the political life through cooperation with German parties, achieving some of their minority goals through them.<sup>92</sup> Their political division was mirrored also in the two weeklies they had, one of which was Christian-Social (Hrvatske novine, since 1922) and the other Social-Democrat (Naš glas,

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123-127. There were state schools too to which the provincial authorities appointed teachers who spoke no Croat. (Ammende (ed.), p. 327.)

85 The teachers were educated in Hungarian spirit, to boot. (Valentić, Gradišćanski Hrvati, p. 35.)

86 Valentić, Školska problematika, p. 125; Idem, Gradišćanski Hrvati, p. 35.

87 Schreiner, pp. 49-51. There were 53 of them with 111 classes in 1921/22; in 1933 there were 43 of them with 120 classes. As for secondary and professional schools, there were none. However, the use of the Croat language in these schools differed and was dependant on language skills and propensity of the teacher. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 741-742; Ammende (ed.), pp. 328-329.) The new Burgenland educational law of 1937 didn't endanger Croatian educational achievements, and thanks to compact settlement the vast majority of Croat children had instruction in mother-tongue, with mandatory German lessons. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, pp. 795-796.) However, it should be noted that school statistics differ somewhat with different authors. (Cf. Trnjegorski, p. 71.) According to Ujević, 18 out of 65 villages had no Croat teacher in 1934, whereas in some there were several of them. (Ujević, p. 93.) According to the data of the Yugoslav government the Burgenland Croats had 171 teachers in 1938. Out of that, 121 were Croats and 50 Germans. (AJ, 38, 93/225.) According to Kosijer, there were 155 teachers in that year: 108 Croats and 47 Germans. (Kosijer, p. 88.) This proves the statistics are slippery even in the countries which are known for their accuracy.

88 Schreiner, pp. 45-47.

89 According to Ujević, there were youth associations in 19 villages, female ones in 9, and singing ones in 9 (two in Pandorf). (Ujević, pp. 92-93.) To be sure the Croat Cultural Association (Kroatischer Kulturverein im Burgenlande) was founded in 1921, but it had to cease operating immediately. It was renewed only in 1929, but it failed to overcome ideological rift, particularly concerning education. After the Anschluss a group of Croat Nazis (sic!) took control of it. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 745; Schreiner, pp. 36-38; Trnjegorski, p. 74; Ujević, pp. 82-83; Valentić, Obilježja, p. 104; Idem, Gradišćanski Hrvati, p. 34.) There were also 5 savings-banks and 14 dairy cooperatives in the late 1920s. (Naši u inostranstvu, p. 770.)

90 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 743.

91 Trnjegorski, p. 73.

92 Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 744; Ammende (ed.), p. 329; Trnjegorski, pp. 73-74; Ujević, pp. 80-81. The Independent Croatian Party joined the Christian-Social Party in 1927. (Valentić, Gradišćanski Hrvati, p. 34.) The Croats not only had their MPs in the Diet, but one of their main leaders, Lovro Karall, made a brilliant political career: in 1927 he became a MP in the provincial Diet, in 1930 provincial counsellor, in 1934 deputy-provincial chief and state counselor, and after the Second World War he made it to the provincial governor 1946-1956 and the chairman of the Diet 1956-1960. (Suppan, Jugoslawien, p. 744; Valentić, Gradišćanski Hrvati, p. 38.)

since 1923).<sup>93</sup> On the occasion of the Anschluss, Croatian leaders also declared loyalty to the new authorities,<sup>94</sup> and the situation of the Burgenland Croats remained, thanks to lack of historical animosity, better than that of the Carinthian Slovenes, although it deteriorated perceptibly.<sup>95</sup>

The situation of the Carinthian Slovenes and the Burgenland Croats proved, just like the position of some minorities in Yugoslavia, to what degree minority fate within one and the same state depended on many factors: relations throughout history, intentions of the government, political system, foreign-political concerns, etc. Whereas in the case of Italy that was a stronger and potentially more dangerous neighbor, Yugoslavia couldn't solve the minority question in favor of its co-nationals, in the case of the two Yugoslav minorities in Austria, it was plain that it was loath to conclude bilateral agreements in this matter, led by fear that other countries and their minorities would demand the same solution of the minority question on the basis of reciprocity – seen in Belgrade as opposed to the Yugoslav national interests.

Yugoslav minorities in Hungary, both during the inter-war period and after the Second World War received much less attention from the Yugoslav public and social sciences, although their total number didn't lag much behind that of minorities in Austria. The reason lay certainly in their situation of a real Diaspora which couldn't become subject of irredenta by any means. Furthermore, the greater part of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary were the Croats, whose political leaders in Yugoslavia were busy for a long time primarily with regulating the position of the Croats within their country. On the other hand, there were only a few Serbs and Slovenes in Hungary so that they were no great topic for their co-nationals in the mother country.

According to the official Hungarian statistics, there were 36,864 Croats, 23,228 Bunjevci, 17,132 Serbs and 6,087 Slovenes, or 83,311 in all, in that country in 1920. Ten years later, the census registered 27,083 Croats, 20,564 Bunjevci and 7,031 Serbs.<sup>96</sup> However, according to some computations of Yugoslav officials, the total was app. 137,000,<sup>97</sup> 165,000,<sup>98</sup> or even as many as 180,000.<sup>99</sup> Mate Ujević

93 Schreiner, pp. 38-42; Valenić, *Obilježja*, p. 105. Apart from these two, an annual journal of the Cultural Society and two children's journals, as well as, several literary works were also published. (Ammende (ed.), p. 330; Trnjegorski, p. 74; Schreiner, pp. 42-45.)

94 Neu Frei Presse, March 19, 1938; Wiener Zeitung, April 6/7, 1938; Kosier, pp. 90, 304-306.

95 So for instance, the Nazis closed down Croatian confessional schools in September 1938. (Schreiner, pp. 53-54; Valentić, *Školska problematika*, p. 127.) Ties with Zagreb were paralyzed, newspapers and textbooks couldn't be printed and Burgenland itself was abolished as a province. (Valentić, *Gradišćanski Hrvati*, p. 38.) During the existence of the independent Austria, the question of the Burgenland Croats never played a role in the bilateral relations. (Suppan, *Jugoslawien*, p. 875.) The reasons were surely their better position, weaker ties with the mother country and the oppositional attitude of the Croats toward the Yugoslav state throughout larger part of the inter-war period.

96 Trnjegorski, p. 78.

97 This number is adduced in a document about the situation of the Yugoslavs in Hungary from September 1932. (ASANU, 14485/135.)

98 Trenjegorski, p. 84.

99 This was the estimate of Dr Milan Petrović, chief of the Educational Department of the Danube Province in 1939. (AJ, 14, 27/71.) The Zagreb journal *Obzor*, wrote a year later about 150,000 Croats in Hungary in 1929, and only 70,000 in that year. (AJ, 38, 122/267.)

deemed that out of the total number of the Croats, some 15,000 were the Burgenland Croats.<sup>100</sup> He appraised the educational situation also of this part of the Croats as predominantly favorable, and he said as much of the Church,<sup>101</sup> which was probably conditioned by the wish of the Hungarian authorities that the Croats there not compare their position unfavorably to that of their brethren in Austria. As for the rest of the Croats, the Hungarian authorities prevented them from organizing. The Hungarian restrictive, very minority-unfriendly school regulations, were applied to them too,<sup>102</sup> and their situation concerning the press was also extremely bad.<sup>103</sup> This was in keeping both with the Hungarian assimilationist traditions and with the conviction shared by almost all Hungarian parties after the catastrophe of Trianon, that national minorities had betrayed the historical Hungary, and that it didn't go under because of its wrong minority policy, but rather because it didn't Magyarize enough. For these reasons the policy of Magyarization was stepped up after the First World war, and the scattered Croats were its natural prey.<sup>104</sup>

The Serbian minority, although less numerous and also subject to pressure, found itself in a somewhat more favorable position. It was less due to the better material situation of the Serbs in Hungary, but rather more to the separate ecclesiastical and school organization inherited from Austria-Hungary. Thanks to it, the Serbs had 64 parishes in 1937, 19 priests, 17 confessional schools and 18 teachers, several choirs, agricultural cooperatives, etc.<sup>105</sup> And yet, due to large emigration, a considerable drop in the number of Serbian schools is perceptible as compared to 1932 when there were 40 Serbian schools (including auxiliary ones) and 44 teachers.<sup>106</sup> The Serbs maintained their schools themselves, teachers were elected by ecclesiastical communes and confirmed by diocesan authorities.

Another mainstay of the Serbian minority, tightly intertwined with the first one, was the Serbian Orthodox Church. It enjoyed autonomy ever since the days of the Great Migration of the Serbs (1689/90) and it continued acting as preserver of

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100 Ujević, p. 25.

101 Ibid., pp. 78-79. Nevertheless, he remarked that some teachers imposed the Hungarian language, as well as that schoolbooks were lacking since importation from Austria was forbidden.

102 Trnjegorski adduces the official number of Croat and Bunjevac-Šokac schools and teachers, but he doesn't say in which language instruction was conducted. (Trnjegorski, p. 94-95.) However, it is known that 90% of the minority schools for the Southern Slavs belonged to the so-called C-type of minority schools, in which instruction was in Hungarian, whereas the minority language was only a mandatory subject. (Attila Kovács, the review of the book: Loránt Tilkovszky, *Nemzetsegi politika Magyarországon a 20. században*, Debrecen 1998, in: *Razprave in gradivo*, 36-37, 2001, p. 294.) According to the data from 1932, 42 Croat and Bunjevci schools belonged to this type, six to the type B with somewhat more instruction in mother-tongue, and only two to the type A which were the real minority schools. (ASANU, 14485/135.)

103 There was only one monthly in the ikavski dialect in 1932 (Bunjevačko-šokačke novine) which was eventually suppressed, just like the calendar (Danica). (ASANU, 14485/135; AJ, Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, I-3 a/4.)

104 Kovács, p. 295; Rothschild, p. 193. On the Croats in Hungary see also a (predominantly ethnographical) work by Juraj Lončarević, *Hrvati u Mađarskoj i Trijanonski ugovor*, Zagreb 1993.

105 Trnjegorski, p. 94.

106 ASANU, 14485/I 35.

national consciousness even after the break-up of the historical Hungary. Therefore it was a thorn in the side of the Hungarian authorities who revived the action to create the Hungarian Orthodox Church that would be subordinate to the Patriarch of Constantinople and that would comprise the Serbs, Romanians and Greeks in Hungary.<sup>107</sup> This idea existed ever since 1868,<sup>108</sup> and its realization would help kill two birds with one stone: the Magyarization would be facilitated, and the Hungarian state would lay its hands on property of considerable value.<sup>109</sup> The Hungarian authorities supported separation from the Serbian Orthodox Church, they hindered contacts between the bishop of Buda and the Serbian Patriarch and prevented priests from Yugoslavia from coming.<sup>110</sup> In their action they built on the insufficiently developed national consciousness of the Serbs who had remained in Hungary,<sup>111</sup> since the majority had opted and emigrated by the early 1930s.<sup>112</sup>

The first liturgy in Hungarian was held on December 25 1933 in Szeged, where the priest and the chairman of the ecclesiastical commune had been Magyarized. The Hungarian Orthodox Church had 4 priests at that time and it was recognized on May 31, 1934 by Abraham, the Syrian-Jacobite Patriarch (*de facto* the head of a Middle-East sect), who put it under his spiritual jurisdiction. A Roman-Catholic ex-priest Istvan Nemeth was appointed metropolitan under the name Theodosius I. He was arraigned for embezzlement and (temporarily) disavowed by the Hungarian government which desisted, for a while, from setting-up of the Hungarian Orthodox Church in 1935, since the campaign against the Serbian Orthodox Church had caused it (the government) great moral damage.<sup>113</sup> However, the Hungarian authorities didn't give up their intention, so that they continued their action soon afterwards.<sup>114</sup>

Apart from the Croats and Serbs, a small number of the Rab Slovenes lived in 9 big villages near where Yugoslav, Hungarian and Austrian borders met.<sup>115</sup> Since

107 ASANU, 14485 / I 35.

108 Sava [Vuković], episkop šumadijski, Pokušaj stvaranja Mađarske pravoslavne crkve u toku Drugog svetskog rata, Crkva 1991, Beograd 1991, p. 3.

109 Jugoslovenski dnevnik, September 9, 1933. One of the champions of that idea was Ferenc Herczeg, then adored as a literary demi-god, the chairman of the Revisionist League who „defended the rights“ of the Hungarian Orthodox Christians who didn't want to hear divine service in an alien and incomprehensible language and „in the ideology which demeaned their national consciousness“. (Pesti Hirlap, May 6, 1934.)

110 ASANU, Fond Vukašina Životića, 14458/ I-51.

111 AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/184.

112 Optants from both Yugoslavia and Hungary were arriving throughout the 1920s, since the deadline for emigration had been prolonged several times. Every deterioration of the inter-state relations entailed expulsions of larger or smaller groups of optants from both countries. Opting was finally regulated in November 1940. (AJ, 74, 2/5; AJ, Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, I-3 a/4; Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Mađarska 1918-1933, p. 418.)

113 Iskruljev, Raspeće, pp. 571-577.

114 The Magyarország wrote on September 19, 1937 that 5 ecclesiastical communes had separated from the Serbian and joined the Hungarian Orthodox Church. All these communes had no permanent priests, although they had 3000 faithful. The action was continued in the territory of the occupied Bačka during the Second World War, and eventually the Hungarian Orthodox Church found its canonical framework only in 1949 by inclusion into the Moscow Patriarchy as a proto-presbyteriat, i.e. without a bishop of its own. (Sava [Vuković], p. 17.)

115 Apart from Hungary, they also lived in 4 villages in Austria. (Trnjeoraki, p. 89.)

they were mostly employed as tillers of the land on large estates,<sup>116</sup> their economic situation wasn't enviable, and since they had only 6 schools of B-type and as many as 60 of the C-type in 1932, their educational situation was no better either.<sup>117</sup> It was only the government decree of February 1941 that heralded better days for minority education, but it came too late and it wasn't issued for the Yugoslavs in the first place.<sup>118</sup>

Apart from these factors, the Yugoslav population in Hungary was particularly exposed to various kinds of terror and chicanery, especially in the first years after the First World War and in the bordering regions which had been under Yugoslav occupation for a while.<sup>119</sup> The Yugoslavs, as well as members of other minorities and people of foreign extraction, were also exposed to moral pressure to change their names, although that pressure wasn't legalized like in Italy.<sup>120</sup> Furthermore, they were subject to pressure of nationalist organizations such as the Levente, that sometimes tried to force the Yugoslav youths to join,<sup>121</sup> whereas in other cases these organizations refused to take them in,<sup>122</sup> preventing thus their integration. Finally, although there was no economic discrimination,<sup>123</sup> transfer of property rights over real estates along the border was nevertheless limited for the unreliable and particularly minority elements.<sup>124</sup>

The Yugoslav minorities (particularly the Croats and Slovenes) in Hungary felt most painfully all the consequences of their historical development as Diaspora, and even more of the bad relations between the country in which they lived and their mother country. Poor organizational and personal basis inherited from the time before the war, combined with the increasingly intolerant minority policy of the Hungarian authorities, made any significant successes in organization of minority life impossible. The Serbs, who had possessed the organization, property and partly the cadres, lost through emigration a considerable part of advantages they had had in comparison with other minorities.

The Kingdom of Romania differed from all other neighboring countries in that the relations with it throughout the larger part of the inter-war period were good, and even those of alliance. This does not mean that in the beginning, at the

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116 Trnjegorski, p. 90.

117 ASANU, 14485 /I-35.

118 Magyarország, February 2, 1931; Pester Lloyd, February 2, 1941.

119 AJ, 14, 182/674; 124/444. Sometimes the terror wasn't exercised by the government organs, but by nationalist organizations such as the Cherkas. (AJ, 14, 130/469.) The Hungarians of leftist leanings were also victims, and in general the people who had cooperated with the Yugoslav authorities. (Milutinović, Vojvodina, p. 217.)

120 AJ, 38, 46/104; 63 (pov.), 1934, f. 16, 1-300. Similar actions were undertaken already in the late 19th century. Civil servants and army officers were particularly pressurized. (Cf. Johann Weidlein, Geschichte der Namensmadjarisierung, in: Idem, Pannonica. Ausgewählte Abhandlungen und Aufsätze zur Sprach- und Geschichtsforschung der Donauschwaben und der Madjaren, Schorndorf 1979, pp. 298-309.)

121 AJ, 14, 110/414.

122 AJ, 14, 120/433.

123 Rothschild, p. 193.

124 Weidlein, Die nationale Bodenpolitik Ungarns, p. 317; Idem, Das ungarländische Deutschtum in der ungarischen politischen Literatur der 1930-er Jahre, in: Idem, Pannonica. Ausgewählte Abhandlungen und Aufsätze zur Sprach- und Geschichtsforschung der Donauschwaben und der Madjaren, Schorndorf 1979, p. 351.

time the inter-state relations had been tense because of the unsolved question of the Banat, and immediately after it had been divided,<sup>125</sup> there was no pressure on members of the Yugoslav minorities, the Serbs in particular,<sup>126</sup> despite promises of equality given by the Great Popular Assembly of Alba Iulia on December 1, 1918.<sup>127</sup> The establishment of friendly and allied relations that followed soon afterwards, as well as approximately the same number of members of respective minorities in the Banat, relaxed the pressure on the minorities after some time.<sup>128</sup>

According to the official data, there were 43,454 Serbs in Romania in 1930, whereas according to the statistics of the Serbian Orthodox Church, there were 44,413 – which is one of the few cases that statistical data of a state and of a minority concur almost completely.<sup>129</sup> Furthermore, there were also some 10-11,000 Croats in Romania too.<sup>130</sup> Little was known about them, so that the Yugoslav state paid little attention to them.<sup>131</sup>

The Serbian minority in Romania, although absolutely and relatively not large, inherited, just like the one in Hungary, despite a negligible number of intellectuals and professionals,<sup>132</sup> organizational forms from the times of the Habsburg Empire which facilitated its survival as a minority. It was the ecclesiastical

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125 Mitrović, *Razgraničenje*, pp. 184-194; Bjelajac, pp. 163-169; Spector, pp. 89-97, 102/105, 187-190, 228, 271-272.

126 The Serbs, former civil servants and gendarmes accused of persecuting the Romanians during the Serbian occupation, particularly had to bear the brunt. Furthermore, Serbian songs and music were prohibited in Timișoara – unlike Hungarian and German ones. News of terror and pillaging on part of the Romanian gendarmes came from some places. (AJ, F. 336, f. 4 and 5.) The Romanian pressure caused also a wave of Serbian refugees, although their number is not known. (AV, 81, 1537/1919.) On the other hand, it was difficult for the Serbs living in the territory that had been under Serbian control for some time, to find a *modus vivendi* with the new Romanian authorities. (Mitrović, *Razgraničenje*, p. 268; AJ, F. 336, f. 3.) The Romanian authorities treated all minority population in the newly-annexed territories harshly. (Kolar, p. 35; Köpeczi (ed.), p. 651.)

127 Constantinescu, *L'acte*, p. 124.

128 This, however, didn't occur quite quickly: although the Romanian army and population were ordered to treat the Serbs nicely in mid-1920 (AJ, 14, 104/401.), there were complaints even in the second half of 1925 that the Serbs were being persecuted. (AJ, 66 (pov.), 71/185.)

129 Trnjegorski, p. 99. The *Jubilarni zbornik života i rada SHS* also adduces some 50,000 Yugoslavs living in Romania. (*Jubilarni zbornik*, p. 770.) Nevertheless, some sources adduce more: thus the correspondent of the Central Press Bureau wrote from Bucharest on October 23, 1938, there had been 51,062 Serbs in Romania. (AJ, 38, 52/120.)

130 Trnjegorski, p. 99; Petar Vlašić, *Hrvati u Rumunjskoj. Putopisno-povijesne crtice s narodnim običajima*, Beograd 1928, p. 7. The number of the Croats is difficult to determine more precisely, since they were irrelevant for the Romanian statistics – compared to 1.4 million Hungarians, 750,000 Germans, 600,000 Ruthenians, 400,000 Russians, 270,000 Gypsies or 155,000 Turks.

131 However, Dušan Popović counted on them too in his plans of moving the Yugoslav border eastwards to the Banat mountains, claiming, they and the Serbs in Romanian part of the Banat must survive for strategic reasons. As for the Serbs in Arad and Timișoara, he wrote them off as materially and nationally bankrupt. (ASANU, 14439/572.)

132 Pavle Stojanov, *Jugoslovenska nacionalna manjina u Rumuniji*, Beograd 1953, p. 51; D. Nikolić, *Srbi u Banatu*, p. 235.



and school autonomy, which functioned until 1948 in accordance with the decree from 1872.<sup>133</sup> In keeping with it, schools were managed by diocesan school committees and chiefs of school sections. In that way, the majority of Serbian schools in Romania were run by ecclesiastical bodies that secured their autonomous survival. Apart from 41 confessional schools, the Serbs had had 12 communal schools in the Romanian territory (mostly in the Bishopric of Timișoara) in 1918, which were put under state control and into which Romanian was introduced as the language of instruction.<sup>134</sup> However, after the implementation of the school convention for the Banat of 1934 had begun, they were turned into confessional ones too.<sup>135</sup> Although this convention was implemented on the Romanian side only slowly, unequally and grudgingly, it nevertheless contributed to an improvement of the situation of Serbian education in Romania.<sup>136</sup> Instruction in "national subjects" (i.e. Romanian language, history and geography) in Romanian was introduced into the Serbian confessional schools in 1924/25 at the demand of the Romanian Ministry of Education.<sup>137</sup>

As is almost always the case with national minorities, the Serbs in Romania lacked teachers due to the emigration in large number after 1918, lack of a teachers training college and small salaries paid irregularly and grudgingly by ecclesiastical communes. For this reason, a large number of insufficiently qualified teachers had worked in schools, and the situation improved somewhat only after contractual teachers came from Yugoslavia after the conclusion of the school convention.<sup>138</sup> Together with maintaining their confessional schools, the Serbs had to pay a tax for support of Romanian state schools, which was an additional financial burden.<sup>139</sup> On the other hand, financing of Serbian autonomous schools was made more difficult by the agrarian reform, which in 1921 confiscated much of the communal land meant for school maintenance.<sup>140</sup> Although the situation was not brilliant in the confessional schools either, it was much better than in the communal schools which had come under state control, in which the Serbs hardly managed to obtain religious instruction in their mother tongue.<sup>141</sup>

As for the secondary education, for the Serbs it officially didn't exist for a long time, although the authorities tacitly tolerated a lower private high school held since 1921 by the priest Milan Nikolić in Ketfel (now Gelu). It operated over 15 years and over 170 pupils passed through it, many of whom continued further education. Nikolić, whose school devolved from private preparatory classes for private exams,

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133 Sabljčić, p. 12.

134 AJ, 66, 71/185; Sabljčić, p. 15.

135 Sabljčić, p. 15.

136 Ibid., p. 17.

137 ASANU, 14439/572; Sabljčić, p. 32.

138 Sabljčić, pp. 35-41. Because of lack of teachers, with the government approval, the diocesan committee organized in 1921-1924 four courses for teachers from which 13 candidates graduated. The 5th course was organized in Romanian in 1926 and the 6th in 1929. (Cerović, p. 188; Sabljčić, pp.115-117.) The arrival of teachers from Yugoslavia didn't quite solve the problem, especially since not enough candidates applied for work in Romania. (AV, 126/IV, 41761/940.)

139 Sabljčić, p. 43; Stojanov, p. 47.

140 Sabljčić, p. 42.

141 These were mainly schools in the Danube Gorge (Klisura) and Poljadia. (Ibid., p. 145.)

didn't charge for his services, and took care himself of many poor but talented pupils.<sup>142</sup> Possibilities of official secondary education of members of the Serbian minority were created only after the conclusion of the Yugoslav-Romanian convention on minority schools in the Banat. Although it had been concerned only with primary schools, it created a kind of more favorable atmosphere in which both parties opened a minority class in high-schools in Timișoara and Vršac respectively in 1934/35. For the next few years that Serbian class in the Timișoara high-school was tacitly tolerated, and then made official in 1937 as a section of the high-school Constantin Diaconovici-Loga, on the opening of which the Bishopric of Timișoara particularly insisted. Teachers and textbooks came mainly from Yugoslavia, but the number of pupils remained small due to weak activity of communal school boards which were supposed to attract pupils to the lower high school and due to a lack of understanding with the people. Furthermore, high tuition fees (not only for the Serbs) repelled the poor.<sup>143</sup> The interest of the Serbs for Romanian teachers training colleges was also small because of poor school qualifications and large costs coupled with education. Most of those few who did opt for those schools never finished them, which prevented filling of vacant teachers' posts with qualified cadres.<sup>144</sup>

The other pillar of the Serbian national consciousness in Romania was tightly connected with the first one: it was the Serbian Orthodox Church. After the break-up of the Habsburg Monarchy, 40 ecclesiastical communes of the Bishopric of Timișoara and 14 of the Bishopric of Vršac remained in Romania. After the final drawing of boundaries, the Bishopric of Timișoara had 52 ecclesiastical communes and 5 monasteries.<sup>145</sup> Although the seat of the bishopric remained nominally in Timișoara, its administration moved to Kikinda, whereas only the diocesan vicar, Stevan Nikolić,<sup>146</sup> resided in Timișoara. During the 1930s the vicar was Slobodan Kostić, with whose national activity the local Serbs were not satisfied.<sup>147</sup> In order to alleviate lack of priests which was felt immediately after the First World War, Serbian theologians studied mostly at theological seminaries in Yugoslavia, or at abbreviated courses in Romania, so that by 1938 secular parish priests replaced monks who had been quite numerous in the first years, particularly in remote areas.<sup>148</sup> The Serbian clergy received subsidies from the Romanian government,<sup>149</sup> but the Serbian Orthodox Church had lost (together with its monasteries) 4,070 morgen of land in the course of the agrarian reform, so that it had left only 3,147

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142 Cerović, pp. 189-190; Sabljčić, pp. 66-69; Idem, *Srpska mešovita gimnazija u Temišvaru*, Temišvar 1993, p. 4.

143 Sabljčić, *Srpsko školstvo*, pp. 70-75; Idem, *Srpska mešovita gimnazija*, pp. 6-7; D. Nikolić, *Srbi u Banatu*, p. 233. A certain number of Serbs from Romania (Klisura) learned in Bela Crkva in Yugoslavia, where such pupils were 5-6 % of the total each year. (Margan (ed.), *Monografija*, p. 388.)

144 Sabljčić, *Srpsko školstvo*, pp. 149-151.

145 Stevan Bugarski, *Srpsko pravoslavlje u Rumuniji*, Temišvar, Novi Sad, Beograd 1995, pp. 15-17; D. Nikolić, *Srbi u Banatu*, pp. 217, 230; Sabljčić, *Srpsko školstvo*, p. 14.

146 D. Nikolić, *Srbi u Banatu*, p. 230.

147 *AJ*, 38, 52/120; Stojanov, pp. 28, 40-41. Kostić and people around him were accused of assisting assimilation and of financial malfeasances.

148 Cerović, *Srbi u Rumuniji*, pp. 49-50, 190; Sabljčić, *Srpsko školstvo*, p. 153.

149 Stojanov, p. 51.

morgen.<sup>150</sup> As we have seen, the Yugoslav side never ratified the convention on orthodox churches, deeming it not in the state interest, so that an opportunity to improve the situation of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Romania was allowed to slip away.<sup>151</sup> Thus, the interests of the national minority were sacrificed to the interest of the nation-state once more.

Publishing work by the Serbs in Romania was even more modest than that of the Romanians in Yugoslavia. Between 1921 and 1940 (with an interruption in 1933) the *Glasnik* was published in Timișoara, which was to all intents, the journal of the bishopric. The *Temišvarski vesnik* (later with the Romanian version of the town's name, *Timișoarski dnevnik*) was published since 1934, also in Timișoara, edited by Dr. Spasoje Nikolić, chairman of the National Serbian People's Party. Otherwise, publishing activity was rather poor. A Serbian bookshop was opened in Timișoara in the bishop's palace in 1934 at the initiative of the clergy and teachers.<sup>152</sup>

Apart from these institutions for preservation of the national consciousness, the Serbs in Romania had according to the 1931 data, also 10 reading-rooms, 21 choirs, 4 humanitarian and two sport societies.<sup>153</sup> In 1940 they had 18 choirs, 8 reading-rooms and three humanitarian societies, as well as two cultural-educational institutions.<sup>154</sup> Of economic institutions they had only a savings-bank in Timișoara and two agricultural cooperatives.<sup>155</sup> This would indicate the deterioration of their situation in the 1930s, but the school convention of 1934 nevertheless improved the key element of the minority existence at the time the position of other minorities in Romania deteriorated.<sup>156</sup>

As for the political organizing, the Serbs remained reserved, ignoring invitations of Romanian parties to join them. The former vicar of the Bishopric of Timișoara, Dr. Stevan Nikolić founded the National Serbian People's Party in 1931, which was to all intents, a branch of the Romanian Liberal Party. After a flop at the elections it soon stopped operating since it had failed to gather membership, whereas its leader had been compromised by misappropriation of party funds and by taking bribes from the Liberal Party.<sup>157</sup>

The Croatian national minority in Romania was several times smaller than the Serbian one, without its historically conditioned advantages, and far away from its mother country at that. It was comprised of three groups: one (the so-called Šokci, probably from Dalmatia) to the East of Timișoara in Rekaș and around it; the second in Checia to the West from Timișoara (descended from the vicinity of Zagreb,

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150 Ibid., p. 40. Nikolić adduces somewhat different data. (Nikolić, *Srbi u Banatu*, p. 235.) Toša Iskruljev cried blue murder about the Serbian monasteries "robbed" by the Romanian agrarian reform. (Iskruljev, *O Vojvodini*, p. 28.)

151 AJ, Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, f. II; Popi, Rumuni, p. 124; Cerović, p. 30.

152 Cerović, pp. 200, 204; Stojanov, p. 56.

153 ASANU, 14439/572.

154 AJ, 37, 87/495.

155 D. Nikoloć, *Srbi u Banatu*, p. 232. Vladimir Margan mentioned only one cooperative in 1940. (AJ, 37, 87/495.) Dušan Popović claimed in 1931 the agricultural cooperatives had died out because the authorities had demanded that they keep books in Romanian. (ASANU, 14439/572.)

156 Kolar, p. 122.

157 Stojanov, pp. 29, 56.

according to a legend from Turopolje, and allegedly almost all nobles); the third and the largest (some 8,000) in Craşova.<sup>158</sup> They were engaged almost exclusively in land-tilling and cattle breeding and their national consciousness wasn't very developed.<sup>159</sup> Unlike the Serbs, they had their priests and teachers only in some places: in 9 villages of Craşova there were Croat schools that worked under varying conditions, dependant on local factors. In ethnically mixed villages there were also non-Croat schools with non-Croat teachers. After the Yugoslav-Romanian school convention, their schools became state-run with Croatian as the language of instruction. Roman-Catholic teachers from Yugoslavia came to some of them, but their number remained insufficient.<sup>160</sup> Together with such incomplete primary educations, the Croats in Romania possessed also several singing and educational societies and bands.<sup>161</sup>

On the whole, it can be stated that Romania, like all nation-states, pursued the policy of assimilation of minorities,<sup>162</sup> although the minorities of the allied Yugoslavia enjoyed a somewhat better treatment. Romanian forthcoming partly surpassed that of the Yugoslav authorities displayed for the Romanian minority in the Yugoslav Banat. It can even be said that the situation of the Serbian minority in Romania, although far from ideal, was the best compared to all Yugoslav national minorities in the neighboring countries.<sup>163</sup>

The comparatively favorable position of the Yugoslav minorities (particularly the Serbs) in Romania differed greatly from the situation of the Macedonian population in Greece, which can best be compared to that of the Slovenes and Croats in Italy – often to the detriment of Greece, at that. It pursued a policy of denationalization and supplanting of the non-Greek population which was in many aspects harsher than the policy of the Italian Fascists. This policy was begun in the most brutal way already in the first days after the destruction of the Ottoman power in Macedonia, by burning of places, massacres and internment of the population, destruction of cultural monuments and other terrorist measures.<sup>164</sup> Such policy, with hardly

158 Vlašić, pp. 5-17; Naši u inostranstvu, p. 773.

159 Vlašić, p. 5; Naši u inostranstvu, p. 770. The inhabitants of Craşova vacilated long between the Croatian, Serbian and Bulgarian national consciousness, only to develop one of their own in the late 20th century. (Cf. Mihaj N. Radan, Uzroci kolebanja Kraševaka pri etničkom opredeljivanju, in: Biljana Sikimić (ed.), *Skrivene manjine na Balkanu*, Beograd 2004, p. 180.) Radan adduces that, although there are several theories as to their origin, the majority of Slavists considered them (because of the ekavski dialect) to be of Serbian origin. (Radan, p. 181. Cf. also Wolf, p. 16.)

160 Sabljčić, *Srpsko školstvo*, pp. 156-158; Vlašić, *passim*; AV, 126/IV, 41761/940. Larger part of the contractual teachers was dissatisfied with the situation they had encountered, so that they strove to return home as soon as possible.

161 Naši u inostranstvu, p. 773; Trnjegorski, p. 110.

162 Thus for instance Romanian schools were opened in Yugoslav villages with very few Romanians or huge Romanian churches were built, whereas the number of minority officials was limited. (Trnjegorski, p. 108.)

163 Emphatic and extremely exaggerated sounds the sentence of Toša Iskruljev: "Let us never forget that we have over 80,000 Serbs and other Slavs in Romania who groan under the heavy yoke, casting sad glances at our state." (Iskruljev, *O Vojvodini*, p. 29.)

164 *Dotation Carnegie*, pp. 69, 75, 79, 84-86, 94, 113; Тошо Поповски, *Македонско национално малцинство во Бугарија, Грција и Албанија*, Скопје 1981, pp. 71-72; Данчо Зографски, Горги Абаџијев, Анастас Митрев, Михајло Керемидчијев, *Егејска Македонија во нашата национална историја*, Скопје 1951, pp. 306-315.

mitigated means,<sup>165</sup> coupled with the colonization of Greek refugees from Asia Minor, was continued throughout the inter-war period, although Greece committed itself by the treaties in Neuilly and Sevres to observe minority rights.<sup>166</sup>

How large was the number of the Macedonians the Greek authorities tried to assimilate or force to emigrate in such a brutal manner? It is probably more difficult to answer this question than a question about the number of any other nationality in the region. During the Turkish rule there were no statistics that would be at least as reliable as the already dubitable Hapsburg ones, so that they had been produced by all interested parties according to their national preferences.<sup>167</sup> The official Greek statistics found only 81,984 Macedonians in 1928, whereas the Yugoslav propaganda claimed there had been 250,000 of them.<sup>168</sup> This would imply the Macedonians in Greece were the second-largest Yugoslav minority in a neighboring country. However, the interest in them was nothing like so strong as for the Yugoslavs in Italy or Austria, so that they didn't even get that modicum of verbal moral support the Slovenes and Croats in these two countries received. The reason lay in the non-recognition of the Macedonian national individuality within Yugoslavia itself.

Therefore, official Belgrade led mostly restrained policy toward the Macedonian minority in Greece. A diplomatic intervention ensued only after the Greek-Bulgarian convention on protection of national minorities of September 29, 1924 (Kavalof-Politis) by which the Macedonians had been recognized as Bulgarians. Yugoslavia reacted to this by severance of the treaty of alliance of 1913. A diplomatic tug-of-war and then negotiations followed, which the Yugoslav side tied to the status of the Yugoslav free zone in Thessalonica. They were ended on August 17, 1926 by conclusion of a convention on observance of minority rights and the Yugoslav free zone. A year later, the Greek parliament refused to ratify the convention, whereas the whole matter was pushed under the carpet after normalization of relations, by acceptance of the attitude that the two governments wouldn't interfere with the minority question: that was left to the League of Nations.<sup>169</sup> Obviously, the Yugoslav government only used the minority question as a means of diplomatic pressure – applicable only in this case, since there was practically no Greek minority in Yugoslavia for which Greece could adduce the principle of reciprocity.

Another country which appeared to be the mother country of the Macedonians in Greece was Bulgaria. It had assumed that role before Serbia (and later on Yugoslavia), and to all appearances, it played it more convincingly.<sup>170</sup> This was

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165 Occasional massacres took place later on too, and a commission of inquiry of the League of Nations also probed into the murder of 17 peasants of Trlis and Lovča on July 27, 1924. (AJ, Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, I-3 a/4.)

166 Popovski, p. 75.

167 Лазо Мојсов, Околу прашањето на македонското малцинство во Грција. Еден поглед врз опсежната документација, Скопје 1954, pp. 129-172.

168 Trnjevski, p. 117; Mojsov, pp. 227-228.

169 ASANU, 14387/9096; Mojsov, pp. 264-272; Popovski, p. 77; Историја на македонскиот народ, III, Скопје 1969, pp. 251-259; Христо Андоновски, Македонско национално малцинство во Грција, Булгарија и Албанија, Гласник, XVIII, 1, 1978, p. 48.

170 Živojin Balugdžić wrote to the foreign minister Momčilo Ninčić about the Macedonians in Greece from Athens on January 24, 1923: "This population doesn't feel it belongs to us at all, so that it doesn't even expect our help in its struggle with the Greek authorities for preservation of its schools and churches." According to him, the people had to be

mirrored above all in the signing of the Treaty of Neuilly and the concomitant convention on November 27, 1919, which foresaw voluntary emigration of minorities. In practice very few people had decided to migrate, until 1923 when they were “encouraged” by the Greek authorities.<sup>171</sup> In early 1928 a treaty on further emigration was signed, and according to the official Greek data, 72,000 “Bulgarians” left Greece between 1913-1926.<sup>172</sup> On the other hand, by Bulgarian data, 86,572 “Bulgarians” emigrated from Aegean Macedonia until 1928, and over 640,000 “Greeks” immigrated.<sup>173</sup> Be that as it may, moving of people on large scale occurred. Its aim was the change of the ethnic make-up of the population, from which mainly Greece profited, i.e. Bulgaria played the role of the protecting country only inasmuch as it gave shelter to the expelled and emigrants. In terms of real protection, it could do as little as Yugoslavia, so that the Macedonian population was exposed to the worst assimilation measures possible.<sup>174</sup> The Macedonians were declared “Slavophone” Helens, and by oppressive measures and even terror, the authorities did their best to make them “Helenophone”.<sup>175</sup> The official use of Macedonian was forbidden, and soon its use in private conversations was prohibited on pain of fine.<sup>176</sup> None of 225 primary and 5 secondary (Bulgarian) schools operating in 1907/8 survived.<sup>177</sup> Mandatory Hellenizing evening schools were introduced instead, which taught “national subjects”. Truancy was punishable, with a gradation of punishments ranging from fines, to castor oil, beating, and internment. Every tiny little Macedonian village got a day care center and school at the time many places in Greek part of the country had no such facilities.<sup>178</sup> After monarchy had been re-established in 1935, the situation of the Macedonians deteriorated still further. On November 21, 1926 the Law on Hellenization of Place Names was passed.<sup>179</sup> The use of the Macedonian language was prohibited and offenders punished by imprisonment or internment.<sup>180</sup> Slavic churches were renamed and church service in Old-Slavonic was abolished. Slavic frescos were destroyed, or Slavic inscriptions replaced by Greek ones.<sup>181</sup> It can be freely admitted that due to such a situation the Macedonians in Greece were the least protected and

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separated from the Bulgarians first, and only then could Yugoslavia impose itself as protector. (ASANU, 14387/9099.)

171 Popovski, p. 67; Zografski et al., pp. 317, 335; Schechtmann, p. 14.

172 Zografski et al., pp. 320, 340. Andonovski considers this number pretty accurate. (Andonovski, p. 33.)

173 Popovski, p. 68; Zografski et al., p. 322; Andonovski, p. 39. The Slavic Muslims whom the Greeks resettled to Asia Minor together with the Turks were not included in the number of the „Bulgarians“.

174 On February 3, 1925, the Greek parliament repudiated as interference with internal affairs the Treaty of Sevres from August 10, 1920 which obliged Greece to protect minorities. (Zografski et al., p. 337.)

175 Zografski et al., p. 339.

176 Mojsov, pp. 234-236; Trnjegorski, p. 127; Историја на македонскиот народ, III, Скопје 1969, p. 275.

177 Zografski et al., pp. 331-332; Trnjegorski, p. 128; Jovan Hadži-Vasiljević, Naši pod Arbanasima i Grcima, Bratstvo, XXV, 1931, p. 76.

178 Zografski et al., pp. 341-344.

179 Andonovski, p/ 37; Mojsov, p. 231; Zografski et al. p. 339; Hadži-Vasiljević, Naši, pp. 77-78.

180 Popovski, p. 73.

181 Hadži-Vasiljević, Naši, p. 76.

worst persecuted Yugoslav minority. Measures against them were more drastic than those against the Slovenes and Croats in Italy and they were pursued with almost unabating ferocity from the very beginning. The mother country, which certainly could have done more than for the Yugoslavs in Italy, didn't want to do it for reasons of domestic and foreign policy, i.e. it utilized them only as a bargaining chip.

Even less than this were worth the Yugoslav minorities in Albania. They comprised the Serbs and the unrecognized Macedonians, whose number was not exactly known, but which certainly didn't surpass a few 10,000s.<sup>182</sup> The Macedonians lived in Golo Brdo, around Korça, near the Lake of Prespa, in several ethnically mixed places around Podgradec, as well as in Albanian towns.<sup>183</sup> Until 1944 they had no schools in their mother tongue, the use of which was punishable, as well as no possibility for cultural or educational activity, preservation of their traditions, folklore etc.<sup>184</sup>

The Serbian minority was numerically even weaker than the Macedonian one, but it had the advantage of belonging to the leading people in Yugoslavia and of possessing several schools dating from the times before the First World War. They existed in Scutari, Vraca, Kamenica,<sup>185</sup> whereas schools in the Dibra region (which had probably been Macedonian, i.e. Bulgarian) had been shut down and opening of new ones was forbidden.<sup>186</sup> The school in Scutari had two classes with 57 pupils and 4 teachers in 1930, and there was also a day care center with 30 children as well as a workers' school with 11 school girls.<sup>187</sup> According to the (to be sure exaggerated) reports of the Yugoslav authorities, 2/3 of Muslims in Scutari were of Slavic origin (refugees from Bosnia and the Sandžak from 1878), so that the Yugoslav authorities hoped the knowledge of the Serbian language could be disseminated from the local Serbian school.<sup>188</sup> The Serbian school in Kamenica was probably closed in 1925, in keeping with the so-called Organic State Law which stipulated at least 25 pupils were needed for founding a minority school.<sup>189</sup>

The Albanian authorities were ill disposed toward Serbian schools from the very beginning – which was understandable, concerning the overall relations between the two states and the two peoples – although the attitude changed later on, depending on changes in the bilateral relations.<sup>190</sup> The situation of minority schools deteriorated since 1927 when stricter control and more Albanian instruction were introduced. "National subjects" in Albanian, taught by Albanian teachers were introduced in 1929. The order about Albanization of pupils' names was issued in 1930, and in September of that year the Serbian school was provocatively renamed after the greatest Albanian national holiday – "The Full School November 28 - Scutari". It

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182 Trnjegorski supposed there were 20,000 Serbs in Albania (into which he probably counted the Macedonians too). (Trnjegorski, p. 130.) Macedonian and Bulgarian authors estimate there could be some 40-50,000 Macedonians or Bulgarians in Albania in the inter-war period (3/4 of them Muslims). (Andonovski, p. 58; Popovski, p. 239.)

183 Popovski, p. 241.

184 Ibid., p. 247.

185 AJ, 38, 20/61; 74, 3/10.

186 Hadži-Vasiljević, Naši, p. 74.

187 AJ, 66, 7/17.

188 AJ, 66, 18/13.

189 Dimić, Školsko pitanje, p. 12.

190 Ibid., p. 11.

was ordered that the instruction be imparted in Albanian, but it seems the teachers avoided that on instructions from the Yugoslav consulate.<sup>191</sup> It seems the school in the less exposed Vraça was nationally less endangered.<sup>192</sup> The Albanian authorities closed down private schools in 1930 – Serbian ones included. The Yugoslav diplomacy estimated the damage from abolishing of the two Serbian schools would be smaller than the gain due to suppression of Italian and Greek propaganda, but this was soon proven wrong.<sup>193</sup>

The Serbian Orthodox Church in Albania was also in a bad situation, because the Albanian authorities perceived it as an agent of a not-very-friendly country. At the same time, they worked at the emancipation of the Albanian Orthodox Church which was self-proclaimed without the approval of the Patriarch of Constantinople at the ecclesiastical assembly in Korça in 1921. Because of the overall relations between the two countries, the Albanian authorities prevented the Serbian Orthodox Church from receiving a sufficient number of priests and hindered its activity at every step. The Serbian Orthodox Church tried to parry these actions of the Albanian secular authorities by aiding the foundation of the Albanian Orthodox Church (which officially occurred in May 1925 with the aid of the SOC).<sup>194</sup>

Apart from the pressure in the field of (anyway scanty) education and the Orthodox Church, the Serbian and Macedonian population was also subject to changes of personal (1930) and place names.<sup>195</sup> The overall hard living conditions spurred some of the Serbs to emigrate from Albania. The inhabitants of Glombočani from the vicinity of Prespa had intended the same, but the Albanian authorities prevented the collective emigration from there.<sup>196</sup>

The position of the Slavic population in Albania was less known than in other neighboring countries. On the whole it wasn't good, but due to lack of sources it is difficult to determine just how bad it was. It is only certain that the Yugoslav authorities had no reason to make much fuss in the international relations over few thousands of their co-nationals, since the other side had much better arguments based on incomparably larger number of its co-nationals in Yugoslavia. In other words, the fate of members of the minority was sacrificed to the state interests in this case too.

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191 Ibid., pp. 12-17; AJ, 66, 7/17. Kostelancik's claim the school in Scutari was shut down after Yugoslav-Albanian diplomatic talks about Albanian education, is not correct. (Kostelancik, p. 92.)

192 AJ, 66, 7/17; Dimić, Školsko pitanje, p. 18.

193 Dimić, Školsko pitanje, pp. 20-21; AJ, Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, f. II. Greece protested at closure of private minority schools with the Permanent Tribunal of International Justice in the Hague, which found that by closing them, Albania infringed the obligations it had accepted on joining the League of Nations on October 2, 1921. (Ilija Pržić, Manjinske škole u Albaniji, Arhiv za pravne i društvene nauke, knj. 48, sv. 3, 1935.).

194 Slijepčević, pp. 276-286. The Patriarchy of Constantinople issued the thomos for the Albanian Orthodox Church in 1937, and the latter "thanked" the Serbian Orthodox Church by putting under its control the organization of the Orthodox Church in parts of Kosovo and the Metohija which were joined to the Italian Greater Albania during the Second World War.

195 AJ, 66, 7/17.

196 Thus for instance 24 families (170 people) from Vraça took refuge in Podgorica, whereas all inhabitants of Gorica fled. (AJ, 74, 56/77; Zbirka A. Cincar-Markovića, f. II.)



It would be difficult to adduce the precise number of members of Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries, but it is certain that it ranged between 600,000 and 800,000. All of them lived in states which (with the exception of Romania) couldn't be called friendly in the real sense of the word. With all of them (including the allied Romania) territorial or minority disputes existed, and some of them even had ambitions to destroy Yugoslavia, which for its part occasionally cherished the idea of "helping" to carve up Albania. The bilateral relations of Yugoslavia with its neighbors were (again with the exception of Romania) predominantly bad. It is obvious that such a foreign-political framework couldn't influence favorably the situation of national minorities – both in Yugoslavia and in the neighboring countries. Apart from such foreign political situation, the bad position of the Yugoslav minorities was due to historical heritage of mutual strife with the majority populations of the neighboring countries, as well as the increased nationalism in all countries of the region (including Yugoslavia). Whereas improvements in the situation of minorities in Yugoslavia occurred, as a rule, due to improvement or wish for improvement of bilateral relations, this didn't always work the other way round, since Yugoslavia was a junior partner to some of the countries in which its minorities lived (Italy, Germany since 1938). Finally the factor that prevented Yugoslavia from intervening firmer in favor of its co-nationals abroad was the fact that the number of its minorities in the neighboring countries was usually much smaller than the number of the respective national minorities in Yugoslavia. This wasn't so only in the case of Italy which was too strong and of Greece where the Macedonians lived, for whom Belgrade had no great interest. In other words, with countries in which something could have been done for the Yugoslav minorities, it wasn't done so that their co-nationals in Yugoslavia wouldn't have to be granted the same benefits, in keeping with the principle of reciprocity. The only exception from this rule was Romania with which the Yugoslav government (extremely grudgingly) concluded a bilateral agreement on minority primary schools.

Finally, if we compared the situation of the Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries to the position of the national minorities in Yugoslavia, we would see that there was basically no substantial difference: the situation of minorities was mostly bad in all countries, with individual, not large exceptions. The situation of all Yugoslav minorities within neighboring countries wasn't the same, sometimes not even within one and the same country, just as the situation of all minorities wasn't the same in Yugoslavia, i.e., the situation of one minority in various parts of the country. In the course of this chapter and this whole book we have adduced various reasons for that. In the age of inflated victorious or revisionist nationalism, both in the region and in the whole of Europe, it would be unrealistic to expect that Yugoslavia or any country from the region could be above it. The same held true of the majority of members of minorities, who also, due to the historical development and unsatisfactory situation, sought the improvement of their position, apart from emigration, above all in irredentism. This was the case with the Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries too.

One gets the impression the main interest of Yugoslav policy in survival of the Yugoslav minorities in the neighboring countries laid exactly in the wish to use them some day if a propitious opportunity presented itself, as an excuse for the

extension of the state borders at the expense of the neighboring countries.<sup>197</sup> We have seen that the neighboring countries too cherished similar hopes as to the usefulness of their minorities in Yugoslavia.

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197 The plans of the Serbian royalist Chetnik movement in the Second World War about expansion of Yugoslavia at the expense of its neighbors plainly mirrors such view of the usability of national minorities in the neighboring countries. (CF. Jozo Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941-1945. The Chetniks*, Stanford 1975, pp. 167-173.)

## Epilogue

The Second World War put an end to the existence of the first Yugoslav state, bringing great turmoil to its inhabitants and upsetting the condition of ethnic communities in nearly all parts of the country. Tempestuous events during the war-time had also changed the conditions of national minorities very drastically. This held true both for the numerically smaller minority groups and for the three “major” ones. Whereas the smaller groups, particularly the Slavic ones (some of the Poles, Slovaks and Czechs), found themselves in a somewhat ambiguous situation to which they reacted either by joining the resistance movement or by various degrees of collaboration with the new authorities (as was typical of the Romanians in the Banat and some of the Ruthenians). The three “major” minorities found themselves again in a situation that made it much easier to identify themselves with the more privileged nationalities. The earlier history of ethnic conflicts, together with the experiences in the inter-war period, influenced to a high degree how the minorities of Yugoslavia aligned themselves during the Second World War. In a like manner, their situation within the Kingdom influenced (sometimes decisively) the war-time situation of the previously dominant nationalities, i.e., the Serbs and Slovenes. For these reasons we shall here briefly survey the behavior of the three “major” national minorities during the Second World War, because we feel that it completes their history in the bourgeois Yugoslavia. At the same time it helps to explain the treatment that both they and other minorities experienced after the end of the war.

The people who were, in many respects, in the worst position during the inter-war period were the Albanians. It is therefore understandable that the irredentist forces of Greater Albania would direct their propaganda to those of the Albanian nationality in Yugoslavia. And since the occupation of Albania was orchestrated by Italy, they expected to find a ready response among the members of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav authorities were well aware of the dissatisfaction of their ethnic Albanians, but they never took any steps to diminish it. For that reason ethnic Albanians felt free to form armed groups that would attack units of the Yugoslav Army to take strategic objectives under their control. These groups would also terrorize the Serbian population, especially the colonists. The Albanian population also greeted Italian and German troops as liberators – this being the deplorable outcome of the 20-year Yugoslav rule.

After the wartime partition of Yugoslavia, the largest part of the territories inhabited by the Albanians fell to Greater Albania under the aegis of Fascist Italy. Smaller parts fell to the German occupation zone in Serbia and the enlarged Bulgaria – although the border between the Italian and Bulgarian occupational zones remained disputed. In the territories under their control the Italian authorities introduced a number of policies aimed at winning over the Albanian population. They introduced measures that the Yugoslav state failed to utilize: they opened Albanian schools and introduced Albanian as an official language (along with Italian): they installed ethnic Albanian officials; they allowed the use of the Albanian flag; etc. Furthermore, only sporadically did they discourage numerous Albanian acts of violence against the Serbian population: arson, mass murders (often bestial), threats, pillage

and expulsion which started a spate of refugees from Kosovo and Metohija that numbered several tens of thousands of victims.<sup>1</sup> The situation of the Serbian population was not much better in the German zone, and after the capitulation of Italy, the German forces occupied the Italian zone too. The Germans continued playing the role of “liberators”, only occasionally preventing pogroms on the Serbian population that caused them to pay with their lives and property, not only for centuries-long ethnic intolerance but also for the wrong policy of the inter-war Yugoslav authorities. Colonists, particularly Montenegrins, often paid for their offensively haughty behavior.

There were four “liberation movements” that had, besides the antifascist ones, their separate revolutionary and/or nationalistic goals, and who fought in Albanian-inhabited territory. The Serbian Chetniks received some support only from some of the endangered Serbian population, and they could enlarge their nominally Yugoslav basis in this non-Yugoslav environment even less than in other non-Serb areas. The Yugoslav Communists (of which the Albanians were less than 10% in the area) were not attractive to the Albanian masses, which abhorred equally all Yugoslav or Serbian movements and for whom renewal of any kind of Yugoslav state was equally unacceptable. For these reasons the bulk of the partisan movement in Kosovo was formed by Serbs, and the Albanians were only symbolically represented. Nevertheless, the toying of some local (partly Albanian) communist leaders with the future appurtenance of Kosovo, was rejected by the Yugoslav Communist leadership as inopportune at that moment. The Communist Party of Albania (founded with the aid of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia) also strove to separate predominantly Albanian-inhabited parts from Yugoslavia and to join them to Albania, but since the Albanian Communist Party was under the influence of, and in many respects dependent on, its Yugoslav opposite number, such attitudes had to be suppressed in public. Furthermore, ties with the Yugoslav Communists certainly were not good advertisement for the Albanian party with the Albanian masses in Yugoslavia. Finally, the Albanian bourgeois resistance movement, Balli Kombëtar, also cherished Greater Albanian aspirations, but it turned out to be too weak to oppose the local Communists even in Albania itself.

For reasons such as: the insufficient strength and appeal of various resistance movements; welcomed concessions granted by the occupiers; and memories of an unsatisfactory situation in the inter-war Yugoslavia; the vast majority of the Albanians remained on the side of Germany and its allies until the end of the war. However, the Yugoslav Communists who took power in the eastern parts of the country in the autumn of 1944, were willing to forgive them in order to win them over to a restructured Yugoslav state. However, the Albanian masses, accustomed to anarchy and hostility to the Serbs and to every Yugoslav state, refused to reconcile themselves with the return into the former state framework or to fight alongside the hated Serbs in the last phase of the war. This caused a massive sedition in late 1944 and early 1945 which had to be suppressed by harsh military means. The remnants of the rebellion persisted until the early 1950s, making the reeducation and integration of the Albanian minority into socialist Yugoslavia more difficult. This was also the reason the state used the carrot-and-stick approach toward the Albanian population during the first two decades following the war: preventing the return of the greater part of the inter-war colonists; revising the agrarian reform; opening

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1 As in many other cases, the total number is disputed in this case too.

Albanian schools; allowing the use of the Albanian language; gradually integrating increasingly more Albanian cadres into the civil service; but at the same time retaining tight police control. After the mid-1960s police control was relaxed and the Albanians were granted a number of new concessions. However, because of the hyper-productivity of humanistic intelligentsia, and an excessive birth-rate combined with inadequate economic development, the integration of the Albanian national minority into the multiethnic Yugoslav state eventually failed. It would not be wrong to state that the failure of that integration, epitomized in the separatist demands posed from 1981 onward, triggered the final wave of nationalism that led to the bloody break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.<sup>2</sup>

The situation of the German minority during the Second World War was in some respect similar to that of the Albanian one, but its fate after the war was much different. The Volksdeutsche had also greeted the Wehrmacht troops with enthusiasm and their paramilitary groups also took over in several places even before the arrival of the German or Hungarian forces. It is not clear to what extent the paramilitary groups were a continuation of the "sports associations" founded already a few years before the war, and to what extent they were *ad hoc* groups of civic guards, such as members of other peoples had also set up during the April War (sometimes together with members of other nationalities). The fact is that some of the actions of the paramilitary Volksdeutsche groups couldn't be qualified as purely defensive. Their activity, as well as the casualties they caused, would bring painful retaliation to the whole German minority four years later.<sup>3</sup>

Ethnic Germans were scattered over many sections of Yugoslavia and the people were divided among the various governments after the invaders had the country carved up. In Lower Styria, which had been annexed directly to the Reich, the Volksdeutsche there found themselves in a privileged position, often holding offices and participating in the organization of the state apparatus. They helped in realizing assimilation measures against the Slovenes. The district of Kočevje, or

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2 Nenad Antonijević (ed.), *Albanski zločini nad Srbima na Kosovu i Metohiji za vreme Drugog svetskog rata*. Dokumenta, Beograd 2004; Branislav Božović, Milorad Vavić, Surova vremena na Kosovu i Metohiji, Beograd 1991; Ali Hadri, NOP na Kosovu 1941-1945, Beograd 1973; Idem, Okupacioni sistem na Kosovu i Metohiji 1941-1944, *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 2, 1965; Bogdanović, pp. 200-210, 224-256; Horvat, o.c.; Savo Drljević, *Kontrarevolucija na Kosovu i Metohiji – zavođenje vojne uprave februara 1945. godine*, *Istorijski zapisi*, 4, 1986; Dogo, Kosovo, pp. 321-345; Slijepčević, pp. 303 ff; Vickers, pp. 120-289; Borozan, pp. 262-502; Đaković, o.c.; Malcolm, Kosovo, pp. 290-341; Bataković, *The Kosovo Chronicles*, pp. 13-15, 22; Imami, pp. 284-341; Dragnich, Todorovich, pp. 138-184; Lenard Cohen, *Ethnopolitical Conflict in Yugoslavia: Elites in Kosovo 1912-1982*, in: Ronald H. Linder, Bert A. Rockman (eds.), *Elite Studies and Communist Politics. Essays in Memory of Carl Beck*, London, Pitsbourgh 1984, pp. 247-291; Glišić, *Albanizacija*; Willem Vermeer, *Albanians and Serbs in Yugoslavia*, *Yearbook of European Studies*, 5, 1992, pp. 115-120; Janko Pleterski, *The National Liberation Struggle in Kosovo and the Question of Antifascism*; Spasoje Đaković, *The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the National Liberation Struggle and Revolution in Kosovo and Metohija*; Branko Petranović, *AVNOJ and the Bujan Conference*; Milija Šćepanović, *The Exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins (1878-1988)*, all in: *Kosovo. Past and Present*, Belgrade s.a.

3 Biber, *Nacizem*, pp. 211-267; Mirnić, *Nemci*, p. 78; Petar Kačavenda, *Nemci u Jugoslaviji 1918-1945*, Beograd 1991, pp. 25-27; *Das Schicksal*, pp. 45E-50E.

Gottschee, which had remained deep in the Italian zone of occupation was resettled, and its inhabitants were partly settled alongside the Sava and the Sutla rivers within the framework of Germanization of Slovenian territories. The less numerous Germans from Ljubljana were also resettled.<sup>4</sup>

The German Folk Group in the Independent State of Croatia comprised the Volksdeutsche of Syrmium, Slavonia and Bosnia, as well as a small number scattered in other areas. They were granted extensive privileges and the authority to organize themselves with a legal standing. A number of German schools were opened and, in places with higher percentage of the Volksdeutsche, German was introduced as the official language. Quite a few German civil servants were appointed at the community and higher levels of administration. Separate German military units were also established, which came under the command of the armed forces of the Reich in 1943. The authorities of the Independent State of Croatia, or ISC, had to grant the Volksdeutsche considerable privileges – as a concession to their great ally – but in practice there was constant friction over offices and sharing of the confiscated Jewish and Serbian property.

Persecution of the Serbs living in the ISC sparked the resistance movement, and the Volksdeutsche there were quite busy fighting the partisans – which caused their villages – particularly the scattered ones – to be endangered by the partisans. For that reason, the Germans were resettled within the ISC. Volksdeutsche from Bosnia were resettled in the winter 1942/43, and the Volksdeutsche from western Slavonia were resettled to eastern Slavonia and Syrmium in 1943/44. Finally in autumn 1944 the vast majority of the Volksdeutsche were completely evacuated from the territory of the ISC because of the deteriorating situation on the war front.<sup>5</sup>

The younger and nationally more conscious of the Volksdeutsche in the Bačka and Baranya were extremely disappointed that they had come under the Hungarian, instead of the German rule. Many of the older generation that had been

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4 Frensing, o.c; Tone Ferenc, *Nacistička politika denacionalizacije u Sloveniji u godinama od 1941 do 1945*, [Ljubljana, Beograd 1979], pp. 119-120, 476-631; Idem, *Nemška kolonizacija na Slovenskem v drugi svetovni vojni*, *Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis*, 1-2, 1974; Idem, *Nemci na Slovenskem med drugo svetovno vojno*, in: Dušan Nečak (ed.), *"Nemci" na Slovenskem 1941-1955*, Ljubljana 1998.

5 Wilhelm Sattler, *Die deutsche Volksgruppe im Unabhängigen Staat Kroatien. Ein Buch von Deutschen in Slawonien, Syrmien und Bosnien*, Graz 1943; Zdravko Krnić, *The German Volksgruppe in the Independent State of Croatia as an Instrument of German Occupation Policy in Yugoslavia*, in: *The Third Reich and Yugoslavia*; Antun Miletić, *The Volksdeutsche of Bosnia, Slavonia and Srem Regions in the Struggle against the People's Liberation Movement (1941-1944)*, in: *The Third Reich and Yugoslavia*; Kačavenda, pp. 48-54; Petar Vukelić, *Okupaciona vlast i sistem nacionalne diskriminacije u Sremu za vreme »Nezavisne Države Hrvatske«*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 35, 1963; Holm Sundhaussen, *Zur Geschichte der Waffen-SS in Kroatien 1941-1945*, *Südost-Forschungen*, XXX, 1971; Vladimir Geiger, *Nijemci u Đakovu*, pp. 141-166; Žarko Atanacković, *Srem u Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu i socijalističkoj revoluciji*, Beograd 1968; Idem, *Zemun i okolina u ratu i revoluciji*, Beograd 1962; Antun Miletić, *Preseljenje i evakuacija folksdojčera iz Srema i Slavonije 1942-1944. godine*, *Zbornik Historijskog instituta Slavonije i Baranje*, 12, 1975; Oberkersch, *Die Deutschen*, pp. 372-441; *Das Schicksal*, pp. 50E-54E; Kačavenda, pp. 48-54. Cf. also an extensive writing of Altgayer, which although subjective and sometimes factually faulty, remains very useful.

raised in Hungary adapted more easily. On the whole, however, the Bačka Germans, together with the Transylvanian Saxons, were the most radical among the Germans in the enlarged Hungary, and they even became the decisive factor in the *Volksbund*, the blanket organization of the Germans in Hungary. The largest number of the volunteers of the Waffen-SS from Hungary stemmed from the Bačka, although the reasons for joining were often more of a practical than ideological or national nature. The earliest of three major recruitment campaigns occurred in 1942 and was mostly voluntary. Pressure was used during the campaign in 1943, and the third one, which took place after German occupation of Hungary in 1944, wasn't even voluntary in name. Clearly, the martial zeal diminished over time and the national enthusiasm cooled off with collision with reality. Albeit grudgingly, Hungary had to make a number of concessions to its German minority, particularly in the field of education, but their privileges were never as great there as in the ISC or in the occupied Banat. In return for the privileges granted to them, the Volksdeutsche of the Bačka and Baranya had to perform military and economic duties, which became increasingly onerous with time.<sup>6</sup>

A Volksdeutsche quasi-state existed only as a dream in Syrmium and the Bačka, but it was closer to a reality in the Banat where the local Germans, aided by some units from Germany, tried to proclaim such an autonomous region in the days of upheaval. This attempt was nipped in the bud. As a consolation reward for their moral and material support to the German occupation, but especially in order to facilitate the administration of that part of the occupied Serbia, the Volksdeutsche in the Yugoslav Banat were granted considerable autonomy. This was important to them as an ethnic group and to the Banat as a region. Although the larger part of the administrative apparatus remained staffed by pre-war Serbian officials, Volksdeutsche were appointed to key administrative posts. The same held true of the commissioners entrusted with administering the confiscated Jewish property. German schools were opened in the Banat and German was introduced as the official language. The organization of the ethnic Germans was in the manner of a folk-group, which corresponded with similar structures in the Reich. In the end, everything had to serve the interests of Germany: decisions were made by the occupation authorities in Belgrade or by the government of the Reich in Berlin. The Volksdeutsche officials served merely to execute the decisions – albeit sometimes very willingly. Together with members of other nationalities, Volksdeutsche were engaged as guards in prisons and concentration camps, and since early 1942, as soldiers of the Waffen-SS. Although recruitment for the 7<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division “Prinz Eugen” was nominally voluntary, it was in fact a mandatory call-up. Against the wishes of the leaders of the folk group, this unit was deployed against the partisans in parts of the country that were remote from the Banat. Certain of their actions committed during the anti-guerrilla warfare were considered to be criminal and would later be avenged painfully on all of the German minority throughout the country. Evacuation of the Volksdeutsche from the Banat that had been minutely planned for when the occupying Reich Germans were withdrawn, was never executed because there was a delay in

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6 Mirnić, Nemci; Idem, The Enlistment of the Volksdeutsche from the Bačka Region in the Waffen SS, in: *The Third Reich and Yugoslavia*; Tilkovszky, Ungarn, pp. 146-158, 168-259, 264-282, 301-334; Idem, *Zeitgeschichte*, pp. 139-172; Spannenberger, pp. 260-268, 282-310, 326-385, 402-404; *Das Schicksal*, pp. 57E-58E.

granting authorization to start evacuating. For that reason, the vast majority of the Banat Volksdeutsche, as well as about half of those in the Bačka, came under sway of the partisans and the Red Army.<sup>7</sup>

In the spate of revenge by Yugoslav partisans, some 10,000 Volksdeutsche were killed outright and almost all Germans remaining in the country were interned in concentration camps by mid-1945. By spring of 1948 some 50,000 of them had died of starvation, sickness and exhaustion – the Western Allies having refused to allow their resettlement in Germany as the Yugoslav Communist authorities repeatedly demanded. Since the entirety of their property had been confiscated by the decision of the Presidency of the interim partisan parliament, the AVNOJ, on November 21, 1944, almost all Volksdeutsche survivors emigrated from Yugoslavia during the 1950s. Unlike with the Albanians, the CPY made no attempt to reconcile itself with the German minority at the end of the war – perhaps fearing Germany could again use them as a pawn at some time in the future. There was also the fear that Germany might somehow lay claim to the considerable property of the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche. This property made possible tying of the partisan soldiers and their families to the new regime as they were colonized on the Swabian estates in the Vojvodina.<sup>8</sup>

Attempts at integration of the ethnic Germans ensued only when the few remaining members of the German minority had no longer any wish to be integrated into the socialist society – a society that had treated them so extremely cruelly for crimes committed only by some of the Volksdeutsche.<sup>9</sup> In their case, it wasn't so

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- 7 Shimizu, o.c.; Thosmas Casagrande, *Die Volksdeutsche SS-Division „Prinz-Eugen“*. Die Banater Schwaben und die national-sozialistische Kriegsverbrechen, Frankfurt, New York 2003, pp. 155-337; Branislav Popov Miša, *Nemački zatvori i koncentracioni logori u Banatu 1941-1944*, Beograd 1992, passim; Kačavenda, pp. 29-48; Vegh, o.c.; Ekkehard Völkl, *Der Westbanat 1941-1944. Die deutsche, die ungarische und andere Volksgruppen*, München 1991; Slobodan Milošević, *Kvislinške snage u Banatu u službi nemačkog okupatora 1941-1944*. godine, *Vojno-istorijski glasnik*, 1, 1979; Božidar Ivković, *Neki metodi ekonomske politike i privredne pljačke okupatora u Banatu 1941-1944*, in: *Vojvodina 1941*, Novi Sad 1967; Idem, *Uništenje Jevreja i pljačka njihove imovine u Banatu 1941-1944*, *Tokovi revolucije*, I, 1967; Idem, *Zatvori i koncentracioni logori u Banatu 1941-1944*. (Primena fašističkih metoda genocida), *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 39, 1964; Karl-Heinz Schlarp *Wirtschaft und Besatzung in Serbien 1941-1944. Ein Beitrag zur nationalsozialistischen Wirtschaftspolitik in Südosteuropa*, Stuttgart 1986, pp. 299, 338, 353; *Das Schicksal*, pp. 55E-57E. An apologetical version of the Volksdeutsche leaders see in: Janko, Weg; Beer, *Donauschwäbische Zeitgeschichte*; Johann Wüsch, *Beitrag zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Jugoslawien für den Zeitraum von 1934 bis 1944*, Kehl am Rhein 1966, pp. 63-141. On the broader context of the recruitment of the Vojvodina Swabians for the Waffen-SS cf.: Valdis O. Lumans, *A Military Obligation of the Volksdeutsche of Eastern Europe Towards the Third Reich*, *East European Quarterly*, XXIII, 3, 1989.
- 8 *Das Schicksal*; *Leidensweg der Deutschen im kommunistischen Jugoslawien*, I-IV, München 1991-1995; Vladimir Geiger, *Nestanak folksdojčera*, Zagreb 1997; Zoran Janjetović, *Between Hitler and Tito. The Disappearance of the Vojvodina Germans*, Belgrade 2000, pp. 196-346; Božo Repe, "Nemci" na Slovenskem po drugi svetovni vojni, in: Dušan Nećak (ed.), "Nemci" na Slovenskem 1941-1955, Ljubljana 1998.
- 9 Goran Nikolić, *Život posle skidanja sa krsta*, in: Nenad Stefanović (ed.), *Jedan svet na Dunavu. Razgovori i komentari*, Beograd 1997 (2nd ed.)



much the dissatisfaction with their treatment in the inter-war Yugoslavia that prevented their integration, but rather the treatment at the hands of the authorities at the end of the war and later. Carried away by national fervor and attracted by propaganda, the Yugoslav Germans (like most of members of all other nationalities in the country) sided with the national colors. The situation was somewhat different only in Slovenia: the Second World War there was just the last round in the national struggle of the Slovenes with the Germans that had lasted ever since mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. It is certain that the inter-war period didn't help to calm down that struggle or to end it with any compromise, thus leading to an uncritical siding of the Volksdeutsche in Slovenia with the Reich. All attempts of the Yugoslav Communists to win over the Volksdeutsche to their resistance movement bore no fruit because the Communist ideology remained alien to the majority of the German population. There was also the influence of historical circumstances, where they found themselves on the wrong side – which at first seemed victorious, but became soon so compromised and oppressive. Leaving would certainly have entailed a large risk with only the uncertain possibility of gain.

As for the Magyars, their position during the Second World War and immediately after it, was somewhere between those of the Albanians and the Germans. They too enthusiastically greeted the occupiers (particularly Hungarian ones), and in several places their paramilitary groups made the task of the occupying forces easier. Frequent vengeful or wanton murders occurred in the process. After the dismemberment of the country, the Magyars in the ISC were granted certain cultural rights, but this didn't quell their irredentism. The same held true of the Hungarians in the Banat – toward whom the Germans cherished mistrust, denying them initially participation in the administrative apparatus. As members of an allied nation, they enjoyed greater rights than the defeated Serbs, but not the autonomy that they had wished – until their eventual annexation by Hungary.

In the Bačka the state apparatus was built up in part with the aid of the leaders from the Hungarian minority and the Magyar population provided the dominance of the Hungarian power. Some had participated in crimes against the Serbs and Jews.<sup>10</sup> Serbian colonists were either expelled or put in concentration camps, and some of their land was distributed to the local Hungarians, but also to the Szekler colonists.

About one third of the Communists in the Vojvodina had been of Hungarian nationality before the outbreak of the war. After they had been liquidated in the first months of the war the Hungarian minority remained loyal to the authorities and did not join the Communist resistance movement in any significant numbers. The fate of the Magyars at the end of the war was somewhat different from that of the Germans, thanks to a different situation in various parts of the country. There was the intervention of Hungarian Communists and to be sure, the Soviets, who had already earmarked Hungary as a future Communist country. The new powers were willing to make a difference in their treatment of the Magyars in the Bačka and also in other parts of the country. The first wave of revenge coupled with mass murders was strongest exactly in the Bačka, and the internment in concentration camps that followed, was most massive there. However, the policy toward the Hungarian minority

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10 This was particularly obvious during the April War and the infamous "Razzia" (state-organized pogrom of the Serbs and Jews in early 1942.)

was changed already in November 1944, when gradual liberation of those Magyars who had been interned began. Their induction into the Yugoslav Army also started, albeit at first only into non-combat units, and by spring of 1945 they started getting posts in the state apparatus. This process of integration into the socialist community was gradually continued and it was fairly successful during the later decades, partly due to the foreign political reasons (suppression of the uprising in Hungary in 1956 and establishment of a much more rigid regime there than in Yugoslavia). While the Communist authorities managed to avoid many of the errors of the minority policy of the inter-war period, they did reduce the numerical importance of the Hungarian minority<sup>11</sup> by colonizing Serbian partisan families in the Bačka.

The Romanian minority in the Banat had also experienced a widening of its rights under German rule, but they remained nevertheless a negligible factor in the overall relations in that region. They too cherished hopes of eventually joining their mother country. They remained consistently passive toward the partisan movement, whereas some of the young generation did sympathize with the Iron Guard. The Romanian attitude toward the post-war Communist authorities was that of passivity and mistrust. The latter being reciprocated as their representatives began to be integrated into the new system more slowly than those of the Hungarian minority.<sup>12</sup>

The four small Slavic minorities partly sided with the partisans, although contrary tendencies also made themselves manifest among the Ruthenians.<sup>13</sup> Emigration of the Poles and some of the Ruthenians after the war was a curious continuation of the pre-war and wartime way of solving the ethnic question, and it was certainly an answer to the scattering and the small number of members of these minorities.<sup>14</sup>

On the whole, it can be said that the inter-war situation of the three "major" national minorities in the Yugoslav state, coupled with the effect of propaganda on the part of their mother countries and other interested powers, decisively influenced their choice of sides during the Second World War. The kind of policies of the Yugoslav state toward dominant minority peoples between 1918 and 1941 served more to increase than to decrease inter-ethnic tensions, thereby contributing to their turning against that state during the Second World War. This in turn damaged further their relations with majority peoples and made the later attempt at

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11 Kasaš, Mađari; Tibor Cseres, *Krvna osveta u Bačkoj*, Zagreb 1993; Živan Kumanov, *Bačka u NOB*. Kratak pregled, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 27, 1960; Jovan M. Pejin, *Srbi i Mađari*, Kikinda 1996; Bogner, pp. 95-101; M. Mitrović, pp. 220-229; Zvonimir Golubović, *Racija u južnoj Bačkoj 1942. godine*, Novi Sad 1992; Idem, *Racija u januaru 1942 u južnoj Bačkoj*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 35, 1963; Mila Čobanski, Zvonimir Golubović, Živan Kumanov, *Novi Sad u ratu i revoluciji 1941-1945*, I, Novi Sad 1976; Saopštenja o zločinima okupatora i njihovih pomagača 1941-1944, knj. 1. *Bačka i Baranja*, Novi Sad 1946; Josip Mirnić, *Sistem fašističke okupacije u Bačkoj i Baranji*, *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, 35, 1963; Rehak, *Nacionalni i politički razvitak*, pp. 564-566.

12 Perunika D. Petrović, o.c.

13 Biljnja, Rusini, pp. 45-46, 58-60, 79-83.

14 Burda, pp. 188-189; Biljnja, Rusini u Vojvodini, pp. 149-152; Kostelnik, *Prilog; Drljača, Kolonizacija; Hanzl, Matušek, Orct*, o.c. On the participation of the Ruthenians in the disreputed "Razzia" cf. Golubović, *Racija u južnoj Bačkoj*, p. 17.

integration into the Yugoslav body politic more difficult – the attempt that was undertaken after three years of fatal delay in the case of the Volksdeutsche. A somewhat better position during the inter-war period, their Slavic ethnicity and the position of their mother countries during the war, caused the greater part of the Slavic minorities to remain loyal to the state in which they lived – which didn't necessarily lead to an easier integration after the war.<sup>15</sup> In any case, the treatment they experienced during the inter-war period in Yugoslavia was one of the decisive factors that determined the behavior of members of national minorities during the Second World War.

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15 The largest part of the Polish minority emigrated from Yugoslavia at the Polish government's instigation after the Second World War.



## Conclusion

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia created in 1918, despite the fact it posed as a nation-state, was in fact a truly multinational body politic much like an empire. It was no less multi-ethnic than the Habsburg or Ottoman Empires which had for centuries ruled the territories that were included into its framework. These empires were responsible for the ethnic make-up of the areas that were united as Yugoslavia under the scepter of the Karađorđević dynasty at the end of the First World War. Apart from several South Slavic peoples (the national consciousness of some of which was still undeveloped, or who were denied the right to an independent national identity), large parts of the new state were also inhabited by alien Slavic, and even more non-Slavic populations. To a greater extent, these peoples had been settled there during the two centuries that preceded the founding of Yugoslavia. Except for the Germans in the Kočevje and in several Slovenian towns, the only traces remaining from the minority populations that settled in the Middle Ages are village names, i.e. toponomastics.) Their relations with the majority population varied throughout history and ranged from times of peaceful coexistence and intermingling and at other times, to serious confrontations and even armed conflicts. At that, the conflicts in the early past didn't have so much of a nationalistic tinge, but more of a social or religious one. It was not until the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century that conflicts ensuing from social, political or religious differences started to take on the character of nationalism.

The way a national minority had been settled, or the way the majority Yugoslav population perceived that settlement, significantly influenced the attitudes the Yugoslavs had toward immigrant members of a minority. The perceptions that members of the Yugoslav peoples had of the newcomers were determined by their rank on the social ladder or their role in the economic life or administrative apparatus of the ruling empires. For these reasons there was a strong tendency to identify members of certain peoples (especially the Germans and Magyars) or of certain religions (mostly Muslims) with the rulers of the two large empires, the Habsburg and the Ottoman.<sup>1</sup> Although that identification wasn't completely groundless, the multi-ethnicity of those

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1 One reflection of such sentiments that still lives (with most people probably unconsciously) are the very popular jokes about "stupid Bosnians" who always have Muslim names of Mujo and Haso, and never Christian ones like Petar or Pavle, or Marko and Janko. That reflection of the animosity toward (once privileged) Muslims found its expression in jokes where the Muslims became a personification of "dumb" or "stubborn" Bosnians, although the Muslims are actually the minority among population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Another example of identifying members of one people with the empire in which it only nominally was the leading one, can be seen in the proverb "It is better that a Turk chases you with a saber, than a German with a feather", which alludes to slowness and intricacy of the Habsburg bureaucracy, and which overlooks the fact that considerable part of its officials (although they did business in German), were not Germans, but Czechs, Poles, Croats or Slovenes, loyal only to the "illustrious house" [of the Habsburgs], and not to the German nation toward which the Habsburgs themselves, although for a long time formally German emperors, were indifferent, or in whose nationalist-democratic tendencies in the era of nationalism they correctly saw a danger to their rule.

empires was usually ignored by the common people, as was the multi-ethnicity of their administrations. Thus, dissatisfaction with the government was often projected onto members of the dominant nationalities and to the dominant religions within a community or smaller local area. The often underprivileged status of members of those peoples was often overlooked in the process. Little attention was given to the poverty of Hungarian and (less numerous) German landless peasants in the Vojvodina, Muslim serfs in the South, lack of schools for the Albanians in the Ottoman Empire and for the Swabians in Hungary, lack of political rights for the vast majority of the Hungarians in Hungary etc. In other words, a very simplified "picture of the other" appeared, which disregarded social stratification, cultural opportunities and real political influence of individuals belonging to minority communities.

The creation of Yugoslavia happened against the will of the majority of members of national minorities: they had no say in the affair, and the goals of the Yugoslav peoples were achieved in some cases only by the use of weapons, and not by the will of the majority of the population in certain territories. This encroachment on the territories predominantly inhabited by non-Yugoslav population was excused by rectification of historical injustices. According to that theory, the alien empires colonized, more by force than peacefully, their co-nationals, who in turn, again more by force than peacefully, ousted or assimilated the indigenous Yugoslav population. The natural continuation of this theory was the claim that the majority of members of minorities in the Yugoslav territory were in fact not real members of minorities, but assimilated Southern Slavs, who therefore were, to be "returned" to their "original" nationality through schooling and other assimilationist measures.

All this means the authorities of the new state took an inimical stance toward the larger part of the minority population. The exceptions were members of the Slavic minorities – the Slovaks, Czechs, Ruthenians (and to a lesser extent the Poles), who were treated as "brothers", although it remained clear, as "younger brothers". They were granted somewhat more rights than the real aliens (particularly if it was necessary to augment the number of Slavic inhabitants in a given territory, so that it reached at least the relative majority in comparison with the non-Slav population), but they couldn't count on equally favorable treatment as members of the leading Yugoslav peoples.

As for other minorities, the ruling powers often made no secret that they preferred that these didn't exist. Even the modest international minority protection that the victorious powers had secured for them, was more or less evaded. The poor efficacy of the League of Nations relieved fears that existed in the government circles that there might be interference with domestic affairs resulting from signing of the Convention on Protection of Minorities. Minorities were perceived as necessary evil, and the number of their members was to be reduced by emigration or assimilation. If that proved impossible, the minority population was to be made politically impotent, culturally weakened and economically marginalized. All the more, since members of minorities, to a large extent, inhabited the sensitive bordering regions. In some places they played the dominant role in the economy and enjoyed cultural supremacy and social prestige. Therefore, not only were the members of minorities to be supplanted, but also their cultural and economic influence. These were often still fed by the economic clout and cultural attraction of their mother countries.

Measures undertaken to suppress members of minorities and their influence were widely varied. They varied from the prohibition of the use of their

mother-tongue (to be sure not always strictly abided by) in official intercourse, to limiting of possibilities for political activities and organization. There were policies for the redistribution of educational facilities and disproportional increase in the instruction in the "state language" coupled with denial of private or even any instruction in mother-tongue. There was an almost complete exclusion of minorities from civil service (except on the lowest levels) and an agrarian reform intended to weaken the predominantly alien large landholdings. Further economic weakening was achieved by putting firms under sequester, i.e. under control by means of "nationalization". Resettlement or colonization of the "national element" in predominantly minority-inhabited areas reduced minority influence. Encouraging emigration was the most extreme measure, but it wasn't always applied – partly because it depended on the possibility of settlement in the countries of immigration.

In addition, members of minorities were also subject to physical violence. In the north this ranged from beating to the occasional use of firearms by the gendarmerie or nationalist groups. In southern parts there were real military operations including the use of artillery. However, such rough treatment wasn't limited only to members of national minorities, but for any opponents to the existing order, when the situation became strained enough. The state fought its foes not with kid gloves but with boxing gloves, regardless of their national or political colors. Censorship of the press, as well as pressure and even violence at elections or during electoral campaigns, were directed against all opponents of the government, not just against national minorities. It reflected the lack of the existence of a legal state and the generally oppressive climate that more or less prevailed in the country throughout the inter-war period.

Despite this circumstance which, at the first glance, appears unfavorable, national minorities were not totally deprived of maneuver space. It was, however, different in various fields of activity and in different parts of the country. Members of national minorities who had previously belonged to privileged nationalities within the defunct empires, often enjoyed to a large extent a better economic and social status than members of the Yugoslav peoples. This was a result of how they had been settled, better technology, etc... To be sure, this wasn't true of all members of these minorities, but some of them had strong and socially influential upper classes. This was particularly true of Albanian and Turkish beys and agas in the southern parts, although their economic strength gradually declined during the inter-war period. They managed, to a large degree, to safeguard their material interests through old and new ties with the ruling politicians. They even profited from Yugoslav protectionism by posing at the same time as national champions, as did some German industrialists and large merchants in Slovenia, as well as some non-Slav industrialists in the Vojvodina. Furthermore, some less well-off members of minorities were nevertheless better off than their South-Slav neighbours, which often bred envy and friction. In the field of culture, the Germans in Slovenia and in the Vojvodina the Hungarians, aided by Magyarized Jews, long preserved cultural and linguistic influences that shone from their mother countries and which the Yugoslav authorities weren't able to suppress.

In the field of politics, the situation of individual minorities was rather different. Members of minorities in the northern part of the country were not granted the right to participate in running of their communities until 1927, and then only briefly. For the Albanians and Turks in southern parts, that was a matter of course

from the very beginning – although the percentages of members of various administrative bodies, particularly in larger towns, didn't always correspond to the ethnic make-up of the population. As a rule, minority parties were junior partners in relation to the parties of the majority peoples. They couldn't fully develop their capacities due to gerrymandering, scattered population and political pressure. It was the conviction of some minority voters that they would realize their interests better by leaning on large Yugoslav parties. Nevertheless, sometimes they were the cock of the parliamentary balance. When the political life had been thawed after the "Granted Constitution" in 1931, the opportunity for political activity of national minorities was narrower still. The number and the role of their representatives in political bodies was mostly decorative, i.e. complaints they presented in them were largely a voice of one crying in the wilderness. Nevertheless, some minority politicians were comparatively successful in making a political career.<sup>2</sup>

What was rather important for some minorities was the influence of their mother countries. The smallest minority – the Italians – profited most from this, whereas all others (except for the Czechs and Slovaks) had to wait long for their turn to have their situations improved in that way. Even then, the concessions they were granted were modest and, more importantly, were given only grudgingly, out of political necessity and not out of conviction by the Yugoslav authorities that minorities deserved better treatment.

Did national minorities deserve a more magnanimous treatment? Measured by today's standards, the answer would be – yes, by their very existence as minorities. However, it would be un-historic to project the standards of today onto the situation of 70-80 years ago. It is certain that the leading circles in the country didn't deem minorities deserved more rights and better opportunities than those they were already getting. Those who claimed minorities had been granted too much as it was, were quite numerous. As for members of minorities themselves, they were visibly dissatisfied with their position and they expressed it in both legitimate and illicit ways. Those who had their own press used it to express their complaints, within boundaries set by censorship. Parliamentary representatives from among minorities presented complaints of their voters to the parliament on several occasions. When this didn't avail, they complained to diplomatic representatives of their mother countries, to the European Minority Congress and to the League of Nations. In the southern districts of Yugoslavia the rifle was a traditional substitute for the legal state, *kaçak* gangs substituted for parliamentarism, and rebellions were the usual mode for expressing popular dissatisfaction. The disgruntled Muslim population (including the Yugoslav Muslims) used these time-tested means to expressed their attitude toward the authorities. Their tacit representatives in the parliament and a non-existent press were not able to show it to the world in a more civil form. Political, educational and economic demands by minorities in the north benefited from the clout afforded by their economic power, social influence, cultural prestige and, not in the least, the influence of their mother countries. The demands of minorities in the south, in contrast, were strengthened by the activities of groups of outlaws – even when they were only apolitical bands of cattle thieves. Their influence was further aided by sympathetic Albanians and

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2 The long-term leader of the Yugoslav Germans, Stefan Kraft, continued playing the leading role among the Volksdeutsche in emigration.



plotting emigrants, but it is rather questionable if they were really helpful to the Albanian minority.

Every expression of dissatisfaction – by words or actions – led to oppression in the form of censorship of the press, disbanding of cultural, artistic and other societies, assaults by gangs of bullies or mistreatment by the gendarmerie or the military. To be sure, none of these measures could reconcile the new state with members of minorities who, in most cases, had been turned from members of privileged peoples to members of discriminated national minorities, thereby provoking feelings of anger. Their previously favorable situation (except of the Slovaks, Czechs, Poles and Ruthenians) and the hostile attitude of the new authorities toward them, did little to inspire any feeling of loyalty. The consequence was that instead of seeking solution through the recognition of minority rights they sought solutions to their position in irredentism – the annexation to their mother country. More precisely put, the grudging granting of minority rights was just a temporary measure to avoid irredentism. In the case of the Germans, for whom it was impractical be annexed to their mother country, there was the likelihood of organizing that minority according to the *Volksgruppe*-principle, i.e. as a minority community that would have only minimal contacts with the state in which it lived.

The ruling circles of Yugoslavia never had the slightest idea of choosing a more tolerant minority policy unless it was conditioned by foreign policy concerns. For the former inhabitants of the historical Hungary who had had no right to vote, there was no suggestion of winning them over by introducing any form of true democracy. There was an idea of winning over the Hungarian Germans by opening schools but it was only short-lived. During the agrarian reform, almost no one came up with the idea of winning over Hungarian and other minority landless peasants for the new state by giving them land. Similarly, no one thought of winning over the Albanians or Turks, which might have been done by improving administration and by promoting development in economic or other fields. The situation in the southern parts of Yugoslavia could have been improved so as to contrast with the lack of development and the chronic instability that existed in semi-dependent Albania or with the authoritarian measures by Atatürk in Turkey. It is clear that such solutions would have demanded more time and more money (which was scarce), though good will and honest administration would have certainly have helped to achieve a gradual improvement. However, such a solution was ruled out from the very beginning. The problem was that the authorities were corrupt and harsh, even in purely Yugoslav areas. A more magnanimous treatment of national minorities was prevented by the historical experience with minority peoples, and an ostentatious triumphal nationalism that caused those in minority regions to feel insecure or even inferior. Contributing to this insecurity was the situation of Yugoslav minorities living in the neighboring countries, where the authorities there were also harsh, intolerant and corrupt.

Finally, and more importantly, from whom could the Yugoslav leaders have learned tolerance? Throughout the inter-war period, as well as before the First World War, hardly any European country could boast of consistent and thorough observation of the rights of national minorities. The state nationalism in stricter or milder form was the order of the day, not multi-ethnicity or tolerance. The two large multi-ethnic empires, whose heir was Yugoslavia, not only left it no recipe for a just and balanced treatment of minority matters, but they left it with a whole series of

national conflicts. Throughout the inter-war period, these tensions continued to exist, though under changed conditions and in somewhat altered form, only to explode bloodily anew during the Second World War.

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## Abbreviations

AIDGL – Archives of the Institute for Danube-Swabian History and Geography, Tuebingen

AJ – Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade

AKB – Archives of the Kulturbund, Osijek

AV – Archives of the Vojvodina, Novi Sad

DSP - Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici Kraljevine Srbije

EJ – Enciklopedija Jugoslavije

HDA – Croatian State Archives, Zagreb

HWBGAD – Handwörterbuch des Grenz- und Auslandsdeutschtums

IA – Historical Archives, Novi Sad

IAP – Historical Archives of Pančevo, Pančevo

ICG - Istorija Crne Gore

INJ - Istorija naroda Jugoslavije

ISN – Istorija srpskog naroda

JlČ - Jugoslovenski istorijski časopis

PA – Political Archives of the German Foreign Ministry, Berlin

SBNS - Stenografske beleške Narodne skupštine Kraljevine SHS/Jugoslavije

SBS – Stenografske beleške Senata Kraljevine Jugoslavije

VA – Military Archives, Belgrade



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